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AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT 
IN CHINA 



WRITINGS OF PAUL S. REINSCH 



The Common Law in the Early Ameri- 
can Colonies, 1899 
World Politics at the End of the Nine- 
teenth Century as Influenced by the 
Oriental Situation, 1900 
Colonial Government, 1902 
Colonial Administration, 1905 
American Legislatures and Legislative 

Methods, 1907 
Intellectual Currents in the Far East, 

1911 
International Unions, 191 1 
Essentials of Government, 1920 

(Published in Chinese) 

Secret Diplomacy^ 1921 



AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT 

IN CHINA 



BY 
PAUL S. REINSCH 

AMERICAN MINISTER TO CHINA 
I913-I919 




GARDEN CITY, N. Y., AND TORONTO 

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 

1922 



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^ 
<' 



43 



N i 



COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY 

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION 

INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN 

COPYEIGHT, I92I, 1922, BY ASIA PUBLISHING COMPANY IN iHE 
UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES 

AT 

THE COUNTRY LIFE PEESS, GARDEN CITY, N. Y. 

First Edition 



MAR ! 8 1922 
0)CU654958 



CONTENTS 

PART I 

OLD CHINA AND THE NEW REPUBLIC 



CHAPTER 
I. 

II. 

HI. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

X. 



XI. 

XII. 
XIII. 
XIV. 

XV. 

XVI. 

XVII. 



The Dictator-President of China . 

China of Many Persons 

Old Confucianism in the New China . 
A GHmpse Behind the PoHtical Scenes 
With Men Who Watch Pohtics , . 
China of Merchant-Adventurers .1 '". 
Prompt Proposals for American Action 
A Little Vision for China .... 
"Slow Americans'* 
Folk Ways and Officials 



y 



I 

8 

23 
42 
48 

59 
70 
80 

95 
108 



PART II 

THE PASSING OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 

The War: Japan in Shantung 123 

The Famous Twenty-One Demands . . 129 

Getting Together 1 50 

War Days in Peking 161 

Emperor Yuan Shih-Kai 171 

Downfall and Death of Yuan Shih-Kai 183 

Republicans in the Saddle . . . . . 198 



vi CONTENTS • , 

PART III 
THE WAR AND CHINA 

CHAPTER PAGB 

XVIII. American Entrepreneurs in Peking. . . 207 

XIX. Guarding the "Open Door" .... 217 

XX. Diary of Quiet Days. Autumn of 1916 . 230 

XXI. China Breaks with Germany .... 241 

XXII. China's Bosses Come to Peking . . . 260 

XXIII. An Emperor for a Day 272 

XXIV. War with Germany: Readjustments . . 286 
XXV. The Chinese Go A-Borrowing .... 296 

PART IV 

LAST YEAR OF WAR AND AFTERMATH 

XXVI. The Lansing-Ishii Notes 307 

XXVII. Amidst Troubles Peking Rejoices . . .317 
XXVIII. A New World War Coming? . . . .328 

XXIX. Japan Shows Her Teeth 339 

XXX. Bandits, Intriguers, and a House Divided . 347 

XXXI. Young Men in Peking, Old Men in Paris . 3 58 

XXXII. A Nation Strikes and Unites . . . . 368 

XXXIII. Taking Leave of Peking 375 

Index 391 



INTRODUCTION 

Through recent developments China has been put in the 
forefront of international interest. The world is beginning 
to have an idea of its importance. Those who have long 
known it, who have given attention to its traditions and the 
sources of its social and industrial strength, have the con- 
viction that China will become a factor of the first magnitude 
in the composition of the world of the twentieth century. 
They have penetrated beyond the idea that China is a land of 
topsy-turvy, the main function of which is to amuse the out- 
sider with unexpected social customs, and which, from a 
political point of view, is in a state bordering upon chaos. 
When we ask ourselves what are the elements which may 
constitute China's contribution to the future civilization of 
the world, what are the characteristics which render her 
civilization significant to all of us, we enter upon a subject 
that would in itself require a volume merely to present in 
outline. From the point of view of social action, there is the 
widely diffused sense of popular equity which has enabled 
Chinese society for these many centuries to govern itself, to 
maintain property rights, personal honour and dignity with- 
out recourse to written law or set tribunals, chiefly through 
an informal enforcement by society itself acting through 
many agencies, of that underlying sense of proportion and 
tightness which lives in the hearts of the people. From the 
point of view of economic life, China presents the picture of a 
society in which work has not been robbed of its joy, in which 
the satisfaction of seeing the product of industry grow in 
the hands of the craftsman still forms the chief reward of a 
labour performed with patient toil but without heartbreaking 



viii INTRODUCTION 

drudgery. From the point of view of social organization, 
China forms an extremely intricate organism in which the 
specific relationship between definite individuals counts far 
more than any general principles or ideas. Loyalty, piety, a 
sense of fitness give meaning to the ceremonial of Chinese 
social life, which is more than etiquette as a mere ornament 
of social intercourse in that it bodies forth in visible form as 
every-day observances, the relations and duties upon which 
society rests. From the point of view of art, China stands 
for a refinement of quality which attests the loving devotion 
of generations to the idea of a perfect product; in the repre- 
sentative arts, calmness of perception has enabled the 
Chinese to set a model for the artistic reproduction of the 
environments of human life. In their conception of policy 
and world position, the Chinese people have ever shown a 
readiness to base any claim to ascendancy upon inherent ex- 
cellence and virtue. They have not imposed upon their 
neighbours any artificial authority, though they have proudly 
received the homage and admiration due their noble culture. 
At this time, when the Far Eastern question is the chief 
subject-matter of international conferences and negotiations, 
China stands before the world in the eyes of those who really 
know her, not as a bankrupt pleader for indulgence and 
assistance, but as a great unit of human tradition and force 
which, heretofore somewhat over-disdainful of the things 
through which other nations had won power and preference 
and mechanical mastery, has lived a trifle carelessly in the 
assurance that real strength must rest on inner virtue; China 
has made no use of the arts of self-advertisement, but has felt 
within her the consciousness of a great human force that must 
ultimately prevail over petty intrigue and forceful aggression. 
The secular persistence of Chinese civilization has given to 
the Chinese an inner strength and confidence which make 
them bear up even when the aggressiveness of nations more 
effectively organized for attack seems to render their posi- 



INTRODUCTION ix 

tion well-nigh desperate. Can the world fail to realize that 
if this vast society can continue to live according to its 
traditions of peace and useful industry instead of being made 
the battleground of contending Imperial interests, the peace of 
the world will be more truly advanced than it may be by any 
covenants of formal contrivance? Declarations, treaties, 
and leagues are all useful instruments, but unless the nations 
agree without afterthought to respect the life and civilization 
of China, all professions of world betterment would be belied 
in fact. If China is to be looked upon as material for the 
imperialist policies of others, peace conferences will discuss 
and resolve in vain. 

During the six years of my work in China I was constantly 
surrounded by the evidences of the transition of Chinese life 
to new methods and aims. In all its complex phases this 
enormous transformation passed in review before my eyes, 
in all its deep significance, not only for China and the Far 
East, but for the whole world. It was this that made life 
and work in China at this time so intensely fascinating. A 
new form of government had been adopted. As I repre- 
sented the Republic upon which it had been largely mod- 
eled, whose spirit the Chinese were anxious to follow, it 
fell to me to counsel with Chinese leaders as if I had 
been one of their number. The experience of a great 
American commonwealth which had itself successfully en- 
deavoured to raise its organization to a higher plane was of 
unending assistance to me in enabling me to see the Chinese 
problems as part of what right-thinking men were struggling 
for throughout the world. The most discouraging feature 
was, however, that the needs of China so often took the form 
of emergencies in which it seemed futile to plan at long range, 
in which immediate help was necessary. Where one was 
cooperating with a group of men beset by overpowering 
difficulties of the moment, it often seemed academic even 
to think of the general improvement of political and economic 



X INTRODUCTION 

organization, over a longer range of time. The old elements 
of the Imperial regime, the traditional methods of basing 
authority on something from above, the purely personal 
conception of politics with the corruption incident upon the 
idea that members of clans must take care of each other — 
which formerly was a virtue — all were the sources of the 
outstanding difficulties that jutted ever5rwhere into the plans 
for a more highly and efficiently organized commonwealth. 
But it was a pleasure to see the growing manifestation of a 
commonwealth spirit, the organization of public opinion, and 
the clearer vision of the demands of pubHc service. Even 
among the officials the idea that the Government was merely 
a taxing and office-holding organization was giving way, 
especially among the younger men, to a desire that the 
functions of government should be used for developmental 
purposes, in helping the people towards better methods in 
agriculture and industry, in encouraging improved communi- 
cations and pubHc works of many kinds. 

International action as seen from Peking during this 
period did not have many reassuring qualities. In most 
cases it was based upon a desire to lose no technical ad- 
vantage of position; to yield not a whit, no matter what 
general benefit might result through mutual concessions. 
Each one was jealously guarding his position in which he 
had advanced step by step. Some were willing to make 
common cause with others in things that would not always 
commend themselves to a sense of equity, in order that they 
might take still another step forward. During the major 
part of this period one power employed every device of 
intrigue, intimidation, corruption, and force in order to gain 
a position for itself in flagrant disregard of the rights of the 
Chinese people itself, and in oblivion of the rights of others. 

As to American poHcy, the difficulties which I encountered 
arose from the fact that a great deal was expected of a 
country so powerful, which had declared and always pursued 



INTRODUCTION xi 

a policy so just to China. Chinese goodwill and confidence, 
and the real friendship of the Chinese people toward 
America certainly tended to make easier any task America 
might be ready to undertake. But America had no political 
aims and desired to abstain particularly from anything 
verging on political interference, even in behalf of those 
principles we so thoroughly believe in. American relation- 
ships to China depended not on governmental action, but on 
a spontaneous cooperation between the two peoples in mat- 
ters of education, commerce, and industry. 

Infinitely complex as were the questions of Chinese inter- 
nal affairs and of the privileges and desires of the various 
powers, yet to my mind it was not a difficult problem to see 
what should be done in order to put matters on a sound 
foundation. I had learned to have great confidence in the 
abihty of the Chinese to manage their own affairs when let 
alone, particularly in commerce and industry. 

That was the first desideratum, to secure for them im- 
munity from the constant interference, open and secret, on 
the part of foreign interests desirous of confusing Chinese 
affairs and drawing advantage from such confusion. So far 
as American diplomatic action was concerned, its essential 
task was to prevent such interference, and to see to it that 
China could not be closed even by those indirect meth- 
ods which often accompany the most vociferous, ardent 
declarations in favour of Chinese independence and sov- 
ereignty. We therefore had to keep a close watch and to 
resist in specific detail any and all of those innumerable 
efforts on the part of others to secure and fortify a position 
of privilege. That was the negative side of our action. The 
positive side, however, was entirely non-political. Ameri- 
cans sought no position of tutordom or control. Only upon 
the free and spontaneous invitation of the Chinese would 
they come to counsel and assist. 

The important thing was that Americans should continue 



xii INTRODUCTION 

to take a hand in the education of China and the upbuilding 
of Chinese business and enterprise. They had done this in 
the past, and would do it in the future in the spirit of free 
cooperation, without desire to exercise a tutelage over others, 
always rejoicing in any progress the Chinese themselves 
made. Such activities must continue and increase. Sound 
action in business and constructive work in industry should 
be America's contribution to the solution of the specific diffi- 
culties of China. The Chinese people were discouraged, con- 
fused, disillusioned; but every centre, no matter how small, 
from which radiate sound influences in education and busi- 
ness, is a source of strength and progress. If Americans 
could be stopped from doing these things, or impeded and 
obstructed in them, then there would nothing further remain 
worth while for Americans to do. But if they could organize 
enterprises, great and small, they would in the most direct 
and eff'ective manner give the encouragement and organizing 
impulse which China needed so urgently. So the simple 
principle of American action in China is this: By doing 
things in themselves worth while, Americans will contrib- 
ute most to the true liberation of the Chinese people. 

Never has one nation had a greater opportunity to act as 
counsellor and friend to another and to help a vast and lov- 
able people to realize its striving for a better life. Coopera- 
tion freely sought, unconstrained, spontaneous desire to 
model on institutions and methods which are admired — that 
is the only way in which nations may mutually influence 
each other without the coercion of political power and the 
cunning of intrigue. That is a feeling which has existed in 
the hearts of the Chinese toward America. The American 
people does not yet realize what a treasure it possesses in this 
confidence. 



PART I 

OLD CHINA AND THE 
NEW REPUBLIC 



AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT 
IN CHINA 

CHAPTER I 
THE DICTATOR-PRESIDENT OF CHINA 

"My opponents are disloyal. They would pull down my 
government." He who spoke was cordial in his manner as 
he thus off handedly epitomized his theory of government. 

Yuan Shih-kai, President of the Chinese Republic, was 
short of stature and thick-set; but his expressive face, his 
quick gestures, his powerful neck and bullet head, gave him 
the appearance of great energy. His eyes, which were fine 
and clear, alive with interest and mobile, were always 
brightly alert. They fixed themselves on the visitor with 
keen penetration, yet never seemed hostile; they were full 
always of keen interest. These eyes of his revealed how 
readily he followed — or usually anticipated — the trend of 
the conversation, though he listened with close attention, 
seemingly bringing his judgment to bear on each new detail. 
Frenchmen saw in him a resemblance to Clemenceau; and 
this is born out by his portrait which appears on the Chinese 
dollar. In stature, facial expression, shape of head, contour 
of features as well as in the manner of wearing his moustache, 
he did greatly resemble the Tiger. 

I had noted these things when I was first presented to the 
President, and I had felt also the almost ruthless power of 
the man. Republican in title he was, but an autocrat at 
heart. All the old glittering trappings of the empire he had 



2 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

preserved. Even the Chief of the Military Department of 
the President's household, General Yin Chang, whom Yuan 
had sent to fetch me in Imperial splendour, is a Manchu and 
former Imperial commander. His one foreign language 
significantly enough was German which he acquired when he 
was minister in Berlin. I had passed between files of the 
huge guardsmen of Yuan Shih-kai, who had Frederick the 
Great's fondness for tall men; and I found him in the showy 
palace of the great Empress Dowager, standing in the main 
throne hall to receive me. He was flanked by thirty generals 
of his household, extended in wings at both sides of him, 
and their uniforms made it a most impressive scene. 

But that was an occasion of state. Later, at a more 
informal interview, accompanied only by Mr. Williams, 
secretary of the legation and Mr. Peck, the Chinese secretary, 
observed Yuan's character more fully. He had just expelled 
from parliament the democratic party (Kuo Min Tang); 
then he had summarily dismissed the Parliament itself. 
Feeling, perhaps, a possible loss of American goodwill he 
had sent for me to explain his action. 

"It was not a good parliament, for it was made up largely 
of inexperienced theorists and young politicians," he began. 
"They wished to meddle with the Government as well as to 
legislate on all matters. Their real function was to adopt 
a permanent constitution for the Republic, but they made no 
headway with that." And with much truth he added: 
"Our traditions are very different from your Western ones 
and our affairs are very complex. We cannot safely apply 
your abstract ideas of policy." 

Of his own work of stirring up, through emissaries, internal 
and partisan controversies which prevented the new parlia- 
ment from effectively organizing. Yuan of course omitted 
to speak. Moreover, he said little of the possibility of 
more closely coordinating the executive and the legislative 
branches; so while he avowed his desire to have a constitu- 



THE DICTATOR-PRESIDENT OF CHINA 3 

tion forthwith, and to reconstitute Parliament by more 
careful selections under a new electoral law, I found myself 
thinking of his own career. His personal rule, his un- 
scrupulous advancement to power, with the incidental 
corruption and cold-blooded executions that marked it, 
and his bitter personal feehng against all political opponents 
— ^these were not qualities that make for stable parHamentary 
government, which depends on allowing other people frankly 
to advocate their opinions in the effort to gain adherents 
enough to succeed in turn to political power. The failure to 
understand this basic principle of democracy is the vice of 
Chinese politics. 

"As you see," Yuan beamed eagerly, "the Chinese Re- 
pubHc is a very young baby. It must be nursed and kept 
from taking strong meat or potent medicines like those 
prescribed by foreign doctors." This metaphor he repeated 
with reHsh, his eyes sparkling as they sought mine and those 
of the other listeners to get their expressions of assent or 
reserve. 

A young baby indeed and childishly cared for! Here, for 
example, is a decree pubHshed by Yuan Shih-kai on March 
8, 191 5. It indicates how faith in his republicanism 
was penetrating to remote regions, and how such faith was 
rewarded by him: 

"Ihsihaishun, Prince of the Koersin Banner, reported 
through the Board for MongoHa and Tibet that Kuanchuk- 
chuaimupal, Hutukhtu of the Banner, has led his followers 
to support the cause of the Republic and requested that the 
said Hutukhtu be rewarded for his good sentiments. The 
said Hutukhtu led his followers and vowed allegiance to the 
RepubHc, which action shows that he clearly understands the 
good cause. He is hereby allowed to ride in a yellow 
canopied carriage to show our appreciation." 

This rather naive emphasis on externals and on display is 
born of the old imperialism, a more significant feature of 



4 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Chinese political life than it may seem. It colours most of 
the public ceremonies in China. The state carriage which 
the President had sent to convey me to his official residence 
in the Imperial City for the presentation of my credentials, 
on November 17th, was highly ornate, enamelled in blue with 
gold decorations. It was drawn by eight horses, with a 
cavalry escort sent by the President and my own guard of 
mounted marines; the legation staff of secretaries and 
attaches accompanied me In other carriages. 

Thus In an old Imperial barouche and with an ex-Imperial 
military officer, General Yin, at my side, I rolled on toward 
the abode of the repubHcan chief magistrate. We alighted 
at the monumental gate of an enclosure that surrounds the 
lovely South Lake in the western part of the Imperial City. 
On an island within this lake arose, tier above tier, and roofed 
with bright tiles of blue and yellow, the palace assigned by 
the Empress Dowager to Emperor Kwang Hsu; for long 
years, until death took him, it was his abode in semi-cap- 
tivity. This palace was now the home of President Yuan. 

The remote origin of its buildings, their exquisite forms and 
brilliant colouring, as contrasted with the sombreness of the 
lake at that season, and the stirring events of which they have 
been the scene, cannot fail to impress the visitor as he slowly 
glides across the Imperial lake in the old-fashioned boat, with 
its formal little cabin, curtained and upholstered, and with 
Its lateral planks, up and down which pass the men who 
propel the boat with long poles. 

Arrived at the palace, everything recalled the colourful 
court Hfe so recently departed. I was greeted by the master 
of ceremonies, Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang, and his associate, 
Mr. Alfred Sze, later Chinese minister at London and 
Washington. The former soon after became Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, while Mr. Sze was originally sent as minister 
to England. These gentlemen escorted me through a series 
of courts and halls, all spacious and impressive, until we 



THE DICTATOR-PRESIDENT OF CHINA 5 

reached the old Imperial library, a very jewel of architecture 
in this remarkable Eastern world of beauty. The library 
faces on a clear and deep pool round which are grouped the 
court theatre and various throne rooms and festival halls; 
all quiet and secluded — a charming place for distinguished 
entertainments. The rustle of heavy silks, the play of 
iridescent colour, the echoes of song and lute from the 
theatre — all that exquisite oriental refinement still seems 
to linger. 

The library itself is the choicest of all these apartments. 
The perfect sense of proportion expressed in the architecture, 
the quiet reserve in all its decorations, the living literary 
reminiscence in the verses written on the paper panels by the 
Imperial hand, all testify to a most fastidious taste. 

Here we rested for a few minutes while word was carried 
to the President, who was to receive my credentials. Then 
followed our walk between the files of the huge guardsmen, 
our entrance to the large audience chamber in the pretentious 
modern structure erected by the Empress Dowager, and the 
presentation to Yuan Shih-kai, as he stood in the centre, 
flanked by his generals. 

I was formally presented to the President by Mr. Sun 
Pao-chi, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Dr. Wellington Koo 
translated my brief address and the President's reply. 

A military dictatorship had succeeded the old imperialism, 
that was all. Yuan had made his reputation and gained his 
power as a military commander. Yet there was about him 
nothing of the adventurer, nor any suggestion of the field of 
battle. He seemed now to be an administrator rather than a 
military captain. Certainly he had won power through 
infinite patience, great knowledge of men, political insight, 
and, above all, through playing always a safe if unscrupulous 
game. 

What is meant by governing in a republic he could not 
know. Without high literary culture, although with a mind 



6 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

trained and well informed, he had not seen foreign countries, 
nor had he any knowledge of foreign languages. Therefore, 
he could have only a remote and vague notion of the foreign 
institutions which China at this time was beginning to 
imitate. He had no real knowledge or conception of the 
commonwealth principle of government, nor of the true use 
and function of a parliament, and particularly of a parlia- 
mentary opposition. He merely accepted these as necessary 
evils to be held within as narrow limits as possible. 

During the two and a half years from my coming to Peking 
until the time of his death. Yuan Shih-kai left the enclosure 
of his palace only twice. This reminds me of the American, 
with an introduction from the State Department, who wired 
me from Shanghai asking me to arrange for him to take a 
moving picture of Yuan " proceeding from his White House 
to his Capitol." This enterprising Yankee would have 
had plenty of time to meditate on the difference between 
oriental political customs and our own if he had waited for 
Yuan Shih-kai to "proceed" from his political hermitage. 
The President's seclusion was usually attributed to fear of 
assassination, but if such fear was present in his mind, as well 
it might have been, there was undoubtedly also the idea, 
taken over from the Empire, that the holder of the highest 
political power should not appear in pubhc except on very 
unusual occasions. 

When he received me informally, he doffed the uniform of 
state and always wore a long Chinese coat. He had retained 
the distinction and refinement of Chinese manners, with a few 
additions from the West, such as shaking hands. His cue he 
had abandoned in 1912, when he decided to become President 
of the RepubHc. In the building which is now the Foreign 
Office and where he was then residing, Yuan asked Admiral 
Tsai Ting-kan whether his entry into the new era should not 
be outwardly expressed by shedding the traditional adorn- 
ment of the head which though once a sign of bondage had 



THE DICTATOR-PRESIDENT OF CHINA 7 

become an emblem of nationality. When Admiral Tsai 
advised strongly in favour of it, Yuan sent for a big pair of 
scissors, and said to him: "It is your advice. You carry it 
out." The Admiral, with a vigorous chp, transformed Yuan 
into a modern man. 

But inwardly Yuan Shih-kai was not much changed 
thereby. 



CHAPTER II 
CHINA OF MANY PERSONS 

Yuan Shih-kai, a ruler whose power was personal, whose 
theories of government were those of an absolute monarch, 
who believed that in himself lay the hope of his people; China 
itself a nation of individualists, among whom there was as yet 
no unifying national sense, no inbred love of country, no 
traditions of personal responsibility toward their government, 
no sense that they themselves shared in the making of the 
laws which ordered their lives — ^these, I think, were the first 
clear impressions I had of the land to which I came as envoy 
in the early days of the Republic. 

Even the rivers and cities through which we passed on our 
way to Peking seemed to deepen this feeling for me. The 
houseboats jammed together in the harbour at Shanghai 
visualized it. Each of these boats sheltered a family, 
who lived and moved and had their being, for the most part, 
on its narrow decks. Each family was quite independent of 
the people on the next boat. Each was immersed in the 
stern business of earning bread. These houseboat people 
(so it seemed) had little in common with each other, little in 
common with the hfe of the cities and villages which they 
regularly visited. As a class they lived apart; and each 
family was, for most of the time, isolated from the others. 
Their life, I thought, was the civilization of China in minia- 
ture. Of course such a figure applies only roughly. I mean 
merely to suggest that the population of this vast country is 
not a homogeneous one in a political sense. The unit of 

society is — as it has been for many centuries — ^the family, 

t 



CHINA OF MANY PERSONS 9 

not the state. This is changing now, and changing rapidly. 
The seeds of democracy found fertile soil in China; but a 
civilization which has been shaping itself through eighty 
centuries cannot be too abruptly attacked. China is, after 
all, an ancient monarchy upon which the republican form of 
government was rather suddenly imposed. It is still in the 
period of adjustment. Such at least were my reactions as 
we ascended the Hwang-pu River, on that October day in 
191 3, and drew into the harbour basin which lies at the centre 
of Shanghai. 

In one of the hotels of the city we found the "Saturday 
Lunch Club " in session. I was not a little surprised that this 
mid-day gastronomic forum, which had but lately come into 
vogue in America, had become so thoroughly acclimated in 
this distant port. But despite the many nationalities rep- 
resented at this international gathering, the language was 
English. As to dress, many of the Chinese at the luncheon 
fi referred their dignified, long-flowing robes to Western coats 
and trousers. 

Dr. Wu Ting-fang was present in Chinese costume and a 
little purple skull cap, and we sat down to talk together. 
He related the moves made by President Yuan against the 
democratic party (Kuo Min Tang) in parliament and said: 
"Yuan Shih-kai's sole aim is to get rid of parliament. He 
has no conception of free government, is entirely a man of 
personal authority. The air of absolutism surrounds him. 
Beware," Dr. Wu admonished, "when you get behind those 
high walls of Peking. The atmosphere is stagnant. It 
seems to overcome men and make them reactionary. No- 
body seems to resist that power!" 

Later I was accosted on a momentous matter by an Ameri- 
can missionary. He was not affiliated with any missionary 
society, but had organized a so-called International In- 
stitute for a Mission among the Higher Classes. His mien 
betrayed overburdening care, ominous presentiment, and he 



lo AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

said he had already submitted a grave matter to the Depart- 
ment of State. It concerned the Saturday Lunch Club. 
Somewhat too precipitately I spoke with gratification of its 
apparent success. "But, sir," he interposed, "it was estab- 
lished and set in motion by the consul-general!' ' 

As still I could not see wherein the difficulty lay, my 
visitor became emphatic. 

"Do you not realize, sir, that my institute was established 
to bring the different nationalities together, and that 
the formation of such a club should have been left to 
me?" 

When I expressed my feeling that there was no end of work 
to be done in the world in establishing relationships of good- 
will; that every accomplishment of this kind was to be re- 
ceived with gratitude, he gave me up. I had thought, at first, 
that he was about to charge the consul-general, at the very 
least, with embezzlement. 

That afternoon I inspected the student battalion of St. 
John's University. This institution is modern, affiliated 
with the Episcopalian Church, and many of its alumni are 
distinguished in public life as well as in industrial enterprise 
and commerce. Of these I need only mention Dr. W. W. 
Yen, Dr. Wellington Koo, Dr. Alfred Sze, and Dr. Wang 
Chung-hui, later Chief Justice of China. Dr. Hawks Pott, 
the president, introduced me to the assembled students as 
an old friend of China. There I met Dr. Pott's wife, a 
Chinese lady, and several of their daughters and sons, two 
of whom later fought in the Great War. 

A newspaper reporter brought me back abruptly to local 
matters. He was the first to interview me in China. "Will 
you remove the American marines," he queried, "from the 
Chienmen Tower?" 

A disturbing question! I was cautious, as I had not even 
known there were marines posted on that ancient tower. 
Whether they ought to be kept there was a matter to 



CHINA OF MANY PERSONS ii 

look into, along with other things affecting the destiny of 
nations. 

I could not stop to see Shanghai then, but did so later. 
If one looks deeply enough its excellences stand out. The 
private gardens, behind high walls, show its charm; acres 
covered with glorious plants, shrubs, and bushes; rows and 
groves of springtime trees radiant with blossoms; the parks 
and the verandas of clubs where people resort of late after- 
noons to take their tea; the glitter of Nanking Road at 
night, its surge of humanity, the swarming life on river and 
creeks. This is the real Shanghai, market and meeting 
place of the nations. 

Nanking came next, visited the 4th of November. For- 
lorn and woeful the old capital lay in gray morning light as 
we entered. The semi-barbarous troops of Chang Hsun 
lined its streets. They had sacked the town, ostensibly 
suppressing the last vestiges of the " Revolution. " General 
Chang Hsun, an old imperialist, still clinging to ancient 
customs, had espoused the cause of President Yuan. A 
rough soldier quite innocent of modernity, he had taken 
Nanking, not really for the republican government, but for 
immediate advantage to himself, and for his soldiers to loot 
and burn. There they stood, huge, black-uniformed, pig- 
tailed men, "guarding" the streets along which the native 
dwellers were slinking sullenly and in fear. Everywhere 
charred walls without roofs; the contents of houses broken 
and cast on the street; fragments of shrapnel in the walls — 
withal a depressing picture of misery. 

Nanking, immense and primitive, had reverted partly 
to agriculture, and for miles the houses of farmers line ex- 
tensive fields. Three Japanese men-of-war rode at anchor 
in mid-river; they had come to support the representations 
of the Japanese consul over an injury suffered by a Japanese 
barber during the disturbances. General Chang Hsun, 
forced to offer reparation, had among other things to call 



12 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

ceremoniously on the Japanese consul to express his formal 
regrets. This he did, saving his face by arranging to call on 
all the foreign consuls the same day. 

Another bit of local colour: We were driven to the Ameri- 
can consulate, modestly placed on the edge of the agricultural 
region of Nanking, with barns in the oJB&ng. The consul being 
absent on leave, the official in charge greeted us. His wife 
related that a few days before thirty of Chang's braves, 
armed to the teeth, had come to the house to see what they 
might carry off. In her husband's absence Mrs. Gilbert met 
them at the door and very quietly talked the matter over 
with them as to what unending bother it would occasion 
everybody, particularly General Chang, if his men should 
invade the American consulate, and how it would be fap 
better to think it over while she prepared some tea for them. 

The men, at first fierce and unrelenting, looked at one 
another puzzled, then found seats along the edge of the 
veranda. When the tea came in, their spokesman said they 
recognized that theirs had been a fooHsh enterprise. With 
expressions of civility and gratitude they consumed their tea 
and went away — which shows what one American woman can 
do in stilling the savage breast of a Chinese vandal by a 
quiet word of reason. 

After the exhibition his men had made of themselves in 
Nanking, I had no wish to call on His Excellency Chang 
Hsun. We arranged to take the first train for Tientsin. 
Crossing the broad river by ferry, from its deck friends 
pointed out Tiger Head and other famous landscapes, the 
scenes of recent fighting and of clashes during the Revo- 
lution of 191 1. In the sitting room of our special car on the 
Pukow railway, the little company comprised Dr. Stanley 
K. Hornbeck, who went on with me to Peking; Mr. Roy S. 
Anderson, an American uniquely informed about the 
Chinese, and a Chinese governmental representative who 
accompanied me. In a single afternoon Mr. Anderson gave 



CHINA OF MANY PERSONS 13 

me a complete view of the existing situation in Chinese 
politics, relating many personal incidents and characteris- 
tics. 

In Chinese politics the personal element is supreme. The 
key to the ramifications of political influence lies in knowl- 
edge of persons; their past history, affiUations and interests, 
friendships, enmities, financial standing, their groupings and 
the interactions of the various groups. Intensely human, 
there is little of the abstract in Chinese social ethics. Their 
ideals of conduct are personal, while the remoter loyalties 
to principle or patriotic duty are not strongly expressed 
in action. In this immediate social cement is the strength 
by which Chinese society has been able to exist for ages. 

The defect of this great quality is in the absence of any 
motive whereby men may be carried beyond their narrower 
interests in definitely conceived, broad public aims. When 
I came to China these older methods prevailed more than at 
present; hence Mr. Anderson's knowledge of the Chinese, 
wide as the nation and specific as to the qualities of all its 
important men, enabled me to approach Chinese affairs 
concretely, personally, and to lay aside for the time any 
general and preconceived notions. It enabled me to see, 
also, how matters of such vast consequence, as, for example, 
the Hwai River famines, had been neglected for the short- 
sighted individual concerns of Chinese politics. 

That afternoon we passed through the Hwai River region. 
An apparently endless alluvial plain, it is inexhaustibly rich 
in depth and quality of soil — loess, which has been carried 
down from the mountains and deposited here for eons. 
Fitted by Nature to be one of the most fertile garden spots 
on earth, Nature herself has spoiled it. The rivers, swollen 
by torrential rains in the highlands, flood this great area 
periodically, destroying all crops; for many years only two 
harvests have been gathered out of a possible six, in some 
years there have been none at all. 



14 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Here the visitations of famine and plague are immemorial. 
The liberal and effective assistance which the American Red 
Cross gave during the last famine, in 191 1, is gratefully 
remembered by the Chinese. Beholding this region, so 
richly provided and lacking only a moderate, systematic 
expenditure for engineering works to make it the source of 
assured liveUhood for at least twenty miUions more than its 
present population, I resolved that one of my first efforts 
would be to help reclaim the vast estate. 

We arrived after dark in the province of Shantung — Shan- 
tung, which was destined to play so large a part in my ojEcial 
Hfe in China! The crowds at stations were growing enor- 
mous, their greetings more vociferous. An old friend 
appeared, Tsai Chu-tung, emissary of the Provincial Gover- 
nor and of the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs; he had been 
a student under me, and, for a time, my Chinese secretary. 
Past the stations with their military bands and metallic 
welcomes and deputations appearing with cards, at all hours 
of the night, we arrived at length at Tsinan, Shantung's 
capital. Here, in behalf of the Governor, the young Com- 
missioner Tsai, together with an official deputation, formally 
greeted me; thence he accompanied me to Peking, affording 
me another chance to hear from a very keen and highly 
trained man an account of China's situation. 

Reaching Tientsin that afternoon, we were met by repre- 
sentatives of the Civil Governor and by his band. There the 
American community, it seems, had been stirred prematurely 
by news of my coming, and had visited the station for two 
days in succession. The manager of the railway, a Britisher, 
had confused the Consul-General by his error in date of my 
arrival, starting too soon the entire machinery of reception, 
including a parade by the Fifteenth United States Infantry. 

We had dinner that evening with Civil Governor Liu at 
his palace. Miles of driving in rain through dark, narrow 
streets, ending with a vision of huge walls and lantern- 



CHINA OF MANY PERSONS 15 

illuminated gates, found us in the inner courts, and, finally, 
in the main hall of the antique, many-coloured structure 
where the fat and friendly Governor received us. The heads 
of the various provincial departments attended, together 
with the President of the Assembly and the military aides. 
Young Mr. Li, the Governor's secretary and interpreter for 
the after-dinner speechmakers, performed the rare feat of 
rendering into either language an entire speech at a time — 
and the speeches were not short. My Chinese secretary 
commented on his briUiant translations, the perfect render- 
ings of the EngHsh into Chinese, and I could myself admire 
his mastery of the English idiom. Such talent of trans- 
lation is seldom displayed; the discourse of speakers is usually 
Hmited to brief paragraphs, continually checked by the 
renderings of the interpreters. Of course, this interrupts the 
flow of thought and contact with one's hearers. But the 
interpreter at this dinner even managed to translate jokes 
and witticisms without losing the point. A play on words is 
most difficult to carry into a foreign tongue, but the Chinese 
is so full of opportunities for puns that a nimble interpreter 
will always find a substitute. To the telling of a really funny 
situation the Chinese can be rehed on to respond. Their 
humour is not unhke the American, which dehghts par- 
ticularly in exposing undue pretensions. Interpreters, in 
translating speeches to the general public, have sometimes 
resorted to something of their own invention, in order to 
produce the expected laugh. When they despair of making 
the foreign joke hit the bull's-eye, they occasionally help 
things along by making personal remarks about the speaker, 
whose gratifications at the hilarity produced is usually un- 
clouded by a knowledge of the method employed. 

Our departure from Tientsin was signalized by an unusual 
mark of Chinese governmental courtesy. For the trip to 
Peking we found assigned the palace car of the former 
Empress Dowager, and I was told that it had not been used 



i6 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

since her reign came to an end. Adapting a new invention 
to old custom, the car's interior had been arranged as a Httle 
palace chamber. The entrance doors were in a double set. 
Those in the centre were to be opened only when the sover- 
eign entered or departed, the side doors being for ordinary 
use. Opposite the central doors at the end of the salon stood 
a little throne, high and wide, upholstered in Imperial yellow. 
The draperies and upholsteries of the car were all of that 
colour, and it made, in its way, quite a showing of splendour 
and departed greatness. 

As one approaches the capital city, the beautiful mountain 
forms of the so-called Western Hills, which rise suddenly 
out of the plain about ten miles beyond Peking and attain 
an altitude of from six to seven thousand feet, present a 
striking contrast to the flat and far-stretching Chihli plain. 
The towers and city walls of Peking, an impressive and 
astounding apparition of strength and permanence, befit this 
scene. Solemn and mysterious, memorable for their size, 
extent, and general inevitableness of structure, they can be 
compared only with the Pyramids, or with great mountains 
fashioned by the hand of Nature herself. Looking down 
upon these plains, where so many races have met, fought, 
worked, lived, and died, where there is one of the chief 
meeting points of racial currents, these walls are in them- 
selves the symbols of a memorable and long-sustained 
civilization. 

As we approach more ciosely, the walls tower immediately 
above us as the train skirts them for several miles, crosses a 
number of busy roads leading to the southern gates of the 
city, and then suddenly slips through an opening in the walls 
to the inside. We first pass through the so-called Chinese 
city; this particular corner is no longer densely populated, 
but is now left to gardens, fields, and burial places with their 
monuments and pagodas. We only skirt the populous pan: 
of the Chinese city. Soon we are brought immediately under 



CHINA OF MANY PERSONS 17 

the lofty walls which separate the Chinese from the Manchu 
city, adjacent to it on the north, but separated from it by an 
enormous wall one hundred feet high, with a diameter of 
eighty feet. Where the two encircling walls meet, towering 
bastions soar upward, and above the roadways rise high gate- 
houses of many stories. The impassivity of these monu- 
mental structures contrasts sharply with the swarming 
human life that surges in the streets below. 

From Mr. Willys R. Peck, Chinese Secretary of the 
Legation, who had met us at Tientsin and accompanied us to 
Peking, I learned more about the recent events in the capital 
and the fight which Yuan Shih-Kai was waging against the 
Parliament. At the station we were greeted by a large con- 
course of civilian and military officials, and Mr. E. T. 
Williams, Charge d'AfFaires since Mr. Calhoun's departure, 
acted as introducer. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sun 
Pao-chi, a tall, benevolent-looking man, wearing European 
dress and long chin whiskers, and speaking a little English 
with more French and German, offered his welcome and 
felicitations. Other high officials were there, many members 
of the American community, and several representatives of 
the parliament. It was a delight to see the fine-looking 
companies of American marines, who among all troops in 
Peking are noted for their well-groomed, smart, and soldierly 
appearance. Included for the official welcome was a com- 
pany of stalwart Chinese infantry, and one of the Peking 
gendarmerie, which also is military in its organization. 
The several bands vied with each other in playing national 
airs and salutes, while thousands of spectators congregated. 

The central Tartar city gate (the Chienmen), was still 
in its original form, and in passing through or under it one 
received an indelible impression of the stupendous majesty 
and dignity which characterize this unique capital. The 
curtain walls connecting the inner and outer gates have since 
been removed. We drove through a side gate in the curtain 



i8 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

wall, finding ourselves in an impressive plaza overtowered 
by the two lofty and beautiful gate-houses. Two small 
picturesque antique temples flank the main entrance; one, 
dedicated to the God of War, was a favourite place with 
the Empress Dowager, who stopped her cortege there when- 
ever she passed. From the flag-poles of these temples huge, 
brilliantly coloured banners floated in the air. Atop the wall 
from which the Chienmen Tower arises were American 
marines on guard and looking down upon us. These, then, 
were the men whose presence up there seemed to be interest- 
ing people so much. 

From the main gateway one looks straight up the avenue 
which forms the central axis of Peking; it leads through many 
ornamental gates and between stately buildings to the 
central throne halls of the Imperial Palace. The city plan of 
Peking is a symmetrical one. This central axis, running due 
north and south, passes through a succession of important 
gateways, monuments, and seats of power. From it the city 
expands regularly east and west; on the south the Chinese 
city, the symmetry of its streets and alleyways more broken; 
and the Manchu city on the north, with broad avenues lead- 
ing to the principal gates, while the large blocks between 
them are cut up more regularly by narrower streets and 
alleyways. 

From the main south gate of the Chinese city the central 
line passes along the principal business street to the central 
south gate of the Tartar city — ^the imposing Chienmen — 
while eighty rods beyond this stands the first outer gate of 
the Imperial City. Thence the central line cuts the large 
square which lies immediately outside of the Forbidden 
City, forming the main approach to the Imperial City. 
The line then passes between pillars and huge stone lions 
through the Forbidden City's first gate, cutting its inner 
parade ground and inner gate, above which stands the 
throne from which the Emperor reviewed his troops. 



CHINA OF MANY PERSONS 19 

Through the central enclosures, with the throne rooms and 
coronation halls, three magnificent structures in succession, 
the line passes, at the point where the thrones stand, into the 
residential portion of the Forbidden City where the present 
Emperor lives, and strikes the summit of Coal Hill, the 
highest point in Peking. It bisects the temple where the 
dead bodies of Emperors reposed before burial, and proceeds 
from the rear of the Imperial City by its north gate through 
the ancient Bell Tower and Drum Tower. A more awe- 
inspiring and majestic approach to a seat of power is not to 
be seen in this world. We can well imagine, when tribute 
bearers came to Peking and passed along this highway beset 
with imposing structures and great monuments, that they 
were prepared to pay homage when finally in the presence 
of the being to whose might all this was but an introduction. 

But we did not follow along this path of sovereign power. 
After passing through the Chienmen we turned directly to 
the right to enter the Legation Quarter and to reach the 
American Legation, which nestles immediately inside the 
Tartar wall in the shadow of the tall and imposing Chienmen 
Tower. It is the first of the great establishments along 
Legation Street, which is approached through a beautiful 
many-coloured pailu, or street arch. 

No other American representative abroad has quite so 
easy a time upon arrival at his post. We were going to a 
home prepared for our reception, adequately furnished, and 
with a complete staff of servants and attendants who were 
ready to serve luncheon immediately, if required. In most 
cases, unfortunately, an American diplomatic representative 
will for weeks or months have no place to lay his head except 
in a hotel. Many American ministers and ambassadors have 
spent fully one half the time during their first year of office 
in making those necessary living arrangements which I found 
entirely complete at Peking. That is the crucial period, too, 
when their minds should be free for observing the situation 



20 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

in which they are to do their work. May the time soon come 
when the nation reaHzes more fully the need of dignified 
representation of its interests abroad. 

The residence of the minister I found simple but handsome, 
in stately colonial renaissance style, its interior admirably 
combining the spaciousness needed for official entertaining 
with the repose of a real home. It is made of imported 
American materials, and a government architect was ex- 
pressly sent to put up the legation buildings. He had been 
designing government structures in America, and the some- 
what stereotyped chancery and houses of the secretaries were 
popularly called "the young post offices." But the minis- 
ter's house, largely due to the efforts of Mr. Rockhill, who 
was minister at the time, is a masterpiece of appropriateness 
— all but the chimneys. It is related that the architect, 
being unfamiliar with the ways of Chinese labourers and 
frequently impatient with them, incurred their ill-will. 
When Mr. Rockhill first occupied the residence, it was found 
the chimneys would not draw; the disgruntled masons had 
quietly walled them up, in order that the architect might 
"lose face," and the chimney from the fireplace of the large 
dining room was so thoroughly blockaded that it remained 
permanently out of commission. 

At a distance from the "compound," or enclosure, which 
surrounds the minister's residence, fronting on a central 
plaza, there is a veritable hamlet of additional houses oc- 
cupied by secretaries, attaches, consular students, and the 
clerical staff. It is a picturesque Chinese village, with an 
antique temple and many separate houses, each with its 
garden enclosed within high walls — a rescued bit of ancient 
China in the midst of the European monotony of the Le- 
gation Quarter. It adjoins the Jade Canal, opposite the 
hotel called "Sleeping Cars" by some unimaginative director, 
but more fitly known as the Hotel of the Four Nations. At 
the Water Gate, where the Jade Canal passes under the 



CHINA OF MANY PERSONS 21 

Tartar wall, is the very point where the American marines 
first penetrated into the Tartar city in 1900. 

The Chinese are remarkably free from self-consciousness, 
and therefore are good actors; as one sees the thousands pass- 
ing back and forth on the streets, one feels that they, too, are 
all acting. Here are not the headlong rush and elbowing 
scramble of the crowded streets of a Western metropoHs. 
All walk and ride with dignity, as if conscious of a certain 
importance, representing in themselves not the eager purpose 
presently to get to a certain place, but rather a leisurely flow 
of existence, carrying traditions and memories of centuries Vf 
in which the present enterprise is but a minor incidedt. 
Foreign women have sometimes been terrified by these vast, 
surging crowds; but no matter how timid they be, a few 
rickshaw rides along the streets, a short observation of the 
manners of these people, will make the faintest hearted feci 
at home. Before long these Tartaric hordes cease to be 
terrifying, and even the feeling that they are ethnological 
specimens passes away; it is remarkable how soon one feels 
the humanity of it all among these multitudes that seem to 
engulf but that never press or crowd. 

Looking down upon a Chinese street, with multitudes of 
walkers and runners passing back and forth, mingled among 
donkey carts, riders on horse- or donkey-back, mule litters, 
rickshaws, camel caravans, flocks of animals led to sale and 
slaughter, together with rapidly flying automobiles — all gives 
the impression of perfect control of motion and avoidance, 
of crowding and scuffling, and recalls the movements of 
practised dancers on a crowded ballroom floor. A view of 
the crowds which patiently wait at the great gateways for 
their turn to pass through aff^ords a constant source of 
amusement and delight. The fine slowly pushes through the 
gate like an endless string being threaded through a needle. 
If there is mishap or collision, though voices of protest may 
arise, they will never be those of the stoic, dignified persons 



22 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

sitting in the rickshaws; it is against etiquette for the passen- 
ger to excite himself about anything, and he leaves that to 
the rickshaw man. All humanity and animaldom live and 
work together in China, in almost undisturbed harmony and 
mutual understanding. 

Only occasionally a hubbub of altercation rises to the 
skies. In these days the pigtails had only just been abolished. 
Under the old conditions, the technique of personal combat 
was for each party to grab the other by the cue and hold him 
there, while describing to him his true character. During 
the first years of the reform era one might still see men who 
were having a difference frantically grabbing at the back of 
each other's heads where there was, however, no longer any- 
thing to afford a secure hold. 

A great part of Chinese life is public. It is on the streets 
with their innumerable restaurants; their wide-open bazaars 
of the trades; their ambulent letter-writers and story-tellers 
with the curious ones clustered about them; their itinerant 
markets; their ghding rickshaws; their haphazard little shops 
filled with a profusion of ageless, precious relics. There is 
the charm of all this and of the humanity there swarming, 
with its good-natured consideration for the other fellow, its 
constant movement, its excited chatter, its animation and its 
pensiveness, and its occasional moments of heated but blood- 
less combat. 



CHAPTER III 

OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA 

"The whole Chinese people hold the doctrines of Con- 
fucius most sacred," declared President Yuan Shih-kai in his 
decree of November 26, 1913, which re-introduced much of 
the old state religion. He stopped a little short of giving 
Confucianism the character of an established religion, but 
ordered that the sacrificial rites and the biennial commemo- 
ration exercises be restored. "I am strongly convinced," 
he said, "of the importance of preserving the traditional 
beliefs of China." In this he was upheld by the Confucian 
Society at Peking, in the organization of which an American 
university graduate. Dr. Chen Huan-chang, was a leading 
spirit. Mr. Chen's doctoral dissertation had dealt with the 
economic principles of Confucius and his school; upon his 
return to China his aim had been to make Confucianism the 
state religion under the Republic. 

The Christian missionaries were agitated. They felt it 
to be a step backward for the new republic to recognize any 
form of belief. Yuan, however, said: "It is rather the ethic 
and moral principles of Confucius, as a part of education, 
that the Government wishes to emphasize." As there is 
nothing mystical or theological about Confucianism, such a 
view is, indeed, quite tenable. 

Yuan Shih-kai again declared toward the end of December: 
" I have decided to perform the worship of heaven on the day 
of the winter solstice." 

This fell on the 23 rd of December, and again excited dis- 
cussion. " It means that Yuan is edging toward the assump- 
tion of the Imperial dignity," many said. 

23 



24 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

I had a talk about this matter with the Minister of the 
Interior, Mr. Chu Chi-chien, who was thoroughly informed 
concerning the details of Confucian worship and the worship 
of Heaven; he had, in fact, an inexhaustible fund of knowledge 
of Chinese traditions. Nevertheless, he was a man of action, 
planning cities, building roads, and developing industries. 
Comparatively young and entirely Chinese by education 
and character, he had supremely that knowledge of the 
personalities of Chinese politics which was necessary in 
his ministry. As a builder he became the Baron Haussmann 
of Peking, widening and paving the avenues, estabhshing 
parks, rearranging public places, in all of which he did 
marvels within his short term of two years. He estabhshed 
the National Museum of Peking, and converted a part of the 
Imperial City into a public park which has become a centre of 
civic hfe theretofore unknown in China. Mr. Chu's famili- 
arity with religion, art, and architecture — he was a living 
encyclopaedia of archaeology and art — and his pleasure in 
reciting the history of some Chinese temple or palace did not 
free him from a modern temptation. He would try to import 
too many foreign elements in the improvements which he 
planned, so that foreign friends of Chinese art had to keep 
close to him to prevent the bringing in of incongruous Wes- 
tern forms which would have spoiled the marvellous harmony 
of this great city. 

"It would be dangerous," Mr. Chu informed me, "for the 
republican government to neglect the worship of Heaven. 
The entire farm population observes the ceremonial relative 
to sowing, harvesting, and other rural occupations according 
to" the old calendar. Should the worship of Heaven be 
omitted on the winter solstice day, now that the Government 
has become estabhshed; and should there follow a leanness or 
entire failure of crops, the Government would surely be held 
responsible by the farmers throughout the land." 

"Of course," he added, smilingly, "the worship will not 



OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA 25 

guarantee good crops, but at any rate it will relieve the 
Government of responsibility." 

I could not but reflect that, even in our own democracy, 
administrations have been given credit and blame by reason 
of general prosperity or of the lack of it, and that good 
crops certainly do help the party in power. 

"In the ritual, we shall introduce some changes appro- 
priate to republicanism," Mr. Chu assured me. "I am 
myself designing a special ceremonial dress to be worn by 
those participating, and the music and liturgy will be some- 
what changed." But it was difficult to see wherein con- 
sisted the specific republican bias of the changes. Yuan 
Shih-kai did proceed to the Temple of Heaven before day- 
break on December 23 rd; in the dark of the morning the 
President drove to that wonderfully dignified open-air 
sanctuary in its large sacred grove along the southern wall of 
the Chinese city. He drove surrounded by personal body- 
guards over streets covered with yellow sand and lined three- 
fold with soldiers stationed there the evening before. With 
him were the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Master 
of Ceremonies, the Censor General, the Minister of War, 
and a staff of other high officials and generals. Arrived at 
the temple, he changed his uniform for the sacrificial robes 
and hat, and, after ablutions, proceeded together with all 
the other dignitaries to the great circular altar, which he 
ascended. He was there joined by the sacrificial meat- 
bearers, the silk and jade bearers, the cupbearers, and those 
who chanted invocations. In succession the different cere- 
monial offerings were brought forward and presented to 
Heaven with many series of bows. A prayer was then 
offered, as follows: 

Heaven, Thou dost look down on us and givest us the nation. All- 
seeing and all-hearing, everywhere, yet how near and how close: We 
come before Thee on this winter solstice day when the air assumes a new 
life; in spirit devout, and with ceremony old, we offer to Thee jade, silk, 



26 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

and meat. May our prayer and offerings rise unto Thee together with 
sweet incense. We sanctify ourselves and pray that Thou accept our 
offerings. 



The first Confucian ceremony, which the President 
attended in person at four o'clock in the morning, took place 
about two months later. A complete rehearsal of the 
ceremony, with all details, had been held on the preceding 
afternoon. Many foreigners were present. Passing from 
the entrance of the Temple, between rows of immemorial 
ilex trees, and through lofty porticoes, in one of which are 
preserved the famous stone drums which date from the time 
of the Sage, the visitors entered the innermost enclosure. 
It, too, is set with ancient trees, which, however, leave the 
central portion open. The musical instruments were placed 
on the platform in front of the main temple hall. Here the 
ceremony itself was enacted, while the surface of the court 
was filled with members of the Confucian Society, ranks of 
dignified long-gowned men, members of the best classes of 
Peking. 

I was told that the music played on this occasion was a 
modification of the classic strains which had from time 
immemorial been heard here. Perfect knowledge of this 
music seems no longer to exist. The music accompanying 
the ceremony was nevertheless attractive, produced with 
jade plaques, flutes, long-stringed instruments resembling 
small harps, but with strings of more uniform length, drums, 
and cymbals. A dominant note was struck on one of the 
jade plaques, whereupon all the instruments fell in with a 
humming sound, held for fully a minute, which resembled 
the murmur of forest trees or the surging of waves. There 
was no melody; only a succession of dominants, with the 
accompaniment of this flow of sound surging up, then ebbing 
and receding. One of the instruments is most curious, in the 
shape of a leopard-like animal, in whose back there are 



OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA 27 

closely set about twenty small boards. At certain stages 
of the music a stick is rapidly passed over these boards, giv- 
ing a very peculiar punctuation to the strains that are being 
played. 

The chief dignitaries officiating were Mr. Chu Chi-chien, 
the Minister of the Interior, and Mr. Sun Pao-chi, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, gorgeous in their newly devised 
ceremonial costumes. The splendid and dignified surround- 
ings of the temple courts enhanced the ceremony, but it 
depended for its effect on the manner of chanting, the music, 
and the very dignified demeanour of all who participated. 
Quite apart from the question of the advisability of a state 
religion or the possible reactionary influences which such 
ceremonies might have, I could not but feel that the refusal 
to cast off entirely such traditions was inspired by sound 
instinct. 

Moreover, this revival came during the adoption of new 
ways. Chinese ladies came out in general society for the 
first time on the night of the 5th of February, at the Foreign 
Office ball. Many representatives of the outlying de- 
pendencies of China were there in picturesque costumes, 
invariably exhibiting a natural self-confidence which made 
them seem entirely in place in these modern surroundings. 
The Foreign Office building, planned by an American archi- 
tect, contains on the main floor an impressive suite of 
apartments so arranged as to give ample space for large 
entertainments, while it affords every opportunity for the 
more intimate gathering of smaller groups. Guests were 
promenading through the long rows of apartments from the 
ballroom, where the excellent Navy Band was playing for 
the dancers. 

The Chinese women gave no hint of being unaccustomed 
to such general gatherings of society, but bore themselves 
with natural ease and dignity. Nor did they conceal their 
somewhat amused interest in the forms of the modern dance; 



28 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

for only a few of the younger Chinese ladles had at that time 
acquired this Western art. The number of votaries, how- 
ever, increased rapidly during the next few years. 

From among the Tartars of the outlying regions this 
occasion was graced by a Living Buddha from Mongolia, to 
whom the Chinese officials were most attentive. Sur- 
rounded by a large retinue, he overtopped them all, and his 
bodily girth seemed enormous. He found his way early in 
the evening to a room where refreshments were being offered, 
took possession of a table, and proceeded to divest himself of 
seven or eight layers of outer garments. Thus reduced, he 
became a man of more normal dimensions. Several of his 
servitors then went foraging among the various tables, bring- 
ing choice dishes to which the Living Buddha did all justice. 
Long after midnight reports still came to the ballroom: 
"The Living Buddha is still eating." 

It seems remarkable that Chinese women should so readily 
adapt themselves to wholly new situations. They have 
shown themselves capable of leadership in social, political, 
and scientific matters; a great many develop wide intellectual 
interests and manifest keen mental powers. When I gave 
the Commencement address at the Women's Medical College 
of Peking, the 13th of February, I was curious to see what 
types of Chinese women would devote themselves to a med- 
ical education. In this field Dr. King Yamei and Dr. Mary 
Stone are the pioneers. With the advance of modern medi- 
cine in China many Chinese women have adopted the 
career of nurses and of physicians. On this occasion the 
women students of the middle school sang various selections, 
and I was impressed with the cello-like quality of their alto 
voices. As customary on such occasions my address was 
made through an interpreter. The delivery of these chopped- 
ofF paragraphs can scarcely be inspiring, yet Chinese audi- 
ences are so courteous and attentive that they never give 
the speaker any suggestion of impatience. 



OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA 29 

A luncheon at the Botanical Gardens was given the next 
djiy by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Chang Chien. This 
institution, to which a small and rather hungry-looking 
collection of animals is appended, occupies an extensive 
area outside of the northwest gate, and was formerly a park 
or pleasure garden of the Empress Dowager. A modern- 
style building, erected for her use and composed of large 
main apartments on each floor, with smaller side-chambers 
opening out from them, was used for our luncheon party. 
Its walls were still hung with pictures painted by the hand 
of the august lady, who loved to vary her busy life by paint- 
ing flowers. The conversation here was mostly on Chinese 
art, there being among the guests an antiquarian expert. 
Chow, who exhibited some fine scrolls of paintings. I noted 
that the Chinese evinced the same interest in the writing ap- 
pended to the paintings (colophon) as in the picture itself. 
They seemed to admire especially the ability, in some famous 
writers, of executing complicated strokes without hesitation 
and with perfect control. When we were looking at a page 
written by a famous Sung poet, Mr. Chow said: "He always 
finished a stroke lightly, like his poems, still leaving some- 
thing unsaid." 

Chinese handwriting has infinite power to express differ- 
ences of character and cultivation. It is closely associated 
with personality. Some writing has the precision of a steel 
engraving; other examples, again, show the sweep and 
assurance of a brush wielded by a Franz Hals. It is the 
latter that the Chinese particularly admire; and even without 
any knowledge of Chinese script one cannot but be impressed 
with its artistic quality and its power to reveal personal 
characteristics. It is still the great ambition of educated 
Chinese to write well — that is, with force and individual 
expression. My host on this occasion was one of the most 
noted calligraphers in China. Many emulated him; among 
them a northern military governor who had risen from the 



30 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

ranks, but spent laborious hours every day decorating huge 
scrolls with a few characters he had learned, with which to 
gladden the hearts of his friends. 

The new things cropping out in Chinese life had their 
detractors. Mr. and Mrs. Rockhill had come to Peking for 
a visit. Relieved of official duties through a change in the 
administration, it was quite natural that Mr. Rockhill 
should return where his principal intellectual interests lay. 
Throughout our first conversation at dinner Mrs. Rockhill 
affected a very reactionary view of things in China, praising 
the Empire and making fun of all attempts at modernization. 
One would have thought her not only a monarchist, but a 
believer in absolutism of the old Czarist type. A woman so 
clever can make any point of view seem reasonable, Mr. 
Rockhill did not express himself so strongly, but he was 
evidently also filled with regret for the old days in China 
which had passed. While we were together receiving guests 
at a dinner I was giving Mr. Rockhill, some of the young 
Foreign Office counsellors appeared in the distance, wearing 
conventional evening clothes. "How horrible," Mr. Rock- 
hill murmured, quite distressed. Not perceiving anything 
unusual to which his expression of horror could refer, I 
asked, "What?" "They ought to wear their native cos- 
tume," he answered; "European dress is intolerable on them, 
and it is so with all these attempted imitations." 

The talk at another dinner, a small gathering including 
Mr. Rockhill, Doctor Goodnow, and Dr. Henry C. Adams, 
revolved around conditions in China and took a rather 
pessimistic tone. Doctor Adams had been elaborating a 
system of unified accounting for the railways. "At every 
turn," he said, "we seem to get into a bhnd alley leading up 
to a place where some spider of corruption sits, the whole 
tribe manipulated by a powerful head spider." 

This inheritance of corruption from the easy-going past, 
when the larger portion of official incomes was made up 



OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA 31 

of commissions and fees, was recognized to be a great evil 
by all the more enlightened Chinese officials. They at- 
tempted to combat it in behalf of efficient administration 
but they could not quite perform the heroic task of lifting the 
entire system bodily onto a new basis. Because the new 
methods would require greatly increased salaries, the ideal 
of strict accountability, honesty, and efficiency, could only 
be gradually approached. Doctor Goodnow for his part 
contributed to the conversation a sense of all the diffi- 
culties encountered by saying: "Here is a hitherto non- 
political society which had vegetated along through centuries 
held together by self-enforced social and moral bonds, with- 
out set tribunals or formal sanction. Now it suddenly de- 
termines to take over elections, legislatures, and other 
elements of our more abstract and artificial Western system. 
I incline to believe that it would be infinitely better if the 
institutional changes had been more gradual, if the system of 
representation had been based rather on existing social 
groupings and interests than on the abstract idea of universal 
suffrage. These political abstractions as yet mean nothing 
to the Chinese by way of actual experience." 

He also did not approve of the persistent desire of the 
democratic party to establish something analogous to the 
English system of cabinet government. He felt that far 
more political experience was needed for working so delicate 
a system. *T am inclined to look to concentration of power 
and responsibility in the hands of the President for more 
satisfactory results," he said. 

Mr. Rockhill's fundamental belief was that it would be 
far better for the world not to have meddled with China at 
all. "She should be allowed to continue under her social 
system," he urged, "a system which has stood the test of 
thousands of years; and to trust that the gradual influence of 
example would bring about necessary modifications." He 
had thorough confidence in the ability of Yuan Shih-kai, if 



32 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

allowed a free hand, to govern China in accordance with her 
traditional ideas but with a sufficient application of modern 
methods. He even considered the strict press censorship 
applied by Yuan Shih-kai's government as proper under the 
circumstances. 

Throughout this conversation, which dwelt mostly on 
difficulties, shortcomings and corruption, there was, never- 
theless, a notable undercurrent of confidence in the Chinese 
people. These experienced men whose work brought them 
into contact with specific evils, looked at the Chinese, not 
from the ordinary viewpoint so usual with foreigners who 
assume the utter hopelessness of the whole China business, 
but much as they would consider the shortcomings of their 
own nation, with an underlying faith in the inherent strength 
and virtue of the national character. The idea of China 
being bankrupt was laughed to scorn by Mr. Rockhill. 
"There are its vast natural and human resources," he 
exclaimed. "The human resources are not just a quantity 
of crude physical man power, but there is a very highly 
trained industrial capacity in the handicrafts." But it is 
exactly when we realize the stupendous possibilities of the 
country, her resources of material wealth, her man power, 
her industrial skill, and her actual capital that the difficulties 
which obstruct her development seem so deplorable. 

Mr. Liang Chi-chao gave a dinner at about this time, at 
which Doctor Adams, Doctor Goodnow, President Judson of 
Chicago, and the ladies were present. Mr. Liang had a cook 
who was a master in his art, able to produce all that infinite 
variety of savory distinction with which meat, vegetables, and 
pastry can be prepared by the Chinese. One usually speaks 
of Chinese dinners as having from one hundred fifty to two 
hundred courses. It would be more accurate, however, to 
speak of so many dishes, as at all times there are a great 
many different dishes on the table from which the guests 
make selection. The profusion of food supplied at such a 



OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA 33 

dinner is certainly astonishing. The guests will take a taste 
here and there; but the greater part of it is sent back to the 
household and retainers. It is a popular mistake to be- 
lieve that Chinese food is composed of unusual dishes. 
There are indeed birdsnest soup, shark fins, and ducks' 
kidneys, but the real excellence of Chinese cooking lies in the 
ability to prepare one thing, such as chicken, or fish, in in- 
numerable ways, with endless varieties of crispness, consist- 
ency, and flavour. It is notable to what extent meat 
predominates. Although there is always a variety of vegeta- 
bles and of fruit, the amount of meat consumed by the 
Chinese is certainly astonishing to one who has classified them, 
as is usually done, as a vegetarian people. 

The show of abundance at a Chinese banquet seems the 
fare of poverty compared with the cargoes of deHcacies 
served at the Imperial table. It was a rule of the Imperial 
household that any dish which the Emperor had at any time 
called for, must be served him at the principal meal every 
day; as his reign lengthened the numbers of dishes at his 
table, naturally, constantly increased. It is related that the 
dinner of the Emperor Chen Lung required one hundred and 
twenty tables; and the Empress Dowager, at the time of her 
death, had worked up to about ninety-six tables. It is not 
to be wondered at that the Emperor's kitchen had an army 
of three hundred cooks ! At one time when the Duke Tsai 
was discussing with me the financial situation of the Imperial 
family, he remarked, with a deep sigh: "The Emperor has 
had to reduce the number of his servants. For instance, at 
present he has only thirty cooks." Not knowing of the 
custom described above, I was inclined to consider that 
number quite adequate. I believe the little Emperor has 
at the time I write reached the quota of about fifteen tables. 

At the hospitable board of Mr. Liang Chi-chao, while the 
dishes were served in Chinese style and the food eaten with 
chopsticks, some modifications of the usual dinner procedure 



34 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

had been made. The etiquette of a Chinese meal requires 
that when a new set of dishes with food has been placed in 
the centre of the table, the host, hostess, and other members 
of the family survey what is there and pick out the choicest 
morsels to lay on the plates of their guests. The guests 
then reciprocate the courtesy, and the interchange of favours 
continues throughout the dinner, giving the whole affair a 
most sociable aspect. At Mr. Liang Chi-chao's table these 
courtesies were observed, but there were special chopsticks 
provided for taking the food from the central dishes and 
transferring it to a neighbour's or to one's own. 

The conversation after dinner wandered toward Chinese 
ethics. Mr. Liang Chi-chao is one of the most competent 
authorities on this subject and on its relations to Western 
thought and life. I ventured this opinion: "While the high 
respect in which the elders are held by the younger gene- 
ration in China is a remarkably strong social cement, it is 
discouraging to progress in that it gives the younger and more 
active little chance to carry out their own ideas." 

"But the system does not," Mr. Liang rejoined, "neces- 
sarily work to retard change; because it is, after all, society 
rather than individuals which controls. With all proper 
respect for elders, the younger element has ample oppor- 
tunity to bring forward and carry out ideas of social change." 

He regarded the principle of respect for elders and of 
ancestor worship of fundamental importance; in addition to 
its direct social effects, it gave to Chinese society all that the 
Western peoples derive from the belief in immortality. The 
living individual feels a keen sense of permanence through 
the continuity of a long line of ancestors, whose influence 
perceptibly surrounds those actually living; moreover, their 
own actions are raised to a higher plane, as seen not from the 
narrow interests of the present, but in relation to the life 
of the generations that are to succeed, in whom the character 
and action of the individual now Hving will persist. 



OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA 35 

This evening's entertainment, with its intimate Chinese 
setting and its conversation deahng with the deeper relation- 
ships between different civilizations, has remained a memo- 
rable experience for those who attended it. Only recently it 
was thus recalled by one of the guests : "Think of going to a 
dinner with the 'Secretary of Justice' in Washington, and 
conversing about the immortality of the soul!" 

Interested to see how, despite the new ways in China, the 
old Confucianism persisted, I determined upon a pilgrimage 
to the Confucian shrines. Dr. Henry C. Adams invited 
me in November, 1914, to join him on a trip to the sacred 
mountain, Taishan, in Shantung Province, and to Chiifu, the 
home of Confucius. 

A small party was made up. I shpped away quietly in 
order to avoid official attentions and to spare the local 
authorities all the bother of formally entertaining a foreign 
representative. We arrived at Taianfu early in the morn- 
ing, where with the help of missionaries chair-bearers had 
been secured to carry us up the mountain. 

The trip to these sacred heights is of an unusual character. 
The ascent from the base is almost continuously over stair- 
ways. Up these steep and difficult grades two sturdy 
chairmen, with a third as alternate, will carry the traveller 
rapidly and with easy gait. The route is fascinating not only 
because of the singular natural beauty of the ravines through 
which it passes, and of the constantly broadening prospects 
over the fruitful plains of Shantung from every eminence, 
but because of the historic interest of the place; this is 
testified to by innumerable temples, monuments, tablets, and 
inscriptions sculptured in the living rock which line the path 
up the mountain. It must be remembered that in the time of 
Confucius this was already a place of pilgrimage of im- 
memorial tradition; a place of special grandeur, wherein the 
mind might be freed of its narrow needs and find its place in 
the infinite. Many of its monuments refer to Confucius and 



36 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

record his sayings as he stopped by the way to rest or to be- 
hold the prospect. At one point, whence one looks off a steep 
precipice down to the plain thousands of feet below, his say- 
ing, as reported, was: "Seen from this height, man is indeed 
but a speck or insect." But not all of his remarks were of 
this obvious nature, which justifies itself in its appeal to 
the common mind, to be initiated into the truths of the 
spirit. 

In these thousands of years many other sages, emperors, 
and statesmen have ascended the sacred hill, also leaving 
memorials in the shape of sculptured stones bearing their 
sentiments. It would be an agreeable task for a vacation to 
read these inscriptions and to let the imagination shadow 
forth again these unending pilgrimages extending back to the 
dawn of history. 

The stairway leading up the mountain, which is about 
6,000 feet high, is often so steep that we had to guard against 
being overcome by dizziness in looking down. Occasionally 
a stop is made at a wayside temple, where tea is served in the 
shady courts. In the summer heat these refuges must be 
especially grateful. We reached the temples that crown the 
summit after a journey of about six hours. In a temple 
court at the very top the servants who had preceded us had 
set up their kitchen, and an ample luncheon was awaiting 
us there. 

At this altitude a cold and cutting wind was blowing. Yet 
we preferred to stay outside of the temple buildings in order 
to enjoy the view which is here unrolled, embracing a great 
portion of the whole province of Shantung. I noted that the 
cooHes did not seem impressed with the sanctity of this 
majestic height, but used the temple courts as a caravan- 
serai. 

The descent is made rapidly, as the practised chair-bearers 
run down the stairs with quick, sure steps — ^which gives the 
passenger the sensation of skirting the mountainside in an 



OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA 37 

aeroplane. When I inquired whether accidents did not 
occasionally happen, they told me: "Yes, but the last time 
when any one has fallen was about four hundred years ago." 
As in the early days chair-bearers who had fallen were killed, 
the tendency to fall was in the course of time eradicated. 
They descend with a gliding motion that reminds one of the 
flight of birds. The chair-bearers are united in a guild, and 
happen to be Mohammedans by religion. 

The town of Taianfu, which lies at the foot of the moun- 
tain, is notable for a very ancient and stately temple dedi- 
cated to the god who represents the original nature worship 
which centres around Mount Taishan, and which forms the 
historic basis for all religion in China. The spacious temple 
courts, with their immemorial trees and their forests of tall 
stone tablets bearing inscriptions dedicated by emperors for 
thousands of years past, testify to the strength of the native 
faith. The streets of the town, set at frequent intervals 
with arches bearing sculptured animal forms, were lined with 
shops through whose trellised windows, now that night had 
come, lights were shining, revealing the activities within. 
These, with an occasional tall tower or temple shadowing 
the gathering darkness, made this old town appear full of 
romance and strange beauty. 

Sleeping on our car, we were by night carried to the railway 
station of Chiifu ; some seven miles farther on lies the town of 
the same name, the home of Confucius. We hired donkey 
carts at the station; also, as the ladies were anxious to have 
the experience of using the local passenger vehicle, the wheel- 
barrow, we engaged a few of these; whereupon our modest 
cavalcade proceeded first to the Confucian burial ground, to 
the north of the city. On the way thither we were met by 
chair-bearers who carried a portable throne and brought 
complimentary messages from the Holy Duke. As the chair 
had been sent for my use, there was nothing for it but to get 
in. Soon appeared, also, a string of mule carts drawn by 



38 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

sleek and well-fed animals, contrasting with the bony and 
dishevelled beasts we had hired. 

It was plain that the incognito was ended, and that the 
Duke had been apprised of our coming. Then came the 
emissaries of the district magistrate, offering further courte- 
sies, such as a guard of honour; and another delegation from 
the Duke brought a huge red envelope containing an invi- 
tation for luncheon. We tried to decline all these civilities 
and to stroll about quietly, in order to come entirely under 
the spell of this place. But there was no more rambling and 
strolling for us. We had to sit in our chairs and carts, 
and, after two polite declinations of the luncheon invita- 
tion, alleging the shortness of our time and our desire to see 
everything thoroughly, and asking leave to call on the Duke 
later in the afternoon — ^we accepted the customary third issue 
of the ducal invitation. 

Our procession was quite imposing as we passed on to the 
inner gate of the cemetery. Covering about one and a half 
square miles, the enclosure has been the burial ground of 
the Confucian family for at least three thousand years, 
antedating Confucius himself. No other family in the 
world has such memorials of its continuity. The simple 
dignity of a huge marble slab set erect before the mound- 
covered grave marks the burial place of the sage. The ad- 
joining site of the house where his disciples guarded his tomb 
for generations, but which ultimately disappeared some two 
thousand years ago, also bears monuments and inscriptions. 

Leaving the cemetery, a large cavalry escort sent by the 
district magistrate joined our cavalcade of chairs, mule 
carts, and wheelbarrows, together with crowds of the curious 
who trudged along. The village streets were Hned with 
people anxious to see the strangers; but their curiosity had 
nothing intrusive. They were friendly lookers-on, nodding 
a pleasant welcome should your eye catch theirs. 

We passed through many gates of the ancient palace before 



OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA 39 

we were finally received by the Duke himself at the main 
inner doorway. He was accompanied by the magistrate, and 
with these two we sat down to chat; nearly an hour elapsed 
before we were summoned to the table. The meal, which 
was made up of innumerable courses, lasted at least two 
hours, during which we kept up an animated conversation 
concerning the more recent history of the town and of the 
temple. 

The Duke was agitated because missionaries from Taianfu 
were trying to acquire land in the town of Chiifu. He 
looked upon this intrusion as unwarranted, saying that as his 
town was devoted to the memory of the Chinese sage, it did 
not seem suitable that any foreign religion should try to 
introduce its worship, and it would certainly result in local 
ill-feeling. 

I tried to quiet his apprehensions by speaking of the edu- 
cational work of missionaries, of the fact that they, also, 
respected the great sage; but it was hard to allay his op- 
position. 

The magistrate was jovial, laughing uproariously at the 
mildest joke. When we arose from the table, the Duke took 
us to the apartments of the Duchess, who was staying with 
the infant daughter recently born, their first child. The 
Duchess was his second wife, and he was considerably her 
senior. The little lady seemed to be particularly fond of cats, 
of which at least forty were playing about her; one of these 
she presented to Mrs. Adams. 

The great Temple of Confucius immediately adjoins the 
palace. Although the afternoon was wearing on, we still 
had time to visit it and to wander about in its noble courts. 
The pillars in the main halls are adorned by marvellous 
sculpture, and the temple is remarkable for the refined 
beauty of the structures composing it and for the serene 
dignity of its aspect. Adjoining the main temple is an 
ancient well near which stood the original house of Confucius. 



40 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Stone reliefs present in a long series the history of Confucius 
in pictures, and there is a great collection of instruments 
used in performing the classical music. But the chief charm 
of the temple lies in the vistas aflforded by its courts, set with 
magnificent trees and with the monuments of the past seventy 
generations. 

It was dark when we had finished our visit to the temple. 
We bade the Duke farewell, and our cavalcade, starting back 
to the station, was now made picturesque by the flaring 
torches and the huge paper lanterns which were carried 
alongside each chair and cart. Slowly the procession wound 
its way back over the dark plains toward the lights of the 
station platform and the emblems of a mechanical civiHza- 
tion that contrasted at every point with the life we had seen. 
The Duke had regretted having objected so strongly to the 
proposal to bring the railway closer to the town, for it was of 
inconvenience to visitors; but he felt, after all, that the great 
sage himself would always prefer the peacefulness and quiet 
of the older civilization. 

I revisited Chiifu three years later, this time with Mr. 
Charles R. Crane and Mrs. Reinsch, who had been unable to 
accompany me on the first visit. The officials were expect- 
ing us, and everywhere we were followed with attentions. 
Not satisfied with giving us two private cars, the railway 
officials insisted that we have a special engine, too. In the 
region of Chiifu we gathered an army of military escorts. 
Arriving at the palace, the Duke greeted us with a child 
on either arm. The little daughter was now over three, the 
son slightly over one year old. I have never seen any one 
who appeared more devoted to his children than the Duke. 
He always had them with him, carried them about, playing 
with them and fondling them. When he and the Duchess 
visited us in Peking he brought the two little ones, and they 
and my small children played long together joyfully and to 
the amusement of their elders. The Duke was tall, broad- 



OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA 41 

shouldered, aristocratic looking. While not credited with 
great ability, he was undoubtedly a man of intelligence, 
although his education had been narrowly classical and had 
not given him contact with the world's affairs. He was 
seventy-third in line from the great sage. At that time he 
was engaged especially with plans to create in Chiifu a 
university wherein the Confucian tradition should be pre- 
served in its purity, but which should also teach modern 
science. 

Once during the revolution against the Manchus the Duke 
was considered a possible successor to the throne. If the 
country had had a Chinese family of great prominence in 
affairs, the transfer of the monarchy to a Chinese house 
might have been accomplished, but the Duke was by no 
means a man of action or a politician. Neither had the 
descendants of the Ming, Sung, and Chow emperors, or of 
other Imperial houses, sufficient prominence or genius for 
leadership to command national attention. 

The title of the Holy Duke is the only one in China which 
remains permanently the same. Under the empire, titles 
were granted, but in each succeeding generation the rank was 
lowered by one grade until the status of a commoner had 
again been reached. By this arrangement, under which 
noble rank gradually ''petered out," China escaped the 
creation of a class or caste of nobility. 



CHAPTER IV 
A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE POLITICAL SCENES 

Modelling largely on American example, China is striving 
to create truly representative political institutions. Per- 
sonal rule, imperial traditions, hamper the Chinese in their 
efforts, unguided as they are by experience; moreover, they 
meet with foreign skepticism and opposition. It is Amer- 
ica's role not officiously to interfere in their endeavours, but 
in every proper way to help them. 

The institutions a nation develops are largely its own busi- 
ness. Other nations should not interfere. But in China 
all liberal-minded, forward-looking men see in the United 
States a free government which they not only wish to emu- 
late, but to which they look for interest, sympathy, and 
moral assistance. The results of their efforts are by no 
means indifferent to us. Should they fail, should militarist 
and absolutist elements gain the upper hand; particularly, 
should China become an appendage to a foreign militarist 
autocracy, grave dangers would arise. The ideals of the 
progressive Chinese are in keeping with the peaceful, 
industrious traditions of China. With these traditions 
Americans in China are closely allied. They do not seek, 
nor have they need to seek, to control by political means the 
choice of the Chinese people. On the other hand, it would be 
difficult for them to tolerate any attempt to prevent the 
Chinese from freely following the model of their choice, and 
from securing those mutually helpful relations with Ameri- 
cans which they themselves desire. In this sense only, then, 
have Americans a vital interest in Chinese politics. That 
personal rule and imperial traditions, as well as military des- 

42 



A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE POLITICAL SCENES 43 

potism, are still powerful enough to hamper the will of the 
new Chinese democracy may be manifest from a few in- 
stances that early came to my attention. 

The first case was that of Mr. C. T. Wang. When he re- 
lated to me the history of the dissolution of his party — he was 
and still is one of the leaders of the democratic party (Kuo 
Min Tang) — he told me that he was in great personal danger. 
Mr. Wang had been marked for execution as a leader of the 
disbanded party and he was living in concealment as a 
refugee. 

His call upon me, shortly after my arrival in Peking, was 
my first direct contact with Chinese internal or party poli- 
tics. He had greeted me at the railway station upon my 
arrival, and now he told me the story of Yuan Shih-kai's suc- 
cessful attempt to break down the opposition of the parlia- 
ment and to render that body entirely innocuous. Mr. 
Wang was the Vice-President of the Senate, and through his 
party was associated with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and General 
Huang Hsin, the men who had attempted the revolution dur- 
ing the summer just passed. But Mr. Wang represented the 
younger, more modern-minded elements in the party, who 
desired to adopt the best institutions and practices of the 
West, but who did not favour violent measures. 

Yuan Shih-kai had divided the majority party, in order 
in the end to destroy its two sections. The most recent 
action in this fight was the dissolution of the Kuo Min 
Tang, which was decreed by the President on November 5th, 
on the ground that this body was implicated in, and respon- 
sible for, the revolutionary movement against the President. 
The President had approached the Tutuhs — or military 
governors, after the downfall of Yuan Shih-kai called 
Tuchuns — in the various provinces and had secured in ad- 
vance an endorsement of his action. Of course, this appeal 
ignored the constitutional character which the state was 
supposed to have, and encouraged the military governors in 



44 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

thinking that they were semi-Independent rulers. After the 
death of Yuan their sense of their own importance and inde- 
pendence grew apace. They imitated him in looking upon 
their armies as their personal property. Moreover, they 
seized control of the provincial taxes. From all this arose 
that pseudo-feudalism of military despots, which is the bane- 
ful heritage left by Yuan Shih-kai in China. 

I had already received, through the Department of State, 
an inquiry from American friends concerning Mr. Wang*s 
safety. He was graduated from Yale University, was 
first among the American-returned students, and favour- 
ably known among Americans in general. He had been the 
president of the Chinese Y. M. C. A. and bore the reputation 
of being an able, clean-handed, and conscientious man. I 
could not, of course, know in how serious danger Mr. Wang 
found himself, nor could I make any formal representations 
in a case where the facts were unknown. However, through 
making inquiry as to whether any unfavourable action, such 
as arrest, was contemplated, I hinted to the Government that 
any harsh action against Mr. Wang would be noted. The 
very fact that a well-disposed foreign nation is taking notice 
will tend to prevent rash or high-handed action, which is fre- 
quently forced by some individual hothead commander or 
official. When public attention has been directed to the 
unjust treatment of a man, rash vindictiveness may be re- 
strained by wiser heads. 

A further example of the working of Chinese internal 
politics which came under my observation at this time is 
shown in the method by which Yuan Shih-kai politely im- 
prisoned the Vice-President. 

From time to time Yuan Shih-kai had made efforts to 
induce the Vice-President, General Li Yuan-hung, to come 
to Peking from Wuchang, where he was stationed in com- 
mand of troops. He had sent him messengers and letters, 
protesting the need he felt of having General Li closely by 



A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE POLITICAL SCENES 45 

his side in order to profit by his support and advice on im- 
portant affairs. These poHte invitations had been an- 
swered by General Li in a most self-deprecatory tone; he 
could not aspire to the merit and wisdom attributed to him 
by the President; he could be of but little assistance in im- 
portant affairs of state; it was far better for him to stay in 
his position as commander at Wuchang, whence he could 
effectively support the authority of the President and all his 
beneficent works. 

This interchange of correspondence went on for some 
time. It was evident that General Li did not wish to come to 
Peking. It was surmised that the President did not like 
the prominence which the democratic party had given to 
the name of General Li Yuang-hung, whom they had her- 
alded as a true republican and a man of popular sympathies. 
Probably Yuan feared that General Li might be placed at 
the head of a new political movement against the President's 
authority. 

The President not only sent messengers and letters of 
cordial invitation, but he also rearranged the disposal of 
troops, with the result that bodies of troops upon which 
Yuan Shih-kai could rely were drawn around Wuchang 
with a constantly shortening radius. Finally in December 
General Li realized that he had no alternative. He there- 
fore informed the latest messenger of Tuan that he could 
no longer resist the repeated cordial invitations, and that 
while he was sharply conscious of his shortcomings, he would 
endeavour to assist the chief magistrate to the Hmit of his 
powers. 

He came to Peking in December, without troops of his 
own. The President received him with the greatest cor- 
diality, embracing him and vowing that now the burden of 
responsibility was lightened for him; that he must have his 
great associate and friend always close at hand, where he 
could consult with him daily, in fact, any hour of the day 



46 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

and night ; he therefore invited General Li to make his home 
close to the palace of Yuan, namely, on the little island in the 
South Lake in whose many-coloured, gracefully formed halls. 
Emperor Kwang Hsu was for many years kept a prisoner 
by the Empress Dowager. 

There General Li took his residence, knowing that his great 
friend the first magistrate could not spare his presence at 
any hour of day or night. 

The question arose whether the foreign representatives 
should call on the newly arrived Vice-President. The Gov- 
ernment tentatively suggested that as hosts it might be 
proper for them to make the first call. Whether or not 
this was done in the expectation that the suggestion would 
not be accepted, it certainly was not the desire of Yuan 
Shih-kai to encourage close relations between the Vice- 
President and any outsiders. 

Although Yuan Shih-kai still allowed the rump parliament 
to exist, he had undoubtedly decided at this time to dispose 
of it entirely. A ready pretext was at hand, because, with 
the expulsion of the Kuo Min Tang, the parliament no 
longer could muster a quorum. On November 13th, it was 
announced that a central administrative conference would 
be created to act in an advisory capacity in matters of gov- 
ernment. It was plain that this body was intended to dis- 
place parliament. The list of nominees was made up mostly 
of men of the old regime, literati and ex-officials — ^the kind 
known among the Chinese as "skeletons"; a group of high 
standing and very good reputation, but from which little 
constructive action could be expected. Among them was a 
very efi'ective orator. Ma Liang, a member of the Roman 
CathoHc Church. He was a dignified, elderly man, who 
came to see me to talk about reforestation and colonization 
of outlying regions. His contact with Western civilization 
had been through the Jesuit College at Zikawei. Another 
member was Dr. Yen Fu, who had won reputation by trans- 



A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE POLITICAL SCENES 47 

lating a large number of scientific works into Chinese and 
creating a modern scientific terminology in Chinese. Among 
other councillors with whom I became well acquainted was 
Hsu Shih-chang, later President of China, and Li Ching-hsi, 
a nephew of Li Hung-chang, who had been Viceroy of Yun- 
nan under the Empire. 

Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, the American Constitutional Ad- 
visor, often discussed Chinese political affairs with me. It 
was his impressionthat parHament had attemptedtotake over 
too much of Western political practice without sufficiently 
considering its adaptability to Chinese uses. He believed 
that the administrative power should not be subject to con- 
stant interference by parliament, and that China was not 
yet ready for the cabinet system. He therefore held a 
rather conservative view favouring gradual development in 
the direction of Western institutions, but not a wholesale 
adoption of the same. The Yuan Shih-kai government 
took advantage of this attitude of the American expert to 
give out, whenever it proposed a new arrangement for 
strengthening its hold, that the matter had the approval 
of Doctor Goodnow and other foreign advisers. However, 
these authorities were not really consulted; that is, they were 
not brought into the important conferences, nor given the 
chance to cooperate in the formulation of vital projects. 
As a matter of form they were, of course, "consulted" — 
but usually after the decisions had been made. They were 
informed of what had been agreed upon; and then it was 
announced that the approval of the advisers had been 
secured. Another example of the bland self-sufficiency of 
Yuan Shih-kai and his government. They believed in them- 
selves; they considered that they were accountable only to 
themselves; they had fundamentally the monarchic point 
of view in all departments of public service. 



CHAPTER V 
WITH MEN WHO WATCH POLITICS 

I FOUND in Peking several good observers of political life, 
especially Dr. George Morrison, Mr. B. Lenox Simpson, and 
Mr. W. H. Donald. All three had the training in obser- 
vation and judgment which comes from writing for respon- 
sible papers. Doctor Morrison was gifted with a memory 
for details. Thus, he would say: "When I first visited New 
York I lived in a little hall room on the third floor of 157 
East Twenty-ninth Street, with a landlady whose name 
was Simkins, who had green eyes and a red nose and who 
charged me two dollars a week for my room." He delighted 
in detailing minutely his daily doings. His sense of infinite 
detail combined with his remarkable memory made Doctor 
Morrison an encyclopaedia of information about Chinese 
public men. He knew their careers, their foibles and am- 
bitions, and their personal relationships. Like most British 
in China he was animated with a sincere wish to see the 
Chinese get ahead, and was distressed by the obstacles 
which a change for the better encountered at every step. 
His own mind was of the analytical and critical type rather 
than the constructive, and his greatest services were ren- 
dered as interpreter of events and in giving to public men 
and the people a clear idea of the significance of complex 
Chinese situations. "I am annoyed," he would say, "be- 
cause kindly old ladies persistently identify me with the 
missionary Morrison who died in 1857." 

Mr. Donald's acquaintance with Chinese affairs had come 
through close contact with the leaders of new China, with 
whom he cooperated intimately in their military and politi- 

48 



WITH MEN WHO WATCH POLITICS 49 

cal campaigns. He had a heart for the Chinese, as if they 
had been his own people. He worried about their troubles 
and fought their fights. Mr. Simpson, the noted writer who 
uses the pen name "Putnam Weale," began active life as 
a member of the Maritime Customs service, but he soon 
resigned, to devote himself wholly to literary work. His 
masterly works of political analysis were written in the 
period of the Russo-Japanese War, although his best-known 
book came a little earlier — a book which long earned him the 
ill-will and suspicion of many of the legations in Peking. 
He himself disavows giving in "Indiscreet Letters from 
Peking" a recital of actual facts. He told me: "I wished 
to give the psychology of a siege, selecting from the abund- 
ant material significant facts and expressions, but I was not 
in any sense attempting to chronicle events and personal 
actions." 

Mr. Simpson has also written a series of novels dealing 
with Chinese life. The short stories are the best; the 
longer ones, while interesting in description and clever in 
dialogue, lack that intuitive power of characterization which 
is found in the greatest novels, though "Wang the Ninth" 
which has recently come from the press is an admirable 
study of Chinese psychology and an excellent story as well. 
Though his playful and cynical mind often led people to 
judge that he was working solely for literary effect, it seemed 
to me he had a deep appreciation of what China should mean 
to the world; he also had real sympathy for the Chinese, and 
desired in every way to help them to realize the great prom- 
ise of their country and people. As a conversationaHst Mr. 
Simpson resembled Macaulay, in that his interludes of si- 
lence were infrequent. Notwithstanding the brilliance of 
this conversation, luncheon parties of men occasionally 
seemed to become restive under a monologue which gave 
few others a chance to wedge in a word. 

Aside from these three British writers, many other men 



so AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

were following with intelligent interest the course of events. 
Bishop Bashford, gifted with a broad and statesmanlike 
mind, could always be trusted to give passing events sig- 
nificant interpretations. Dr. W. A. P. Martin had then 
reached an age at which the individual details of current 
affairs no longer interested him. His intimate friend, Dr. 
Arthur H. Smith — a rarely brilliant extemporaneous speaker 
— ^was full of witty and incisive observations, often deeply 
pessimistic, though tempered with a deep friendship for the 
Chinese people. 

Among the members of the diplomatic corps it was chiefly 
the Chinese secretaries who busied themselves, out of pro- 
fessional interest with the details of Chinese affairs, al- 
though they did not in all cases exhibit a broad grasp of the 
situation. 

Mr. Willys R. Peck, Chinese secretary of the American 
Legation, born in China, had a complete mastery of the 
difficult language of the country. He could use it with a col- 
loquial ease that contrasted most pleasantly with the stilted 
and stiff enunciation of the ordinary foreigner speaking 
Chinese. His tact in intercourse with the Chinese and his 
judgment on character and political affairs could be relied on. 
Mr. Peck took the place of Mr. E. T. WilHams, who was 
called to Washington as chief of the Far Eastern Division 
in the State Department. I considered it great good for- 
tune that there should be at the Department a man so 
experienced and so familiar with Chinese affairs. 

It was my good fortune to have as first secretary of the le- 
gation a man exceptionally qualified to cope with the diffi- 
culties and intricacies of Chinese affairs. Not only are 
these affairs infinitely complex in themselves, but they have 
been overlaid through many decades with a web of foreign 
treaty provisions, which makes them still more baffling to the 
stranger who tackles them. But Mr. J. V. A. MacMurray, 
the secretary, was possessed of a keenly analytical, legally 



WITH MEN WHO WATCH POLITICS 51 

trained mind which was able to cut through the most hope- 
lessly tangled snarl of local custom, national law, inter- 
national agreement, and general equity. Also his interest 
in things Chinese was so deep and genuine that his re- 
searches were never perfunctory. The son of a soldier, he 
had an almost religious devotion to the idea of public service. 

Among the ministers themselves. Sir John Jordan, actual 
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, was through long experience 
and careful attention to affairs most fitted to speak with 
authority on things Chinese. I was immediately greatly 
attracted to him and formed with him a close acquaintance- 
ship. This led to constant cooperation throughout the 
difficult years that lay ahead. Sir John was a man of un- 
usually long and varied experience in China. He came first 
to the consular service, then became minister resident in 
Korea, and his forty years of official work had given him 
complete intimacy with Chinese aff'airs. Although he speaks 
Chinese with fluency, in official interviews and conversa- 
tions he was always accompanied by his Chinese secretary 
and expressed himself formally in English. As a matter of 
fact, few diplomats ever use the Chinese language in official 
conversation. Because of its infinite shades of meaning it 
is a complex and rather unprecise medium, therefore misun- 
derstandings are more readily avoided through the con- 
current use of another language. While Sir John understood 
Chinese character and affairs and was sympathetic with the 
country in which his life work had been spent, yet there dwelt 
in him no spirit of easy compliance. When he considered it 
necessary, he could insist so strongly and so emphatically 
upon the action he desired taken that the Chinese often 
thought of him as harsh and unrelenting: yet they always 
respected his essentially English spirit of fairness and straight- 
forwardness. 

Other colleagues with whom close relationships grew up 
were Don Luis Pastor, the Spanish minister, a gentleman 



52 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

thoroughly American in his ways and famiUar through 
long residence in Washington with our affairs; and Count 
Sforza, the Itahan minister. To the latter China seemed 
more or less a place of exile; he appeared bored and only mod- 
erately interested in the affairs about him. But his legation — 
with Countess Sforza, Madame Vare, whose Lombard beauty 
did not suggest her Scotch origin; the Marquise Denti, 
with her quizzical, Mona Lisa-Hke haunting smile, concealing 
great ennui; and the entirely girlish and playful Countess 
Zavagli, a figure which might have stepped out of a Watte au 
— ^was a most charming social centre. M. Beelaerts van 
Blokland, the Netherlands minister, a man of clear-thinking, 
keen mind, and great reasonableness, and the Austrian min- 
ister, M. von Rosthorn, a profound Chinese scholar, who was 
then working on a Chinese history, were men of whom I saw 
much during these years. 

There were few sinologists in Peking at this time. The 
successive Chinese secretaries of the American Legation rank- 
ed high in this respect. Of resident sinologists the most noted, 
Mr. (later Sir) Edward Backhouse was a recluse, who never 
allowed himself to be seen in the company of other people of a 
Western race. At the only period when I had long conver- 
sations with him I found him much disturbed by wild 
rumours current in the Chinese quarter to which I could not 
attach any weight. Others whose knowledge of Chinese 
was exceptional were Mr. Sidney Mayers, representative of 
the British China Corporation, who had formerly been in 
the consular service; Doctor Gattrell, who had acted as 
secretary of the American Group; Mr. W. B. Pettus, the 
director of the Peking Language School; Mr. Simpson, al- 
ready mentioned ; and several missionaries and professors at 
Peking University. 

Of the Chinese there were, of course, many with whom I 
could profitably discuss the events of the day and gather 
suggestions and interpretations of value. With all these 



WITH MEN WHO WATCH POLITICS 53 

men I conversed upon events, relying for my information not 
on rumours or reports, but on the facts which I could learn 
through the men directly concerned; or through others well 
informed. The opinion which I formed from such various 
sources about the political condition of China at this time, 
the spring of 1914, may be stated as follows: 

The political authority of the Central Government in 
China rested upon military organization. Other sources of 
authority, such as customary submission on the one hand, 
and the support based upon the intelligent cooperation of all 
classes of citizens in the achievement of the purposes of 
government in accordance with pubHc opinion on the other, 
were only of secondary influence. It was therefore import- 
ant to inquire whether the military power was so organized 
as to afford a stabilizing support to public authority. This 
did not seem to be the case. 

In the first place, the existence of a large army of doubt- 
ful efficiency was in itself an evil, considering the then limited 
resources of the Chinese State, and the fact that any attempt 
to reduce the military forces to more reasonable dimensions 
met with stubborn opposition. Whenever troops were dis- 
banded they showed no tendency to return to useful occupa- 
tions : the ex-soldiers desired only to continue to live upon the 
country, and, no longer serving the established authority, 
they joined bandit gangs, rendering the interior of the ma- 
jority of the provinces insecure. 

The weakness of the army was strikingly demonstrated 
whenever an attempt was made to use it to defend the 
country against either external or internal enemies. In the 
campaign against the Mongols, the Chinese troops had 
failed entirely; even within the country itself, this huge 
army was not able to insure the fulfilment of that first duty 
of a government — ^the protection of the lives and property of 
its citizens. 

In the provinces of Honan and Hupei brigands, led by a 



54 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

person known as "White Wolf," had for months been terri- 
fying the population; ravaging the countryside; sacking 
walled cities; murdering and outraging the population; and 
in a number of instances had killed foreigners. Thus far 
the army had been powerless to suppress these brigands; in 
fact, evidence was at hand that the troops had repeatedly 
been so lax and remiss that the only explanation of their 
conduct would seem to lie in a secret connivance at the 
brigandage, and lack of cooperation among the commanders 
of the troops. 

As the authority of the Central Government was com- 
mensurate with its control over the tutuhs (tuchuns), or 
military governors, the attitude of the latter toward the 
President had to be carefully watched; and it was causing no 
small uneasiness that there did not seem to be perfect 
agreement among these pillars of authority in the various 
provinces; thus, friction had recently been reported between 
General Tuan Chi-jui, the Minister of War, who was the act- 
ing tutuh of Hupei, and General Feng Kuo-chang, the 
tutuh of Kiangsu, two of the most powerful supporters of 
the President. 

None of the provinces of China, during the preceding 
three months, had been free from brigandage, attempted 
rebelHon, troubles resulting from the disbanding of troops, 
and local riots. Conditions were worst in the provinces of 
Honan and Hupei, in which the bands of "White Wolf* 
are operating. 

These bands had assumed a distinctly anti-foreign atti- 
tude. In Kansu there were constant Mohammedan up- 
risings, related to the open rebellion in Tibet and MongoHa. 
Bandit movements had also occurred in the provinces of 
Shansi, Shensi, Szechuan (super-added to revolts of the 
troops), Anhui, Kiangsi, Hunan, Fukien, Kweichow, Yun- 
nan, and Kwangtung. Chekiang, Kwangsi, Shantung, and 
Chihh had been the least molested. 



WITH MEN WHO WATCH POLITICS 55 

While the Government had been unable to fulfil its duty of 
protecting the lives and property of its citizens, it was also 
unable to exercise the elementary power of providing, 
through taxation, the means for its own support. The 
maintenance of the army had eaten up the available means 
and it had not been possible to secure sufficient money from 
the provinces to meet the ordinary running expenses of 
the Central Government. The remarkable resisting power 
of China is illustrated by the fact that, notwithstanding the 
conditions of rebellion and political unrest which charac- 
terized the year 191 3, general commerce remained so active 
that the collections of the Customs and of the Salt Gabelle 
exceeded those of any previous year. These two sources of 
revenue were sufficient to provide for the interest payments 
and amortization of the long-term foreign loans then con- 
tracted; their administration, under foreign control, had 
secured to the Central Government the funds to meet 
these obHgations and to avoid open bankruptcy. 

•AH other forms of taxation were disorganized. The col- 
lection of the land tax was in many places discontinued; 
records had been destroyed, or the population took an atti- 
tude hostile to its collection. The proceeds of the likin, as 
far as collected, were retained for provincial use. Alto- 
gether, the Central Government received from the provinces 
not more than 10 per cent, of the estimated income from 
these sources under the last Imperial Budget for 191 2. 

Meanwhile, the Central Government had been living from 
hand to mouth, using the proceeds of foreign loans for ad- 
ministrative purposes, and was kept going by taking cash ad- 
vances upon foreign loan contracts made for furnishing 
materials and for various concessions. In this way the future 
had been discounted to a dangerous extent. 

The weakness of the financial administration of the Gov- 
ernment was found in all other branches of its activities. 
There was little evidence of constructive capacity. 



S6 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

In the ministries and departments of the Central Govern- 
ment the greatest disorganization was apparent. In deal- 
ing with technical questions the officials were often entirely 
at sea, not being trained themselves in these matters, nor 
willing to make real use of the many advisers who were en- 
gaged by the Government; there was no adequate system of 
accounting; the departmental records were not well kept; 
frequently the existence of a transaction was not known to 
the officials most nearly concerned; past transactions, fully 
consummated, had been forgotten; there was no centraHza- 
tion of governmental knowledge; so a great deal of the public 
business was transacted in a haphazard way, leading to a 
helpless opportunism of doing the things most strongly 
urged and of grasping at small immediate advantages at the 
cost of engagements long to be regretted. 

Ambitious schemes of general policy had been brought 
up, and elaborate regulations promulgated, to all of which 
little attention was subsequently paid. On the other hand, 
there had scarcely been one single concrete result ob- 
tained in constructive work. 

The metropolitan Province of Chihli had been quiet and 
peaceful since the outbreak of 191 2. The Government here 
certainly had sufficient authority to introduce constructive 
reforms, and the general conditions for such action in this 
province had been relatively most favourable. But not 
even in the case of ChihH Province had the taxation system 
been rendered efficient; no efficient auditing methods had 
been introduced in practice, although systems of auditing 
control had been promulgated; educational institutions had 
been allowed to run down : in short, under the most favour- 
able conditions, no constructive work had been accomplished. 

Nearly all attempts to do something of a constructive 
nature had been immediately associated with foreign loans, 
often involving a cash advance to the Government. It 
might, of course, be said that the great difficulty of the 



WITH MEN WHO WATCH POLITICS 57 

Chinese Government was exactly that it lacked the funds for 
carrying out constructive work; and that, therefore, only 
such lines of improvement could be followed for which it 
had been possible to secure foreign loans. 

This, however, was only partly true. A great many re- 
forms could have been accomplished without the increase of 
expenditure; indeed, they would have resulted in a reduction 
of outlay. The fact seemed to be that the Central Govern- 
ment, realizing how important foreign financial support 
had been to it during the Revolution of 191 3, was anxious 
to secure more and more funds from abroad without count- 
ing the ultimate cost. 

An opportunity for obtaining from abroad large sums of 
money, far beyond any amount ever before dealt with by 
Chinese officials and merchants, in itself had an unsettling 
effect upon methods of public business. The old caution 
and economy, which kept the public debt within narrow 
limits, had given way to a readiness to obtain funds from 
abroad in enormous amounts, without apparently the 
realization of the burden imposed upon China byway of the 
necessity of return in the future through the results of labour 
and sacrifice of millions of people. 

Nor had the old system, under which the inadequate 
salaries of officials had ordinarily to be supplemented by 
extraneous illicit gains, given way to a more efficient and 
business-like organization of the public service under which 
officials would be able to devote their undivided attention to 
the accomplishment of their regular allotted tasks without 
spending their energy in contriving additional means of 
obtaining income. 

In the case of certain classes of officials, the Government 
had endeavoured to place their salaries at a figure sufficient 
to render them independent of these practices; but the 
resources of the Government were not adequate to enable it 
at once to place the entire public service upon a basis of 



58 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

individual independence. It was also true that certain 
among the closest advisers of the President were commonly 
believed to have used their positions for the purpose of 
accumulating vast private fortunes — a belief which, whether 
justified or not, must be counted with in determining the 
standing of the Government as enjoyed throughout the 
country. 

Thus the old hostility and lack of confidence, which 
formerly characterized the relations between merchants and 
ojfficials, continued under the new system. 

Through the dissolution of the Parliament, the Govern- 
ment had destroyed an organ which might, in the course of 
time, have established relations of confidence between the 
great middle class of China and the Government. 

As a statesman, the President emphasized in the first place 
the requirements of order and of authority. To him it 
seemed that Parliament, with its free discussion, with its 
opportunity for forming political factions, opposing the men 
in authority, stood in the way of the estabhshment of a last- 
ing system of legal order. He, therefore, dissolved first the 
national parliament, then the assemblies of the provinces, 
and finally the local self-governing bodies. 

In each case inefficiency was justly complained of. The 
men in the parHamentary bodies had often been self-seeking, 
factional, and unpractical. But the President seemed to 
have no perception of the true value of parliamentary action 
as a basis of public authority; he considered opposition to the 
Government synonymous with opposition to lawful au- 
thority. And in his ideas upon the reconstitution of Parlia- 
ment, as far as they had been announced, two main principles 
dominated: first, that only men of mature experience and of 
conservative ideas should be selected; and secondly, that the 
activities of Parliament should be confined to discussing and 
giving advice upon policies already determined upon by the 
Administration. 



CHAPTER VI 
CHINA OF MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS 

The past may become in the human present more aHve 
than ever. John Richard Green finds in the old records of 
the guilds of Berwick an enactment "that where many 
bodies are found side by side in one place they may become 
one, and have one will, and in the dealings of one with 
another have a strong and hearty love." In the history of 
the Saxons, Edwin of Northumbria "caused stakes to be 
fixed in the highways where he had seen a clear spring," 
and "brazen dishes were chained to them, to refresh the 
weary sojourner, whose fatigues Edwin had himself ex- 
perienced." These things shine with the sun, and enlighten 
our work to-day. The Maine woodsman sits on a stump 
whose rings number centuries of growth. When Chinese 
children came to play with our children at the Legation, I 
was always impressed by their dignity of demeanour and 
their observance of the courtesies while their elders were 
present. On the faces of these little heirs of the Holy Duke 
the composure of eighty generations of culture and traditions 
sat freshly; and it by no means alloyed their delight, which 
was unstinted, in American toys and dolls. 

This transmutation of the old into new life is seen every- 
where in China. The day comes every morning fresh as a 
flower. But we know it is old; it is an ancient day, white- 
clad and beautiful as the stars. The Chinese peasant thrusts 
his stick of a plough many eons deep into his ancestral soil. 
In north China it is loess soil, the most fertile on the globe, 
brought down from the mountains for millenniums and 
deposited to depths of from twenty to thirty feet. When 

59 



6o AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

there are no floods the rain sinks deeply into this porous soil, 
meets the moisture retained below, and draws up therefrom 
the inorganic salts that are held dissolved. So its fertility 
is inexhaustible. 

But floods do come, as they have come unchecked for ages. 
In the Hwai River region, with all this natural richness 
underfoot, the people are poor, weak, famine-stricken, living 
in aggregations of shabby hovels that are periodically swept 
away. Its crops, which should normally be six in three 
years, average but two and three. This region is only one 
example of several prodigious and extensive valleys choked 
with fertility, yet with famine and pestilence raging through 
them, cursed as they are by inundations that might be com- 
pletely checked at little engineering cost. With these regions 
reclaimed and the border provinces colonized, China's crops 
alone would support double her present population. The 
people of the Hwai region, secure and affluent, might be 
easily increased by twenty million living heirs of a fifty- 
centuries-old civilization. Indeed, a little vision and scien- 
tific application would transform China. 

With what the ages have produced for the West — ^the old 
guild spirit reviving, if you please, in the modern trust — ^the 
West can meet the East. The true ministers and am- 
bassadors to China are the merchant-adventurers of the 
Western nations, bearing their goods, their steel and tools, 
their unique engineering skill and works. It was not for 
what the entrepreneurs "could get out of" China, nor yet 
for what China could get out of us, that my poHcy as Ameri- 
can minister was directed to this complementary meeting of 
two civilizations. It was because I saw millions perishing 
wretchedly whose birthright in the higher arts and amenities 
of living is at least as rich as our own — perishing for lack of 
an organizing skill which it is the province of the Western 
peoples to supply. It was because I knew, with their 
admirable family life and local democratic institutions, it 



CHINA OF MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS 6i 

needed only trunk-line railways to link together these close- 
set communities, comprising one quarter of the earth's popu- 
lation, into as admirable a central democracy. 

But how the West was then meeting the East came home 
to me on the second morning of my stay in Peking. I 
entered the breakfast room, where I found Doctor Hornbeck 
in a state of annoyance. He handed me the morning copy 
of the Journal de Peking, a sheet published in French and 
known to be subservient to Russian and French political 
interests from which it got subventions. The article in 
question was a scurrilous attack on me personally, and on 
American action in China generally. 

A Chinese journal in Shanghai had published a laudatory 
article in which had been cited extracts from my published 
books. One of these, taken from "World Politics," had hap- 
pened to speak of French subserviency to Russian policy 
in the Far East. The French journal repeated these ex- 
pressions as if they had been given out by me in an inter- 
view upon arriving in China. As they were in fact taken 
from books published more than ten years before, which had 
run the gauntlet of French critical journals without ever 
having been taken as hostile to France, I did not have 
any reason to worry, and the fume and fury of the local 
journal rather amused me than otherwise. I could, however, 
not help noting the temper of these attacks, their bitterness 
and the utter rashness and lack of inquiry with which the 
charges were made. It gave me early warning, considering 
its gross lack of courtesy to a newcomer, who had entered the 
field in a spirit friendly to all, as to what might be expected 
from some of our friendly rivals. When several years later 
one of the ministers whose legation stood sponsor for this 
sheet approached me with a request to use my influence to 
suppress a Chinese paper which had attacked him, I re- 
gretted that it was not in my power to be of assistance. 

The significance of the article lay of course in its attack 



62 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

upon American policy, which was characterized as one of 
"bluff", and which charged the United States with assuming a 
tone of superior virtue in criticising others, and, while loudly 
professing friendship for the Chinese, failing to shoulder any 
part of the responsibility in actual affairs. The Y. M. C. A. 
and the Standard Oil Company were coupled together as 
twin instruments of a nefarious and hypocritical policy. 

The China Press, the American newspaper of Shanghai, 
pointed out that the attack of the French paper indicated 
what the American minister would have to face, and ob- 
served that the success or failure of his diplomatic mission 
must depend upon the readiness of the American Govern- 
ment to take an active part in the rehabilitation of China. 
Should America play the role of an altruistic but impotent 
friend, and of a captious critic of the other powers, it could 
gain neither sympathy nor respect. 

The American Government was at this time severely 
criticised for its failure to endorse the Six-Power Consortium; 
it was urged that the Administration had sacrificed the best 
opportunity for bringing American goodwill to bear on 
Chinese public affairs, by exercising a moderating and 
friendly influence in the council of the great powers. On the 
other hand, it ought to be considered that a new adminis- 
tration, when confronted with the sudden proposal that it 
give exclusive support to one special group of banks, might 
well hesitate, particularly in view of the fact that the group 
in this case consisted of only four New York houses. An 
earlier administration had answered such an inquiry in a 
similar way. Considering the merits of the question from 
the point of view of China, the action might present itself 
in the Hght of a refusal to join with others in placing upon 
the young republic the fetters of foreign financial control. 
Moreover, the proceeds of the Reorganization Loan were 
actually not used for the benefit of the Chinese people, but 
on the contrary this financial support fastened the personal 



CHINA OF MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS 63 

authority of Yuan Shih-kai on the country and enabled him 
to carry on a successful fight against parliament. That 
body never gave its approval to the loan. 

From my conversations with President Wilson before 
departing for my post I had formed the conclusion that the 
President realized that as America had withdrawn from a 
cooperative effort to assist in the development of China, it 
was incumbent upon her to do her share independently and 
to give specific moral and financial assistance; in fact, I 
received the President's assurance of active support for con- 
structive work in China. In his conversation he dwelt, 
however, more on the educational side and on political ex- 
ample and moral encouragement, than on the matter of 
finance and commerce. 

It cannot be doubted that in China the withdrawal of the 
United States from the Consortium was interpreted as an act 
of friendship by all groups with the exception of that which 
was in control of the Government at the time, which would 
have preferred to have the United States at the council table 
of the Consortium Powers. Those opposed to the Govern- 
ment were particularly strong in their commendation of our 
refusal to join in an agreement which to them seemed far 
from beneficial to China. But all parties without exception 
drew the conclusion that the friendly action of the United 
States, which had now rejected the method of international 
cooperation, would continue independently of the others. In 
view of the power and resources of the United States, it was 
hoped that there would be a greater participation by the 
United States in Chinese industrial and commercial affairs, 
as well as in administrative loans, than had hitherto existed. 

It is apparent from all this that the American position in 
China was not free from difliculties. The covert antagonism 
of the five Consortium Powers was continuous. We were 
isolated, and would be judged by what we could do by our- 
selves. Should it turn out that we had nothing to offer but 



64 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

sage advice, the strictures of our rivals might in time come to 
carry a certain amount of conviction. 

So far as the Americans themselves were concerned, they 
were thoroughly discouraged, and everywhere talked as if 
it were all up with American enterprise in China. When I 
said: "No, it is only just beginning," polite incredulity was 
the best I could expect. It is very probable that the Ameri- 
cans who were so downcast saw in the appointment of a 
literary and university man as minister to China an ad- 
ditional indication that there was to be no special encourage- 
ment given to American economic enterprise. Having long 
been famiHar with the underlying facts of the Far Eastern 
situation, I had entirely made up my mind on the primary 
importance of American participation in the industrial and 
economic development of China. No one could have ap- 
preciated more highly than I did the important work done 
by American missionaries, teachers, and medical men, in 
bringing to China a conception of Western learning and life. 
But if China should have to rely entirely on other nations for 
active support in the modern development of her industries 
and resources, then our position in the eyes of the Chinese 
nation could never come up to the opportunities which Nature 
had given us through our geographic position and our 
industrial strength. 

I had long discarded any narrow interpretation of diplo- 
macy, but even if I had adhered to the principle that the 
diplomat must busy himself only with political matters, I 
should have had to admit that in China political matters 
included commerce, finance, and industry. I did not, of 
course, intend that the Legation should enter into a scramble 
for concessions, but it was my purpose that it should main- 
tain sympathetic contact with Americans active in the 
economic life of China, and should see to it that the desire of 
the Chinese to give them fair treatment should not be de- 
feated from any other source. 



CHINA OF MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS 65 

When I thought of American enterprise in China I had 
less in mind the making of government contracts, than the 
gaining of the confidence of the Chinese people in the various 
provincial centres of enterprise by extensive business under- 
takings, resting on a sound and broad foundation. In China 
the people are vastly more important than the Government, 
so that it is necessary to make up one's mind from the start 
not to regard Peking as the end-all and be-all of one's 
activity, but to interest one's self deeply in what is going on 
in all of those important interior centres where the real 
power of government over the people is exercised, and 
where the active organizations of the people are located. 

The universal knowledge that America has no political 
aims in China, of itself gives Americans the confidence of the 
Chinese and predisposes the latter to favour intimate co- 
operation. Our policy is known to be constructive and not 
to imply insidious dangers to their national life. It would 
be discouraging to the Chinese, should Americans fail to take 
a prominent part in the development of Chinese resources. 
To Americans the idea of securing preeminence or pre- 
dominance is foreign, but from the very nature of their 
purely economic interest they have to resist any attempt on 
the part of others to get exclusive rights or a position of 
predominance, which could be utilized to restrict, or entirely 
to extinguish, American opportunities. 

I was therefore resolved to give every legitimate en- 
couragement to constructive enterprise, whether it were in 
education, finance, commerce, or industry.-' Fully a year 
before going to China I had expressed my view of the nature 

iThe leading British paper of China had this to say concerning the modem functions of diplomacy: 
" It is characteristic of Doctor Reinsch and his outlook upon China that he should mark a point of prog- 
ress in the fact that the legations are ceasing to be merely political centres, and that, instead of poli. 
tics being the one and only object of their existence, they are now establishing relations of all kinds of 
mutual helpfulness in vital phases of national reorganization. In this connection,we may see an increase 
in the number of experts who will come, unofficially for the most part, to study conditions and gather 
data which may be available as a sure foundation for progress." I may say in passing that the British 
papers in China, throughout the period of my work there, were almost uniformly fair and friendly, and 
gave credit for honest efforts to improve condition*. 



66 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

of American policy there, saying that a united China, master 
of its own land, developing its resources, open to all nations 
of the world equally for commercial and industrial activity, 
should be the chief desideratum. 

Among the specific American interests already existing in 
China, that of missionary and educational work had at this 
time to be given the first rank. There are two factors which 
have made it possible for this work to achieve a really notable 
influence. The one is that it is plainly the result of in- 
dividual impulse on the part of a great many people animated 
by friendly motives, and not the result of a concerted plan of 
propaganda. The second factor is the spirit of helpfulness 
and cooperation which permeates this work. There is no 
trace of a desire to establish a permanent tutelage. An 
institution like the Y. M. C. A. acts with the sole thought of 
helping the Chinese to a better organization of their own 
social and educational Hfe. The sooner they are able to 
manage for themselves, the better it seems to please the 
American teachers, who may remain for a while as friendly 
counsellors, but who make no effort to set up a permanent 
hierarchy of supervision. The Chinese have an intense 
respect for their educators, and it has been the good fortune 
of many Americans — men Hke Dr. W. A. P. Martin and Dr. 
Chas. D. Tenney — ^to win the devoted loyalty of innumerable 
Chinese through their activity as teachers. 

Among commercial enterprises the Standard Oil Company 
was carrying petroleum to all parts of China. It had intro- 
duced the use of the petroleum lamp, had extended the 
length of the day to the hundreds of millions of Chinese, and 
even its emptied tin cans had become ubiquitous in town 
and country, because of the manifold uses to which these 
receptacles could be put. For efficiency and close contact 
with the people, the Chinese organization of this great 
company was indeed admirable. 

A similar result had been obtained by the British-Ameri- 



CHINA OF MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS 67 

can Tobacco Company, which, although organized in England 
under British law, is American by majority ownership, busi- 
ness methods, and personnel. The cigarette had been made 
of universal use, and had been adapted to the taste and 
purchasing ability of the masses. Though there were 
several American commission firms of good standing, none 
had the extensive trade and financial importance of the great 
British houses. Several American firm names established 
in China early in the nineteenth century, like that of Frazar 
& Company, had become British in ownership. The only 
American bank was the International Banking Corporation, 
which at this time confined itself to exchange business and did 
not diff'er in its policy or operations from the common run of 
treaty port banks. 

If national standing in China were to be determined by the 
holding of government concessions, America was at this 
time, indeed, poorly equipped. The Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation had in 1910 concluded a contract with the 
Imperial Government for the construction of vessels to the 
value of ^20,000,000. When I came to China, a vice- 
president of the corporation, Mr. Archibald Johnston, was 
in Peking, ready to arrange with the republican govern- 
ment for a continuance of the contract. The American 
banking group was a partner in the Hukuang Railways, in 
which it shared with the British, French, and German groups. 
An American engineer was employed at the time in making a 
survey of a portion of the proposed line along the Yangtse 
River. The American group also held the concession for the 
Chinchow-Aigun Railway in Manchuria, the execution of 
which had been blocked by Russia and Japan. The group 
further participated with the three other groups above 
mentioned in the option for a currency loan. The only 
activity going on at this time in connection with these 
various contracts, on the part of America, was the survey of 
the Hukuang railway line west of Ichang. 



68 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

For some time the practice had grown up, on the part of 
European powers, to urge the Chinese to employ, as advisers, 
men reputed to have expert knowledge in certain fields. 
The most noted adviser at this time was Dr, George Morri- 
son, who had gained a reputation in interpreting Far East- 
ern affairs as Peking correspondent for the London Times 
during and after the critical period of 1900. A fresh group 
of advisers had just been added under the terms of the 
Reorganization Loan. Each power therein represented had 
insisted that the Chinese appoint at least one of its nationals 
as an adviser. The American Government had never urged 
China to make such an appointment. But when President 
Eliot visited China in 191 3, Chinese officials expressed to 
him the wish that a prominent American should be retained 
as adviser to the Chinese Government. President Eliot 
suggested that the Carnegie Endowment might propose 
certain experts from whom the Chinese Government could 
then make a selection. This method was actually followed, 
and as a result Prof. F. J. Goodnow of Columbia University, 
a recognized authority on constitutional law, had been re- 
tained by the Chinese Government and was at this time 
already in residence at Peking. The Ministry of Communi- 
cations on its part had sought a man familiar with railway 
accounting, and had called upon the late Prof. Henry C. 
Adams, the noted economist and railway expert of Michigan 
University. 

The important administrative positions of Inspector 
General of Customs and of Foreign Inspector of the Salt 
Revenue were held by two British officials. The salt 
administration had come within the purview of inter- 
national supervision through the Reorganization Loan 
agreement; and, as America was not a party to that loan, 
the appointment of Americans to any positions in this service 
was frowned upon by several of the partners. The In- 
spector, Sir Richard Dane, an official of long experience in 



CHINA OF MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS 69 

India, however, adopted the pohcy of not confining the 
appointments to subjects of the Consortium Powers. He 
had retained several Americans, in whom he seemed to 
place great confidence. In the Customs Service, Americans 
did not hold the number of positions to which they were 
relatively entitled. This was undoubtedly due to the fact 
that very few people in the United States knew that such 
positions in China are open to Americans; moreover, many 
of those Americans who were actually appointed had be- 
come impatient with the relatively slow advancement in this 
service and had been attracted by other opportunities. There 
were, however, a number of highly reputed and efficient 
American officials in the Customs Service. 



CHAPTER VII 
PROMPT PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN ACTION 

The Chinese were not slow in showing what conclusions 
they deduced from the withdrawal of the American Govern- 
ment from the Six-Power Consortium. On November 27th, 
two cabinet ministers called on me for a private conver- 
sation. Following this interview Mr. Chang Chien, recog- 
nized master of antique Chinese learning, but also Minister 
of Industries and Commerce, came to me. I will relate the 
substance of what passed on these two occasions, beginning 
with Mr. Chang. 

Chang Chien carried off first honours in the great metro- 
politan examinations of Peking under the old regime in 1899. 
He is a scholar par excellence o! the Chinese classics, and his 
chirography is so famous that he has been able to support a 
college out of the proceeds of a sale of examples of his writing. 
But he has not rested satisfied with the ancient learning. In 
the region of his home, Nan Tung-chow, on the banks of the 
Yangtse, he has established schools, factories, and experiment 
stations for the improvement of agriculture and industry. 
He had financial reverses. People at this time still doubted 
whether he would be permanently successful, although they 
admitted that he had given impetus to many improvements. 
Since then his enterprises have flourished and multiplied. 
He has become a great national figure, whose words, spoken 
from an honest desire for right public action, have decisive 
weight with the nation. While he still represents the old 
belief that the superior man of perfect literary training should 
be able successfully to undertake any enterprise and to solve 
any practical difficulty — ^which belief is contrary to the de- 

70 



PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN ACTION 71 

mands of our complex modern life for specialization — yet 
he has succeeded in bending his intelligence to thoroughly 
modern tasks. 

As would be expected from his high culture as a Chinese 
scholar, Mr. Chang Chien is a man of refinement and dis- 
tinction of manners, than which nothing could be more 
considerate and more dignified. The Chinese are exceed- 
ingly sensitive to the thought and feeling of any one in 
whose company they happen to be; if their host is busy or 
preoccupied, no matter how politely he may receive them, 
they will nevertheless sense his difficulty and will cut their 
visit short. They also have great tact in turning a conversa- 
tion or avoiding discussions they are not ready for, and they 
can do this in a manner which makes it impossible to force 
a discussion without impolite insistence. The smoothness 
and velvet iness of Chinese manners, together with the ab- 
sence of all servile assent and the maintenance of complete 
independence of discussion, are marvellous and bear evidence 
to thousands of years of social training. 

Mr. Chang Chien was particularly interested in river 
and harbour development, and in plans for the drainage 
of those regions of China which are subject to periodical 
floods. It was contemplated to estabhsh a special conser- 
vancy bureau under whose care surveys for important proj- 
ects were to be undertaken. I questioned Mr. Chang con- 
cerning the status of the Hwai River conservancy scheme 
for the prevention of floods in the northern portion of the 
provinces of Kiangsu and Anhui, the region from which he 
came. 

"I have already estabHshed a special engineering school,'* 
he replied, "in order to train men for this work. A large 
part of the survey has been made, and it can be entirely com- 
pleted by a further expenditure of 35,000 taels. 

" Besides the enormous benefit of such a work to all the 
adjoining agricultural lands," he continued, "there would be 



72 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

reclaimed nearly 3,000,000 acres which could now not be used 
at all, although their soil is inexhaustibly fertile. The land 
thus reclaimed would be salable immediately for at least $40 
an acre. Would not this alone be ample security for a large 
conservancy loan.^ ^25,000,000 would do the work." 

Mr. Chang was also interested in the establishment of a 
commercial and industrial bank, in copartnership with 
American capitalists. "Such a bank," he said, "would as- 
sist in furnishing the capital for the works of internal im- 
provement." 

It was quite plain that Mr. Chang looked upon a bank 
as an institution which would invest its capital in such enter- 
prises — a conception which was then quite current among the 
Chinese. They had not yet fully realized that in the mod- 
ern organization of credit a bank may act as a depository and 
may make temporary loans, but more permanent invest- 
ments must ultimately be placed with individual capitalists, 
with banks acting only as underwriting and selling agencies. 

As we talked about the execution of these large and useful 
projects, Mr. Chang repeatedly made expressions such as 
this : " I prefer American cooperation. I am ready to employ 
American experts to work out the plans and to act as super- 
visors. But please to bear in mind, these works may not be 
undertaken without raising a large part of the needed funds 
in the United States or in other countries." 

When the two cabinet ministers called they brought no 
interpreter. "The matters about which we wish to talk," 
they said, "are so important that we wish to keep the dis- 
cussion confined to as few persons as possible. We bring 
the ideas of President Yuan Shih-kai and his government 
with respect to what Americans might do in China." 

They first gave me a review of the recent development of 
the Russo-Japanese entente with respect to Manchuria and 
Mongolia. They expressed their belief that an understand- 
ing existed between these powers to treat outer Mongolia 



PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN ACTION 73 

as a region within which Russian control should not be ob- 
structed, and, vice versa, to allow a free hand to Japan, not 
only in southern Manchuria, but also in eastern Mongolia. 
Continuous activity of the Japanese in south China, in 
stirring up opposition to the Central Government, indicated 
a desire to weaken China, and, if possible, to divide it against 
itself. The extraordinary efforts made by Japan to increase 
her naval estabhshment were also particularly mentioned. 
The impression their discourse conveyed was that Japan was 
engaged in a strong forward policy in China, and that in this 
she had the countenance and support of Russia. 

My visitors then passed on to the reasons why the Chinese 
entertained the hope that America would give them its 
moral support to the extent of opposing the inroads made by 
Japan and Russia, and of cooperating with Great Britain and 
other powers favourable to the Open Door policy in pre- 
venting attempts to break up the Chinese Republic. They 
fully realized the improbability of an alliance between 
China and the United States, but laid stress on the parallel 
interests of the two countries, and particularly on the sym- 
pathy engendered through following the principles of demo- 
cratic government. Having become a republic, the Chinese 
Government is brought into peculiarly close relationship to 
the United States; it sees in the United States its most sin- 
cere and unselfish friend, and realizes the importance of 
American moral support. 

Descending to particulars, the ministers pointed out that 
while China appreciated and valued the friendly interest 
and counsel of the United States, it was disappointing that so 
very little had been done by America, while the European 
Powers and Japan should have taken such a very important 
part in the development of the resources of China. They 
said that the Chinese Government and people were desirous 
of affording the Americans unusual opportunities, should 
they be ready to cooperate. 



74 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Taking up specific enterprises, they stated that the 
Government was quite wilUng to ratify and carry out the 
contract made in 1910 by the Imperial Government with the 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Under this contract they 
intended to. build vessels adapted for commercial purposes, 
but convertible into warships somewhat Hke the vessels of the 
Russian Volunteer Fleet. The establishment of a steam- 
ship line to the United States, directly or by way of the 
Panama Canal, was greatly desired by the Government. 

It was recalled that at the time the naval mission of Prince 
Tsao visited the United States, the matter of lending Ameri- 
can experts as instructors for the Chinese navy came up for 
discussion, and such assistance was promised by the Ameri- 
can Administration under President Taft. The assistance 
contemplated was to be instructional and technical, not 
involving matters of policy or suggesting a political alliance, 
and of a nature such as had been in the past given by other 
nations, particularly Great Britain. The ministers stated 
that the Chinese Government still intended to avail itself of 
this assistance should the need for it arise, and that American 
cooperation in a matter like this was preferred because of the 
political disinterestedness of the American Government. 

The ministers then took up more purely industrial enter- 
prises, and dwelt particularly on plans for river and harbour 
improvement, mentioning the Hwai River region and other 
districts where agricultural pursuits are interrupted by 
destructive floods. As the Central Government contemplated 
the establishment of a national bureau to provide for these 
matters, the ministers suggested that the American Govern- 
ment would be invited to give its assistance by lending 
experts to plan and conduct the proposed works. They 
expressed their belief that the experience of Americans in 
such enterprises had quahfied them above any other nation 
for coping with these problems of China. 

Other matters were taken up, such as the possible creation 



PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN ACTION 75 

of a tobacco monopoly, from which the ministers expected 
both increased revenue and a more effective organization of 
tobacco production throughout China. It was not their 
desire to oust the British-American Tobacco Company, but 
they suggested that an arrangement would be made whereby 
this company might act as the selling agent of the Chinese 
Government. 

Another subject was the exploration of China for petro- 
leum. They stated that the Government wished that the 
development of oil fields should be undertaken. On account 
of the manner in which some other nations were wont to 
extend the scope of any concessions of this kind so as to 
establish general claims of preference, particularly as to 
railway rights, the Government much preferred to take up 
this matter with Americans. 

It was apparent that these men entertained high hopes of 
American activity in China, and that they were ready to 
do their part in making the conditions favourable. Their 
minds were alive with plans of development. Both because 
of American experience with similar problems and of the 
American spirit of fairness, they believed that great benefit 
would result if Americans were to become prominently active 
in the vast industrial transformation which they anticipated 
in the immediate future. 

As this conversation passed from topic to topic, touching 
on proposals of moment, I could not but feel that a new 
spirit had surely arisen in China. It would have been 
inconceivable under the old regime for high officials, trained 
in the traditional formalism and reticent with inherited dis- 
trust of the foreigner, to approach a foreign representative 
thus frankly, laying before him concrete proposals for joint 
action. In the past, as we know, it was the foreigners who 
had desired changes and new enterprises and who had in and 
out of season pressed them upon the reluctant and inert 
Chinese officials. But here were men who realized that it is 



76 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

the function of the Government to plan and to initiate; and 
they were ready to go to any length in making advances to a 
country in whose motives they had full confidence. 

It was impossible not to be fascinated by the prospects 
that were here unfolded. A country of vast resources in 
natural wealth, labour, power, and even in capital, was turn- 
ing toward a new form of organization in which all these 
forces were to be made to work in larger units, over greater 
areas and with more intensive methods than ever before. 
The merely local point of view was giving way to the national 
outlook. National resources and industries were looked at 
not from the point of view alone of any local group interested 
but of the unity of national life and effort. To know that 
in this great task of reorganization, Americans would be most 
welcome as associates and directors; that they were spon- 
taneously and sincerely desired in order that all these 
materials and resources might the more readily be built into 
a great and effective unity of national life — ^that, indeed, 
could not fail to be a cause for pride and gratification to an 
American. The only disturbing thought was the question 
whether Americans were ready to appreciate the importance 
of the opportunity here offered. Yet there could be no 
doubt that every energy must be applied in order to make 
them realize the unprecedented nature of the opportunities 
and the importance to America herself of the manner in which 
these materials were to be organized so as to promote general 
human welfare rather than selfish exploitation and political 
ambition. 

The Russian efforts to strengthen their position in 
Mongolia, to which these two visitors had alluded, had at 
this time brought fruit in the form of an agreement with 
China to have the "autonomy" of Mongoha recognized. A 
result and byplay of these negotiations came to the notice 
of the foreign representatives in Peking at a meeting of the 
diplomatic corps on December nth. The meeting was at 



PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN ACTION 77 

the British Legation, to which Sir John Jordan had by this 
time returned. 

The head of the large establishment of the Russian Le- 
gation was a young man, Mr. Krupenski. Trained under 
some of the ablest diplomats of Russia and having spent many 
years in Peking as secretary, he had manifestly not been 
selected by chance. With his English secretary he occupied 
his vast house alone, being unmarried. He entertained 
brilHantly, ably seconded therein by the Russo-Asiatic Bank 
across the way. Besides his thorough understanding of the 
Chinese, Mr. Krupenski had a valuable quality in his ability 
to shed all the odium that might attach to the policy of his 
government, as a duck sheds water. He appeared at times 
greatly to enjoy mystifying his colleagues, to judge by his 
amused and unconcerned expression when he knew they were 
guessing as to what his last move might mean. Mr. Krupen- 
ski is tall, florid, unmistakably Russian, During my first 
visit with him he plunged in medias res concerning China. 
Though he probably wondered what move I might contem- 
plate after the Manchurian proposals of Mr. Knox and 
America's withdrawal from the Six-Power Group, he gave no 
hint of his feelings, which undoubtedly did not contemplate 
me as likely to become an intimate associate in policies. 
When I left him I knew that here was a man, surrounded by 
competent experts in finance, language, and law, who could 
play with the intricacies of Chinese affairs and take ad- 
vantage of opportunities and situations of which others 
would not even have an inkling. 

At the meeting of December nth the Russian minister 
stated that he desired to make an announcement, and pro- 
ceeded to tell his colleagues quite blandly that his govern- 
ment had decided to withdraw the legation guards and 
other Russian troops from north China, and that they sug- 
gested to the other governments to take similar action. 

This announcement caused surprise all around the table. 



78 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Questions came from all directions: "Is this action to be 
immediate?" "What is the purpose of your government?" 
"What substitute for this protection do you suggest?" 
These and many more. The Russian minister seemed 
amused by the excitement he had caused. He allowed none 
of the questioners to worry him in the least, or to draw him 
out. With a quizzical and non-committal smile he let the 
anxious surmises of his colleagues run off his back. He 
shrugged his shoulders and said: "These are the instructions 
of my government. Their purpose — I do not know." 
When the meeting adjourned, small groups walked off in 
different directions, all still intently discussing the meaning 
of this move. So, the legation guards were really very 
important! The first question put to me in Shanghai had 
related to them, and here I found the diplomatic corps 
thrown into excitement by the announcement that Russia 
was withdrawing her guard. 

When I arrived at the Legation, where Mrs. Reinsch was 
receiving and where visitors in large numbers were taking tea 
and dancing to the music of the marine band, the news had 
evidently already preceded me, for several people asked me 
what had happened; and Putnam Weale and W. C. Donald, 
the British press representatives, were full of surmises. The 
interpretation generally accepted was that the Russians, and 
possibly the Japanese, were trying to put the other powers 
in a hole; if they did not withdraw their legation guards they 
might displease the Chinese Government, after what Russia 
had done; if they did withdraw them, they would give an 
advantage to Russia and Japan, powers who, on account of 
their proximity to China, could send large bodies of troops 
upon short notice. 

From the attitude of the diplomats it had been apparent 
that the proposal of the Russians would not prove acceptable. 
For weeks the press was filled with attempts to gauge the 
true bearing of the Russian proposal. Looked at from this 



PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN ACTION 79 

distance after the Great War, it is hard to imagine how so 
relatively unimportant a matter could cause excitement. Of 
course, the removal of the legation guard was not considered 
so important in itself, but it was of moment as an indication 
of what Russia might plan with respect to the further 
advance of her influence in China. 

Probably Russia's action did not really contemplate any 
far-reaching consequences. The Russians were urging the 
Chinese Government to make an arrangement for Mon- 
goHan ** autonomy," which could not but be intensely dis- 
tasteful to the Chinese. The Russians had to offer some- 
thing in return; with thorough knowledge of the old type of 
the Chinese official mind, they selected something which 
would not cost them anything, but which would be most 
gratifying to the Chinese Government. The Government 
looked upon the presence of foreign troops in Peking and in 
Chihli Province as incompatible with its dignity. Therefore, 
the Russian Government knew that through withdrawing its 
troops and calling upon the other governments to do likewise, 
an opportunity would be given the Chinese Government to 
claim an important victory, and the bitterness of renun- 
ciation with respect to Mongolia would thus be somewhat 
tempered. Yuan Shih-kai and the Government as such 
would probably take that view; but the Chinese as in- 
dividuals were not likely thus to consider the presence of 
foreign troops an unmixed evil. These guards tended to 
stabilize the situation, also to prevent unconscionable acts 
or high-handed inroads by any individual powers. So 
far as the people of China were concerned, Russia might not 
gather much credit through this move. 



CHAPTER VIII 
A LITTLE VISION FOR CHINA 

I HAVE said that a little vision and the application of 
American scientific methods would transform China. Chang 
Chien had instanced the Hwai River valley, and the ease 
with which it might be made to bloom as the most fertile 
tract on the globe. China boasts the most skilled horti- 
culturists and truck-farmers of any nation, and they breed 
its thousands of species of vegetables and flowering plants 
and shrubs. It is said of the Chinese gardener, that if there 
is a sick or weakened plant, he *'Hstens and hears its cry," 
and nurses it into health like a mother. But now the multi- 
tudes in the flood-ridden districts must periodically expect 
the scarification of their gorgeous acres, the bearing away 
of their dwellings and loved ones on the remorseless floods. 

Americans had for some time been aware of the possi- 
bilities of delivering from their curse these garden spots 
of earth. The American Red Cross, after giving ^400,000 
for relief of the severe famine in 191 1, was advised by its 
representatives how such calamities might be prevented, and 
it set an American engineer at making surveys in the Hwai 
regions and suggesting suitable engineering works. Chang 
Chien, with his native school of engineers, was also investi- 
gating the flood conditions, just about the time the American 
group of financiers left the Six-Power Consortium. It might 
be expected that this American group would be reluctant 
immediately to start further enterprises in China; indeed, 
that it might even discourage others from starting. Hence 
I thought it essential to propose only such undertakings as 
would come naturally from past relationships or would help 

80 



A LITTLE VISION FOR CHINA 8i 

develop some American interest already established in 
China. I was attracted by this plan, sound, useful, and 
meritorious, to redeem the Hwai River region. 

I found that the Chinese did not wish to take up this 
matter with any other nation than the United States, for 
they feared the territorial ambitions of the other powers and 
their desire to establish "spheres of influence" in China. 
To send in engineers, to drain and irrigate, meant close 
contacts; it might mean control over internal resources 
within the regions affected, for by way of security the foreign 
creditor would demand a mortgage upon the lands to be 
improved. Then there was the Grand Canal, a navigable 
watercourse, which would come within the scope of such 
works, and would give the foreign engineers and capitalists a 
direct means of penetrating the interior. Jealous of foreign 
political control in their domestic affairs, the Chinese were 
guarding their rights. But the American policy was tra- 
ditionally non-aggressive, and I found that to fair-minded 
Americans the Chinese would grant concessions which no 
other nation might hope to secure. 

I therefore asked through the Department of State what 
the American Red Cross might continue to do. Would it 
take steps toward the choosing of a reputable and efficient 
American engineering firm and have this firm supported by 
American capitalists, who might lend the Chinese Govern- 
ment the funds needed to reclaim the rich Hwai River region f 
The Red Cross responded favourably. I thereupon sought 
out Mr. Chang Chien, the scholar and minister, and got 
from him a definite agreement to entrust to the American 
Red Cross the selection of engineers and capitalists to carry 
out this great reform upon conditions laid down. 

The minister and I had frequent conferences. We dis- 
cussed carefully the engineering contracts, the conditions of 
the loan, the security. Every sentence in the proposed 
agreement had been weighed, every word carefully chosen; 



82 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

finally, on January 27, 1914, it was signed by Chang Chien 
as minister, and by myself in behalf of the American Red 
Cross. The J. G. White Corporation was chosen to finance 
the preHminary survey. Thus there were sent to China 
during the next summer three experts : Colonel (later Major 
General) Sibert, of the Panama Canal Commission; Mr. 
Arthur P. Davis, director of the United States Recla- 
mation Service; and Prof. D. W. Mead, of the University 
of Wisconsin, an expert in hydraulic engineering. 

Here was a beginning of great promise, and in a new 
direction. 

But American enterprise had already affected the daily 
life of the Chinese in the field opened up by the Standard Oil 
Company. In fact, the lamp of Standard Oil had lighted 
China. 

Now enter Mr. Yamaza, the Japanese minister. Japan, 
who had no oil in her lamp, wished to explore for it in China; 
so did other nations. But the American oil company, in a 
way which I shall detail, had gotten the concession. More- 
over, the Bethlehem Steel Corporation had agreed for 
^20,000,000 to build a merchant fleet for China, convertible 
into cruisers — this to take the place of an old imperial con- 
tract for warships. At China's express request, and not at 
all because they were in that business, the Bethlehem people 
also consented to apply three millions of the whole sum to 
improve a Chinese port. Together with the Hwai River 
enterprise these American activities had put Japan on the 
alert. The Japanese press had distorted their significance, 
and now in the small Bethlehem contract Mr. Yamaza began 
to see things — a future Chinese mistress of the Asian seas, 
perhaps, and the Chinese littoral all besprinkled with 
naval ports. One evening Mr. Yamaza spoke to me about 
it, and at length; it was plain that his government meant some 
move. 

Now Mr. Yamaza and his first secretary, Mr. Midzuno, 



A LITTLE VISION FOR CHINA 83 

were both unusually clever men. They drank a great deal. 
The minister explained that he did this for reasons of health, 
because, unless there were something he could give up if he 
should be taken sick, it might be very bad for him. I recall 
how Mr. Midzuno entertained a party at dinner by detailing 
his notable collection of expressions in various languages, of 
equivalents to the German term "Katzenjammer." Both 
of these men had previous Chinese experience and were 
intimately familiar with Chinese affairs. Yamaza was a 
man of great shrewdness; being under the influence of liquor 
seemed rather to sharpen his understanding. Taciturn and 
speaking in hesitating sentences, he would never commit 
himself to anything, but would deploy the conversation with 
great skill, in order to give his interlocutor every chance to 
do that very thing. 

On the evening of this conversation we were guests of the 
manager of the Russo-Asiatic Bank. An amateur theatrical 
performance was in progress — three French "one-acters," 
the chief being "The Man Who Married a Dumb Wife," by 
Anatole France. Peking foreign society was there in force ; the 
majority were gathered in the large salon where the stage was 
set, others promenading or conversing in small groups. In 
the intermission between two plays I encountered the 
Japanese minister, and, finding that he desired to talk, 
wandered with him to the smoking room, where we pre- 
empted a corner, whence during a long conversation we 
would catch now and then the echoes from the salon as the 
action on the stage rose to a more excited pitch. 

Mr. Yamaza was more talkative than I had ever seen him. 
As was his custom, he had consumed ardent waters quite 
freely, but, as always, his mind was clear and alert. "In 
Shensi and Chihli provinces," he opened up, "the exertions of 
Japanese nationals in the matter of the concession to the 
Standard Oil Company have given them a right to be con- 
sidered. I have been contending to the Chinese that 



84 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Japan has a prior interest in the oil field of Shensi Province. 
Do you not know that Japanese engineers were formerly 
employed there?" 

On my part, I expressed surprise that the Japanese papers 
should make so much noise about the American oil con- 
cession, whereas it was quite natural that Americans, who 
had done business in China for over a century, should oc- 
casionally go into new lines of enterprise. 

But it soon became manifest that Mr. Yamaza was think- 
ing of the Bethlehem Steel contract. "I must tell you," 
he said, "of the strategical importance of Fukien Province 
to my country." Then followed a long exposition. " China," 
he concluded, "has promised not to alienate this province to 
any other power, and Japan has repeatedly asserted an in- 
terest in that region." 

He then repeated various surmises and reports concerning 
the nature of the Bethlehem contract. I told him quite 
specifically the nature of the agreement and about its long 
previous existence. Mr. Johnston, vice-president of the 
Bethlehem company, at the request of the Chinese Govern- 
ment had viewed various naval ports with the purpose of 
making an estimate of improvements which were most 
needed. I could not admit any sinister significance in this 
visit nor concede that Americans were not free to engage 
in port construction in any part of China. 

While I had not been unguarded in my statements, I had 
assuredly not looked upon a conversation in such circum- 
stances as a formal one. Yet I soon found out that a memo- 
randum upon it was presented to the Department of State 
by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, during an 
interview with Secretary Bryan on the question of harbour 
works in Fukien. I shall revert to this matter later. 

A peculiarity of Chinese psychology was evinced after the 
Standard Oil contract had been signed. One year was 
given to select specific areas within which oil production was 



A LITTLE VISION FOR CHINA 85 

to be carried on as a joint enterprise of the Chinese Govern- 
ment and the American company, the ratio of property 
interest of the two partners being 45 to 55. The contract 
undoubtedly offered an opportunity for securing the major 
share in the development of any petroleum resources which 
might be discovered in China; for, once such a partnership 
has been established and the work under it carried out in an 
acceptable manner, an extension of the privileges obtained 
may confidently be looked for. But in itself the contract 
signed in February, 1914, was only a beginning. It denoted 
the securing of a bare legal right; and in China a government 
decree or concession is not in itself all-powerful. If its 
motives are suspected, if it has been obtained by pressure or 
in secrecy, if its terms are not understood or are believed to 
imply unjust burdens to certain provinces or to the people at 
large, then popular opposition will arise. This may not 
affect the legal character of the grant or the responsibility of 
the Government, but it will seriously obstruct the ready and 
profitable carrying out of the business. The obverse of this 
situation — the getting of a contract "on the square" and 
the demonstration that it is fair and just — finds every in- 
fluence willing to cooperate. 

But when the Standard Oil Company's contract had been 
signed, not much was publicly known about it save in general 
terms. Rival interests began to portray it as involving in- 
roads upon the rights of the Chinese people, especially of the 
provinces of Shensi and Chilili. Stories of bribery were 
circulated in the papers. In the negotiations concluded at 
Peking no particular attention had been paid to local opinion, 
the suspicions of provincials were stirred, and an outcry 
speedily arose. 

The representatives of the Standard Oil Company had left 
Peking. I informed the company that its interests were 
endangered. Its response was to send to Peking Mr. Roy 
S. Anderson, the American whose intimate knowledge of 



86 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Chinese affairs has been referred to. Mr. Anderson held 
sessions with those who had objected, especially with the 
provincials of Shensi who were resident in Peking. He 
discussed with them the terms of the contract, pointing out 
the benefit to the provinces through the development of a 
large industry there. The Chinese always respond to 
reasonable discussion, and not many days later the very 
associations which had protested most vigorously against the 
agreement waited upon the Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce with their congratulations. They promised the 
aid of the province in carrying out the contract. Had the 
contract not been straightforward and fair in its terms and 
free of undue influence in its making, such active support 
could not have been had. 

It was then that the Chinese Government created an Oil 
Development Bureau, together with a River Conservancy 
Bureau for drainage works, including those projected in the 
Hwai River region. Of the new Oil Development Bureau 
the Prime Minister, Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling, on his resignation 
from the cabinet in March, accepted the position as chief. 
He had been both Premier and concurrently Minister of 
Finance. Tall, good-looking, with full face and shining 
black hair, Mr. Hsiung speaks with great fluency in a high- 
pitched voice. Though he was a member of the Chin Pu 
Tang, or progressive party, he had been selected Premier 
by Yuan Shih-kai, who was fighting the democratic party 
(Kuo Min Tang), probably because he believed that parha- 
ment would reject him and he could then blame that body 
for obstructive tactics. It accepted him, and Yuan took 
another path to overthrow parliament. In his career Mr. 
Hsiung had been aided by the counsel and cooperation of his 
wife, who is exceptionally capable. Well-intentioned, broad- 
minded, given to Western methods, the Premier was handi- 
capped during his term through relative inexperience in 
administrative and financial matters. He was pitted against 



A LITTLE VISION FOR CHINA 87 

men of shrewdness as politicians and of deep immersion in 
financial manipulations. 

As chief of the Oil Development Bureau, Mr. Hsiung's 
first task was that of pointing out to the Japanese minister, 
Mr. Yamaza, whom the Japanese interests immediately 
pressed forward, that no monopoly of exploitation had been 
granted to the Standard Oil Company, for within a year the 
company would have to select specific and limited areas 
within the two provinces where production was to be carried 
on. 

"The grant to Americans," the Japanese minister there- 
upon remarked, "seems to indicate that China does not care 
much about the international friendship of Japan." 

Mr. Hsiung's reply was that this was a business arrange- 
ment, and the nationals of other countries as well — Great 
Britain, France, and Germany — had sought such concessions 
in the recent past. To the inquiry whether a similar agree- 
ment would be concluded with Japan for other provinces, 
the director replied that it would not at this time be con- 
venient. 

"Then I hereby notify you," Mr. Yamaza rejoined, "that 
in all likelihood I shall take up this matter with the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs." 

Mr. Yamaza referred to the Japanese engineers who at 
one time worked in the oil fields of Shensi Province; where- 
upon Mr. Hsiung recalled that American and German en- 
gineers had formerly been employed in the Hgtnyehping iron 
enterprise; yet when that company made a Joan agreement 
with Japanese interests, no objections had been made either 
by America or Germany. 

This conversation illustrates the manner in which attempts 
are often made to establish prior claims with regard to 
enterprises in China by alleging a prior desire or the prior 
employment of individuals — considerations which would 
nowhere else be considered as establishing a preference or 



S8 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

inchoate option. It is as much as to say that by merely 
expressing a wish for a thing one has already established a 
prior right to it should it be given out. 

The making of two important contracts with the Chinese 
Government naturally attracted attention. Of the British 
press the North China Daily News repeated the judgment of 
its Peking correspondent: "The Americans deserve their 
success, for they have worked for it steadily and consist- 
ently." 

The Daily News attributed this success primarily to the 
fact that since the days of Secretary Hay, American enter- 
prise in China had been consistently pacific and benevolent. 
"Tn no country in the world," it declared, "can more be done 
through friendship and for friendship's sake than in China." 

The German press, while inclined to be critical, still 
admitted the fairness of the contracts and the probable 
benefit to be derived therefrom by China, and spoke in dis- 
approval of the Japanese attitude assumed toward the new 
oil enterprise. Later a long article appeared in the chief 
German paper in China {Ostasiatische Lloyd)^ in which 
the existence of a very far-reaching policy of economic 
penetration by America was surmised. The writer imagined 
that all the factors — educational, financial, and industrial — 
were being guided according to a complicated but harmonious 
plan to achieve the actual predominance of American inter- 
ests in China. 

The German minister. Von Haxthausen, spoke to me 
about this article. "I hope," he said, "that you will not 
conclude that its views are those of myself and my legation." 

I assured him that I felt highly flattered that anybody 
should have conceived that American action proceeded with 
such careful planning and such cunning grasp of all details. 

The Franco-Russian semi-official sheet, the Journal de 
Pekin, continued its carping attitude against all American 
enterprise. It lumped together the Y. M. C. A., mission- 



A LITTLE VISION FOR CHINA 89 

aries, Standard Oil, and the British-American Tobacco 
Company as engaged in a nefarious effort to gain ascendency 
for American influence in China. It failed, however, to 
surmise the subtle plan suggested in the German paper, but 
presupposed an instinctive cooperation of all these American 
agencies. This paper was occasionally stirred to great waves 
of indignation, as when it discovered that the Y. M. C. A. was 
undermining Chinese religious morale and destroying the 
sanctity of holy places by estabhshing a bathing pool in one 
of the temples. This deplorable desecration, which wrung 
from the breast of the Belgian editor of the Franco-Russian 
sheet moans of outraged virtue, had for its substance the 
fact that in the large monastery of Wo Fu Ssu — in the foot- 
hills fifteen miles from Peking, where the Y. M. C. A. had 
summer quarters — a large pool in the residential part of the 
enclosures was actually used for a dip on hot mornings. But 
no Chinese had ever hinted that his feelings were lacerated. 

The American papers and Americans generally were some- 
what encouraged by this constructive action. In the Chinese 
Press the veteran American lawyer, T. R. Jernigan, said: 
"It is clear that the Wilson Administration will use its 
influence to further the extension of the business of American 
merchants whether they act in a corporate capacity or 
otherwise." 

On the side of finance as well as industry the Chinese 
courted American interest. The Minister of Finance and 
Mr. Liang Shih-yi were frequently my guests; and we 
conversed particularly on the financial situation. Both took 
a view quite different from the traditional Chinese ofiicial 
attitude. They desired to have the Government make 
itself useful and take the lead in organizing both national 
credit and industry. They considered it possible to develop 
Chinese domestic credit to an extent that would materially 
supply the financial needs of the Government, Unfortu- 
nately, the great system of banking which had been built up 



90 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

by the Shansi Bankers' Guild was very inadequate to modern 
needs. Banking had rested wholly on personal knowledge 
of the character and credit of borrowers; no collateral was 
used, there was no dealing in corporate securities. 

When China came into contact with the business methods 
of Western nations, this system could not help in developing 
new enterprises. That task fell largely to the foreign banks 
established in the treaty ports, who had no vision of the 
possibilities of internal development in China. The Shansi 
bankers, on their part, unable to adapt themselves to new 
conditions, saw their field of action gradually limited, their 
business faUing off. These banks lost their grip on affairs. 
They felt themselves in need of financial assistance from the 
Government. The Minister of Finance was considering 
whether these old institutions might not be transformed into 
modern and adequate agencies of Chinese domestic credit. 
He and other native financiers became interested in the 
national banking system through which, in the United States, 
quantities of pubhc debentures had been absorbed to furnish 
a sound basis for a currency. 

It seemed impossible to utilize the Shansi banks as the 
main prop of a modern system. A new organization, such as 
the Bank of China, planned on modern lines, might be 
strengthened by American financial support and technical 
assistance. Mr. Liang Shih-yi was willing to give to Ameri- 
can interests an important share in the management of the 
Bank of China in return for a strengthening loan. A New 
York contractor, Mr. G. M. Gest, was at this time in Peking 
on a pleasure tour with his family. Impressed with the need 
for the launching of new financial and industrial enterprises 
in China, his first thought had been to secure a concession to 
build a system of tramways in Peking. Chinese officials had 
previously told me of an existing Chinese contract which 
might be turned over to Americans. I was not very en- 
thusiastic about this particular enterprise, because I feared 



A LITTLE VISION FOR CHINA 91 

it might destroy the unique character of Peking street life, 
without great business success or much benefit to anybody. 

On inquiring further we found that French interests had 
just signed a loan contract which covered, among other 
things, the Peking tramways. 

The financing was curious; the proceeds were presumably 
to be used to complete the port works at Pukow, on the 
Yangtse River, and to establish the tramways of Peking. 
However, it was plain that the loan had been made really for 
administrative or political purposes, its industrial character 
being secondary, as the work was indefinitely postponed. 
This subterfuge of so-called "industrial loans," of which the 
proceeds were to be used for politics, was later very exten- 
sively resorted to, particularly in the Japanese loans of 191 8. 

Learning of this state of affairs, Mr. Gest turned his at- 
tention to the problem of Chinese domestic financing, and at 
the close of his short residence in Peking he had obtained 
an option for the Bank of China loan contract, which he 
followed up with energy upon his return to the United States. 

American attention had been drawn to the contracts for 
the Hwai River conservancy and for petroleum exploration, 
and American commercial journals and bankers were again 
giving thought to the financing of projects in China. To 
show the attitude of New York bankers at this time, of their 
difficulties, doubts, and inclinations, I shall cite portions of a 
letter written me by Mr. Willard Straight, dated April 29, 
1914. While I did not agree with Mr. Straight on several 
matters of detail, especially the withdrawal from the Con- 
sortium, we were both agreed as to the importance of con- 
tinued American participation in Chinese finance and in- 
dustry. The letter follows: 

As regards the Hwai River conservancy, you have doubtless already been 
advised that the Red Cross has made an arrangement with J. G. White 
& Company, whereby an engineering board will be despatched to China to 
make a detailed survey. The matter of financing was brought to the 



92 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Group, who felt it impossible satisfactorily to discuss this question without 
more definite information regarding actual conditions and the probable 
cost of the work contemplated. 

When, upon receipt of the report of the engineering board, we take up 
the discussion of the financial problem, the suggestions contained in your 
letter of the 24th of March will be very valuable. It might, as you say, 
be comparatively easy to issue a loan of ten million dollars at almost any 
time. That would depend, however, not on the size but on the nature of 
the loan. There is no market for Chinese securities in this country at this 
time, and it would be difficult if not impossible for the bankers to create 
one within any reasonable time without the active and intelligent support 
or at least the declared approval of the Government. . . . 

When the American Group first entered upon negotiations for the 
Hukuang loan, conditions in this country were good. Business men were 
looking abroad for new trade openings, the Taft Administration was anx- 
ious to encourage the extension of foreign trade and the Chinese Govern- 
mental Bubble had not been pricked. During our four years of experience 
a not inconsiderable public interest in China and her development was 
aroused, and had we issued the Reorganization Loan, as we had hoped to 
do, in February, 1913, we probably could have sold our twenty-million- 
dollar share to investors throughout the country. This we would have 
been able to do despite the revolution and uncertain governmental condi- 
tions in China, because of public confidence due to the support of our own 
and the other interested governments. 

Neither Mr. Taft nor Mr. Knox ever promised to send American battle- 
ships to threaten China, or to land marines to occupy Chinese territory, 
in case of default in interest payments. The public was misled by no false 
statements, but there was, nevertheless, a general belief that our Govern- 
ment was actively interested in the preservation of China's credit and in 
the development of that country. 

This, as I told you in our conversation at the Century Club, was changed 
by the President's declaration of March 19, 1913. The fact that the 
President and the State Department felt that China, as a young republic, 
was entitled to extraordinary consideration and sympathy; the fact that 
our Government^ recognized Yuan Shih-kai's political machine, and the 
fact that the Administration subsequently gave out some general expres- 
sions regarding the Government's interest in the development of American 
trade, did not in any way restore in the mind of the investor the confidence 
which had been destroyed by the specific condemnation of the activities 
of the only American banking group which had had the enterprise, the 
courage, and the patience to enter and remain in the Chinese field and 



A LITTLE VISION FOR CHINA 93 

which, despite its unpopularity among certain yellow journals and a num- 
ber of Western Congressmen, stood for integrity, fair dealing, and sound 
business in the minds of the bond-purchasing public, upon whose readiness 
to buy the success of any bond issue must depend. 

This confidence which would have enabled us to sell Chinese bonds had 
been created by four years of hard work on the part of the bankers and the 
Government. Once destroyed, it can be restored only by general govern- 
mental declarations, which will probably have to be stronger than any of 
those made by the Taft Administration, or, in the absence thereof, by effec- 
tive, consistent, and repeated specificproof of the Government's willingness 
to assist and encourage our merchants, contractors, and bankers. As you 
know, it is more difficult to correct a bad impression than it is originally 
to create a good one. 

I quite appreciate that it will be difficult for the President to take any 
action which would seem to be a reversal of his former position, but I hope 
that the last paragraph of his declaration of last March, in which he stated 
that he would urge "all the legislative measures necessary to assure to 
contractors, engineers, etc., the banking and other financial facilities which 
they now lack" may be interpreted and developed along lines which will 
permit him actively to support the Red Cross plan. 

If the Administration will publicly evidence its interest in and its sup- 
port of this project during the next few months, so that when the matter 
is finally brought up to the bankers for decision they may be able to feel 
that the public has become interested and assured that our Government 
is behind the plan, it may prove to be the means by which we can again 
enter China. This I have pointed out to Miss Boardman who, I feel sure, 
fully understands the situation. 

I sincerely trust that your great interest and your energy in endeavour- 
ing to extend our interests in China may have an effect upon our own 
Administration. I believe the bankers will always be willing to help if 
they are able to do so, but we are not, like our Continental friends, anxiously 
looking for chances to invest abroad, especially at the present time when 
we have so many troubles of our own, and instead of being merely shown 
the opportunity, we must be persuaded in the first place that it is sound 
business and in the second place that it is our patriotic duty to undertake 
it. And we must feel, in addition, that if we should undertake it our 
enterprise and energy will not serve merely to rouse a storm of jealousy on 
the part of those who will not assume any risks themselves, but who cry 
"monopoly" as soon as an interest capable of handling foreign business is 
given the active support of our Government. 

I am sorry that it is impossible to give a more optimistic picture, but 



94 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

I assure you that I shall do all in my power to support you and your 
efforts, which I sincerely trust may be attended with the success they 
deserve. 

The intelligent support promised in this letter continued 
until the untimely death of Mr. Straight in Paris, while he 
was with the American Peace Commission. 



CHAPTER IX 
"SLOW AMERICANS" 

"The Americans are altogether too slow!" 

This exclamation from a Chinese seemed amusing. It 
came on the evening of the red dust-storm that enveloped 
Peking, during one of the long after-dinner conversations 
with Liang Shih-yi and Chow Tsu-chi; and it was the latter 
who thus gave vent to his impatience. 

Liang Shih-yi, the "Pierpont Morgan of China," Chief 
Secretary to the President, was credited as being, next to 
Yuan Shih-kai, the ablest and most influential man in Peking. 
Mr. Liang is highly educated according to Chinese literary 
standards, and while he has not studied Western science, he 
has a keen, incisive mind which enables him readily to under- 
stand Western conditions and methods. His outstanding 
quality is a faculty for organization. He built up the 
Chinese Communications Service on the administrative and 
financial side. He declined taking office as a minister, but 
usually controlled the action of the cabinet through his 
influence over important subordinates, and managed all 
financial aff"airs for Yuan Shih-kai. Cantonese, short of 
stature and thickset, with a massive Napoleonic head, he 
speaks little, but his side remarks indicate that he is always 
ahead of the discussion, which is also shown by his searching 
questions. When directly questioned himself, he will always 
give a lucid and consecutive account of any matter. He did 
not rise above the level of Chinese official practice in the 
matter of using money to obtain political ends. To some he 
was the father of deceit and corruption, to others the god of 
wealth, while still others revered in him his great genius for 

95 



96 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

organization. While by no means a romantic figure, he 
thoroughly stimulated a romantic interest among others, who 
attributed to him almost superhuman cunning and ability. 

When the noted Sheng Hsuan-huai became Minister of 
Communications in 191 1, he used his influence and cunning 
to thwart Liang and throw him out of the mastery of the 
Board of Communications, known as the fattest organ of 
the Government. Mr. Liang stood his ground, and his 
influence greatly increased because of his ability to withstand 
so strong an attack. During the revolution Liang Shih-yi 
was also very influential in the Grand Council, attaching 
himself more and more strongly to Yuan Shih-kai. Always 
satisfied with the substance of power without its outward 
show, he steadfastly declined to become a responsible minis- 
ter, and worked from the vantage ground of the Secretariat 
of the President. His life has frequently been endangered. 
He gained the hatred of the democratic party, with which 
he was once associated, because he aided Yuan in playing his 
complicated game of first confusing, then destroying, parlia- 
ment. Nor were the Progressives (Chin Pu Tang) enamoured 
of him. Of great personal courage, he was indifferent to 
the blame and ridicule which for a while almost all news- 
papers heaped upon him. As he was still in a comparatively 
inferior position when these attacks began, they rather 
helped him by calling attention to his abilities and his 
personal importance. Thus his opponents advertised him. 
In possession of all the intricacies of the situation, when 
the parliamentarians first came to Peking, he sat back in- 
conspicuously, and, supplied with influence and money, 
moulded the political situation as if it had been wax. 

Of all the cabinet, Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, Minister of Com- 
munications, was personally most familiar with American 
affairs, having lived for several years in Washington and 
New York in an official capacity. He speaks English 
fluently and prefers American methods. He hates un- 



"SLOW AMERICANS" 97 

necessary ceremony. Whenever he called upon me I had 
almost to engage in personal combat with him to be per- 
mitted to accompany him to the outer door, as is due to a 
high dignitary in China. He beheves in learning improved 
methods from reHable foreigners, and will go as far as any 
Chinese in giving foreigners whom he trusts a free hand, 
though he would not yield to any one a power of supreme 
control. On this occasion he talked about the reorgani- 
zation of the Bank of China, and the possibility of floating 
domestic bonds among Chinese capitaHsts. Mr. Chow was 
chanting a jeremiad about how the Chinese had been led to 
give valuable concessions to Americans, which had not been 
developed, and how this had brought only embarrassment 
and trouble to China. 

We spoke, also, of the original Hankow-Canton railway 
concession which the Americans tried to sell to King Leopold ; 
of the Knox neutralization plan, and of the Chinchow-Aigun 
railway concession, the only effect of which had been to 
strengthen the grip of Russia and Japan on Manchuria. 
W^hen the Americans, as a mark of special confidence and 
trust, had received the option on a currency loan with the 
chance to reorganize Chinese currency, they had straight- 
way invited Great Britain, Germany, and France into the 
game. "Thus they saddled China with the International 
Consortium," Chow Tsu-chi moaned. And so on went the 
recital, through many lesser and larger enterprises that had 
proved abortive. 

One had to confess that in China we certainly had not 
taken Fortune by the forelock, nor even had we clung to her 
skirts. Mr. Chow Tsu-chi was especially grieved at the 
circuitous and dilatory methods of the Four-Power Group 
which held the contract to build the Hukuang railways. 
"The thirty millions of dollars originally provided has been 
almost entirely spent," he complained, "without producing 
more than two hundred miles of actual construction; and 



98 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

there is constant wrangling among the partners concerning 
engineering standards. Moreover, everything has to be re- 
ferred from Peking to London, thence to New York, Paris, 
BerHn, and back and forth among them all, until it is neces- 
sary to look up reams of files to know what it is all about. 
And it may all have been about the purchase of a flat 
car." 

I knew well enough that Americans, too, were much dis- 
couraged at the cumbersome progress of the Hukuang railway 
enterprise. The engineering rights on the section west from 
Ichang up into Szechuan Province had been assigned to 
America, and Mr. W. Randolph was at this time making a 
survey. He had great energy and unHmited belief in the 
future importance and profitableness of this line. But be- 
yond the initial survey the available funds would not go, 
and no new financing could be obtained — this for a railway 
to gain access to an inland empire of forty millions of people! 

In the American enterprises which had been launched 
recently, however, there was no little activity. The Standard 
Oil Company with commendable expedition, if perhaps with 
undue lavishness of men and supplies, sent to China geo- 
logical experts of the first order, together with large staffs of 
engineers, drilling experts, and all needed machinery. The 
geologists were soon off toward the prospective oil regions in 
Chihli and Shensi provinces. In Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling's 
bureau and in the Standard Oil offices the outfitting of 
expeditions, the purchase of supplies, and the selection of a 
large Chinese personnel proceeded apace. Everyone was 
hopeful. 

With the Hwai River conservancy matter, also, negoti- 
ations had gone rapidly in the United States. The American 
National Red Cross and the engineering firm of J. G. White 
& Company had agreed to finance the preliminary survey. 
The American Congress in May passed an act lending the 
services of an army engineer for the prehminary survey. 



"SLOW AMERICANS" 99 

Colonel Sibert of the Panama Canal Commission was desig- 
nated as chairman of the engineering board. The outlook 
was favourable, action had been taken promptly. 

The excitement stirred up among the Japanese by the 
sojourn in China of the Bethlehem Steel Company's vice- 
president, Mr. Archibald Johnston, now had a further sequel. 
The text of an alleged contract between the Chinese Govern- 
ment and the Bethlehem Steel Company was circulated 
early in May — by interested persons — which included among 
other provisions arrangements for construction of a naval 
base in Fukien Province. The bogus quality of the report 
was at once manifest. Through some influence, however, it 
was assiduously pushed forward in the press; it became the 
basis of a legend, which even got into the books of otherwise 
well-informed writers as authentic. It was on the subject 
of this spurious paper that the Japanese ambassador at 
Washington called on Secretary Bryan for information. 
Thus the matter of the possible building of a naval base in 
Fukien for the Chinese Government by American con- 
tractors became a matter of State Department note. I was 
informed that the Japanese ambassador at Washington had 
left a summary of the conversation, of March 12th, between 
the Japanese minister at Peking and myself. Apparently 
the Japanese were attempting to get around my refusal to 
acknowledge that American enterprise in China could in any 
way be limited by the declarations or agreements of other 
powers than the United States. 

The State Department inquired whether the newly re- 
ported contract for a loan of ^30,000,000 was identical with 
the older contract of the Bethlehem Steel Company. I was 
informed that the Japanese Government did not object to 
the loan, but to the construction of any new naval base in 
Fukien, and that the Department had been told that the 
Chinese Government itself did not wish to construct there 
because of the Japanese objection. It was intimated to 



100 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

me that I might encourage the Chinese in the idea that such 
building, while legitimate, would be unwise. 

I reported to the Department that the original Bethlehem 
contract had no connection with the spurious document 
recently circulated; that only a very small sum was to be 
devoted to harbour work in China, the location of which 
had not been fixed; and that the execution of the entire 
contract had been postponed because of financial conditions. 
While the Chinese Government wajs not contemplating any 
construction at this time, I stated that the attempt of any 
other government to establish a claim of special rights of 
supervision must be considered derogatory to Chinese 
sovereignty and to American rights of equal opportunity; 
I urged, therefore, that we avoid any action or statement 
which would admit such a claim, or which would in any 
way encourage the making of it. The Chinese Government 
has never admitted that its right to plan the defence of 
its coastline is subject to veto by any other government. 
Such admission on our part that Japan has the right to 
claim special interests in Fukien would shake the confidence 
of the Chinese in our seriousness and consistency, and in 
our determination to protect our legitimate interests in an 
undivided China, freely open to the commerce of all nations, 
where Americans can do business without asking permission 
of any other outsiders. 

Dr. Chen Chin-tao was then acting as Financial Com- 
missioner of the Chinese Government in Europe and Amer- 
ica. The danger of a further growth of the idea of spheres 
of influence in China had been accentuated. Railway con- 
cessions had been allocated to different nations according 
to territorial areas where the respective countries claimed 
certain priorities; if concessions were made otherwise, the 
combined influence of the powers seeking special spheres 
was used to defeat them. To meet this danger a plan was 
developed for granting a large construction contract to 



"SLOW AMERICANS" loi 

an international syndicate made up of British, American, 
French, and German companies, who would divide the con- 
struction on some basis other than localized national spheres 
of influence. Doctor Chen, with an American assistant, 
was charged to take up this proposal with various companies. 
On the part of France and Germany, contractors and govern- 
ments seemed favourable to the idea. In Great Britain 
the firm approached was Paulding & Company, who had 
already in the preceding year received a railway concession 
in China extending through the Province of Hunan and to 
the south thereof. This firm would readily cooperate, 
but the British Government objected. It would accept 
the principle of the international company only on condition 
that all lines traversing the Yangtse Valley should be con- 
structed by the British participant in the syndicate. 

This suggests the extent to which the sphere-of-influence 
doctrine dominated at this time the thought and action of 
the British Foreign Office. 

The American Government, on its part, took exception 
to the size and duration of the concession, which it feared 
might gain a monopolistic character. Probably the diffi- 
culty would have been cleared up, since, after all, a specific 
and limited, though considerable grant, was intended. But 
the preliminary discussion had not resulted in agreement 
before the Great War supervened. 

When Mr. Gest returned to the United States, he took 
up the matter of a loan to China with American financial 
interests, but they hesitated to act until the American 
Government expressed its approval and willingness to give 
support. Mr. Gest thereupon laid siege to the Department 
of State. He succeeded on the 3rd of June in securing 
from the Secretary a letter to the effect that the Department 
would be gratified to have China receive any substantial 
assistance from Americans in the nature of a loan upon 
terms similar to the present agreement. "This Govern- 



I02 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

ment," the letter stated, "will, in accordance with its usual 
policy, give all proper diplomatic support to any legitimate 
enterprise of that character." 

There had been much talk about the supposed determina- 
tion of the Department of State to let American interests 
abroad shift for themselves, quite without encouragement 
or special protection. The letter, though moderate in 
language, nevertheless attracted great attention and was 
taken to indicate a change of heart in the Administration. 
I may say at this point that the Department of State never 
at anytime failed to back me in efforts to develop and protect 
American interests in China. But it was not always able, 
especially later on, when overburdened with the work of the 
war, to follow up matters which it had approved, when the 
opposition or indifference of other departments put other 
claims in the forefront. 

I had for a season observed and worked with American 
commercial interests in China. I had definite conclusions 
as to what was needed in the way of organization to encour- 
age American trade. The great defect lay in the absence 
of financial institutions for handling foreign loans, and for 
assisting in foreign industrial development, helpful to Amer- 
ican commerce. The only American bank in China, the 
International Banking Corporation, then confined itself 
strictly to exchange business and to dealing in commercial 
paper; it had developed no policy of responding to local 
industrial needs and helping in the inner development of 
China. All the foreign banks had wholly the treaty-port 
point of view. They thought not at all of developing the 
interior regions upon which the commerce of the treaty 
ports after all depends. They were satisfied with scooping 
off the cream of international commercial transactions and 
exchange operations. 

I strongly favoured creating banking institutions which 
would broadly represent American capital from various 



"SLOW AMERICANS" 103 

regions of our country, and would respond to the urgent 
need of China for a modern organization of local credit. 

There were but few American commission houses. In 
most cases American-manufactured goods were handled by 
houses of other nationality, who often gave scant attention 
to promoting American trade and used American products 
only when those of their own nation could not be ob- 
tained. It seemed worth while to establish additional trad- 
ing companies, especially cooperative organizations among 
exporters, after the fashion of the "Representation for 
British Manufacturers, Ltd." Further, I strongly urged 
the American Government to station a commercial attache 
in China. I was gratified by the appointment during the 
year of a commercial attache in the person of Consul- 
General Julean Arnold, an official of great intelligence, wide 
knowledge, and untiring energy. 

The Chinese cabinet, which had been under a provi- 
sional premier for several months, was finally reorganized 
in June, 1914. The chief change in the cabinet was the 
appointment of Mr. Liang Tun-yen as Minister of 
Communications, and the shifting of Mr. Chow Tsu-chi 
from that position to the Ministry of Finance. With 
these new ministers American contractors and financiers 
had much to do. Premier Hsiung Hsi-ling had withdrawn 
in February, and with him the two other members of the 
Chin Pu Tang or progressive party. These political leaders 
had served Yuan's purpose by aiding him to dissolve par- 
liament; they could now be spared. But a new premier was 
not immediately found. Yuan at length prevailed on Mr. 
Hsu Shi-chang to take the premiership in June. The title 
of premier was changed to secretary of state. 

I met Mr. Liang Tun-yen for the first time on June 2nd, 
at a luncheon given by Mr. B. Lenox Simpson, whose land- 
lord he was. Mr. Liang is tall, aristocratic-looking, with 
a fine, intellectual face. He speaks English perfectly, 



I04 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

as he received his earlier education in the United States. 
Then, as on frequent occasions in subsequent years, he 
expressed himself in a deeply pessimistic strain. He com- 
plained of recent inroads attempted by the French in Yun- 
nan, and of the methods they employed to strengthen their 
hold. But this was only one cause for pessimism. In the 
future of his country he saw "no prospect of strong national 
action," or of "any sort of effective help from the outside." 
He considered the upper classes "incapable of sacrifices 
and vigorous action." He had recommended in 1901, 
he told me, that, instead of paying an indemnity, the 
Chinese should be allowed to spend an equal amount of 
public funds in sending abroad young men to be educated. 
All young Chinese, he said, should be sent abroad quite 
early, "before they have become corrupted." 

When Mr. Liang Tun-yen assumed office, it was announced 
that he would subject the Ministry of Communications 
to a thorough cleansing. This implied that the ministry 
had been corrupt and systematically so, under the control 
of Mr. Liang Shih-yi. Outsiders watched for indications 
of how that astute manager would handle the new opposition. 

Mr. Yeh Kung-cho, able and expert, had been chief of 
the Railway Bureau; he became a vice minister, but as he 
was a lieutenant of Liang Shih-yi's, it was understood that 
this position would probably be an empty dignity. A 
friend of Mr. Liang Tun-yen's, a highly respected engineer 
of American education, was appointed as the other vice 
minister. With no formal or open breach between the differ- 
ent factions, manoeuvring and counter-manoeuvring there 
undoubtedly was. The influence of Mr. Liang Shih-yi, 
however, seemed not seriously shaken. He had organized 
the Chinese railway experts and engineers in a railway 
association, keeping in touch with them through Mr. 
Yeh Kung-cho. Thus he held in his hands the main lines 
of influence. Also, he continued to head the Bank of Com- 



"SLOW AMERICANS" 105 

munications, which is the fiscal agency for the Railway 
Board. So again it seemed that the opposition could not 
get at the source of this unusual man's power. 

Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, as Minister of Finance, warmly 
urged the idea that the Americans, to whom the Government 
had shown itself so friendly, reciprocate by making a loan 
to the Chinese Government. He planned a loan of 
^40,000,000 for the purpose of refunding the entire floating 
indebtedness of his government. Hopes had been en- 
tertained that the Standard Oil Company would use its 
influence in bringing about such a loan, but that company 
was not willing to go outside of the special business of its 
contract with China. The option which had been given 
to Mr. Gest had not yet resulted in any completed trans- 
action in the United States. So accustomed were the 
Chinese to the readiness of any nationality which held 
important concessions, in turn to support the Chinese 
Government financially, that they could not understand 
how America, with professions of great friendship and just 
now substantially favoured by the Chinese, should not be 
ready to reciprocate. The soundness of the desire of the 
Americans to have every transaction stand on its own bot- 
tom and not to use financial support as a bait to obtain 
concessions, could, of course, be appreciated by the Chinese. 
But at times their urgent needs made them impatient. 

The news of the assassination at Sarajevo reached us 
on July 1st. As this happened to be, though we did not then 
suspect it, the eve of a terrible convulsion in which all ac- 
cepted conditions of life, national and international, were 
shattered and unsettled, I shall here insert parts of the memo- 
randum which I drew up for my guidance at this time: 

It is evident that China finds herself in a critical situation, in the sense 
that the fundamental character of her political life and the direction of her 
political development are now being decided. While a vast community 
living under a complicated social system, which embodies the experience 



io6 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

of thousands of years, cannot change its methods of a sudden and will 
undoubtedly for a long time continue to differ radically from Western 
political societies, yet it admits of no doubt that a new era of development 
has begun and that certain essential alternatives are being faced. Such 
alternatives are the continued unity of the nation or its division; its con- 
tinued independence or the direct dominance of one or more foreign suze- 
rains; its commercial unity or its division into spheres of influence; the 
tendency of its institutions of government, whether in the direction of the 
absolutism of Russia and Japan, or the republicanism of the United States; 
and the character of its educational and legal system, either dominated by 
the ideas of America and England or of continental Europe or Japan. 
From these, there also follow important alternatives in industrial and com- 
mercial policy. 

Under these circumstances, it is of great moment whether the Chinese 
Government will remain free, with the assistance of influences friendly to 
the development of China's nationality, to preserve the unity of the Chi- 
nese State and to develop its institutions; or whether its financial distress, 
combined with the plottings of a revolutionary opposition, will deliver 
it into the hands of those who are not favourable to the growth of China's 
national life. 

The United States of America enjoys a position of great advantage for 
assisting the Chinese Government and influencing its development in the 
direction of free national life. The lack of a desire for political interfer- 
ence, the real sympathy felt in America with the strivings of the Chinese 
people, and cultural, educational, and charitable work unselfishly per- 
formed, have given the United States the undivided confidence of China. 
It is certainly true that the Chinese people are anxious to follow in the 
footsteps of the United States if they may only be permitted to do so. 

Any development of enterprise which increases American commercial 
interest in China is incidentally favourable to Chinese independence; be- 
cause, through the enlistment of neutral interests, the desire of outsiders 
for political control can be counterbalanced. The organizing of an Amer- 
ican investment bank and similar agencies for the development of Amer- 
ican commerce in China, participation of American capital in railway 
building, and the development of mines and oil fields through American 
companies and under American business methods would all be welcomed 
by China as the strengthening of a favourable influence. Different Chi- 
nese ministers have repeatedly said to me that at this time China is in need 
of the active assistance of those who are amicably disposed and that China 
is willing to do her part in cooperating, and in extending advantages, if 
only such active support is forthcoming. If American capital, industry, 



"SLOW AMERICANS" 107 

and commerce are not ready at this time to give that comparatively slight 
assistance to China which the situation calls for, it is likely that American 
action in China in the future will be on a far more modest basis than 
present possibilities promise. 

The war, of course, brought many changes in China. 
Much of the good work which had been started was either 
destroyed or long delayed. It marked the end of one phase 
of China's development. 



CHAPTER X 
FOLK WAYS AND OFFICIALS 

Several voices whispered: "It's Prince Pu Lun." 

It was at President Yuan Shih-kai's reception, New 
Year's Day, 191 4; the diplomatic corps and high officials 
were there. The Empress Dowager's residence, now oc- 
cupied by the President, was the scene. From the side 
rooms, whither we had withdrawn for refreshments after 
exchanging greetings with the President, we looked out into 
the main hall and saw that its floor had been entirely cleared, 
and a solitary figure in a general's uniform was proceeding 
across the floor toward the President. Walking alone and 
unattended, the representative of the Chinese Imperial 
Family had come to bring its felicitations to the President 
of the Republic. For the first time since the abdication, 
the Imperial Family was publicly taking notice of him who 
had displaced it in power. 

When the guests began to depart I gathered up my party 
and left the hall, together with Admiral Tsai Ting-kan. 
Outside was Prince Pu Lun, still solitary, walking with sad 
and pensive regard. We overtook him. I talked pleasantly 
with him on such non-committal matters as the Imperial 
collection of art, which was at this time being brought from 
Mukden. He seemed quite appreciative of this attention. 
I took him with me to the outer palace gate where his own 
carriage met him. 

Except the automobiles used inside of the palace enclosure, 
few were then to be found in Peking; soon, with improved 
roads, many hundreds came. The Empress Dowager be- 
fore her death had acquired a large collection of these 

108 



FOLK WAYS AND OFFICIALS 109 

foreign vehicles, which interested her greatly; but up to the 
time of her death the Board of Ceremonies had not suc- 
ceeded in solving the problem how she might ride in an auto- 
mobile in which there would also be, in sitting posture, 
one of her servants, the chauffeur. If they had had more 
time, I imagine that they might have found some way by 
which the chauffeur could kneel in driving the Imperial 
car, but, as it was, the poor Empress Dowager never had the 
pleasure of the swift rides she so much coveted. 

Many popular superstitions still prevailed in parts 
of the provinces. The military attache of the American 
Legation, Major Bowley, who later did distinguished ser- 
vice in the Great War as general of artillery, was active 
in visiting the military commanders in different parts of 
China and in observing their actions and getting their views. 
He had just returned from such a trip to Kiangsi Province, 
and related how one of the generals there strove to im- 
prove his morale by drinking the blood of enemies who 
had been killed. He spared Major Bowley a cupful of this 
precious liquid, which was to be taken before breakfast. 
It is startling to discover among the people so highly civil- 
ized as are the Chinese occasional remnants of barbarous 
doctrines and practices. There is an inverted homoeo- 
pathy in Chinese popular belief — ^to the effect that "equals 
strengthen equals"; thus, to eat muscle develops strength, 
to eat tripe aids the digestion, to eat heart or drink blood 
develops courage, and so on. 

One evening, at a dinner at Mr. Liang Shih-yi's house a 
spirited discussion developed between the host and Mr. 
Anderson. The latter had related a local custom of the 
Soochow region according to which it was permissible for a 
community or a crowd of people to bite to death any person 
who was thoroughly disapproved of by all. Apparently 



no AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

the method of execution was in itself a guaranty of universal 
condemnation, as a great many people would have to co- 
operate to effect the desired result by this method. Mr. 
Liang protested that the expression "bite to death" was 
in this case used only metaphorically, and there followed 
a long debate on Chinese folk customs. 

A dinner with General Kiang, Commander of the Peking 
Gendarmerie, afforded another sidelight on Chinese character. 
We had already been seated, when an unusually tall Chinese 
entered, wearing Chinese civihan dress. He was intro- 
duced as Tutuh Yin (General Yin Chang-heng), and I 
learned that he had just returned from Szechuan, where he 
had become governor during the revolution, after putting 
to death the Imperial Governor-General, Chao Er-feng. 
General Yin was of striking appearance, with strong fea- 
tures, and vigorous in gesture. Now, it is the custom at 
Chinese dinners, particularly when military are present, 
to engage in extensive drinkings of health. The Chinese, 
who are usually very abstemious, drink wine that resembles 
sherry, and also a liqueur-like rice wine, which latter is 
potent. The proposer of the toast raises his little cup and 
drains it in one draught; the guest to whom he addresses 
himself is expected to do likewise; both say "Gambey" 
(a challenge to empty the cup). General Yin, who seemed 
in high spirits, was on his legs half the time "gambey- 
ing" to the other guests, especially to myself and the other 
Americans, the military attache, the Chinese secretary, the 
commandant of the guard, and other officers. General 
Yin must have performed this courtesy at least forty times 
in the course of the evening, which with the attentions 
paid us by the other members of the table round, amounted 
to a considerable challenge of one's capacity. It must, 
however, be confessed that I largely shirked this test, in 
company with the amiable General Yin Chang, my Manchu 



FOLK WAYS AND OFFICIALS iii 

neighbour, by irrigating a large plant in front of us with the 
liquid dedicated to friendship. 

I saw General Yin Chang next morning. He asked 
whether I knew what had been the matter with Tutuh Yin 
the night before. I said that he seemed very animated 
and carried his liquor very well. General Yin then told 
me that after I had left, the Tutuh Yin had sat down with 
him and talked seriously and intently, revealing his deep 
worry lest Yuan Shih-kai should have him executed. He 
stated that Chao Er-hsun, the brother of the murdered 
Viceroy, was in Peking, and with other men using every 
influence to destroy him. "So," the Manchu general said/ 
"his bravado was just a cover for his worries." 

Next day Yin Tutuh called on me at my residence. 
He expressed deep regret for having taken so much wine 
on the evening of the dinner. He said : "It is not my custom, 
but I was excited and worried because of the uncertainty 
of my affairs." He then launched forth into a literary 
discussion of Confucianism in its bearing upon modern 
thought. Not knowing that he was a student of the classics, 
I was surprised when he revealed this side of his nature. 
As a matter of fact, he greatly resembled the men of the 
Renaissance who combined harsh and cruel qualities with 
a deep love of literature. The last time I saw the Tutuh 
Yin, more than five years later, he presented me with 
his written works. There were gathered about twenty 
members of the Confucian Society, and the conversation 
again turned around the permanent qualities of Confu- 
cianism. When the concept of the "unknowable" was re- 
ferred to. General Yin cited at length Herbert Spencer's 
views thereon. He said: "The greatness of Confucius lies 
in the fact that he centred his attention on those things 
which we know and can control, and that he aimed at the 
highest development of human action on this common-sense 
basis. He leaves the dreams about the unknowable to others." 



112 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Among our guests at a dinner was Dr. King Ya-mei, a Chi- 
nese lady noted for her wide information and cleverness. We 
spoke about the recent advance of Russia in Mongolia. 
*'Who can resist Russia!" she exclaimed. Like all thinking 
Chinese, she was deeply worried about the difficulties con- 
fronting her nation on all sides. Dr. C. C. Wang, who was 
also present, spoke of the lack of continuity in developing 
expert knowledge, because of the frequent shifts which are 
made in the pubHc service. 

Dr. King Ya-mei then told an amusing incident, which 
shows how natural community action and passive resistance 
are to the Chinese. In an orphan asylum at Tientsin a 
new set of regulations had been issued, but the orphans had 
paid no attention to them. After a good many children had 
been called to order without result, a meeting was convoked 
by the principal. When the orphans were asked why they 
did not obey the regulations, their spokesman said: "We 
are perfectly satisfied with the old regulations, and have 
no desire to change them." — "But the new regulations 
have been made by your teachers," rejoined the superin- 
tendent, "and they must be obeyed." — "We do not think," 
the spokesman replied, "that they are an improvement, 
and we propose to obey the old rules." — "But, then you 
shall be punished severely." — "If you try to punish us, 
we shall all go away; and then what will become of the 
orphan asylum?" 

They had reasoned it out that they were an important part 
of the institution. That orphans should conceive the idea 
to go on strike shows how normal and self-evident that 
mode of social action seems in China. 

I was visited by the newly appointed Chinese minister to 
Japan, Mr. Lu Tsung-yu, who later became quite notorious 
in China in connection with the loans of 191 8. He was ac- 
companied by Doctor Tsur, the president of Tsing Hua 



FOLK WAYS AND OFFICIALS 113 

College and a leading American-returned student. Mr. Lu is a 
slight man of suave manners, keen intelligence, and a love of 
manipulation. On this occasion he developed the idea that 
cooperation between the United States, China, and Japan 
was possible and desirable, as these three countries had many 
parallel interests. It was his opinion that Japan could not 
create an extensive settlement in Manchuria. He had been 
stationed in that region several years when Hsu Hsi-chang 
was viceroy; and he told me that he had observed that the 
Japanese came as officials, soldiers, or railway employees, or 
in connection with mining enterprises : but they did not seem 
to have any impulse to settle in the country as farmers, and 
as small merchants they could scarcely compete with the 
Chinese. Mr. Lu had been educated in Japan, being one of 
the first batch of Chinese students at Waseda University; 
together with Tsao Ju-lin, at this time Vice Minister of 
Foreign AiFairs, who also later played an important part in 
Chino-Japanese affairs; and Chang Chung-hsiang, the 
Chief Justice of China at that time, a man who exercised 
considerable influence in introducing into China the Japanese 
idea of judicial procedure and organization and who became 
Chinese minister in Tokyo in 1916. This trio of associates 
was popularly known as "the Three Diamonds." 

An important meeting of the diplomatic corps dealt with 
the procedure in the matter of claims against the Chinese 
Government on account of damage suffered during the revo- 
lution. The Japanese, French, and German representatives 
were inclined to insist that the Chinese Government be held 
responsible for all losses which could in any way be said to 
have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the revolution. 
In Hne with the traditional policy of fairness and moderation 
followed by the United States I strongly urged that only 
losses directly and physically traceable to violent action 
should be paid, eliminating such uncertain and contingent 



114 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

matters as anticipated profits. The British minister gave 
support to this view; his legation, too, had not encouraged the 
fihng of indirect claims. After much discussion, the sugges- 
tion was accepted in the form proposed. By this action were 
ruled out indirect claims to the amount of nearly four million 
dollars, which had already been Hsted and included by some 
of the legations in their totals. 

The British Legation, in which diplomatic meetings are 
held, is an old palace, formerly the residence of a Manchu 
prince, which was purchased by the British Government at 
the time when legations were first established at Peking. 
Fortunately, the fine architectural forms of the old structure 
had been retained sufficiently to leave this group of buildings 
justly proportioned, beautifully decorated, and free from 
jarring foreign notes. One passes to the minister's residence 
through two lofty, open halls, with tiled roofs and richly 
coloured eaves. The residential buildings are Chinese with- 
out and semi-European within, Chinese decorative elements 
having been allowed to remain in the inner spaces. The 
diplomatic meetings always took place in the dining room, 
where a huge portrait of Queen Victoria, from the middle 
period of her reign, impassively — not without symbolic 
significance — looked down upon the company. 

There were at this time about sixteen legations in Pekmg, 
so that the meetings were not too large for intimate conver- 
sation. The proceedings were usually carried on in the 
EngHsh language, partly out of deference to the Dean, and 
partly because English has come quite naturally to be the 
international language of the Far East. 

The diplomatic corps in Peking meets frequently, and it 
has more comprehensive and complicated business than falls 
to such a body in any other capital. Matters of diplomatic 
routine occupy only a subsidiary place. Because of the 
system of extra-territoriality under which foreign residents 



FOLK WAYS AND OFFICIALS 115 

remain exempt from Chinese law and subject only to that of 
their own respective nation, the foreign representatives in 
China are constantly concerned with the internal affairs of 
that country. The effects of any legislation by the Chinese 
Government upon foreign residents have to be considered by 
the diplomatic corps: if the most punctilious minister dis- 
covers that the measure in question in any way transgresses 
that absolute immunity from local law which is claimed, then 
objection will be made, and the unanimous consent, which is 
necessary to approve of such matters, is difficult or impossible 
to obtain. 

Questions of taxation are constantly before the diplomatic 
corps, as the Chinese local officials quite naturally attempt 
to find some way to make the foreigners bear at least part of 
the taxation of a government whose general protection they 
demand. The methods of proving claims and collecting 
indemnities give rise to much discussion, whenever there 
has been some outbreak of revolutionary activity. As cer- 
tain revenues have been pledged for international loans, the 
diplomatic corps will object to the Chinese Government using 
these revenues at all before they have been released as not 
needed for defraying the debt charges. One of the most 
fruitful causes of irritation comes from attempts frequently 
made by one or the other minister to *'hold up" the funds 
belonging to the Chinese until they have fulfilled some par- 
ticular demand which he had made. The fact that it may 
be an entirely extraneous and irrelevant matter, such as the 
appointment of a national of the minister to a Chinese 
government job, does not seem to disturb the man who 
thinks he has found a clever way to achieve his purpose. 
The international settlement at Shanghai and the regime 
of foreign troops in Peking and along the Mukden Railway 
also give rise to a great many problems which are referred 
to the diplomatic corps. From questions involving the 
recognition of the Government itself to such matters as 



ii6 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

the advisability of bambooing prisoners at Shanghai, no 
question seems to be too big or little to come before this 
body. 

The discussions tend rather to avoid general issues and to 
confine themselves to a statement and explanation of the 
position taken by each government. Occasionally the stub- 
born and unreasonable adherence of one or two representa- 
tives to what is considered by others as an unduly severe and 
exacting position, leads to joint efforts in an attempt to 
make a more fair and liberal policy prevail. The discussions 
are not infrequently longer than is necessary; the main points 
are lost sight of, and discussion becomes entangled, because 
one side may be talking of one thing, whereas the other has 
quite a different matter in view. Until it is discovered that 
there is no real difference or only a difference in form, much 
valuable time ma}^ be consumed. At times, these conferences 
remind one of a university faculty meeting. 

Weeks were filled with innumerable conferences on matters 
of business. In China it rarely happens that the decision 
lies with only one official. In order to have a proposal 
accepted, a great many men have to be consulted and won 
over. Impatient representatives, backed by strong national 
force, have frequently tried to cut short this procedure, and, 
planting themselves before the official whose assent they 
needed, have "pounded the table" until a promise was ob- 
tained. They sometimes succeeded by so powerfully getting 
on the nerves of the Chinese official that he saw no way to 
save his peace of mind but by giving in. At one time I ex- 
pressed great surprise to the Minister of Finance, because, in- 
stead of insisting that reasonable arrangements for the re- 
newal of a certain short-term loan should be made, he had 
given the representative in question — ^the agent of a munition 
company — a large order for additional materials which were 
not needed, only to secure an extension of time. He said, in 



FOLK WAYS AND OFFICIALS 117 

self-defence: "The manners of the man were so abominable 
that I could not stand it any longer." 

However, the method of the strong arm and mailed fist, 
while it has produced results in China, has also carried in 
itself the elements of its own defeat. The Chinese may make 
a concession under such circumstances, but they will there- 
after have no interest whatsoever in facilitating the business 
in question; on the contrary, it is likely to be delayed and 
obstructed at every point, so that it can be carried out only 
through constant pressure and show of force. The people of 
China have a strong and widespread sense of equity. He 
who proposes a reasonable arrangement and gives himself 
the trouble to talk it over with officials and other men con- 
cerned, in the spirit of arriving at a solution fair to all, will 
build on a sound foundation. Whenever foreign interests 
have acted on this principle, the results have been far more 
fruitful of good than where things have been carried through 
with a high hand by demand and threat, without reasoning 
or give and take. But to sit in conference with various people 
on all the phases of any proposal is a great consumer of 
time. One is kept busy day and night in following the roads 
and trails that lead to the final meeting of minds from which 
action is to result. 

I had a visit from the Tuchun Tien, of Kalgan, after my 
return from America in the fall of 191 8. I found that the 
Tuchun was in very bad grace at the American Legation. 
He had interfered with an automobile service which an Amer- 
ican had tried to establish between Kalgan and Urga, in 
Mongolia, and had in other ways shown an apparent hos- 
tility to legitimate American enterprise. As the writing of 
notes had not secured any satisfactory results, I began to 
probe into the situation to find what lay back of the attitude 
of the general. 

I found that he was "blood-brother" of Mr. Pan Fu, whom 



ii8 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

in turn I numbered among my friends. I therefore consulted 
Mr. Pan Fu about the situation. He said that there must be 
some misunderstanding, as the General was certainly not 
animated by any feeling of hostility to America; but that it 
was possible that the particular American in Kalgan had 
rubbed him the wrong way. So he promised to write the 
General a long letter. 

A short time later he called on me and reported that Gen- 
eral Tien had written him that he was soon coming to Peking 
and would be very glad to meet me. The Tuchun soon 
called on me, with Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, and we had a most 
friendly talk. Very little was said about any past difficulties 
in Kalgan, but a great deal about future prospects of good- 
will and mutual help. In fact, our friendship was quite 
firmly estabhshed, and there was no further room for mis- 
understanding. 

Tuchun Tien was an open-faced, friendly looking person 
who, though he had straggling side whiskers unusual with 
the Chinese, had nothing of the berserker in his bearing. 
Our conversation was long and cordial. When it had already 
lasted more than an hour, Mr. Chow looked at me apologetic- 
ally and said, in English: *'We had better let him talk, it 
does him good." As for myself, I was glad to hear his views. 

Mrs. Reinsch and I gave a dinner to Mr. Robert Gailey of 
the Y. M. C. A. on the eve of his departure for America. 
About thirty guests were present, all members of the Amer- 
ican mission societies in Peking. I had just entered the re- 
ception room to be ready to welcome our guests when much 
to my surprise Prince Pu Lun was ushered in. It was evi- 
dent that there had been some mistake about invitations, 
but as there appeared to be no other dinner given at the 
Legation, I made no effort to clear up the error and tried to 
make him thoroughly welcome. I had the table rearranged 
so as to seat the Prince between two ladies both of whom 



FOLK WAYS AND OFFICIALS 119 

spoke Chinese very well. He appeared to be surprised at the 
composition of the company and the absence of wines, but 
was apparently well entertained by his neighbours. When 
the dinner was about half through, Kao, the head boy, came 
to the back of my chair and whispered to me: "Mrs. Lee's 
boy outside. Say Prince belong Mrs. Lee dinner." So after 
dinner I felt in duty bound to tell the Prince that Mrs. Lee 
had sent word that she would be very happy if he could 
come to her house in the course of the evening. 

After a short conversation, in which he told me about his 
children of whom he is very fond, the Prince departed, to 
recoup himself at the house of the navy doctor for the absti- 
nences laid upon him at the minister's dinner. 



PART II 
THE PASSING OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 



CHAPTER XI 
THE WAR: JAPAN IN SHANTUNG 

On August 8, 1914, Japanese war vessels appeared 
near Tsingtau. Japan suggested on August loth that 
the British Government might call for the cooperation of 
Japan under the terms of the Alliance. In view of possible 
consequences the British Government hesitated to make 
the call; the British in China considered it important that 
independent action by Japan in that country should be 
precluded. 

Acting on its own account on August 15th, the Japanese 
Government sent the Shantung ultimatum to Germany. 
The British Government was then informed of the action 
taken. The German representative at Peking had discussed 
informally with the Foreign Office the possibility of im- 
mediately returning Kiaochow directly to China; but the 
Chinese Government was now pointedly warned by the 
Japanese that no such action would be permitted. 

The Chinese Government then also seriously considered 
the poHcy of declaring war on Germany. It would have 
been as easy for the Chinese, as for any one else, to take 
Kiaochow from the Germans, but Japan was ready and 
anticipated them. In fact, the Japanese minister stated to 
the Chinese Foreign Office on August 20th that the Kiao- 
chow matter no longer concerned the Chinese Government, 
which, he trusted, would remain absolutely passive in regard 
to it. The ultimatum to Germany, limited to August 23rd, 
demanded the delivery, at a date not later than September 
15th of the leased territory of Kiaochow to the Japanese 

123 



124 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Government, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the 
same to China." 

Basing its action upon the language of this ultimatum, the 
American Government on August 19th made a communica- 
tion to the Japanese Foreign Office, noting with satisfaction 
that Japan demanded the surrender of Kiaochow with the 
purpose of restoring that tract to China, and that it was 
seeking no territorial aggrandizement in China. 

On my return to Peking on September 30th, I found the 
Chinese in a state of natural excitement over the action taken 
by Japan. By this time the Japanese had invested Tsingtau; 
the British, who had also sent a contingent of troops, were 
kept by the Japanese in a very subsidiary position. The 
scope of Japan's plans was more fully revealed on September 
29th, when the Chinese Government was informed that 
"military necessity" required the Japanese Government to 
place troops along the entire railway in Shantung Province. 
As this railway had never had German military guards, and 
as the portion near Tsingtau was already held by Japanese 
troops, the military necessity of such further occupation was 
by no means apparent. 

Mr. Liang Tun-yen, Minister of Communications, called 
on me on October ist, expressing deep concern over the ac- 
tion of the Japanese in Shantung. He stated his conviction 
that, in departing from the necessary military operations 
around Tsingtau, it was Japan's plan to stir up trouble in the 
interior of China with a view to more extensive occupation 
of Chinese territory. From Japanese sources he had informa- 
tion to the effect that the Japanese militarists were not 
satisfied with the reduction of Tsingtau, but wished to take 
advantage of this opportunity to secure a sohd footing — 
political and military — ^within the interior of China. He was 
further informed that they were ready to let loose large num- 
bers of bandits and other irresponsible persons to cooperate 
with revolutionary elements in an attempt to create wide- 



THE WAR: JAPAN IN SHANTUNG 125 

spread uprisings, in order to furnish a pretext for military 
interference. When I called attention to the declarations 
regarding Kiaochow in Japan's ultimatum to Germany, the 
minister shook his head and said: "Unfortunately, Japa- 
nese poHcy cannot be judged by such professions, but only 
by the acts of the last twenty years, which make up a 
series of broken pledges and attacks upon the rights of 
China/' 

President Yuan Shih-kai had wished to see me; so I called 
on him informally on October 2nd. In stronger terms than 
Minister Liang he set forth his apprehensions. "From in- 
formation in my possession," he stated, "I am convinced that 
the Japanese have a definite and far-reaching plan for using 
the European crisis to further an attempt to lap the founda- 
tions of control over China. In this, the control of Shantung 
through the possession of the port and the railway is to be 
the foundation stone. Their policy was made quite apparent 
through the threatened occupation of the entire Shantung 
Railway, which goes far beyond anything the Germans ever 
attempted in Shantung Province. It will bring the Japanese 
military forces to the very heart of China." 

Thereupon Yuan Shih-kai requested that I ask President 
Wilson to use his good offices in conferring with the British 
Government, in order to prevail upon Japan to restrict her 
action in Shantung to the military necessities involved in the 
capture of Tsingtau, according to the original assurances 
given the Chinese Government. I communicated this re- 
quest to the President through the Department of State. 

With great promptness, however, the Japanese executed 
the plan they had adopted. They informed the Chinese 
that, being judges of their own military necessities, they 
would occupy the railway hy force majeure immediately, but 
would leave its administration in Chinese hands — ^with the 
stipulation that Japanese conductors be placed on the trains. 
The Chinese found no means to resist this arrangement. 



126 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Mr. Eki Hioki, successor of Minister Yamaza, had arrived 
during the summer. He had for many years been minister 
in Chile, where I had met him in 1910; remembering his 
genial and sociable qualities, I was happy to renew this ac- 
quaintance. Mr. Hioki differed from his predecessor in his 
readiness to talk freely and abundantly. In our first conver- 
sation, when the relations between the United States and 
Japan came up, he adduced the customary argument that as 
the United States was preventing the Japanese from setthng 
in America, we could not in fairness object if Japan tried to 
«i develop her activities and influence on the Asian continent. 
I could honestly assure him that American goodwill did 
go out in full measure to any legitimate development of 
Japanese enterprise and prosperity, but we also had duties 
toward our own citizens, who had been active in Chinese 
trade for more than 1 30 years, as well as toward China her- 
self. We could not be expected to approve any action which 
would not respect the rights of these. 

The Chinese people were becoming more and more alarmed 
about Japan in Shantung. The large number of petitions 
and manifestoes which came to me, as the representative of a 
friendly nation, from various parts of China, gave me an 
" idea of how widespread was this anxiety. Some of these 
protests were written with the blood of the petitioner. 

Count Okuma's declaration, that a large increase in the 
military forces of Japan was needed to preserve peace in the 
Far East, was interpreted as meaning that Japan would take 
the present opportunity to make good her actual domination 
throughout eastern Asia. The Chinese felt that any under- 
standing with Japan would inevitably lead to the total sub- 
jection of China to the political dominance of her neighbour. 
They distrust all professions of Japanese friendship. When- 
ever I tried to argue that a frank understanding between 
China and Japan was desirable, I was told that China could 
not trust Japan; that Japan must not be judged by her pro- 



THE WAR: JAPAN IN SHANTUNG 127 

fessions, but by her past acts, all of which show a determined 
policy of political advance veiled by reassuring declarations. 

Thus the Chinese feared Japanese intrigue at every point. 
They believed that revolutionary activities, as in the past, 
were getting encouragement from Japan. The Japanese 
were ready to take advantage of and to aggravate any weak- 
ness which might exist in Chinese social and political life. 
They would fasten like leeches upon any sore spot. The 
tendency toward rebellion and brigandage, the counterfeit- 
ing of banknotes, the corruption of officials, the undermining 
of the credit of important private and public enterprises, the 
furnishing of more dangerous drugs when opium was for- 
bidden — in connection with such mischiefs individual Japa- 
nese had been active to the great damage of the Chinese. 
But though it would be unjust, of course, to charge up this 
meddling to the Japanese nation as a whole the connivance 
of their militarist government was a fact. 

The British looked upon the new adventure of Japan with 
a decided lack of enthusiasm. While welcoming the losses 
inflicted on their enemy in war, they were evidently fearful 
of the results which might come from Shantung. 

It was plain that the Russians, too, while allied with Japan, 
were quite aware of the dangers inherent in the Chinese 
situation. Taken with recent Japanese advances in Inner 
Mongolia, a situation was created in northern China which 
would be regarded as dangerous by the Russians. Discussing 
the unrest in China, the Russian minister said to me signifi- 
cantly: "The situation itself does not impress me as serious; 
the only serious thing about it is that the Japanese say it is 
serious.'* 

In fine, the general temper and direction of Japanese action 
was not relished by the allies of Japan. Japan had taken 
advantage of a conflict which was primarily European, into 
the rigour of which she did not enter, for the purpose of 
gathering up the possessions of Germany in the Far East 



128 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

and the Pacific at a time when they could be but weakly 
defended. 

This policy of Japan deeply affected American prospects 
and enterprise in China, as, also, that of the other leading 
nations. Since the American attitude of goodwill toward 
China had in the past been understood by the Chinese to 
imply a readiness to give them a certain support in times of 
need, large hopes were entertained as to what the United 
States would do. Rich and powerful beyond measure, she 
would, in the minds of the Chinese, help China to maintain 
her integrity, independence, and sovereignty. Other nations, 
not a little jealous of the past goodwill of the Chinese toward 
us, were not slow to point out that American friendship was a 
bubble which vanished before such concrete difficulties as the 
violation of China's neutrality. But the Chinese, after all, 
saw that it did not lie within the sphere of its action for the 
United States to come to the rescue with direct political and 
military support. True, the Chinese had encouraged Amer- 
ican activities in China. They had looked upon them as a 
safeguard to their own national life. Since they were con- 
ducted in a fair spirit and without political afterthought, the 
Chinese did hope and expect as a minimum that Americans 
would stand by their guns and not let themselves be excluded 
by political intrigue or other means from their share in the 
development and activities of China. 



CHAPTER XII 
THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, 1915 

"Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get 
control of China." In these words President Yuan Shih-kai 
summed up the situation when I made my first call on him 
after returning from Europe in September. Many Chinese 
friends came to see me and tell me their fears. Admiral 
Tsai said: "Here are the beginnings of another Manchuria. 
Aggressive Japan in Shantung is different from any European 
tenant." 

Events had moved rapidly. Tsingtau had been taken, 
German control had been wholly eHminated from the lease- 
hold and the railway. The Chinese Government notified 
Japan that permission to use part of the Province of Shan- 
tung for military operations would be withdrawn, since 
occasion for it had disappeared. This the Japanese seized 
upon as a calculated and mahgnant insult; it was made the 
excuse for presentation of the demands. 

The blow fell on January i8th. The Japanese minister 
sought a private interview with Yuan Shih-kai. This meet- 
ing took place at night. With a mien of great mystery and 
importance the minister opened the discussion. He en- 
joined absolute secrecy on pain of serious consequences 
before handing Yuan the text of the demands. He made 
therewith an oral statement of the considerations which 
favoured the granting of them. 

The Chinese, fearing greater evils, did their best to guard 
the secret. They could not, however, keep in complete 
ignorance those whose interests would have been vitally 
affected; also memoranda of important conversations had to 

129 



I30 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

be set down. As soon as I received the first inkling of what 
was going on, I impressed it on the Chinese that, since the 
subjects under discussion intimately affected American 
rights in China, I should be kept fully informed in order that 
my government, relying on the treaties and understandings 
concerning Chinese independence, could take necessary steps 
to safeguard its interests. The Chinese were of course ready 
to comply with my request. My intercourse with Chinese 
cabinet ministers and Foreign Office members was not con- 
fined to formal interviews and dinners. We exchanged many 
visits during which we conversed far into the night, without 
wasting time over formalities or official camouflage. 

In the conversation in which he presented the twenty-one 
demands, the Japanese minister dropped several significant 
hints. 

The minister then spoke of the Chinese revolutionists 
"who have very close relations with many Japanese outside 
of the Government, and have means and influence"; further, 
"it may not be possible for the Japanese Government to 
restrain such people from stirring up trouble in China unless 
the Chinese Government shall give some positive proof of 
friendship." The majority of the Japanese people, he 
continued, were opposed to President Yuan Shih-kai. 
"They believe," he went on, "that the President is strongly 
anti-Japanese, and that his government befriends the distant 
countries (Europe and America) and antagonizes the neigh- 
bour. If the President will now grant these demands, the 
Japanese people will be convinced that his feeling is friendly, 
and it will then be possible for the Japanese Government 
to give assistance to President Yuan." Yuan sat silent 
throughout this ominous conversation. The blow stunned 
him. He could only say: "You cannot expect me to say 
anything to-night." 

Quite aside from the substance of the twenty-one de- 
mands, the threats and promises implied in this statement 



THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 131 

convinced the Chinese leaders that Japan was contemplating 
a policy of extensive interference in the domestic affairs and 
political controversies in China, making use of these as a 
leverage to attain its own desires. The Chinese considered 
it an ominous fact that the paper on which the demands were 
written was watermarked with dreadnoughts and machine 
guns. They believed that the use of this particular paper 
was not purely accidental. Such details mean a good deal 
with people who are accustomed to say unpleasant things 
by hints or suggestions rather than by direct statements. 

A Japanese press reporter called at the Legation on Janu- 
ary 19th, and related his troubles to one of the secretaries. 
The Japanese minister refused absolutely, he said, to say 
anything about what passed between him and the President; 
therefore he had sought the American Legation, which might 
have knowledge which could help him. With his assumed 
naivete the man possibly hoped to get a hint as to whether a 
"leak" had occurred between the Chinese and the American 
minister. But it was not until January 22nd that I learned 
the astonishing nature of the Japanese proposals. Calling 
on one of the Chinese ministers on current business, I found 
him perturbed. He finally confided to me, almost with 
tears, that Japan had made categorical demands which, if 
conceded, would destroy the independence of his country 
and reduce her to a servile state. He then told me in 
general terms their nature, saying: "Control of natural re- 
sources, finances, army! What will be left to China! Our 
people are being punished for their peacefulness and sense of 
justice." The blow evidently had come with stunning force, 
and the counsellors of the President had not been able to 
overcome the first terrified surprise, or to develop any idea 
as to how the crisis might be met. 

An ice festival was being given on the next evening at 
the American guard skating rink. Mr. B. Lenox Simpson 
sought me out and accosted me quite dramatically, with 



132 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

the words : "While we are gambolling here, the sovereignty of 
the country is passing Hke a cloud to the east. It is Korea 
over again." He had received accurate information as 
to the general character of the demands. Two days later 
the representative of the London Times, who had been out 
of town, asked me casually: "Has anything happened?" 
"You may discover that something has happened," I replied, 
"if you look about." That evening he returned to me with 
all that he could gather. 

Although these correspondents, as well as the Associated 
Press representative, telegraphed the astounding news to 
their papers, nothing was published for two weeks either in 
America or in England. The Associated Press withheld the 
report because its truth was categorically denied by the 
Japanese ambassador at Washington. Its Peking repre- 
sentative was directed to send "facts, not rumours." On 
January 27th it was given out "on the highest authority" 
both at Tokyo and at Washington that information purport- 
ing to outline the basis of negotiations was "absolutely with- 
out foundation." Only gradually the truth dawned on the 
British and American press. The British censor had held 
up the reports for a fortnight, but on February 5th Mr. 
Simpson wrote me in a hasty note: "My editors are in 
communication with me, and we have beaten the censors." 
From 25th January on, the demands began to be discussed 
confidentially among members of the diplomatic corps but 
publicly by the press in Peking. As the impossibility of 
keeping the matter secret locally was now universally granted 
from this time high Chinese officials consulted with me almost 
daily about their difficulties. The acceptance of these de- 
mands, of course, would have effectively put an end to the 
equal opportunities hitherto enjoyed in China by American 
citizens; I therefore made it my duty to watch the negotia- 
tions with great care. 

The Japanese were avoiding any interference with the 



THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 133 

formal "integrity, sovereignty, and independence'* of China; 
they were developing special interests, similar to those 
enjoyed by Japan in Manchuria, in other parts of China as 
well, particularly in the provinces of Shantung and Fukien. 
They could place the Chinese state as a whole in vassalage, 
through exercising control over its military establishment 
and over the most important parts of its administration. 
There would be three centres from which Japanese influence 
would be exercised — Manchuria, Shantung, and Fukien. 
Manchuria was to be made more completely a reserved area 
for Japanese capital and colonization, but with administra- 
tive control wielded through advisers and through priority 
in the matter of loans. In Shantung, the interest formerly 
belonging to Germany was to be taken over and expanded. 
A priority of right in Fukien was demanded, both in invest- 
ment and development; this would effectively bar other 
nations and would assimilate this province to Manchuria. 
The northern sphere of Japan was to be expanded by includ- 
ing Inner Mongolia. From the Shantung sphere influence 
could be made to radiate to the interior by means of railway 
extensions to Honan and Shansi. Similarly, from the Fukien 
sphere, railway concessions would carry Japanese influence 
into the provinces of Kiangsi, Hupei, and Kwangtung. The 
Japanese interest already existing in the Hanyehping iron 
and coal enterprise, which was a mortgage with right to 
purchase pig iron at certain rates, was to be consolidated into 
a Japanese-controlled company. Added to these was the 
significant demand that outsiders be denied the right to work 
any mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the 
Hanyehping company without its consent; nor were they to 
be permitted, lacking such consent, to carry out any under- 
taking that might directly or indirectly aflFect the interests 
of that company. This astonishing proposal sought to 
make the Japanese concern the arbiter of industrial enter- 
prise in the middle Yangtse Valley. 



134 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Group V consisted of the sweeping demands which would 
have virtually deprived the Chinese Government of the 
substance of control over its own affairs. The employment 
of effective Japanese advisers in political, financial, and 
military affairs; the joint Chino-Japanese organization of the 
police forces in important places; the purchase from Japan 
of a fixed amount of munitions of war — 50 per cent, or more; 
and the estabHshment of Chino-Japanese jointly worked 
arsenals, were embraced in these demands. The latter in- 
volved effective control over the armament and military 
organization of China. 

So stunned was the Chinese Government by the Japanese 
stroke that it missed its first opportunity. It might have 
immediately given notice to the friendly Treaty Powers of 
the demands, which affected their equal rights in China, as 
well as the administrative independence of the Chinese 
Government. 

A member of the Foreign Office consulted me about 
the best method of deahng with the demands; I expressed 
the opinion — ^which was not given by way of advice — 
that the detailed negotiation of individual demands, with 
a view of granting only the least objectionable, would 
be likely to give most force to considerations of equity. 
Time would be gained; the other nations interested would 
come to realize what was at stake. If certain Hberal 
grants and concessions should be made, China could then 
with greater force refuse to create rights and privileges 
incompatible with her sovereignty. The situation would 
then be more fully and clearly understood by foreign 
nations. 

As the negotiations proceeded the Japanese minister 
hinted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Japanese 
public looked askance at the present Chinese administration, 
because of the hostility often demonstrated by Yuan Shih- 
kai; still, this feeling might be conciliated. It might even 



THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 135 

be possible for the Japanese Government to give Presi- 
dent Yuan assistance against rebel activities. The sinister 
quality of this hint was fully appreciated. It was at this 
point that the Japanese minister used the simile which 
promptly became famous throughout the Far East. He 
employed this picturesque language: *'The present crisis 
throughout the world virtually forces my government to 
take far-reaching action. When there is a fire in a jeweller's 
shop, the neighbours cannot be expected to refrain from 
helping themselves." 

Notwithstanding powerful efforts on the part of Japan 
to enforce silence by menacing China and by muzzling the 
press in Japan, accurate information got abroad; whereupon 
the Japanese Government presented to the powers an 
expurgated version of its demands, from which the more 
objectionable articles were omitted. Later on, it was 
admitted that the demands of Group V had been "dis- 
cussed," and statements were again issued on *'the highest 
authority" that these so-called demands were merely over- 
tures or suggestions, which violated no treaty and involved 
no infringement of Chinese territory and sovereignty. The 
Japanese Legation in Peking asked local correspondents to 
send out a similar statement, which, however, was refused 
by them, as the true nature of the demands was already 
known. 

The British, who had more extensive interests at stake 
than any other foreign nation, had shown agitation. British 
residents and officials expressed deep concern because their 
government, being necessarily preoccupied with events in 
Europe, could not give full attention to the Far East. As 
the action of Japan had been taken under the aegis of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it seemed to the British that this 
was being used to nullify any influence which Great Britain 
might exercise, as against a plan on the part of Japan to 
seize control of the immense resources of China and of her 



136 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

military establishment.* It was believed that some sort of 
communication relating to the demands had been made to 
the British Foreign Office before January i8th. When the 
expurgated summary came out, the Times of London on 
February 12th published an editorial article describing 
Japan's proposals as reasonable and worthy of acceptance; 
it was understood in Peking that this approval related to 
the summary, not to the demands as actually made. But 
the Chinese officials were apprehensive lest a ready acquies- 
cence of public opinion in the less obnoxious demands might 
encourage Japan to press the more strongly for the whole 
list. As late as February 19th, the State Department in- 
formed me that it inferred that the demands under Group 
V were not being urged. The full text of the actual demands 
as originally made had now been communicated to the 
various foreign offices; but because of the discrepancy be- 
tween the two statements, they were inclined to believe that 
Japan was not really urging the articles of Group V. 

The Japanese minister had at first demanded the ac- 
ceptance in principle of the entire twenty-one proposals. 
This v/as declined by the Chinese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. When the Japanese asked that Mr. Lu express a 
general opinion on each proposal, he readily indicated which 
of them the Chinese Government considered as possible 
subjects for negotiation. Forthwith the Japanese minister 
replied that the expression of opinion by Minister Lu was 
unsatisfactory; that negotiations could not continue unless 
it were radically modified. Mr. Lu was evasive and Mr. 
Hioki on February i8th became more peremptory; he 



*For instance, Putnam Weale wrote: "Though Englishmen believe that the gallant Japanese are 
entitled to a recompense just as much now as they were in 1905 for what they have done. Englishmen 
do not and cannot subscribe to the doctrine that Japan is to dominate China by extorting a whole 
ring-fence of industrial concessions and administrative privileges which will ultimately shut out even 
allies from obtaining equal opportunities. ... In China, though they are willing to be reduced 
to second place and even driven out by fair competition, they will fight in a way your correspondents 
do not yet dream of to secure that no diplomacy of the jiujitsu order injures them or their Chinese 
friends." 



THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 137 

informed Mr. Lu that the negotiations might not be confined 
to the first four groups — ^that the whole twenty-one demands 
must be negotiated upon. 

Thereupon I telegraphed inviting President Wilson's 
personal attention to the proposals which affected the rights 
and legitimate prospects of Americans in China. The 
President had already written me in a letter of February 8th: 
"I have had the feeling that any direct advice to China, or 
direct intervention on her behalf in the present negotiations, 
would really do her more harm than good, inasmuch as it 
would very likely provoke the jealousy and excite the 
hostility of Japan, which would first be manifested against 
China herself. . . . For the present I am watching the 
situation very carefully indeed, ready to step in at any point 
where it is wise to do so." * 

Shantung was first taken up in the negotiations. The 
negotiators were: the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Lu Tseng-tsiang; the vice-minister, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin; 
the Japanese minister, Mr. Eki Hioki; and Mr. Ob at a, 
Counsellor of Legation. Vice-Minister Tsao had been 
educated in Japan, and was generally considered as friendly 
to that country. The Japanese minister, genial in manner 
and insistent in business, was aided by a counsellor noted 
for tenacity of purpose and for a grim dourness. Point by 
point the demands on Shantung and Manchuria were 
sifted. By the preamble to Group II, in the original version, 
Japan claimed a "special position" in south Manchuria and 
in eastern Inner Mongolia. The Chinese took decided 
objection. The Japanese minister complained on March 6th 
of slow progress, giving thenceforward frequent hints that 
force might be resorted to. Finally, on March nth, the 
Chinese were informed that a Japanese fleet had sailed for 
ports in China under sealed orders. 

After agreeing to important concessions in Manchuria and 
Shantung, the Chinese determined to resist further demands. 



138 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Just here the American Government gave the Japanese 
ambassador at Washington its opinion that certain clauses 
in the demands contravened existing treaty provisions. 
For the Japanese ambassador had offered a supplementary 
memorandum which substantially gave the proposals of 
Group V as "requests for friendly consideration." They 
were "mere suggestions" to the Chinese! This method of 
disarming foreign opposition imposed one disadvantage — 
it would hereafter hardly do actually to use military force to 
coerce China into accepting the "friendly suggestions" con- 
tained in Group V. The only chance of getting these 
concessions was to keep the other governments in uncertainty 
as to the actual demands, that they might not take them 
seriously, and meanwhile to bring pressure to bear in order 
to force Peking to accept these very proposals. The Chinese 
would feel themselves abandoned by the public opinion of 
the world. 

The Japanese increased their military forces in Manchuria 
and Shantung during the second half of March; for a time 
the movement stopped the ordinary traffic on the Shantung 
Railway. 

The new troops were "merely to relieve those now sta- 
tioned in Chinese territory," it was stated. Military 
compulsion was clearly foreshadowed; and thus beset, the 
Chinese had by the end of March almost entirely accepted 
the Japanese demands in Shantung and Manchuria. I had 
a long interview with President Yuan Shih-kai on March 23rd. 
He seemed greatly worried but was still good-humoured. He 
said: "The buzzing gnats disturb my sleep, but they have 
not yet carried off my rice. So I can live." Then growing 
serious he went on: "I am prepared to make all possible 
concessions. But they must not diminish Chinese in- 
dependence. Japan's acts may force upon me a different 
policy." 

I wondered whether he was actually contemplating armed 



THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 139 

resistance. "Against any action taken by Japan, America 
will not protest, so the Japanese officials tell us. But the 
Japanese have often tried to discourage the Chinese by such 
statements," he added. "They say : 'America has no interest 
in the Chinese'; or, 'America cannot help you even if she 
wishes to.'" 

Yuan felt that if America could only say, gently but 
firmly: "Such matters concerning foreign rights in China, 
in which we have an interest by treaties, policy, and tra- 
ditions, cannot be discussed without our participation," the 
danger would largely dissolve. 

Certain possible solutions were now suggested by the 
Department of State. They aimed to bestow desired 
benefits on Japan, but also to protect China and the interests 
of other nations in China. Personally, I felt that the de- 
mands of Group V should be wholly .eliminated. Any 
version of them would tangle, would more inextricably snarl, 
the already complicated relationships of foreign powers in 
China, and choke all constructive American action. 

The Japanese demands respecting Manchuria were sub- 
stantially comphed with during early April; and the Chinese 
thought this part of the negotiations closed. Not so the 
Japanese; they manoeuvred to keep open the Manchurian 
question on points of detail. Meanwhile, they persistently 
injected Group V into the negotiations. 

For over two months the negotiations had now gone on 
with two or three long conferences every week. The 
furnishing of war materials, Fukien Province, and pointed 
references to a "certain power" — meaning the United States 
— occupied the Japanese part of the discussion on April 6th. 
The Japanese minister was strikingly peremptory in manner. 
Because of the pretensions of this "certain power" he must 
insist on the demands regarding harbours and dockyards. 
Control, direct or indirect, of any naval base in Fukien must 
be frustrated, for the sake both of China and of Japan. 



I40 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

The present American administration might withdraw its 
"pretensions"; but what if they should be resumed in future? 
The only safe course was to exclude this power from any 
possibility of getting such a foothold. Meanwhile, local 
Japanese-edited papers harped upon the great influence 
which Ambassador Chinda was alleged to wield over Secre- 
tary Bryan. It would be futile to hope, they insisted, that 
America might in any way assert herself in support of China. 

At this time I informed the Chinese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs that should the attitude or policy of the United States 
be mentioned by any foreign representative, and should 
statements be made as to what the American Government 
would or would not admit, demand, or insist upon, the 
Chinese Government would be more than justified in taking 
up such a matter directly with the representative of the 
United States, through whom alone authoritative statements 
as to the action of his government could be made. 

The American Government had filed with the Japanese 
strong objections to the granting of any special preference to 
any one nation in Fukien. It had also emphasized the right 
of its citizens to make contracts with the central and pro- 
vincial Chinese governments, without interference and with- 
out being regarded as unfriendly by a third power. So far 
as harbours and naval bases were concerned, as stated 
previously, the American Government did not object to any 
arrangement whereby China would withhold such concessions 
from any and all foreign powers. But Japan needed to 
allege some reason for making special demands with respect 
to Fukien; therefore it alleged the machinations of a "certain 
power." 

No cause for apprehension existed. The talk of "pre- 
tensions" related to the Bethlehem Steel Company*s con- 
tract, made five years earlier, which did not, however, touch 
Fukien, although a spurious version of the contract, circu- 
lated in Peking shortly before, gave this impression. An 



THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 141 

unfounded report spread by interested parties was thus made 
the basis for a demand against the Chinese Government. 

Meanwhile, what the Japanese had put forth for foreign 
consumption in the way of news was being compared with 
what was actually done in Peking. This annoyed the 
Japanese press, not so much because its government had 
been caught in the act of trying to mislead its own allies, 
as because timely publicity and strong pubhc opinion abroad 
were defeating the attempt to impose its demands on the 
Chinese. The Chinese relied on public opinion. It was 
their great desire, as they often said to me, that although 
the American people and its government might not furnish 
material assistance it should at least know the facts about 
the attack made on Chinese liberty; for they saw in the 
public opinion of the world, and especially of the United 
States, the force which would ultimately prevail. Even 
with Yuan Shih-kai, man of authority though he was, this 
hope existed. Mr. Lu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, said 
to me: "All that China hopes is that America and the world 
may know and judge." 

Finally the Japan Mail, a semi-official Tokyo paper, 
pubHshed on April ist the full text of the Japanese demands 
in English. Thus was admitted as a matter of course what 
had been categorically denied upon "the highest authority." 
While the secret negotiations were going on there was a by- 
play on the part of many official and non-official Japanese, 
who were evidently trying to create an atmosphere of 
antagonism to the Western nations. I received daily reports 
of conversations in private interviews, at dinners, and on 
semi-public occasions, in which Japanese were reminding 
the Chinese of all possible grievances against the West, and 
picturing to them the strength and importance that a 
Chino- Japanese alHance would have. Thus it was said 
many times: "Think of all the places from which we are at 
present excluded. Should we stand together, who could 



142 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

close the door in our face?" Or again: "Are you not weary 
of the domineering attitude of the foreign ministers in Peking? 
They do not pound the table in Tokyo. They would be sent 
home if they did." It was constantly repeated that all 
would be well if only China would let Japan reorganize her 
material and military resources. Visions of millions under 
arms, splendidly drilled and equipped — an invincible Chinese 
army officered by Japanese — ^were conjured up. To all such 
siren songs, however, the Chinese remained deaf. 

A complete deadlock developed toward the end of April. 
The Chinese desired to dispose of the grants concerning 
Manchuria. The Japanese would not agree to anything 
definite without including the demands under Group V. 
As a prelude to an ultimatum, the Japanese minister on 
April 26th presented "demands" with respect to Shantung 
and Mongolia, unchanged except for the wording of the 
preamble; this substituted the term "economic relations" 
for "special position." With respect to Hanyehping, they 
were softened to provide that the Chinese might not convert 
the company into a state-owned concern, nor cause it to 
borrow foreign capital other than Japanese. Certain rail- 
way concessions were to be granted, and the most important 
demands under Group V were to be embodied into a pro- 
tocol statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Mr. Lu pointed out that the railway grants sought con- 
flicted with the concessions already given to British interests; 
Mr. Hioki then proposed that China grant these same con- 
cessions to Japan, letting Japan "fight it out" with Great 
Britain. With respect to Fukien, China was to state, in an 
exchange of notes, that no foreign nation might build dock- 
yards or naval bases there, nor should foreign capital be 
borrowed for that purpose. Japan, therefore, abandoned 
her attempt to secure preferential rights in Fukien Province. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs handed his answer to the 
Japanese minister on May ist. The demands under Group 



THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 143 

V, Mr. Hioki was informed, could not possibly be accepted 
by a sovereign power. With respect to the other demands, a 
specific answer was given very closely approaching acceptance 
of the demands as revised by Japan. No railway con- 
cessions were made, however, and it included certain techni- 
cal modifications with respect to the Manchurian demands. 
Everything asked with respect to Shantung was granted, 
with the counter-proposal that China take part in the 
negotiations between Japan and Germany. 

This was conciliatory; nevertheless, the Japanese were 
moving their troops. Everything indicated extreme meas- 
ures. Japan's reservists in Mukden had been ordered to 
their station, Japanese residents in Peking were warned 
to hold themselves ready. At Tsinanfu, new entrench- 
ments were being built. When it was known that an 
ultimatum would be delivered, the Chinese officials were 
perplexed and undecided. Should they await its delivery, 
or try to placate the Japanese by further concessions? The 
Chinese find it hard to obey a demand backed by force; 
they are used to arrangements based on persuasion, reason, 
and custom. To submit to positive foreign dictation would 
be the greatest conceivable diminutio capitis for the Govern- 
ment. Chinese officials visited me frequently. They seemed 
comforted in discussing their difficulties and fears. I could 
not, of course, give them advice, but I expressed my personal 
conviction that Japan could hardly find it feasible to include 
Group V — which she had explained to the powers as sug- 
gestions of friendship — in an ultimatum. 

The position of the American minister throughout these 
negotiations had not been easy. The United States was 
the only power that had its hands free. The Chinese ex- 
pected its resentment and strong opposition to any arrange- 
ments conflicting with Chinese independence and the equal 
rights of Americans in China. I could reiterate our repeated 
declarations of policy and allow the Chinese to draw their 



144 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

own conclusions as to how far our national interests were 
involved. But when the minister I saw most frequently 
would ask: "But what will you do to maintain these rights 
you have so often asserted?" I had to be particularly 
careful not to express my own judgment as to what our 
course of action should be, in order not to arouse any hopes 
among the Chinese as to what my government would do. 
Instructions had been slow in coming. 

It was my personal opinion that America had a sufficiently 
vital interest to insist on being consulted on every phase of 
these negotiations. The Chinese had hoped that America 
might lead Great Britain and France in a united, friendly, 
but positive insistence that the demands be settled only by 
common consent of all the powers concerned. But the 
situation was complex. The state of Europe was critical. 
The most I could do, and the least I owed the Chinese, was to 
give a sympathetic hearing to whatever they wished to discuss 
with me, and to give them my carefully weighed opinion. 
Our own national interests were closely involved. It was 
my positive duty to keep close watch of what was going 
on. While not taking the responsibility of giving advice 
to the Chinese, I could give them an idea as to how the 
tactical situation, as it developed from week to week, im- 
pressed me. Dr. Wellington Koo all through this time acted 
as liaison officer between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
myself, although I also saw many other members of the 
Ministry. In discussing the consecutive phases of the 
negotiations, as they developed. Doctor Koo and I had many 
interesting hours over diplomatic tactics and analysis, 
in which I admired his keenness of perception. Some 
objection was hinted by the Japanese Legation to Doctor 
Koo's frequent visits to my office and house, but his coming 
and going continued, as was proper. 

Councils were held daily at the President's residence from 
May I st on. Informally, the ministers of the Entente Powers 



THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 145 

advised the Chinese not to attempt armed resistance to 
Japan; I believe the Government never seriously contem- 
plated this, although some military leaders talked about it. 
Indeed, violent scenes took place in the Council; it was urged 
that submission would mean national disintegration. It 
would rob the Government of all authority and public sup- 
port, while resistance would rally the nation. The advance 
of Japan might be obstructed until the end of the Great War; 
then European help would come. They pressed the Presi- 
dent with arguments that Japan might, indeed, occupy 
larger parts of China; but this would not create rights, it 
would expose Japan to universal condemnation. However, in 
the existing circumstances of World War, the Government 
feared that to defy Japan would mean dismemberment for 
China. 

Then President Yuan Shih-kai and the Foreign Office made 
their mistake. They were panic-stricken at thought of an 
ultimatum. They were ready to throw tactical advantage 
to the winds. Losing sight of the advantage held by China 
in opposing the demands of Group V, they offered con- 
cessions on points contained therein, particularly in con- 
nection with the employment of advisers. 

But when the Foreign Office emissary came to the Japa- 
nese Legation with these additional proposals and the 
Japanese minister saw how far the Chinese could be driven, 
he stated calmly that the last instructions of his government 
left no alternative; the ultimatum would have to be pre- 
sented. This was done on May 7th at three o'clock in 
the afternoon. 

The Chinese might have foreseen that the demands of 
Group V would not be included in the ultimatum. Never- 
theless, they were astonished at their omission, and annoyed 
at unnecessarily committing themselves the day before. 
At first sight, the terms of the ultimatum seemed to dispose 
of these ominous demands. In the first sense of their re- 



146 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

lief from a long strain, the Chinese understood the stipu- 
lation of the ultimatum that "the demands of Group V will 
be detached from the present negotiations, and discussed 
separately in the future," as an adroit way of abandoning 
these troublesome questions. They were soon to learn 
that their hopes were not in accord with the ideas of the 
Japanese. 

Why, when the Chinese were virtually ready to agree to 
all the demands actually included in the ultimatum, should 
the Japanese not have accepted the concessions, even if they 
fell shghtly short of what was asked? Thus they would 
avoid the odium of having threatened a friendly govern- 
ment with force; a matter which, furthermore, would in its 
nature tend to weaken the legal and equitable force of the 
rights to be acquired. The Japanese made two fundamental 
mistakes. The first was in their disingenuous denials and 
misrepresentation of the true character of the demands; the 
second, in the actual use of an ultimatum threatening force. 
That these mistakes were serious is now quite generally 
recognized in Japan. Why they were made in the first 
place is more difficult to explain. 

Possibly, in the light of subsequent events, when Yuan 
Shih-kai realized that he must unavoidably make extensive 
concessions, he may have sought a certain quid pro quo 
in the form of Japanese support for his personal ambitions. 
This would accord with the hint dropped by the Japanese 
minister at the beginning of the negotiations. If this 
explanation be correct, one might possibly understand that 
Yuan himself in his inmost thought preferred that he should 
be forced to accept these demands through an ultimatum. 
The possibility of such motives may have to be considered, 
yet from my knowledge of the negotiations from beginning 
to end, I must consider utterly fanciful the charge made by 
Yuan's enemies that it was he who originally conceived the 
idea of the twenty-one demands, in order that he might 



THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 147 

secure Japanese support for his subsequent policies and 
ambitions. 

A reason for the harsh measure of the Japanese Govern- 
ment is admissible. The Japanese may have feared that 
public opinion throughout the world, which was disapprov- 
ing the character and scope of these negotiations, would 
encourage the Chinese to hold out in matters of detail 
and gradually to raise new difficulties. Moreover, the men 
who wielded the power of Japan were believers in military 
prestige and may have expected good results from basing 
their new rights in China directly on military power. 

The ultimatum gave the Chinese Government a little 
over forty-eight hours, that is, until 6 p.m. on May 9thj 
for an answer. On May 8th, the cabinet and Council 
of State met in a session which lasted nearly all day, finally 
deciding that the ultimatum must be accepted in view of the 
military threats of Japan. 

In their reply to the ultimatum a serious tactical mistake 
was made. I had been informed that it would be accepted 
in simple and brief language; that the Chinese Government 
would say it had made certain grants to the Japanese, which 
would be enumerated, making no mention of Group V. 
Toward evening of the 9th a member of the Foreign Office 
came to me, quite agitated, saying that the Japanese Le- 
gation insisted that the demands of Group V be specifically 
reserved for future discussion. **What form," I asked, 
**has the Chinese answer taken?" "This," he replied: 
"*The Chinese Government, etc., hereby accepts, with the 
exception of the five articles of Group V, all the articles 
of Group I, etc' But," he added, "when the draft 
was submitted to the Japanese Legation, they insisted that 
after the words 'Group V there be added the clause 
'which are postponed for later negotiation.'" It had been 
thought necessary, my visitor explained, to state in the reply 
that something had been refused, in order to save the face 



148 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

of the Government. But it is perfectly plain that if Group 
V had not been mentioned at all, the Japanese would have 
found it hard to insist upon its being kept open; for it could 
not be avowed before other nations as part of the matter 
covered by the ultimatum. As it was, the demands in 
Group V were given the character of unfinished business, 
to be taken up at a future date. Thus portentously, they 
continued to hang over the heads of the Chinese. 

Partly in an exchange of notes, partly in a convention, 
the concessions exacted through the ultimatum were granted. 
None of these was ever ratified by the parliamentary body, 
as the Constitution requires. Because of their origin and 
of this lack of proper ratification, the Chinese people have 
looked upon the agreements of 191 5 as invalid. 

The State Department had cabled on May 6th counselling 
patience and mutual forbearance to both governments. 
The advice was needed by Japan, but the instructions 
came too late; the ultimatum had been presented. I should 
have found that its delivery would have seemed like whisper- 
ing a gentle admonition through the keyhole after the door 
had been slammed to. 

The Department cabled on May i ith an identical note to 
both governments, which I delivered to the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs on the 13th. It was published in the Peking 
papers on the 24th, together with a telegram from Tokyo 
asserting "on the highest authority" that the report of the 
existence of such a note was only another instance of machi- 
nations designed to cause political friction. 

When he received the note Minister Lu said that he had 
tried throughout to safeguard the treaty rights of other 
nations, with which China's own rights were bound up. 
To a question from him I replied that the American Govern- 
ment was not now protesting against any special proposal, 
but insisted that the rights referred to in the note be given 
complete protection in the definitive provisions of the Treaty. 



THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 149 

The newly acquired privileges of the Japanese in Manchu- 
ria were touched on in the conversation; I pointed out that 
any rights of residence granted to the Japanese, by operation 
of the most-favoured-nation clause, would accrue in like terms 
to all other nations having treaties with China; they ought to 
be informed, therefore, of all the terms of the agreement 
affecting such rights. On May 15th the Department con- 
firmed this view by cabled instructions, which I followed 
with a formal note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

It appeared that the Chinese Government was comforted 
by an expression in which the United States in clear terms 
reasserted its adhesion to the fundamental principles of 
American policy in the Far East. 

So ended the famous negotiations of the Twenty-one 
Demands. Japan had gained from the unrepresentative 
authorities at Peking certain far-reaching concessions. 
But in China the people, as an anciently organized society, 
are vastly more important than any political government. 
The people of China had not consented. ^ 



CHAPTER XIII 
GETTING TOGETHER 

There arrived in Peking in the fall of 191 5 the members 
of a commission sent by the Rockefeller Foundation, to 
formulate definite plans for a great scientific and educa- 
tional enterprise in China. They were Dr. Simon Flexner, 
of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Reserch, of New 
York; Dr. George A. Welch, of Johns Hopkins University; 
and Doctor Buttrick, the secretary of the Foundation. By 
early September, 1919, the cornerstone of the Rockefeller 
Hospital and Medical School in Peking had been laid. 

The China Medical Board had acquired the palace of a 
Manchu prince. When their plans were first being formu- 
lated, the owner had just died, and this magnificent property 
could have been bought for ^75,000 Mex. I cabled to 
New York at the time, advising quick action, but the 
organization had not been sufficiently completed to make 
the purchase. When, four months later, they were ready 
to buy, the price had risen to $250,000. The fact that a 
rich institution desired to acquire the property had undoubt- 
edly helped to enhance the price; but real property was 
then so rapidly rising in value all over Peking, especially 
in central locations, that the price asked, as a matter of fact, 
was not excessive, and a similar site could not have been 
secured for less. A still further increase of values through- 
out the central portion of the city was soon recorded; in 
fact, in many localities of China land values have risen 
after the manner of an American boom town. 

The stately halls of the palace had been dismantled and 
torn down because they did not suit the uses of the hospital. 

150 



GETTING TOGETHER 151 

The materials recovered, however, were in themselves of 
great value. The Board had decided, in consonance with 
the judgment of the architects, that the Chinese style of 
architecture should be used, modified only sufficiently to 
answer the modern purpose of the buildings. 

We gathered on a sunny day of early September, when the 
air of Peking has the fresh balminess of spring, to dedicate 
the cornerstone of the first building to be erected. Admiral 
Knight, who was visiting us at the time, accompanied me. 
Mr. Alston, the British charge; Dr. Frank BiUings, who had 
just returned from Russia where he had been chairman 
of the American Red Cross; and other representatives of 
the American and British community were present, together 
with many Chinese. Mr. Fan Yuen-lin, Minister of Edu- 
cation, represented the Chinese Government, and Bishop 
Norris, of the Anglican Church, offered prayer. I made a 
brief address in which I paid tribute to the achievements of 
American and British medical missionaries, and expressed my 
high idea of the value and significance, for science and human 
welfare, of the great institution here to be established. 

Incidentally, it had seemed to me — and I so expressed 
to Doctors Welch and Flexner during their visit — that much 
of value might be found in the Chinese materia medica. 
In my own experience there had been so many instances 
where relief had been afforded in apparently hopeless cases 
that I thought it worthy of special study. For example, 
a new chauffeur whom I had engaged accompanied my old 
chauffeur in the machine one day; as he jumped out, 
his arm was caught between the door and a telegraph pole 
and crushed. We immediately had him taken to the hos- 
pital, where the doctors decided that only an immediate 
operation afforded any prospect of saving his arm, and 
that even a successful operation was doubtful. I was told 
that evening that his mother had taken the young man 
away, notwithstanding the entreaties of our Chinese legation 



152 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

personnel. We gave him up for lost. But within six 
weeks he reported for his position, only admitting: "My 
arm is still a little weak." A Chinese doctor had cured 
him with poultices. 

Similar cases often came to my attention. Mr. Chow Tzu- 
chi had frequently suffered severely from rheumatism. He 
had tried every scientific remedy without avail. One day 
I was glad to find him chipper and in fine spirits. He said, 
"I am cured"; and he told me that a Chinese doctor had 
fixed golden needles in different parts of his body. Within 
a day his pains had disappeared. The empirical knowledge 
accumulated by Chinese doctors through thousands of 
years may be worth something. 

In their hours of leisure from the scientific tasks of their 
mission, the members of the Rockefeller board saw much 
of Chinese life on the lighter as well as its more serious side. 
One evening we went together to a Chinese restaurant where 
we met some native friends and had an excellent dinner, of the 
best that Peking cooking affords. The American guests 
were delighted with the turmoil in the courts of a Peking 
restaurant. We were entertained after dinner by a well- 
known prestidigitator. This man often performs in Peking, 
where he is known among foreigners by the name of Ega 
Lang Tang. These words mean nothing, being only an 
arbitrary formula which he uses in his incantations. His 
tricks, many and astounding, culminate when, after turning 
a somersault, he suddenly produces out of nothing a glass 
bowl as large as a washtub two feet in diameter filled with 
water in which shoals of fish are gaily swimming about. 

In another way American initiative of an educational 
nature was welcomed in Peking. Among ofiicials and liter- 
ary men were many who were interested in the scientific 
study of economic and political subjects. With them and 
with American and European friends I had often discussed 
the desirability of establishing an association devoted to 



GETTING TOGETHER 153 

such work. The old literary learning .which had up to a 
very recent time organized and given cohesion to Chinese 
intellectual life had largely lost its power to satisfy men, 
whereas the scientific learning of the West had not yet be- 
come sufficiently strong to act as the chief bond of intellectual 
fellowship. 

As all political and social action, and all systematic 
effort in industry and commerce, depend on intellectual 
forces, it is evident that disorganization and confusion 
would soon threaten Chinese life unless centres were formed 
in which the old could be brought into harmonious and 
organic relationship with the new, so as to focus intellectual 
effort. Such centres would wield great influence. 

With the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lu Tsen- 
tsiang, and a number of other friends who were equally 
impressed with the need for such a centre of thought and 
discussion, we decided in November, 1917, to take steps 
toward forming a Chinese Social and Political Science 
Association. 

The first meeting was held at the residence of the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs on December 5, 191 5, when plans 
were discussed. In an address which I made on this oc- 
casion I expressed my idea of the significance of the society 
as follows: 

"The founding of the Society is an indication of the 
entry of China into full cooperation in modern scientific 
work. This initial step foreshadows a continuous effort 
through which the experience and knowledge of China will 
be made scientifically available to the world at large. The 
voice of China will be heard, her experience considered, 
and her institutions understood by the world at large; 
she will be represented in the scientific councils. At home 
the work of such an association, if successful, should result 
in a clearer conception of national character and destiny. 
The knowledge gained by its work would be of great value 



154 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

in constructive administrative reform. But its greatest 
service would lie in the manner in which it would contribute 
to a more deep and more definite national self-conscious- 
ness. 

Virtually all the Chinese officials, of modern education, 
as well as many teachers and publicists, interested them- 
selves in the new society. The idea was supported by men 
of all nations; alongside of Americans like Doctor Goodnow, 
Doctors W. W. and W. F. Willoughby, and Dr. Henry C. 
Adams, were the British, Dr. George Morrison, Sir Robert 
Bredon, Professor Bevan, and Mr. B. Lenox Simpson; the 
French, M. Mazot and M. Padoux; the Russians, M. Konova- 
lov and Baron Stael-Holstein; and the Japanese, Professor 
Ariga. The society thereafter held regular meetings, 
at which valuable addresses and discussions were given; 
it published a quarterly review, and it established the first 
library in Peking for the use of officials, students, and the 
public in general. 

Through the assistance of 'the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Hsu Hsi-chang, a portion of the Imperial City was set aside 
for use by the library — a centrally situated enclosure, called 
the Court of the Guardian Gods. This had been used as a 
depository for all the paraphernalia of Imperial ceremonies, 
such as lanterns, banners, emblems, state carriages, and 
catafalques. When I first visited it, large stores of these 
objects still remained. They were not of a substantial 
kind, but such as are constructed or made over specially 
for each occasion; and, while they were quite interesting, 
they had no intrinsic value. That the officials and the 
Imperial Family should combine to set aside so valuable an 
area for a modern scientific purpose was an indication that 
China is moving. 

Attached to the French Legation was the brilliant sinolo- 
gist Paul Pelliot, whose explorations in Turkestan had se- 
cured such great treasures for the French museums and the 



GETTING TOGETHER 155 

Bibliotheque Nationale. Though he acted officially as 
military attache, M. Pelliot really had a far broader function, 
being liaison officer between French and Chinese culture. 

Before the war the Germans had an educational attache. 
On account of the close relationship between Chinese and 
American education through the thousands of American 
returned students, I strongly urged the appointment of 
an attache who could give his attention to educational 
affairs. I was so pressed with other business that hundreds 
of invitations to address educational bodies throughout 
China had to go unaccepted. If there had been an assis- 
tant who could have met the Chinese on these occasions, 
he could have been exceedingly helpful to them. But I 
was told from Washington that there was no provision for 
an attache with such functions. 

The intimate feeling of cooperation between the British 
and American communities expressed itself in many meetings, 
in some of which the Chinese, too, participated. Thus, on 
December 8, 19 17, there was held a reception of the English- 
speaking returned students. The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs; a number of his counsellors; the British minister, 
Sir John Jordan, and his staff; the American Legation; the 
missionaries; all who had received their education in the 
United States or Great Britain, were here present. It was a 
large company that gathered in the hall of the Y. M. C. A., 
including a great many Chinese women. 

The hum of the preliminary conversation was suddenly 
interrupted by a loud voice issuing from a young man who 
had hoisted himself on a chair in the centre of the room. He 
proceeded to give directions for the systematic promotion of 
sociability and conversation. The Chinese guests were to 
join hands and form a circle around the room, facing inward; 
within that circle the British and American guests were to 
join hands, forming a circle facing outward. At the given 
word the outer circle was to revolve to the right, the inner 



IS6 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

circle to the left. At the word "halt," everyone was to en- 
gage his or her vis-a-vis in conversation. To eliminate every 
risk of stalemate, the topics for conversation were given out, 
one for each stop of the revolving line, the last being: "My 
Greatest Secret." 

The young man who proposed this thoroughly American 
system of breaking the ice had just come out from Wisconsin, 
and it was his business to secure the proper mixing in mis- 
cellaneous gatherings. The British seemed at first some- 
what aghast at the prospect of this rotary and perambulatory 
conversation; yet they quite readily fell in with the idea, 
and when the first word of halt was given, I noticed Sir John 
duly making conversation with a simpering little Chinese 
girl opposite him. 

A little later, in December, there was formed an Anglo- 
American Club, which celebrated its debut with a dinner at 
the Hotel of Four Nations. This was the beginning of the 
closest relationship that has ever existed between the Ameri- 
cans and British in the Far East. In my brief speech I 
expressed my genuine feeling of satisfaction that this coopera- 
tion should have come about. 

My relations with educational authorities and activities 
in Peking were most pleasant. When Commencement was 
celebrated at Peking University I had the distinction of an 
honorary LL.D. conferred upon me. This courtesy was 
performed in a very graceful manner by Doctor Lowry, my 
wise and experienced friend, under whose presidency this 
institution had been built up from small beginnings. I was 
so interested in the promise of this American university in 
the capital of China that I consented to act as a member of 
the Board, and I had interested myself in its development 
as far as my official duties would permit. To my great satis- 
faction, the university had at this time become interdenomi- 
national, representing four of the Christian mission societies 
active in China. A liberal spirit pervaded the university. 



GETTING TOGETHER 157 

inspiring its members with a desire to serve China by spread- 
ing the light of learning, without narrow denominational 
limitations, relying on Christian spirit and character to exert 
its influence without undue insistence on dogma. By a pleas- 
ant coincidence, I on that very date received a cablegram tell- 
ing me that my alma mater, the University of Wisconsin, 
had also given me the honorary LL.D. 

An opportunity for general meetings of Americans and 
British, including, also, other residents of Peking, interested 
in things of the mind, was afforded by a lecture course ar- 
ranged by the Peking Language School. I opened the course 
with an address on the conservation of the artistic past of 
China, which was given at the residence of the British minis- 
ter. Sir John Jordan in his introductory remarks said that 
the time was at hand when foreigners residing in China would 
take a far deeper and more intimate interest in Chinese 
civilization than they had done before. I spoke of the dan- 
ger of losing the expertness and the creative impulse of Chi- 
nese art and of the readiness it had always shown in the past 
to develop new forms, methods, and beauties. Subsequent 
lectures were given alternately at my residence and at the 
theatre of the British Legation, and the entire course empha- 
sized our common interest in Chinese civilization. 

During the height of the student movement in 1919 the 
Peking police closed the offices of the Yi Shih Pao (Social 
Welfare), a liberal paper in Peking. The paper had made 
itself disliked by pubHshing news of the Japanese negotiations 
and criticizing the militarist faction. A number of Amer- 
icans had previously interested themselves in the paper, 
because of its liberal tendencies and because of its devotion 
to social welfare work; they proposed to take it over, but the 
transfer had not yet been carried out. The Chinese editor 
of the paper appealed to me to assist him in the liberation of 
an associate who had been imprisoned. As no legal Ameri- 
can interest at the time existed in the paper, however, it was 



158 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

not possible to use my good ofl&ces in its behalf, although I 
had at all times made the Chinese officials know that the 
suppression of free speech in the press was a very undesirable 
procedure. The suppression of the Yi Shih Pao was a result 
of the desire of the reactionary faction in Peking to choke 
every expression favourable to the national movement; they 
had been encouraged to imitate the stringent press regula- 
tions of Japan. 

Later on the Americans completed their purchase of the 
Yi Shih Pao. The question as to how far American protec- 
tion should be extended over newspapers printed in Chinese, 
but owned by Americans, then came up for decision. As 
Americans had become interested in the bona fide enterprise 
of publishing newspapers in Chinese, it was not apparent 
how such protection as is given to others for their legitimate 
interests could be refused in this case. I therefore recom- 
mended to the Department of State that no distinction 
be made against such enterprises, and several vernacular 
papers were subsequently registered in American consu- 
lates. 

When I told the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that 
American registry had been given the Yi Shih Pao, I informed 
him of the character of the American press laws, under which 
newspapers are in normal times entirely free from censorship, 
but are responsible in law for any misstatements of fact 
injurious to individuals. Many of the reactionary officials 
had persistently opposed the idea of having American- 
registered vernacular papers in China. But, manifestly, 
they could not make any valid protest against such an ar- 
rangement. In fact, we never had any expression of official 
displeasure; on the contrary, nothing could have been more 
welcome to the people of China and to the great majority of 
officials than to know that vernacular papers were to be 
published in China by Americans. 

The publication in Peking of news from abroad was much 



GETTING TOGETHER 159 

facilitated by wireless. Early in 1919 I entertained at lunch 
several American newspapermen, with whom I had a con- 
ference on the press and news situation in the Far East. 
They were Mr. Fleisher, of the Japan Advertiser; Mr. 
McClatchey, of the Sacramento Bee; Mr. Sharkey, of the 
Associated Press; and Mr. Carl Crow, representative of the 
American Committee on Public Information. Mr. Walter 
Rogers, an expert in this matter, had been in Peking shortly 
before. 

The great difficulty with which we were confronted in any 
attempt to develop the news service between China and the 
United States was the expense of telegraphing by cable, 
which made it impossible to transmit an adequate news ser- 
vice. We were therefore all agreed that it was essential to 
use the wireless and that every effort should be made for 
arrangements whereby the wireless system of the American 
Government would carry news messages at a reasonable 
rate. 

The importance of a direct news service was demonstrated 
during the war, when under an arrangement by the Commit- 
tee on Public Information a budget of news was sent by wire- 
less daily to the Far East. For the first time in history had 
there been anything approaching a fairly complete statement 
of what was going on in the United States. The service of 
news of the Peace Conference was also particularly appre- 
ciated by everybody in China. China had never been so 
close to Europe before. 

The only agency supplying news in China is Renter's. 
Its news budget is made up in London. It proceeds to Spain, 
Morocco, and down the west coast of Africa to the Cape; 
thence up the east coast of Egypt, Persia, India, and Ceylon. 
At each of the main stations on the way items of only local 
interest there are withdrawn. What is left at Ceylon as of 
interest to the Far East is sent on to Singapore and Hong- 
Kong, as well as by another route to Australia. It is quite 



i6o AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

natural that with such a source and such a routing, this ser- 
vice should carry next to nothing about America. I once had 
it observed for a whole month in June, 1916, when the only 
American item carried was that Mr. Bryan had shed tears at 
the National Democratic Convention! 



CHAPTER XIV 
WAR DAYS IN PEKING 

During my first absence in America Mr. Peck had been 
appointed consul at Tsingtau, and Dr. Charles D. Tenney 
had been sent as his successor. My predecessor, Mr. W. J. 
Calhoun, in a letter concerning Doctor Tenney, bore witness to 
his unusual acquaintanceship with the Chinese and knowl- 
edge of Chinese affairs. Speaking of Doctor Tenney 's joy in 
returning to China, Mr. Calhoun remarked: "There is a 
strange thing about foreigners who have lived very long in 
China : they never seem to be contented an5rwhere else. They 
are apparently bitten by some kind of bug which infuses a 
virus into their blood, and makes life in that country the only 
thing endurable." 

Existence of a state of war deeply affected social life in 
Peking. The mutual enemies could, of course, not see each 
other. Their social movements, therefore, were considerably 
restricted. The neutrals, however, having relations with 
both sides, were if anything more busy socially than at other 
times. Dinners had to be given in sets, one for the Entente 
Allies, the other for the Central Powers. The Austrian min- 
ister decided that as his country was at war and his people 
were suffering, he would not accept any dinner invitations at 
all, except for small parties en famille. The other represen- 
tatives of belligerent powers kept up their social life on a re- 
duced scale. Dancing was gradually restricted, and finally 
passed out almost entirely. 

Mr. Rockhill had died at Honolulu In December, 191 4. 
He had been retained by President Yuan as his personal ad- 
viser, and was returning to China from a brief visit to the 

161 



i62 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

United States. I felt the loss of a man of such unusual ability 
and experience, to whom China had been the most interesting 
country in the world. In all the difficulties which followed, 
his advice would have been of great value to the Chinese 
President and Government. 

The report of the Engineers' Commission which investi- 
gated the Hwai River Conservancy project made that enter- 
prise look even more attractive than I had anticipated. The 
value of the redeemed land alone would be more than enough 
to pay the cost of the improvements. I felt that the work 
would give great credit to the American name. Not only 
would it assure the livelihood of multitudes through the re- 
demption of millions of the most fertile acres in China, but 
it would give to the Chinese a living example of how, by scien- 
tific methods, the very foundations of their life could be im- 
proved. During the winter of 1914-15 a terrible famine was 
again devastating that region, threatening hundreds of 
thousands of peasants with extinction. Never had the sum 
of twenty millions of dollars produced such benefits as would 
be assured here. But after urgent appeals to the Depart- 
ment in Washington, the National Red Cross, and the 
Rockefeller Foundation, it was found impossible to secure the 
necessary capital during the year of the option. The best I 
could do was to ask for an extension, which was granted, 
although the Chinese themselves were impatient to see the 
work begun. 

We received reports during the first winter of the war 
about the suffering endured by German and Austrian prison- 
ers in Siberia. They had been captured during the summer 
and early autumn, and transported to Siberia in their summer 
uniforms. Subjected to the intense cold of a Siberian winter, 
they were herded in barracks unprovided with ordinary ne- 
cessities; these were sealed to exclude the cold and all kinds of 
disease were soon rampant. The Legation at Peking, being 
nearest to Siberia, superintended the relief work there of the 



WAR DAYS IN PEKING 163 

American Red Cross; there was also a German relief organiza- 
tion (called Hilfsaktion)y of which a capable and enterprising 
woman of Austrian descent, Madame Von Hanneken, was the 
moving spirit. The Legation's work increased; innumerable 
appeals came to it directly, and in lending its good offices to 
the German association care had to be taken that no use of 
it be made that could be properly objected to. Madame 
Von Hanneken was on friendly terms with the Russian Lega- 
tion, which gave her society needed facilities. Its direct 
representatives were European neutrals, chiefly Danes and 
Swedes. The work of the American Red Cross among the war 
prisoners in Siberia, as well as the efforts of the Y. M. C. A. 
to introduce among them industrial and artistic activities 
to alleviate their lot, make a story of unselfish effort. 

I tried to encourage the Chinese to build good roads. The 
Imperial roads around Peking were surfaced with huge flag- 
stones which, through rain and climate, had lost alignment; 
they tilted and sloped at angles like the logs of a corduroy 
road. Vehicles might not pass them, while the Chinese carts 
picked their way as best they could over low-lying dirt tracks 
by the side of these magnificent causeways. The Chinese 
proverbial description of them is: "Ten years of heaven and 
a thousand years of hell." The country thoroughfares have 
worn deep; it is a Chinese paradox that the rivers usually flow 
above and the highways lie below the surface of the land. 
In the loess regions the roads are often cut thirty or forty 
feet deep into the soil. 

I first suggested the building of a road from Tientsin to 
Peking, but the railways did not encourage this enterprise, 
and it was delayed several years. Mr. E. W. Frazar, an 
American merchant from Japan who accompanied me to 
Tokyo in 191 5, had successfully established motor-car 
services in Japan. He had come to north China to establish 
a branch of his firm there; he was willing to get American 
capital for road building and to make a contract therefor 



i64 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

with the Chinese Government. This particular contract 
was not concluded, but an impetus had been given to the 
idea among the Chinese, and the building of roads was grad- 
ually taken up, beginning with highways around Peking. 
The leading men became interested when they began to real- 
ize its effect on real estate values. 

Governor-General Harrison of the Philippine Islands 
spent a week in Peking, sightseeing, making many purchases 
of antiques and Peking products. He was much taken with 
the Chinese rugs and ordered a number of huge carpets to 
be made for the Malacafian Palace. We both strongly felt 
that something should be done to prevent the total disappear- 
ance of the American flag from the Pacific, and this we 
knew would occur if the existing companies carried out 
their threats of retrenchment and withdrawal. Had one 
been able to foresee the enormous demand for shipping 
which was soon to arise, he might have outdistanced 
the richest of existing millionaires. The Chinese Govern- 
ment did give to an American a contract to establish a 
Chino-American steamship line, with a government guar- 
antee of ^3,000,000; unfortunately, it shared the all-too- 
common fate of American undertakings in China and was 
not carried out. 

The lunar New Year of the Chinese Calendar was changed 
to the Republican (Min Kuo) New Year. On January ist 
Peking was given a festal aspect. The Central Park, a part 
of the old Imperial City, had been opened to the public, and 
under innumerable flags crowds streamed along the path- 
ways, stopping at booths to buy souvenirs and toys, or enter- 
ing the always popular eating places where both foreign and 
Chinese music is played by bands large and small. On 
various public places fairs were held; extensive settlements 
of booths built of bamboo poles and matting sprang up over- 
night. There, curios, pictures, brass utensils, wood carvings, 
gold fishes, ming eggs, birdcages, and other objects useful and 



WAR DAYS IN PEKING 165 

ornamental were on sale. Wandering troops of actors and 
acrobats performed in enclosures to which the public was 
admitted for a small fee. Before one of these stockades I 
saw a large sign reading: "Chow and Chang — champion 
magicians educated from America." So, even here, Ameri- 
can education was valued. The art collection in the Im- 
perial City was open at half the usual admission fee; the 
grounds of the Temple of Agriculture and of the Temple of 
Heaven were crowded with holiday visitors, and at all 
theatres were special performances. For three or four days 
the city wore a holiday aspect. 

But the old New Year was not abandoned. On the days 
before the lunar year ended the streets became alive with 
shoppers preparing for the grand annual feasting. Quanti- 
ties of fattened ducks, pigs, chickens, and fishes, loads of 
baked things and sweets were transported in carts, rickshaws, 
and all sorts of vehicles or by hand, everyone chattering and 
smiHng in happy anticipation. The Chinese New Year is 
the traditional time for settling all outstanding accounts. 
Slates are wiped clean, partnerships are wound up, and all 
balances settled. When New Year's eve comes, having 
strained themselves to meet their obligations, all cast dull 
care aside. Families and clans gather for a gargantuan 
feasting, the abundance and duration of which outdistances 
anything seen in the West. 

The official celebration of the Repubhcan New Year at the 
President's Palace had to be modified. Because of the war 
the diplomatic corps could not be received as a unit. It was 
therefore arranged that the President receive the foreign 
representatives in three groups: the Allies, the Neutrals, 
and the Central Powers. High Chinese officials and pictu- 
resque Mongolian dignitaries were received on the first day, 
the diplomatic representatives on the second. As the Presi- 
dent chatted informally with each minister, Madam Yuan 
received in an adjoining apartment, talking quite naturally 



i66 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

with the ladies of the party about such feminine matters as 
the size of famiHes and the choice of dress materials. 

A short time ago a young American teacher, Hicks, was 
murdered and his two companions seriously wounded while 
they were ascending the Yangtse River in a boat. The attack 
was at the dead of night; the survivors recalled only flaring 
torches and swarthy faces, although they believed that their 
assailants wore some sort of uniform. The Chinese Govern- 
ment disavowed responsibility, considering it an ordinary 
robbery, and asserting that if the assailants wore uniforms 
they must have been insurgents, as no regular troops were 
near that place. The crime was revolting, destructive of 
the sense of security of foreign travellers, and I insisted ab- 
solutely on payment of an indemnity. Money payment is 
by no means satisfactory; it does give the injured parties 
redress and testifies to the desire of the Central Government 
to protect foreigners, but does not bring the consequences of 
the crime home to the really guilty parties. I therefore 
always tried to have the personal responsibility in such 
matters followed up and specifically determined; in this case 
it was impossible. The Chinese Government finally agreed 
to the very handsome indemnity of $25,000 for the death of 
young Hicks, the largest pecuniary award for loss of life ever 
made in China. It was an ironical circumstance that just 
after this had been settled, an American driving his automo- 
bile at excessive speed in the Peking streets struck and killed 
an old Chinese woman. When I stated to the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs that I would ask this man to pay $300 to the 
relatives, he replied with a twinkle: "How much was it we 
paid you for the last American who was killed ?" 

However, he did not really intend to dispute the reason- 
ableness of even so enormous a diflPerence. Foreigners in 
China, on account of their employment as managers or head 
teachers, necessarily have to be considered, from a purely 
pecuniary point of view, to have a value far above the aver- 



WAR DAYS IN PEKING 167 

age. Moreover, should large indemnities be paid for the 
death of poor people among the Chinese, they would be con- 
stantly tempted to let themselves be injured or even killed, 
in order to provide for their families. 

Among the Chinese who visited me during the first year of 
the war were the military and civil governors of Chekiang 
Province. Contrary to tradition, both were natives of the 
province they governed, and good governors, too. The civil 
governor, Mr. Chu Ying-kuang, who was under forty, was a 
man of great public spirit and wisdom, eager to discuss con- 
structive ideas and eflPective methods in government and 
industry. Governor Chu wrote me a letter of thanks, which 
may be considered an example of Chinese epistolary style. It 
ran: 

During my short stay in the Capital I hurriedly visited your Excellency 
and was so fortunate as to draw upon the stores of your magnificence and 
gain the advantage of your instruction. My appreciation cannot be ex- 
pressed in words. You also treated me with extraordinary kindness in 
preparing for me an elaborate banquet. Your kindness and courtesy were 
heaped high and your treasures were lavishly displayed. My gratitude is 
graven on my heart and my hope and prayer is that the splendour of your 
merit may daily grow brighter and that your prosperity may mount as 
high as the clouds. 

I, your younger brother, left Peking on the 29th of last month for the 
South, and on February 2nd arrived at Hangchou. The whole journey 
was peaceful so that your embroidered thoughts need not be exercised. I 
reflect fondly on your refined conversation and cannot forget it for an in- 
stant. I respectfully offer this inch-long casket to express my sincere 
gratitude and hope that you will favour it with a glance. 

Respectfully wishing you daily blessings, 

Your younger brother. 

The new German minister. Admiral von Hintze, arrived 
shortly after the New Year. I saw him frequently after his 
first visit, as he had few colleagues with whom, under the 
conditions of war, he could meet. In order to avoid capture 
as an enemy, Admiral von Hintze had come from the United 



i68 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

States incognito, as a supercargo on a Norwegian vessel. 
He had been minister in Mexico, and before that the Emper- 
or's representative at the court of the Czar, and was a man 
of wide knowledge of European affairs and of diplomatic 
intrigue. For a man of his intelligence, he was inclined to 
give undue weight to rumours. Peking was amused shortly 
after his arrival when he sent orders to the Germans resident 
in all parts of the capital to hold themselves ready to come 
into the Legation Quarter immediately upon notice being 
given. He had read books on the troubles of 1900 and on the 
assassination of his predecessor, Baron Kettler; he there- 
fore saw dire menaces where everything seemed quite nor- 
mal to older residents. Especially, he imagined himself 
surrounded by emissaries and retainers of the enemy. Sev- 
eral times he would say to me: "My first *boy' is excellent. 
He could not be better. The Japanese pay him well, so he 
has to do his best to hold his job." 

Being himself a clever man and familiar with opinion out- 
side of Germany, Admiral Hintze thoroughly disapproved 
of the acts of unnecessary violence by which the Germans 
had forfeited the good opinion of the world, especially the 
sinking of the Lusitania and the execution of Edith Cavell. 
"What a mistake," he exclaimed, "for the sake of one 
woman! Why not hold her in a prison somewhere in Ger- 
many until the war is over.^*" The stupidity of such acts 
deeply offended him. Had he become Minister for Foreign 
Affairs at an earlier date, some bad mistakes might have 
been avoided. When the first reports of the resumption of 
exacerbated submarine warfare were received, he remarked 
to me : " Do not believe these reports that Germany will re- 
sume unHmited submarine warfare. I can assure you that 
they will not be foolish enough to do such a thing." 

I noticed soon after Admiral Hintze's arrival that his rela- 
tions with his Austrian colleague were not the most cordial; 
these two seemed to cooperate with difficulty. They were 



WAR DAYS IN PEKING 169 

men entirely different in temperament. The German was 
a man of the world, inspired with the ideal of German mili- 
tary power and looking on international politics as a keen 
and clever intellectual game. Concerning Hindenburg, he 
said to me: "There is a man who makes no excuses for his 
existence." The Austrian minister was a man of scholarly 
impulse, with a broad sympathy for humankind, deploring 
the shallow game of pohtics, and hoping for a more humane 
and reasonable system of government than that of the po- 
litical state. 

Mr. Sun Pao-chi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, resigned on 
January 28th to head the Audit Board, and was succeeded by 
Mr. Lu Tseng-tsiang. Mr. Lu had enjoyed an extensive 
experience in Europe. He had acquired a thorough mastery 
of French and married a Belgian lady, to whom he was 
deeply devoted. Like his predecessor, he abstained from 
internal politics. He was called to office when the exceed- 
ingly difficult negotiations with Japan concerning the twenty- 
one demands were begun, and it became his duty to carry 
through a very painful and ungrateful task. Mr. Lu was 
interested in general political affairs in their broader aspects, 
and gave special attention to international law. 

I was frequently a guest at the house of Mr. Liang Tun-yen, 
the Minister of Communications. He was easy-going, pre- 
pared to talk business there rather than at the Ministry, where 
I would see him frequently also, about the Hukuang rail- 
ways. The engineer of the British section was steadfastly 
trying to secure standards of British engineering and manu- 
facture, to which it would be difficult for American manufac- 
turers to conform. The Legation was beset with protests 
concerning orders for materials which Americans did not 
like, since they embodied the special practice of one partner 
to the contract. Thus matters of a technical nature had to 
be argued between the Legation and the Ministry of Com- 
munications. Mr. Liang himself was not a railway expert. 



I70 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

For example, he once spoke enthusiastically about clearing 
up the Grand Canal, exclaiming: "then you could go from 
Peking to Shanghai in a houseboat." We often fell back on 
the more general features of the political situation in China, 
concerning which Mr. Liang displayed a gentle skepticism 
for all proposed reforms. With respect to railroad conces- 
sions, he was hostile to the idea of percentage construction 
contracts, believing it dangerous to measure the returns of 
an engineering firm by the sum expended on the works. I 
argued that since the professional standing of such a firm 
was involved it could not afford to run up the cost of the 
works merely to increase its own commission. But I did not 
overcome his skepticism. 



CHAPTER XV 
EMPEROR YUAN SHIH-KAI 

"Yuan Shih-kai is trying to make himself emperor, we 
hear from Peking," Mr. E. T. Williams remarked to me at the 
Department of State when I saw him there in July, 191 5. 
The report said that an imperiahst movement in behalf of 
Yuan Shih-kai had been launched in Peking. As there had 
been frequent reports during the year of such attempts to 
set up an empire, I was not at first inclined to give much 
credence to the rumours. 

Upon my return to San Francisco in September, this time 
'to take steamer for China, I met Dr. Wellington Koo, who 
had just come on a special mission. I had been confiden- 
tially informed that he would probably be designated as 
minister to the United States, to take the place of Mr. Shah. 
The Department of State had directed me to delay my de- 
parture in order to confer with Doctor Koo upon recent de- 
velopments in China. On the day we spent together we went 
over all that had happened since my absence. The reports 
which had already been received that a movement had been 
started to make Yuan Shih-kai emperor I then considered im- 
probable, in view of all the difficulties which the enterprise 
must encounter, both internationally and from the Chinese op- 
position. Doctor Koo confirmed this feeling and said that 
Yuan Shih-kai himself was very doubtful. He mentioned the 
Goodnow memorandum, however, as a possible factor. I was 
considerably surprised later to discover that the main object 
of Doctor Koo's mission was to sound pubhc opinion in Amer- 
ica and Europe concerning the assumption of the imperial 
dignity by Yuan Shih-kai, and to prepare the ground for it. 

171 



172 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

During my return voyage to China the matter quickly came 
to a head, so that when I arrived in Peking on October ist 
I was confronted with an entirely new situation. 

To understand the movement it is necessary to review 
briefly the significant facts of Peking politics during the 
summer of 191 5. A concerted effort had been made to com- 
bat the Liang Shih-yi faction. The opposition centred in 
the so-called Anhui Party, which was largely militaristic, but 
in which civilian leaders like the Premier, Hsu Shih-chang, 
the Chief Secretary of the cabinet, Yang Shih-chi, the Minis- 
ter of Finance, as well as the Minister of Communications, 
were prominent. 

Charges of corruption were lodged against Chang Hu, 
Vice-Minister of Finance; Yeh Kung-cho, Vice-Minister of 
Communications; and the Director of the Tientsin-Pukow 
Railway. Including these, twenty-two high officials were 
impeached during July, besides several provincial governors. 
The Anhui Party was trying to eliminate radically the in- 
fluence of the so-called Communications Party, which had 
tried to maintain itself through the vice-ministers and coun- 
sellors of several important ministries, the chiefs of which 
were Anhui men. 

It appears that several Anhui leaders were involved in a 
movement to establish a monarchy, with Yuan Shih-kai as 
emperor. Care was exercised in picking the Committee of 
Ten to make a preliminary draft of the Permanent Constitu- 
tion; it was believed by many that influences were at work 
for putting into that instrument provisions for reestablishing 
the monarchy. Report had it that on July 7th General 
Feng Kuo-chang, military governor at Nanking, had urged 
that the President assume the throne, for which he was re- 
buked by Yuan in severe terms. Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, 
the American constitutional adviser, returned to Peking in 
mid-July for a short stay; he was asked on behalf of the 
President to prepare a memorandum on the comparative 



EMPEROR YUAN SHIH-KAI 173 

adaptability of the republican and monarchical forms of 
government to Chinese conditions. Doctor Goodnow com- 
plied. As a matter of general theory, he took the view that 
the monarchical form might be considered better suited to 
the traditions and the actual political development of the 
Chinese. He saw special merit in the fact that under the 
monarchical system, the succession to power would be regu- 
lated so that it could not be made an ever-recurring object 
of contention. On the expediency of an actual return at the 
time from the republic to the monarchy Doctor Goodnow ex- 
pressly refrained from pronouncing a judgment. The memo- 
randum was prepared simply for the personal information 
of the President. Advisers had been so generally treated as 
academic ornaments that Doctor Goodnow did not suspect 
that in this case his memorandum would be made the start- 
ing point and basis of positive action. 

Meanwhile, Mr. Liang Shih-yi and his group, seeing their 
power threatened, decided to do something extreme to re- 
cover the lead. They concluded that the monarchical move- 
ment was inevitable; thereupon they seem to have persuaded 
Yuan Shih-kai that the movement could be properly handled 
and brought to early and successful issue only through their 
superior experience and knowledge. It was they who ar- 
ranged for the memorandum of Doctor Goodnow. They had 
remained in the background until the middle of August, when 
an open monarchical propaganda began, based avowedly on 
the opinions expressed by the American adviser and thus 
given a very respectable and impartial appearance. 

They formed the Peace Planning Society (Chou An Hui). 
Its aim was to investigate the advantages and disadvantages 
accruing from the republican form of government. Doctor 
Goodnow's views were widely heralded as categorically 
giving preference to monarchy for China, notwithstanding 
disclaimers which he now issued. The fact that an American 
expert should pronounce this judgment was cited as espe- 



174 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

daily strong evidence In favour of the monarchical form, since 
it came from a citizen of the foremost republic in the world. 
It became known in early September that the movement 
was in the hands of capable organizers. Notwithstanding 
Yuan Shih-kai's repeated disclaimers, he failed to take posi- 
tive action to suppress the agitation; he was therefore believed 
to be at least in a receptive mood. The high officials in 
Peking with few exceptions had become favourable to the 
movement. The Vice-President, General Li Tuan-hung, was 
at first opposed, but even he appeared to be reconciled at 
last, being not entirely a free agent. The members of the 
Anhui faction, now that the lead had been taken out of their 
hands, were less enthusiastic for the change. Several politi- 
cal leaders began to withdraw from affairs. General Tuan 
Chi-jui, the Minister of War, and Mr. Liang Chi-chao, the 
Minister of Education, resigned, undoubtedly because of 
their tacit disapproval of the movement, although other 
reasons were alleged.^ The Premier and Mr. Liang Tung- 
yen, the Minister of Communications, though not on princi- 
ple opposed, considered that on account of his previous alle- 
giance to the Imperial Family, Yuan Shih-kai could not with 
propriety assume the Imperial office. Within the inner 
circles of the movement there was no question of the desire 
of the President to have it put through. For a time, early in 

iMr. Liang Chi-chao wrote a characteristic letter of resignation to the President: 

"On a previous occasion, I had the honour to apply to Your Excellency for leave to resign and in an- 
swer to my request, Your Excellency granted me two months' sick leave. This shows the magnanimity 
and kindness of Your Excellency toward me. 

"The recent state of my health is by no means improved. The 'pulses* in my body have become 
swollen and I am often attacked by fits of dizziness. My appearance looks healthy, but my energy and 
spirit have become exhausted. Different medicines have been prescribed by the doctors, but none has 
proved effective. My ill-health has been chiefly caused by my doctors' 'misuse of medicine.' I have 
lately been often attacked by fits of cold, which cause me sleepless nights. I am quite aware of the grav- 
ity of my disease and unless I give up all worldly affairs, I am afraid that my illness will be beyond 
hope of cure. 

"In different places in America, the climate is mild and good for invalids. I have now made up my 
mind to sail for the new continent to recuperate my health. There I shall consult the best physicians 
for the care of my health. I am longing to spend a vacation in perfect ease and freedom from worldly 
cares in order to recuperate my health. I am sailing immediately. I hereby respectfully bring this 
to the notice of Your Excellency." 

He did not, however, proceed to America. 



EMPEROR YUAN SHIH-KAI 175 

September, he was even thinking of forcing the matter, but 
began to be apprehensive regarding the action of certain for- 
eign powers who might attach difficult conditions to their 
recognition of the new regime. 

It was suggested that the Legislative Council might simply 
confer the title of emperor on the President, and the constitu- 
tion might then be amended to make the presidency heredi- 
tary. Thus, it was naively believed, legal continuity could 
be preserved sufficiently to obviate the necessity of seeking 
a new recognition. A republic with a hereditary president 
seemed to some politicians the key to the difficulty. This 
proposal served to direct the minds of those who were man- 
aging the movement to the importance of letting a represen- 
tative body participate in it, and of not carrying it through 
by a coup d'etat. 

On my return to China Mr. Chow Tsu-chi and other 
leaders waited on me, saying that present uncertainties in- 
volved such drawbacks to peace and prosperity that from all 
the provinces the strongest appeals were coming, to prevail 
upon Yuan to sanction the movement. Mr. Chow went so 
far as to say: "There is such a strong demand for this step 
that we shall have great trouble if it is not taken. There 
will be military uprisings." When I looked incredulous, 
Mr. Chow proceeded : "Yes, indeed, the people can only un- 
derstand a personal headship, and they want it, so that the 
country may be settled." Though I took this all with a 
grain of salt, I was surprised at the apparent unanimity with 
which the inevitableness of the change seemed to be accepted. 
When I asked how the President would reconcile such a step 
with the oath he had taken to support a republican govern- 
ment, I was told that this was, indeed, the great obstacle; 
that probably it could not be overcome unless the whole 
nation insisted and made it a point of duty that Yuan Shih- 
kai continue to govern the state under the new form. 

The attempt to reestablish the monarchy seemed to me a 



176 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

step backward. I had always felt that, whereas the Chinese 
had no experience with elective representative institutions, 
nevertheless they were locally so largely self-governed that 
they were fitted by experience and tradition to evolve some 
form of provincial and national representation. Yet I was 
strongly convinced that it is under any circumstances in- 
judicious for one nation or the officials of one nation to as- 
sume that they can determine what is the best form of 
government for another nation. The fundamental principle 
of self-government is that every people shall work out that 
problem for itself, usually through many troubles and with 
many relapses to less perfect methods. 

The Legation had during my absence asked for instructions 
about a possible eventual decision to recognize the new form 
of government. It had suggested that acceptability to the 
people, and, consequently, ability to preserve order, should be 
among the factors determining our attitude. This position 
had been approved by the State Department. In the many 
conversations I had with the President and members of the 
cabinet, I confined myself to expressing the opinion that the 
Government would strengthen itself and gain respect at home 
and abroad in such measure as it made real use of representa- 
tive institutions and encouraged local self-government. 

The Council of State on 6th October passed a law institut- 
ing a national referendum on the question. Each district 
was to elect one representative. The delegates from each 
province were to meet at the respective provincial capitals 
and to ballot upon the question. The election was fixed 
for the 5th of November, the date for balloting on the prin- 
cipal issue on November 1 5th. Those desiring constructive 
and progressive action had allied themselves with the monar- 
chical movement. They hoped to strengthen constitutional 
practice and administrative efficiency after the personal am- 
bitions of Yuan Shih-kai had been reaHzed. With Yuan in 
the exalted position of Emperor, Mr. Chow Tsu-chi explained 



EMPEROR YUAN SHIH-KAI 177 

to me, the government itself would be in the hands of the 
prime minister and cabinet; they would carry it on constitu- 
tionally and in harmony with the legislative branch. As 
Mr. Chow put it: "We shall make Yuan the Buddha in the 
temple." 

The original promoters of the movement were not wholly 
pleased with the efforts to engraft on it principles of constitu- 
tional practice and popular consent. As certain military 
leaders might resort to a coup d'etat on October loth, the anni- 
versary of the outbreak of the revolution in 191 1, the review 
of troops set for that date was countermanded. 

Mr. Liang Shih-yi and Mr. Chow Tsu-chi afterward ex- 
plained to me their preference for the monarchical form. 
Mr. Liang said : "Chinese traditions and customs, official and 
commercial, emphasize personal relationships. Abstract 
forms of thinking, in terms of institutions and general legal 
principles, are not understood by our people. Under an 
emperor, authority would sit more securely, so that it would 
be possible to carry through a fundamental financial reform 
such as that of the land tax. The element of personal loyalty 
and responsibihty is necessary to counteract the growth of 
corruption among officials. The Chinese cannot conceive 
of personal duties toward a pure abstraction." 

With President Yuan Shih-kai I had a long interview on 
October 4th. He assumed complete indifference as to the 
popular vote soon to be taken. "If the vote is favourable 
to the existing system," he said, "matters will simply remain 
as they are; a vote for the monarchy would, on the contrary, 
bring up many questions of organization. I favour a repre- 
sentative parHament, with full liberty of discussion but with 
limited powers over finance." Education and expert guid- 
ance in the work of the Government were other things about 
which he was planning. "There is a general lack of useful 
employment," he added with some hilarity, "on the part of 
the numerous advisers who hover around the departments. 



178 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

With an administrative reorganization all this will be 
changed. These experts will be put to work in helping to 
develop administrative activities." And he reverted to his 
favourite simile of the infant : " Even if we feel that all their 
medicine may not be good for the child, yet we shall let them 
take it by the hand to help it to walk." 

It was plain that Yuan Shih-kai, while seeming very de- 
tached, was trying to justify the proposed change on the 
ground of making the Government more efficient and giving 
it also a representative character. 

Doubtless Yuan Shih-kai had thought originally that the 
Japanese would not obstruct the movement, though ever 
since the time of his service in Korea he had not been favour- 
ably regarded by them. His supporters, indeed, claimed that 
the assurances first given to Yuan by the Japanese were 
strong enough to warrant him in expecting their support 
throughout. By the end of October, however, the Japanese 
Government came to the conclusion that the project to put 
Yuan Shih-kai on the throne should, if possible, be stopped. 

A communication came from Japan to the United States, 
Great Britain, France, and Russia, which expressed concern 
because the monarchical movement in China was likely to 
create disturbances and endanger foreign interests. Japan 
invited the other powers to join in advising the Chinese 
President against continuing this policy. The American 
Government decHned this invitation, because it did not de- 
sire to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. 
The other powers, however, fell in with the Japanese sugges- 
tion, and on October 29th the Japanese Charge, and the 
British, French, and Russian ministers, called at the Foreign 
Office and individually gave "friendly counsel" to the effect 
that it would be desirable to stop the monarchical movement. 

The British minister asked whether the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs thought disturbances could surely be pre- 
vented; whereat the Chinese rejoiced, beheving it a friendly 



EMPEROR YUAN SHIH-KAI 179 

hint that everything would be well, provided no disturbances 
should take place. As the machinery for holding the elec- 
tions had been set in motion, the Chinese leaders beheved 
that any action to stop them would bring discredit and loss 
of prestige. 

The final voting in the convention of district delegates at 
Peking, on December 9th, registered a unanimous desire from 
the elections of November 5th to have Yuan Shih-kai assume 
the imperial dignity. Mr. Chow Tsu-chi remarked to me: 
"We tried to get some people to vote in the negative just for 
appearance's sake, but they would not do it." Prince Pu- 
Lun made the speech nominating Yuan as emperor, which 
earned him the resentment of the Manchus. On the basis 
of these elections, the acting Parliament passed a resolution 
bestowing on Yuan Shih-kai the imperial title, and calling 
upon him to take up the duties therewith connected. He 
twice rejected the proposal, but when it was sent to him the 
third time he submitted, having exhausted the traditional 
forms of polite refusal. 

When Yuan was actually elected Emperor, the Entente 
Powers were puzzled. They announced that they would 
await developments. The Chinese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs informed them that there would be some delay, as 
many preparations were still required before the promulga- 
tion of the empire could be made. But it was generally be- 
lieved that the movement had reached fruition. The Rus- 
sian and French ministers had already expressed themselves 
privately as favourable to recognition. The German and 
Austrian ministers hastened to offer Yuan their felicitations, 
which embarrassed the Chinese not a little. The majority of 
foreign representatives at Peking were favourable to recog- 
nizing the new order on January ist, when the promulgation 
was to be made. Messages of devotion and sometimes of 
fulsome praise came to the Emperor-elect (already called 
Ta. Huang Ti) from foreigners. Foreign advisers, including 



i8o AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

the Japanese but not the Americans, set forth their devotion 
in glowing phrases. Doctor Ariga, the Japanese adviser, ex- 
pressed his feehngs in the traditional language of imperial 
ceremony. It was even announced that the new emperor 
had been prayed for in foreign Christian churches. I could 
not, however, verify any such case. 

Suddenly, on Christmas Day, came the report that an 
opposition movement had been started in Yunnan Province. 

A young general, Tsai Ao, who had for a time lived in 
Peking where he held an administrative post, had left the 
capital during the summer and had cooperated with Liang 
Chi-chao, after the latter resigned his position as Minister of 
Education. Liang Chi-chao attacked the monarchical move- 
ment in the press, writing from the foreign concession at 
Tientsin. General Tsai Ao returned to his native Yunnan, 
and from that mountain fastness launched a military expedi- 
tion which was opposed to the Emperor-elect. 

So the dead unanimity was suddenly disrupted. Now 
voices of opposition came from all sides. The Chinese are 
fatalists. The movement to carry Yuan into imperial power 
had seemed to them irresistible; many had therefore sup- 
pressed their doubts and fears. But when an open opposi- 
tion was started they flocked to the new standard and every- 
where there appeared dissenters. 

A small mutiny took place in Shantung early in December. 
In the Japanese papers it was called "premature." 

A night attack was executed near Shanghai on the settle- 
ment boundary, which was participated in by several Japa- 
nese. Being easily suppressed, it was not thought impor- 
tant. 

Yuan Shih-kai had long been in training for the emperor- 
ship, he loved to use the methods of thought and expression 
of legendary monarchs. Keeping close to national traditions 
in the days of his power he always took care to use words 
indicative of self-deprecation and consideration for his sub- 



EMPEROR YUAN SHIH-KAI i8i 

ordinates. The members of the cabinet repaired on Decem- 
ber 13th to the President's house to offer their congratulations. 
Replying, the Emperor-elect said: "I should rather be 
condoled with than congratulated; for I am giving up my 
personal freedom and that of my descendants for the public 
service. I would find far greater satisfaction in leisurely 
farming and fishing on my Honan estate than in this con- 
stant tussling with problems of state." 

When one of the ministers suggested that there should be a 
great celebration of the new departure, Yuan Shih-kai re- 
plied: "It would be better not to think of celebrating and of 
glory at the present time, but only of work, and work, and 
work. My government should be improved and soundly 
established. In that case, glory will ultimately come, but 
otherwise, if artificially enacted, it is bound to be shortlived." 

These sayings were reported by his faithful ministers as 
being quite in keeping with the character of a self-sacrificing, 
benevolent monarch. 

The empire to be established was to be quite comme ilfaut; 
it was to have a complete ornamentation of newly made 
nobility. The Vice-President was to have the title of prince, 
and there were to be innumerable marquises, counts, and 
barons. The military governors and members of cabinet 
were to become dukes and marquises, while the barons 
would be as many as the sands of the sea. The attitude of 
Vice-President Li Yuan-hung was not quite plain. Aside 
from the princedom he was also offered the marriage of one 
of his sons to one of Yuan's daughters. One of his wives 
seemed especially fascinated by these glittering honours; she 
was said to have virtually prevailed upon General Li to resign 
himself to the situation. The President was very kind to 
him and had supplied him with a bodyguard which watched 
his every movement — for Yuan Shih-kai's information. 

New styles of robes for the Emperor and for his high offi- 
cials and attendants were designed under direction of Mr. 



1 82 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Chu Chi-chien. They were fashioned after the ceremonial 
robes of the Japanese Imperial House. The great coronation 
halls in the Imperial City were thoroughly cleansed and re- 
painted. New carpets were ordered; the making of a nicely 
upholstered throne was entrusted to Talati's, a general mer- 
chandise house in Peking, which fact greatly amused Coun- 
tess Ahlefeldt. 

Meanwhile, with foresight and astuteness, General Tsai Ao 
and Liang Chi-chao were planning their movement against 
Yuan. By establishing the first independent government in 
the remote province of Yunnan they made sure that Yuan 
Shih-kai would be unable to vindicate his authority over all 
China at an early time. With Yunnan as starting point, it 
was hoped that the provinces of Kweichow, Kuangsi, and 
Szechuan could be induced to associate themselves with the 
anti-monarchist movement. Though Canton had a large 
garrison of Yuan's troops, it was hoped that inroads would 
be made even there. 



CHAPTER XVI 
DOWNFALL AND DEATH OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 

Everybody thought that the monarchy was to be pro- 
claimed on New Year's Day, 19 16. Disaffection, it was 
realized, though hitherto confined to a remote province, 
might spread; delay was dangerous. Business in the Yangtse 
Valley and elsewhere was dull. Merchants blamed the 
Central Government, and murmurings were heard. General 
Feng Kuo-chang, who had at first encouraged Yuan Shih-kai, 
now reserved his independence of action. 

The revolt remained localized in Yunnan throughout 
January. With the rise of an opposition. Yuan was now 
more ready to accentuate the constitutional character of the 
new monarchy. His Minister of Finance, Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, 
told me that a constitutional convention would be convoked 
when the monarchy was proclaimed. This would provide 
a representative assembly and a responsible cabinet. Con- 
structive reforms were to be announced. No further patents 
of nobility were to be awarded, the titles already granted 
would be treated as purely military honours. 

If Yuan and his advisers had acted boldly at this time in 
promulgating the monarchy, recognition by a number of 
powers would probably have followed, especially as the con- 
tinuity of the personnel of the Government made recognition 
easier. But hesitation and delay strengthened the opposi- 
tion. Yunnanese troops had by the end of January pene- 
trated into the neighbouring provinces of Szechuan and 
Kuangsi. To learn what was going on in these provinces I 
sent the military attache. Major Newell, up the Yangtse 
River to Szechuan, and the naval attache, Lieut.-Commander 

183 



1 84 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Hutchins, to Canton. Efforts of the generals loyal to Yuan 
to expel the Yunnanese from Szechuan Province were un- 
successful. 

After the peculiarly complex manner of Chinese political 
relationships, Yunnan began to exercise an influence in 
Szechuan Province which was to last for years. The Yunnan- 
ese were protected by natural barriers of mountains; to make 
headway against them was difficult, even had the troops of 
the President shown greater energy. How hollow was the 
unanimity which had been proclaimed in the November 
elections now became thoroughly apparent. Encouraged by 
the open opposition, ill-will against Yuan Shih-kai began to 
be shown in other localities, particularly in Hunan and in 
the southernmost provinces, Kuangsi and Kuangtung. 
Rivalries hitherto held in check by Yuan's strong hand also 
came to the fore. In central China the two men holding the 
greatest military power, Generals Feng Kuo-chang and Chang 
Hsun, began to cherish resentment against the President; 
for, in exchanging notes upon meeting, they discovered that 
Yuan had set each of them to watch the other. 

Even now the monarchical movement might have gained 
strength from the moderates, who feared the Japanese. They 
did not wish to see the national unity disrupted. "Get a 
constitution and a representative legislature," they advised 
Yuan Shih-kai; "put in play a constructive programme of 
state action; reform the finances and the audit, simplify the 
taxes, extend works of pubHc use, build roads, reclaim lands, 
develop agriculture and industry, and all might yet be well." 
Mr. Liang Shih-yi and Mr. Chow Tsu-chi hoped, once the 
question of succession was definitely settled, to "put in com- 
mission " the dictatorial power of Yuan. As Mr. Chow this 
time put it: "Yuan will have the seat of honour but others 
will order the meal." 

Toward the end of January the formal proclamation of 
the empire was further postponed. Mr. Chow Tsu-chi was 



DOWNFALL OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 185 

to go on a special mission to Japan, probably to induce the 
Japanese Government to be more favourable to the new 
monarchy, and to bear handsome concessions to the Japanese. 
But the Japanese Government declared that for personal 
reasons the Emperor of Japan could not receive a Chinese 
embassy at that time. Possibly various other concessionaire 
governments intimated to Japan that they did not expect her 
to entertain any special proposals at this time. Nevertheless, 
the Japanese must have made strong representations to cause 
Yuan Shih-kai, who was a decisive and determined man, to 
risk all by hesitating at this critical moment. 

To present some Americans I called on Yuan Shih-kai on 
February i6th. Mr. and Mrs. Ulysses S. Grant were visiting 
Peking, and Yuan was glad to have me present the son of the 
famous American President who had himself visited China 
and established cordial relations with Li Hung-chang, Yuan's 
great master. Significantly the President said to Mr. Grant: 
*' Your honoured father had great power, but he could safely 
resign it to others when the time came. You have great 
political experience in the West.'* It was quite a Httle party, 
including the newly appointed commercial attache, Mr. 
Julean H. Arnold; the commandant of the guard, Colonel 
Wendell C. Neville; and two young writers, Miss Emerson 
and Miss Weil, who have since devoted themselves to Far 
Eastern studies and hterary work. While the Emperor-elect 
betrayed traces of strain and worry, he had his accustomed 
genial manners. Apropos of the commercial attache and the 
commandant he made a little pleasantry about commerce 
and war coming hand in hand. After a brief interview the 
visitors were taken by the master of ceremonies to see the 
gardens, while I remained with Yuan Shih-kai for a long con- 
versation. This was interpreted by Doctor Tenney and by 
Dr. Hawkling L. Yen, of the Foreign Office; it was understood 
by us all that the conversation was personal and unofficial. 

"I have not sought new honours and responsibilities, but 



1 86 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

now that a course of action has been formally decided upon, 
it is my duty to carry it out," Yuan said. "The people co- 
operated in this, I desire that they shall cooperate at all 
times/* 

I asked how soon he would announce definitely his consti- 
tutional policy. I had some doubt as to how far he intended 
to apply any, and his answer was evasive. "It is hard," 
he replied, "to make a constitution before the monarchy is 
actually reestabHshed. Then, too, if the Emperor heads the 
Government, the powers of departments under him would 
need to be more restricted than under a republic." His 
advisers, it seemed, were unduly, optimistic in expecting 
Yuan to stand squarely for constitutional government, with 
power devolving on the parliament and the different de- 
partments. I reminded him of the British monarchy in its 
various historic forms to refute his idea. 

"Well," he responded, "the new constitution must wait 
for a People's Convention. This is soon to be called; its ac- 
tion must not be in any way anticipated." 

He then fell back on his record, stating that he had pressed 
the Manchu Government to adopt a constitution. He also 
referred to the title chosen for his reign, "Hung Hsien," 
which means "great constitutional era." 

A mandate of February 22nd announced the postponement 
of formal accession to the throne. Mr. C. C. Wu, who 
brought me information concerning certain state plans of 
Yuan Shih-kai, said that this mandate would put an end 
to the innumerable petitions sent to accelerate the formal 
coronation. He added that essentially the Government, so 
far as domestic matters were concerned, was already a mon- 
archy, that only in its international aspects had it failed to 
assume this character. 

Suddenly, on March i8th, the Province of Kuangsi de- 
manded the cancellation of the monarchy; events were mov- 
ing more rapidly. 



DOWNFALL OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 187 

At this juncture I had to decide whether to allow the Lee 
Higginson loan to be completed without a caution or warning, 
or to assume responsibility of virtually stopping that transac- 
tion. As soon as it became clear that open opposition to 
Yuan Shih-kai's government was no longer confined to one 
province and its immediate sphere of influence, it seemed no 
longer proper for any American institution to furnish money to 
the Chinese Government. Many appeals had been made by 
the Opposition based on the demand that, since the country 
was divided, no loans should be made to the Government. In 
ordinary circumstances the protests of factions would not 
have weight, but when several provinces expressed their 
disapproval of a basic governmental poHcy the case was 
different. To have to counsel delay in execution of the loan 
agreement was intensely disappointing to me, fervently as 
L had wished the American financiers to participate in Chi- 
nese finance, in order that credit and resources might be or- 
ganized and developed for the benefit of all. Unfortunately, 
in the lull after the disposal of the twenty-one demands the 
Chinese had immediately embarked on this doubtful poHti- 
cal enterprise, consuming precious energies and money. The 
sums spent on military expeditions, in favourably attun- 
ing doubtful mihtary leaders, and in the creation of the 
alleged unanimous consent through a popular vote, had 
been thrown away. They merely added to the burdens 
carried by the Chinese people. 

With the disaffection of yet more provinces the Govern- 
ment on March 22nd promulgated a decree cancelling the 
monarchy, and announcing that Yuan Shih-kai would retain 
the Presidency of the Republic. 

This sudden and unilateral concession, without a guaran- 
teed quid pro quo by way of submission to the Central Govern- 
ment by the revolting forces, came as a surprise. Doubtless 
the step was taken because the President feared that the 
Province of Kuangtung, whose military governor had urged 



i88 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

him to compromise, would join the revolutionaries. More- 
over, the former Secretary of State, Hsu Shih-chang, who had 
been in retirement, advised it. The Anhui Party in Peking 
saw an opportunity to regain control and oust the Canton- 
ese leaders, in whose hands the monarchical movement had 
been since August. The President believed that the return 
of such men as Hsu Shih-chang and Tuan Chi-jui would 
strengthen him in the eyes of the revolutionists. Hsu Shih- 
chang personally had lived up to the canons of Confucian 
morality in failing to approve the action of Yuan Shih-kai 
when he tried to assume the rank of his former master, the 
Emperor. This gained him universal respect in China. But 
his impelHng motive was personal loyalty to the old Imperial 
Family rather than attachment to its government. 

Of course, the cancellation of the monarchy failed to satisfy 
the revolutionists. They interpreted it as a confession of 
weakness and defeat. Nor was it more welcome to the ad- 
herents of the President in the provinces, especially the 
military, who felt that he was surrendering without getting 
anything in return. Thus the President lost his friends and 
failed to placate his enemies. Had the southern leaders been 
content, the chastened Yuan might have been satisfied to 
be formal head of a constitutional government. But they 
were not. His authority and prestige had been too gravely 
compromised; revolutionists were appearing in various parts 
of China; Tsingtau was being used as a base for revolutionary 
activities in the Province of Shantung with connivance of the 
Japanese authorities. The Peking Government was thrown 
into confusion. The official world was apprehensive as to 
what the President would do, while the foreign community 
feared military riots. 

The leaders of the so-called Anhui Party had evidently ex- 
pected that it would be easy to proscribe the Cantonese 
leaders, Liang Shih-yi, Chow Tsu-chi, lately Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce, and Chu Chi-chien, Minister of 



DOWNFALL OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 189 

the Interior, and have them banished or executed. But 
contrary to their expectations these men did not at that 
critical time take to the woods. To the amusement of every- 
one, the leaders of the other party then became frightened 
and began to remove their famihes from Peking and to plan 
for places of safety for themselves. With somewhat grim 
humour. Minister Chu Chi-chien declared that as conditions 
in Peking were perfectly normal, and as any unwarranted 
show of nervousness by officials would tend unnecessarily to 
disturb the populace, officials would no longer be permitted 
to remove their families from the city. 

It now became a question whether Yuan Shih-kai could 
remain even as President. I had a conversation with Mr. 
Hioki, the Japanese minister, who spoke at length about the 
shortcomings of Yuan, and his tendency to use all the func- 
tions of state, including particularly the financial, to satisfy 
his personal ambitions. Mr. Hioki did not believe that 
Yuan Shih-kai could possibly restore his authority. The 
month of April was a period of great depression in Peking. 
All constructive work, and even planning therefor, had been 
entirely suspended. The new ministry came in on April 
24th, under General Tuan Chi-jui as Minister of War. This 
fact indicated shiftings of power, as General Tuan had never 
supported the President in his imperialist ambitions. The 
Cantonese leaders stepped out of the Government, maintain- 
ing their influence thereafter by the familiar methods of Liang 
Shih-yi. Mr. Tsao Ju-Hn, who belonged to the Communica- 
tions Party, but had been specializing in establishing closer 
relations with the Japanese, became Minister of Communica- 
tions. The President agreed to turn over to the cabinet full 
governmental powers, and to make the ministers responsible 
to the national parliament, which was to be summoned forth- 
with. Yuan ceased his personal control over all important 
branches of the Administration. The control of the army was 
transferred from the President to the Board of War. He 



I90 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

was stripped of all military forces but his Honanese body- 
guard, which numbered about twenty thousand. 

The name of Yuan Shih-kai, however, was retained as a 
symbol of authority, for all the military leaders owed him 
allegiance. Mr. Liang Shih-yi, as president of the Bank of 
Communications, still controlled the finances, and his associ- 
ate, Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, was placed in charge of the Bank of 
China. 

The Government was driven to such extremes by its finan- 
cial needs that in May the cabinet declared a moratorium 
suspending specie payments on notes of the government 
banks. The term "moratorium," which had just then come 
into prominence in Europe, was greeted by the Chinese finan- 
ciers as the password to save them — a respectable name for 
what was otherwise not so honourable. Through this step, 
whatever confidence still remained in Yuan Shih-kai was 
dissipated. Because of the complex nature of Chinese affairs 
peculiar consequences followed. Thus, the postal adminis- 
tration offices and those of certain railways independently 
announced that they would not accept notes but would de- 
mand payment in silver. 

All reports of local troubles coming from reliable sources in 
various parts of China spoke of the participation of Japanese 
in revolutionary activities. Specific reports from Shantung 
indicated that the revolutionaries there were favoured by the 
Japanese. At Tsingtau bandits had come over from Man- 
churia and were openly drilling early in May under the noses 
of the Japanese military. About a thousand of these rebels 
left Tsingtau on May 4th over the Shantung railway, carry- 
ing machine guns to the centre of the province, where they 
took part in the disturbances. Meanwhile, the same railway, 
under Japanese control, had refused to carry Chinese govern- 
ment troops on the ground that neutrality must be main- 
tained. When questioned about the rebels transported, 
the railway officials stated that the rebels must have been in 



DOWNFALL OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 191 

civilian clothes and must have carried their armament as 
baggage. 

It is not clear whether the Japanese were systematically 
working for the establishment of an independent government 
in the south, or whether they were merely covertly encourag- 
ing opposition to the Central Government, to foment division 
and unrest. But the plans of Japan for gaining a dominant 
position in China were certainly favoured by the final break- 
down of the authority of Yuan Shih-kai. 

Japanese correspondents at this time started the report 
that Chinese merchants in the Yangtse Valley were so pro- 
voked with Americans for making a loan to the Chinese 
Government — the Lee Higginson loan — that they were plan- 
ning a boycott against American goods. The Japanese paper, 
Shun Tien Shih Pao, incidentally drew on its imagination, 
and published a yarn to the effect that in addition to the 
$5,000,000 loan already agreed to, the American firm had 
promised to hand over to the Peking authorities $15,000,000 
before the end of July. As a matter of fact, beyond the orig- 
inal payment of $1,000,000, nothing was ever paid over. 
The Chinese did not take up the suggestion of a boycott; 
although, had the making of the loan proceeded, such a result 
might have followed. In Peking, on the other hand, the 
Japanese tried to impress upon Chinese officials that the 
non-completion of the Lee Higginson loan offered new proof 
that Americans could not be relied upon when it came to a 
showdown. 

Throughout this difficult period the European Allied Pow- 
ers felt that they lacked a free hand, and that any joint 
action undertaken might easily assume such form as to create 
a Japanese hegemony. The Japanese at all times urged 
that as they were on the spot it would be only natural to en- 
trust them with the representation of the interests of the 
Allies. Many representative Europeans in China plainly 
intimated to us the hope that the American Government 



192 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

might show a strong interest in Chinese affairs, and might 
not fail to insist on the maintenance of existing treaty rights 
and of Chinese sovereignty. 

I knew from the Chinese who saw him daily that Yuan 
Shih-kai suffered under the strain of his troubles and 
disappointment. As early as March Mr. Liang Tun-yen 
besought me to visit the President and give him encourage- 
ment, as worry and despair were breaking him down. Yuan 
had lived a sedentary life of intense work and great respon- 
sibility. He had developed Bright's disease, but his strong 
constitution had fought it off. Now when great trouble 
beset him his strength failed. Mr. Chow Tzu-chi remarked 
to me: "The President's power of quick decision has left him; 
he is helpless in the troublesome alternatives that confront 
him. Formerly it was *y^s' or *no' in an instant, to my pro- 
posals. Now he ruminates, and wavers, and changes a deci- 
sion many times." Yuan contemplated resignation, and 
seemed taken with the idea of visiting America. I was 
sounded as to giving him safe conduct and asylum. The 
Opposition, it seemed, would make no objection to his leaving 
the country. He was confined to his room during the latter 
half of May, but continued to give his personal attention to 
telegrams and important correspondence. In the first days 
of June his health seemed to improve. I went with my fam- 
ily to Peitaiho to instal them in their summer residence, and 
to rest for a few days. I had left a special code with Mr. 
MacMurray, in which the word Pan stood for Yuan Shih-kai. 
I was shocked on the afternoon of June 6th to receive the 
brief telegram: "Pan is dead." 

By the night train I returned to the capital. Yuan's sons, 
the ex-Premier Hsu Shih-chang, and several of&cials close 
to the President, were with him when he died. During the 
night he had made solemn declaration to the ex-Premier that 
it had not been his wish to become Emperor; he had been 
deceived into believing that the step was demanded by the 



DOWNFALL OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 193 

public, and was necessary to the country. After saying this 
he seemed exhausted, and continued to sink until the end 
came. He had weakened himself and further aggravated his 
illness by indiscriminately taking medicine prescribed by a 
foreign physician together with all sorts of Chinese remedies 
which his women urged upon him. 

The ministers of the Allied Powers at once called on 
General Tuan to inquire whether the Government was pre- 
pared to prevent disorders. Some time previously the 
Japanese minister had asked me whether I would consider it 
suitable for the diplomatic corps, in the event of danger of 
disturbances, to make such an inquiry. I felt it unnecessary 
and undesirable, as it might cause apprehension among the 
public. 

The German and Austrian commandants were included in 
the conference to agree on measures of protection — probably 
the only instance during the war where the belligerents of 
both sides met to consider common action. Subsequently 
the Belgian minister requested the American Legation to 
take over the patrol of the city wall immediately back of the ^ 
Belgian Legation, which had thus far had German sentinels. 
It illustrates the complexity of all things in China that, as 
late as 191 6, German troops were concerned in the formal 
protection of the Belgian Legation. 

Yuan Shih-kai before his death wrote a declaration to the 
effect that in the event of his disability the Presidency should 
devolve on General Li Yuan-hung. The accession of the 
Vice-President was announced immediately. The members 
of the cabinet, as well as Prince Pu-Lun, as chairman of the 
State Council, waited on President Li on the 7th of June; 
with a simple ceremonial, including three deferential bows, 
the cabinet expressed its allegiance to the new President. 
He was accepted peaceably and with unanimity by all the 
provinces. 

General Tuan Chi-jui and Mr. Liang Shih-yi cooperated in 



194 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

arranging for the transfer of authority to the new President. 
That this was done so quietly and in so orderly a fashion 
caused the foreigners to regard Chinese republicanism with 
much higher respect. 

The body of Yuan was not transferred from Peking to 
his Honan home until June 28th, when the mausoleum on the 
ancestral estate was ready. As part of the Imperial move- 
ment, Yuan Shih-kai had previously begun the construction 
of this large tomb. The commemorative ceremony took 
place on the 26th in Peking. The great hall of the Presiden- 
tial palace, where we had often witnessed New Year receptions 
and other festivities, was used. There were gathered the 
foreign representatives with their staffs and the high officials 
of the Chinese Republic. It was a strange mingling of old 
and new. The President's body lay on a high catafalque, in 
the very place where he had so often received us. In front 
of the entrance to the inner apartments stood rows of tables 
bearing the usual funeral offerings as well as the weapons, 
clothes, and other objects of personal use of the departed. 
Here were gorgeous Mandarin coats of the old regime, in- 
cluding the famous Yellow Jacket, and generals' uniforms 
of the new, and innumerable decorations sent by all the coun- 
tries bestowing such honours; also tall riding boots, soft 
Chinese slippers, long native pipes and foreign smoking sets, 
swords, and pistols. 

The service was a litany conducted by Lama priests from 
temples in Peking and Mongoha. Some of the priests wore 
a huge headdress resembling a dragoon's helmet; others, a 
large round hat not unlike that of a cardinal. As they in- 
toned the ritual their deep voices rolled as if they issued from 
an underground cavern. The music accompanying the sing- 
ing was Chinese, supplied by flutes and stringed instruments; 
but at the beginning the President's band had played a 
Western funeral march. The second part of the service con- 
sisted of the burning of incense in memory of the departed. 



DOWNFALL OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 19S 

First, the sons of Yuan, wearing the white garments of mourn- 
ers, came forth from an inner apartment and took their 
station before the catafalque. They prostrated themselves, 
struck their foreheads heavily against the floor, and wailed 
with loud voices. Yuan Ko-ting, as chief mourner, offered 
sacrifice. Meanwhile, the women of the Presidential house- 
hold peered through the windows of the apartments which 
opened into the central hall. 

When the sons of Yuan had withdrawn, the singing of the 
priests was taken up again, now in a different key and accom- 
panied by the tinkling of many bells clear as silver, but some 
of them as deep as the sea. Buddhist prayers were intoned 
in voices sonorous and deep as the grave. The new President 
next offered sacrifice at the bier of his predecessor. 

What contrasts of character and aims, what mingling of 
old and new forces, what a rush of incongruous ideas and 
practices were typified in this ceremony, with all its accom- 
paniments! And these were embodied, too, in the person- 
ality of the dead leader and in his successor! 

The foreign representatives next paid their respect to the 
memory of Yuan. We rose and each in turn deposited before 
the catafalque a huge wreath, and returned after making the 
customary three bows of high ceremony. Following the 
diplomats came the Secretary of State and high Chinese 
officials, as well as the foreign advisers. 

The procession to the railway station, on June 28th, testi- 
fied to the genius of the Chinese for pageantry. They had 
preserved some of the colour and briUiance of an Imperial 
procession, and what was remarkable, had so arranged the 
parade that the modern elements — troops in modern uniform, 
brass bands, officials in evening dress, and diplomats in their 
varied uniforms — myself alone wearing ordinary civilian 
dress — did not impart to the pageant a jarring note. In 
fact, throughout the ceremony at the palace and the subse- 
quent procession, there was a gratifying absence of disso- 



196 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

nance, notwithstanding the multifariousness of the elements 
included. 

The huge catafalque upon which the body of Yuan lay- 
was borne by a hundred men by means of a complicated ar- 
rangement of poles. It was covered with crimson silk em- 
broidered in gold; its imperial splendour accentuated the 
tragedy of the occasion. Old Chinese funeral customs, such 
as the throwing into the air of paper resembling money, were 
observed. Heading the procession rode twenty heralds, 
then followed in succession three large detachments of in- 
fantry, bearing their arms reversed. Between each two 
detachments marched a band. After the infantry came 
Chinese musicians, playing weirdly plaintive strains on their 
flutes. Then came the beautiful and fascinating part of the 
cortege — a large squadron of riders in old Chinese costume, 
carrying huge banners, long triangular pennants, and fretted 
streamers of many colours, which, as they floated gracefully 
in the air, made a charming picture. The Chinese have a 
genius for using banners with dazzling effect. Then followed 
lancers escorting an empty state carriage; Buddhist monks 
beating drums and cymbals; the President's band; long lines 
of bearers with sacrificial vessels preceding the sedan chair in 
which was set the soul tablet of Yuan; then still other lines of 
men bearing the food off"erings, the mementoes of Yuan's 
personal life, and the wreaths, all from the funeral ceremony 
of two days before. High officials came next, on foot, in 
military uniform or civilian full dress, and here indeed the 
frock coats and top hats did seem somewhat out of keeping. 
A throng of white-clad mourners preceded the catafalque; 
the sons of Yuan walked under a white canopy. Yuan 
Ko-ting in the midst of it all seemed a pathetic figure. 

The vast throngs that lined the route behind lines of troops 
looked on in respectful silence. There was no sign of grief, 
rather mute indifference. Yuan had not won the heart of 
the people, who regarded him as a masterful individual 



DOWNFALL OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 197 

dwelling in remote seclusion whose contact with them came 
through taxes and executions. I believe a Chinese crowd is 
incapable of the enthusiastic hero-worship which great politi- 
cal leaders in the Occident receive. The people have not yet 
come to look upon such men as their leaders. The Peking 
population, imbued still with traditions of imperial splendour 
and the remoteness and semi-divinity of their rulers, are as 
yet only onlookers at the pageant of history. 

The tragedy of the great man who had died as a conse- 
quence of his ambition made this occasion impressive to the 
foreigners present, even to the most cynical. It was the 
last act in one of the most striking dramas of intrigue, achieve- 
ment, and defeat. The foreign representatives left the cor- 
tege before it issued from the southernmost gate of the Im- 
perial City, stopping while the mourners and the catafalque 
moved past. A piece of paper money thrown into the air to 
pacify the spirits fell on me, and I kept it as a characteristic 
memento. I walked back to the Legation Quarter with the 
Russian minister. Prince KoudachefF, who, like myself, was 
deeply impressed ; we agreed that in ceremony and pageantry 
the Chinese stand supreme. 

Thus, with the fluttering of bright banners and [the wailing 
of the reed flutes, another crowded chapter in the history of 
the new China drew to its close. 



CHAPTER XVII 
REPUBLICANS IN THE SADDLE 

The passing of Yuan Shih-kai left the ground clear for the 
nurturing of a real republic in China. Would those in con- 
trol be real republicans, or would they be merely politicians ? 
Politics, with all that this term implies in modern times, was 
exotic, its importation into China might have disastrous re- 
sults. Concentration on industry, on local government by 
the Chinese people, and the building up from these of a 
sound and democratic national consciousness were needed. 
It was upon this foundation that Li Yuan-hung might have 
founded his rule. 

His first reception to foreign ministers was given by Presi- 
dent Li Yuan-hung shortly after the funeral of Yuan Shih- 
kai. Li had removed from the island in the Imperial City 
before the death of Yuan; and this was a step toward free- 
dom, though he had continued to be surrounded with guards 
ostensibly for his protection, but really there to watch him 
and restrict his movements. His friends were still apprehen- 
sive for his safety, and I was repeatedly approached with 
inquiries as to whether in case of need I should receive him 
at the American Legation, or possibly, even, send a guard 
detachment to bring him in. The latter I (iould not do; but, 
while it is not proper to give specific assurances of protection 
in advance, I could say that it was customary to grant asylum 
to political refugees. I learned that some Americans were 
ready to try a rescue of the Vice-President should his situa- 
tion become perilous. Upon the death of Yuan Shih-kai, 
General Li's situation of uncertainty and danger was ended 
at least for a while. 

198 



REPUBLICANS IN THE SADDLE 199 

He received the diplomats in a private residence, whence 
he did not remove to the palace for several months. The 
ceremony was simple. The foreign representatives were 
introduced in three groups: Allies, Neutrals, and Central 
Powers. The President received us standing, attended by 
his ministers and twelve generals, all in uniform. General 
Tuan Chi-jui looked disconsolate, standing with bent head 
and with epaulets sloping down on his chest. I do not know 
whether his spirit was as sad as his outward demeanour, but 
he probably saw many difficulties ahead. The President 
made a few remarks of a friendly nature, but throughout he 
looked far more serious than was his wont; and his face was 
not wreathed in smiles. 

On the afternoon of the day of Yuan's funeral I visited the 
new President informally; passing through several interior 
courts where soldiers were on guard and through a smiling 
flower garden I came into the library, simply furnished, 
where the President was working. Piles of papers and 
books on the desk and side tables indicated that he had been 
seeking information from many sources. We spent an 
hour or so discussing the political situation. He felt relieved 
at being no longer guarded and confined; but his newly ac- 
quired state had not changed his simplicity of manner. 
Quite in his usual optimistic mood, he said: "I have found 
a way to secure the cooperation of all factions. I will declare 
the Provisional Constitution of 191 2 to be in force, and sum- 
mon the old parliament; but its membership should be re- 
duced by one half; it is too unwieldy. It will be summoned 
for this purpose only and to finish the Constitution; the reduc- 
tion will come by amending the parhamentary election 
law." 

I. asked the President whether he did not consider it im- 
possible thus to limit the function of the parliament, when 
once it was summoned. Would it not, I asked, almost cer- 
tainly try to assume a controlling power in the Government, 



200 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

and would not this, in the absence of mature leaders, cause 
confusion ? 

*'No," the President insisted; "the parliament will be con- 
fined to the specific function indicated by me." 

As the community of Americans at Shanghai had repeat- 
edly invited me to come to that city, I carried out a long- 
delayed intention by journeying southward to celebrate the 
Fourth of July there. My chief engagement — following, 
among others, an address at the Commencement exercises at 
St. John's University, an American University Club lunch, a 
reception given in my honour on the Flagship Brooklyn — ^was 
an address before the American Chamber of Commerce at 
dinner in the Palace Hotel, on July ist. I spoke about the 
requirements of the new period upon which American com- 
mercial interests in the Far East were entering. In European 
countries and Japan, I said, the relation between the Govern- 
ment and the large industries and banking institutions is 
close. Together they develop national enterprise abroad. 
Not so in America. The Government and the concentrated 
capital of the United States do not act as a unit in foreign 
affairs. We believe that it is better to leave the initiative to 
private enterprise, confining the action of the Government to 
protecting opportunities for commerce abroad. In their 
work of organization, American merchants and representa- 
tives have the function of discovering, testing, and approving 
commercial policies and projects which are to be executed 
with home capital. On their wisdom and experience in 
China, New York and Chicago have to rely. 

At the reception given by the Consul-General in Shanghai 
on the Fourth of July, I met Mr. Tang Shao-yi, the Kuo Min 
Tang leader who had been Premier and Minister of Finance in 
the first cabinet under the Republic. I found him unprepared 
to assume any responsible part in politics, although the 
prominence of his opposition to Yuan Shih-kai might have 
made him ready to help. As President Li had urged him to 



REPUBLICANS IN THE SADDLE 201 

come to Peking, Mr. Tang said he would go when parliament 
had been reconvoked. But I apprehended and understood 
from others that he was loth to go because his enemies in 
Peking were still too powerful. 

After a brief vacation at the summer residence of my 
family at Peitaiho, whither I had proceeded on the U. S. ship 
Cincinnati, I returned to Peking on the 27th of July, as much 
business awaited me there. 

A change of government took place. The appointment of 
a new cabinet was announced on June 30, 1916, with a 
personnel completely different from that under Yuan Shih- 
kai. Mr. Tang did not leave Shanghai. A provisional 
cabinet was therefore constituted under General Tuan 
Chi-jui, Dr. Chen Chin-tao acting as Minister of Finance and 
Mr. Hsu Shih-ying as Minister of Communications. I had 
long known Doctor Chen, who had received his education in 
the United States and had lived abroad many years as 
Financial Commissioner of the Chinese Government. He 
was one of the few men in Chinese official hfe famihar with 
Western finance and banking — a scholarly man, slow and 
somewhat heavy in speech and manner, studious, and desirous 
of carrying modern methods of efficiency and careful audit 
into all branches of the Administration. Everyone met him 
with confidence. 

The southern leaders did not come to Peking because they 
wished their complete ascendency to be recognized before 
taking part in the Government. Their demands that the 
Constitution of 191 2 be revived and that Parliament be 
restored had been complied with. They further insisted on 
punishment for the leaders of the monarchical movement. 
Accordingly, on July 13th a mandate was issued providing 
for the arrest and trial of eight public men, including 
Liang Shih-yi, Chu Chi-chien, and Chow Tsu-chi. All of 
these men happened to be beyond the jurisdiction of 
the Chinese Government, so the mandate had the effect 



202 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

only of a decree of exile. General Tuan, the Premier, 
smilingly remarked in cabinet meeting that if the monarchists 
were really to be punished, few men in public life would 
go free. 

With an entirely new personnel of government, all threads 
of negotiations, past and present, had to be taken up anew. 
I was already acquainted with the Premier and with Doctor 
Chen, but the other cabinet members I had met casually or 
not at all. With Doctor Chen and his associate of the 
Ministry of Finance, Mr. Hsu Un-yuen, who had been 
appointed managing director of the Bank of China, and with 
General Hsu Shu-cheng, the Premier's chief assistant, I 
frequently talked over the financial situation of China. The 
monarchical movement had been defeated, the Republic more 
firmly established; now, they suggested, it was highly ap- 
propriate for America to support China financially. They 
requested that the loan contract made by Lee, Higginson & 
Company be carried out, and further steps taken for 
strengthening and organizing Chinese credit. 

I told the Premier about the railway and canal negoti- 
ations. He wished to encourage American participation in 
Chinese development, but did not commit himself on the new 
American proposals. On the matter of a loan he reenforced 
the position taken by the Minister of Finance and General 
Hsu. General Tuan had won the confidence of the Chinese 
people through his disapproval of Yuan's monarchical 
ambitions, and now occupied a strong position. *'I do not 
expect much good," he said, "from the return of parliament; 
there will be endless party struggles and interference with 
the Administration. But as to this curious modern method 
of governing through talk, which fundamentally I see no 
virtue in, I am willing to give it a fair trial.'* 

When I called on the Minister of Communications, I took 
care that the conversation should be, not on business, but 
an literature and the surroundings of Peking. He liked 



REPUBLICANS IN THE SADDLE 203 

calligraphy; also, he had written short literary pieces, one 
of which was a poetical description of the Summer Palace. 
After a pleasant hour with tea the minister escorted me not 
only through all the various gates of the inner courts, but to 
the very door of my carriage. One of my colleagues on his 
initial visit to the minister had a less fortunate experience. 
The interview, which concerned a certain action long de- 
layed, was somewhat spirited, for the diplomat insisted with 
great emphasis that something be done forthwith. By 
contrast the minister made me specially welcome, pleased 
that I did not immediately descend upon him with demands. 
When, thereafter, matters of business had to be taken up, 
there was the same cordiality, even when difficult things 
were discussed. 

During the first month of its renewed life, beginning the 
1st of August, the parliament did nothing to justify the 
unfavourable expectations of its critics. It was not rash or 
irresponsible, its members subordinated their private and 
partisan views to the urgent needs of national unity and 
cooperation. The military party pursued a waiting policy, 
seeming ready to give parliament a chance to show what it 
could do. Meanwhile, the financial situation of the Govern- 
ment became difficult, as the provinces had not yet been pre- 
vailed upon to give adequate support. 

Among the newly arrived leaders of the democratic party 
whose abilities and character I was appraising was Mr. Sun 
Hung-yi, the Minister of the Interior. I went to him, passing 
through narrow and crooked streets to his house in a remote 
part of the city. It was surrounded by military guards, 
carriages, and automobiles. The courts swarmed with 
people; soldiers were lounging about, while countless long- 
coated individuals hurried to and fro or sat in conversation in 
the rooms or on porches. Mr. Sun, who met me in an 
interior apartment, was tall, broad faced, with sparse 
whiskers and hair standing up rebelliously in wisps. He 



£04 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

wore a long brown coat, bestowing little care on his appear- 
ance. "The parliament," he said, "cannot confine itself 
to its principal task, the finishing of the Constitution; it must 
also control public administration." 

A contest for power was inevitable, it seemed, between the 
Premier and the parliament. 

Mr. Sun was a typical politician. Here he was, his 
innumerable retainers about him, all intent on the game, 
while he was cunningly deploying his forces for tactical ad- 
vantage in politics. He betrayed no ideas of statesmanship, 
only a desire for party dominance; though later he did show 
signs of developing a broader vision. 

I also met Mr. Ku Chung-hsiu, the Minister of Agriculture 
and Commerce, a most complacent and oily person, who 
would be recognized the world over as the suave political 
manipulator. 

Of such calibre, then, were the men who, under President 
Li Yuan-hung, were to lay the foundations of the new 
government. 



PART III 
THE WAR AND CHINA 



CHAPTER XVIII 
AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURS IN PEKING 

As THE second year of the Hwai River conservancy option 
was about to expire, something positive had to be done in 
order to make an actual beginning on this work. Mr. W. F. 
Carey, whose various enterprises have already been referred 
to, had arrived in Peking in December, 191 5, with his family 
and a large staff. He brought over his whole organization, 
for his firm's arrangements with the New York capitalists 
made him feel ready, not only to negotiate, but to start work. 
He had completed extensive railway construction work in 
Canada and the United States; his organization was ready 
for China. He was a man accustomed to attacking his work 
with full force and getting it out of the way. He knew there 
was plenty of work to do in China, and he was ready to start 
doing it without delay. 

Tested and highly recommended as the conservancy under- 
taking had been by the engineering commission under Colonel 
Sibert, the financiers associated with the Siems-Carey 
Company yet hesitated. It was then suggested that they do 
part of the work and reserve an option on the entire enter- 
prise. The negotiations with Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, Minister 
of Finance, developed that the only part which might be 
dissociated from the whole was the restoration of the Grand 
Canal. But it would hardly be profitable to undertake this 
unless at least the whole portion from the Yangtse River 
to Techow were to be made navigable. Enough traffic 
might then be counted upon to afford by means of tolls 
security for the loan, together with certain tracts of land 
which would be drained. A period of four months was given 

207 



208 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

to investigate the feasibility and cost of this work, while the 
option on the more extensive enterprise of the Hwai River 
conservancy was extended. 

The men representing American firms who came with Mr. 
Carey created in Peking the impression of an onslaught of 
American enterprise. The International Banking Corpo- 
ration and the American International Corporation had sent 
a new representative. The firm of Anderson, Meyer & 
Company, hitherto Danish, had been acquired by American 
capital, and a representative had been sent to Peking. 
Social life in the American colony was visibly enlivened by 
this influx. It was amusing to see how large groups of 
people from St. Paul, Kansas City, Chicago, and various 
Eastern towns, suddenly planted in these entirely foreign 
surroundings, could in an incredibly short time make them- 
selves thoroughly comfortable, and establish intimate re- 
lations with their new neighbours. The various American 
representatives took large houses in the city outside of the 
Legation Quarter, where they entertained a great deal. 

But by the legal talent mustered for the negotiations the 
Chinese were rather taken aback. Not much given to legal 
refinements, nor to setting down in the written contract 
detailed provisions for every imaginable contingency, the 
meticulous care of the American legal draughtsmen impressed 
the Chinese as savouring of suspicion. 

Their own business arrangements are more simple and 
general, with reliance on a mutual sense of equity; moreover, 
all contracts with foreigners had hitherto been made in a less 
technical manner. An American lawyer would not be 
satisfied with this. He would think of the other corporation 
lawyers at home, sitting in their offices on the thirty-fifth 
floor, to whom the ordinary Chinese way of drawing up con- 
tracts would seem criminally lax. To overcome the con- 
cealed resentment of the Chinese took time, together with 
much talk about how the common interest would be pro- 



AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURS IN PEKING 209 

moted by completely defining all responsibilities assumed. 
The argument which really impressed them was that other 
foreign nations had frequently interpreted simply drawn 
contracts entirely to the disadvantage of the Chinese. 

Mr. Carey, also, did not personally believe in much legal 
refinement, but bowed to the mature judgment of the pro- 
fession. He had won his way from the ranks, and his Irish 
originality had not been befogged with theoretical discussion. 
He immediately felt at home with the frank and human 
Chinese, and constantly had many of them at his house, 
where they partook of true American hospitality and shared 
in frolics of dancing and poker. The Chinese are fond of this 
American game, in which human nature plays so large a 
part; the impassiveness of their countenance lends itself 
admirably to the tactics of poker. It was amusing to hear 
Liang Shih-yi, who otherwise spoke not a word of English, 
enunciate from behind a pile of chips, in staccato tones: 
"Full house," — "Two pair." This eminent financier was a 
worthy match for any poker expert. 

Mr. Carey brought his unwarped intelligence to bear with 
great freshness on Chinese affairs, which he discussed in the 
language of an American contractor and business man who 
reduced everything to terms of getting something done. To 
observe how a man of his training, instincts, and tradition, 
so utterly different from the Chinese, remained in constant, 
intimate intercourse and joyous mutual understanding with 
them, made one believe that there must be real bonds of 
sympathy between Americans and the Chinese. Mr. Carey 
abbreviated many of the Chinese names, thus making them 
far more pronounceable. Mr. Chen Pan-ping, the Minister 
of Agriculture, thus became Ping-pong; the Secretary of 
State, Hsu Shih-chang, was Susie. 

When the preliminary contract for the Grand Canal had 
been signed, Mr. Carey and all his associates departed for 
Shantung and Kiangsu under the guidance of Mr. Pan Fu, a 



2IO AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

young capitalist and official from Shantung Province, who 
was anxious to have the constructive work begun early. 

A mistake made by Americans in other parts of the world 
was not avoided in China. Several of the new organizations 
that came in at this time and during the war made their 
entry with a considerable blare of trumpets and pounding of 
gongs, announcing the millions that were backing them and 
describing the manner in which they would rip things up 
generally when they got started. As a great part of inter- 
national business is diplomacy, such methods of blatant 
advertisement are not best calculated to facilitate the early 
operations of a new enterprise. They raise expectations of 
"easy money" in the people dealt with, and they engender 
cynicism and rock-ribbed opposition on the part of competi- 
tors. Great enterprises in foreign trade are usually built up 
with quieter methods. My observations on this score by no 
means refer to all new American enterprise in China, but 
there was enough of this sort of brass-band work to give 
people an idea that it was the approved method of American 
entry into foreign markets. The subsequent flattening out 
of several of these loudly heralded ventures did not help 
matters. 

I had on February 29th a long interview with Dr. Jeme 
Tien-yow, an American-educated engineer, who had won 
repute through the survey and construction of the Peking- 
Kalgan Railway, of which he was chief engineer. He was 
looked upon as a living example of what the Chinese could do 
for themselves in engineering. At this time he was managing 
director of the Hukuang railways. I had had extensive 
correspondence with him, directly and through the Consul- 
General at Hankow with respect to the engineering standards 
to be applied on his lines, as it was difficult to find a middle 
ground between the American and British manufacturers 
and those of other nations concerned. Doctor Jeme was on 
the whole favourable to America, but clung to European 



AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURS IN PEKING 211 

standards, much to the disadvantage of American equipment. 
We went over all the disputed points with regard to solid 
cast wheels or tread wheels, shapes of box cars, types of 
engines, and so on — a curiously technical conversation for a 
foreign minister to hold with a railway director as a matter 
of official business. Doctor Jeme was slow, undemonstrative, 
quite willing to discuss, but not ready to yield any point in 
which he thoroughly believed. The argument cleared up 
some matters and left others the subject of continued 
correspondence. 

I was trying to induce the American group to take the lead 
in furnishing funds so that the building of the Szechuan line 
of the Hukuang railways could be undertaken. I also 
hoped that, notwithstanding the war, the British and French 
groups might continue to furnish enough funds to complete 
the line from Hankow to Canton. 

Doubtless the greatest national need of China was the 
completion of these trunk lines, both to connect the north 
and south of the country, and to open a land route to 
Szechuan Province, which could then be reached only by 
boat on the Yangtse, subject to all contingencies of an un- 
certain and dangerous navigation. It should not have re- 
quired argument to induce the capitalists to advance money 
for a short railway which would open an inland empire of 
forty millions of people, especially when they had already 
bound themselves by contract to furnish the funds. 

The ^30,000,000 originally advanced had been spent, 
without more than two hundred miles of actual construction 
to show for the vast sum. This was due partly to the need 
of buying out earlier Chinese companies at extravagant 
figures, but also in large part to the cumbersome and ex- 
pensive organization of this international enterprise. Only 
by actually finishing one of these basically important lines 
and putting it in operation could the money already ex- 
pended be made to count. 



212 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

At home the group seemed favourable to going ahead to the 
completion of the work. Mr. Willard Straight in February 
went to London to seek the consent of the British and 
French partners. But beyond settling some minor details 
about alignments no definite result was secured. Chinese 
development was blocked disastrously through this failure 
to complete the existing contracts. In comparison with the 
amounts spent in Europe by America, the cost of entirely 
carrying out this enormously important work would have 
been infinitesimal; a thousandth part of our war expense 
would have permanently changed the face of China. 

Indeed, completion of such an enterprise would far 
transcend mere business. What the Chinese needed was the 
organization of their national life. In every particular this 
depended upon communications — trunk lines north and 
south, east and west — which would have largely overcome 
obstacles to Chinese progress. The nation's mind, instead of 
being focussed on building up, unifying, and organizing the 
different parts of the country, remained localized and scat- 
tered. A thousand times the energy needed to achieve this 
unique work was spent by us in Europe. That is part of 
the cost of war. 

Mr. Charles Denby, interested in automobile manufacture, 
called one morning and asked that I take a motor ride up the 
Tartar City Wall — a thing which had never before been 
attempted. I yielded to the idea, and without further 
inquiry joined him, together with the commandant of the 
guard. Colonel W. C. Neville. Leaving the rear gate of the 
Legation and approaching the broad ramp leading up to the 
wall, I was surprised to see gathered there all the American 
marines, as well as many other people, including motion- 
picture men. I had not counted on this publicity; it was, 
however, too late to have any regrets, so we were whisked up 
the steep incHne and took a ride on the top of the great wall. 
This first automobile ascension of the monumental structure 



AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURS IN PEKING 213 

excited a good deal of attention. A British paper tried to 
raise a laugh by ironically criticizing the British minister 
for not supporting British industry by taking air flights, or 
doing other things which might serve to attract attention to 
national products. I did not mind what was said, as I had 
enjoyed the excitement of the ride. 

Mr. Carey's party had by this time finished its survey. 
Laborious negotiations had gone on for an acceptable con- 
tract to improve the ancient Grand Canal. Mr. Carey also 
sought a contract for the building of railways. These 
matters were entrusted to Mr. Roy S. Anderson, who carried 
on the detailed negotiations. I had given Mr. Carey an 
introduction to the various officials concerned, and had 
from time to time supported his efforts, but did not take part 
in the details. The business was carried on with Mr. Tsao 
Ju-Hn, the Minister of Communications, while the canal 
matter lay with Mr. Chen Pan-ping, Minister of Agriculture 
and Commerce, a younger man, educated in Japan and a 
member of the Christian Church. Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, the 
Minister of Finance, and Mr. Liang Shih-yi, wielded a direct- 
ing influence in the negotiations. I was careful to abstain 
from anything which could possibly savour of pressure, or a 
desire to take advantage of the difficult financial necessities 
of the Government. The contracts were made not on the 
basis of any temporary or local interest, but to furnish a 
foundation for long-continued constructive work. 

The Chinese Government gave to the American concern 
the right to build fifteen hundred miles of railway, to be 
selected from five alignments mentioned in the contract. 
Mr. Carey started for America on May i8th, to secure 
ratification of the agreements. With him he took the most 
favourable concessions which the Chinese Government had 
ever granted to foreigners. All the most advantageous 
provisions of former contracts had been embodied; the 
American contractors were to get a commission of 10 per 



214 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

cent, on the cost of construction and equipment, and were to 
share, also, in the profits of operation. A broad poHcy of 
development was adopted, embracing the encouragement of 
industries along the railways to be built. 

The Chinese Government, accustomed to financial support 
from nations which had valuable concessions, hoped that the 
Americans would now offer such assistance. The con- 
cessions were in no sense made dependent upon loans, but 
collateral loan negotiations were proceeding, and Mr. Carey 
took with him proposals concerning loans and securities 
offered. His associates made every effort to secure a loan to 
China, but as they now turned over their holdings to the 
American International Corporation, and as the latter was 
negotiating to take over the American group agreements with 
Great Britain, Russia, France, and Japan, the matter became 
hopelessly tangled up with international affairs and no action 
resulted. The Americans understood that Japan would co- 
operate in a joint loan but would oppose any separate action 
by the United States. American finance was still too pro- 
vincial to act independently in such a matter. Also it would 
approach each piece of business as a separate unit, not ready 
to exert itself in behalf of a loan in order to create a more 
favourable situation for other transactions. European and 
Japanese combinations in China took a different view; they 
were organized to represent a broad national interest in 
Chinese business. While the attitude of individual Amer- 
ican corporations corresponded to the individualism of our 
business, yet the national commercial interest of America 
was bound to suffer because an organization did not exist 
which was broadly representative, which would look upon 
all parts of Chinese commerce and finance in their interrela- 
tion, and gather from every individual exertion favourable 
cumulative effects in other fields of enterprise. 

In yet another respect American practice was unsuited to 
the conditions of business in China. After negotiating in a 



AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURS IN PEKING 215 

painstaking manner for months, the corporation's repre- 
sentatives had finally signed a formal agreement that was 
more advantageous than any ever granted before. The 
results of this successful negotiation were set before the home 
office, which took the position that its hands were still com- 
pletely free. The provisions of the contract were minutely 
reexamined; on several points it was concluded that still 
more favourable arrangements might be made. The repre- 
sentatives were instructed to reopen the negotiations, making 
the consent of the home corporation dependent on the accep- 
tance of these additional terms. 

Such a method could not be used in China more than once. 
The Chinese expect that when an agreement is arrived at 
with business representatives in Peking, it will be adhered to, 
unless very radical changes of conditions occur. They have 
been dealing on this basis with the agents of European cor- 
porations, whose experience is considered by their home 
offices as entitling them to handle the details of the negotia- 
tions without reporting minutely to home officials far less 
informed than they. To disavow the activity of a local 
representative in China, except under absolute necessity, is 
to discredit the whole negotiation. The representative 
who should wield great influence is suddenly reduced to the 
dimensions of a clerk with whom the Chinese will not take up 
anything of importance thereafter. 

That the Americans would not make a loan disappointed 
the Chinese officials. They were used to looking for 
financial support to powerful groups, who desired or had 
obtained concessions. When, in addition, proposals came 
for many changes in the signed contracts, the displeasure 
of the Chinese knew no Hmits. The storm broke just before 
the funeral of Yuan Shih-kai. I was appealed to for aid in 
predisposing the Chinese officials to look upon the new pro- 
posals with more favour. The Minister of Communications 
as well as Mr. Chu Chi-chien, the Minister of the Interior, 



2i6 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

whom I interviewed, were dejected because the loan had 
been so abruptly refused. They had counted on America 
to take part in Chinese finance, in order that the Chinese 
Government might not be entirely at the mercy of the Five- 
Power Consortium, or rather of Japan, which was now the 
only active member of that group. I tried to explain the 
action of the Americans on the basis of sound business prac- 
tice. I pointed out that in the United States, capital, 
industry, and commerce are not mobilized for foreign enter- 
prise as is the case with the big foreign banking institutions 
of Europe. I tried to encourage them to set American firms 
to doing constructive work in China, and assured them that 
out of such relationships there would naturally grow a readi- 
ness to afford financial support. 

They did not dispute my point, but, in the words of 
Cleveland, they felt themselves confronted by a condition, 
not a theory. 



CHAPTER XIX 
GUARDING THE "OPEN DOOR" 

Negotiations had been proceeding all through the 
autumn of 1916, between the Corporation and the Chinese 
Government, concerning the modifications which the former 
desired to introduce into the Grand Canal contract signed in 
May. The negotiations on the part of the Chinese were 
in the hands of the Minister of Agriculture, and of Mr. Pan 
Fu, a young Shantung capitalist and official of progressive 
ideas. As the Minister of Agriculture was not well disposed, 
it was found difficult to get him to agree to the additional 
advantages which the Corporation desired to secure before 
finally ratifying the contract. Shortly before Christmas, 
however, a basis of agreement had been reached. Just 
at this time there came from America the astonishing 
news that the American corporation had invited Japanese 
capitalists to cooperate in this contract, on condition that 
such cooperation would be acceptable to the Chinese 
Government. 

The representatives of the American corporation in Peking 
had no thought nor inkhng whatsoever of this change in 
policy. The step had been taken without warning and 
without consulting either the American Government or the 
representatives of the company in China. It may be 
imagined in what position it left the latter, to whom the 
Chinese had entrusted these important rights solely because 
of the confidence they had in Americans, both as to their 
ability to carry through an enterprise of this kind, and as to 
their complete freedom from all poHtical after-thought. 
Unmindful of the fiduciary relationship which their repre- 

217 



2i8 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

sentatives had established in China, the American corpo- 
ration, without first sounding the Chinese and without giving 
any intimation to the American Government — through 
whose approval and support they had been able to gain these 
rights — turned around and made an agreement to bring the 
subjects of another nation into the contract. It is to be 
doubted if the nationals of any other country would have 
acted in this manner. 

If the action had been taken out of deference to rights 
which the Japanese might claim in the future as a part of a 
sphere of influence to be asserted in Shantung, then indeed 
it was one of superlative international courtesy. New York 
bankers, however, were at this time still notoriously the 
most timid beings known to experience, when it came to 
matters of foreign investment. To make up for this they 
did, when they once got started, throw away American 
money in amazing quantities on reckless foreign enterprises 
in Europe and South America. 

What made this action so inexcusable was not that Japa- 
nese cooperation had been invited or accepted, but that the 
one enterprise selected for such cooperation was the one in 
which America, through the National Red Cross, had long 
been interested and which had been committed to Americans 
as a special mark of confidence. One might have thought 
that goodwill to the Japanese might have been amply dem- 
onstrated had our people declared their complete readi- 
ness to cooperate on any one of the numerous unfinished 
enterprises which the Japanese controlled in Manchuria and 
elsewhere. 

It was no easy task for the representatives of the American 
corporation to tell the Chinese what had been done in 
New York. The proviso that the arrangement was con- 
ditional upon its being acceptable to the Chinese was of 
course pathetically ineffectual, because after the arrangement 
made in New York the Chinese could certainly not refuse 



GUARDING THE "OPEN DOOR" 219 

to accept any outside partners without giving very serious 
offence to them, I told the Chinese that we wished them to 
act with perfect freedom and consult their own best interests 
in dealing with the American corporation. But the Premier 
met all my explanations with: "What can we do? The 
corporation has tied our hands." 

The Chinese had shown special favour and bestowed their 
contracts upon the American nation; by their own act Ameri- 
cans had changed this disposal in such a way as to let in a 
third party. Personally, I had not the least objection to 
the Japanese or any other nation; although it seemed that in 
China cooperation with the Chinese would be the normal 
method. Yet my experience with the Hukuang railways 
had made me very doubtful of the practical advantages of 
international cooperation in industry. It is a cumbersome, 
expensive way of doing business, full of delay and circum- 
locution. I felt that the different nations should mutually 
facihtate each other's enterprises and cooperate in con- 
structive planning from which all might derive advantage; 
but I felt strongly that individual enterprises should be 
managed by a particular group or corporation without 
compHcated international machinery. 

The railway concessions made to the Siems-Carey Com- 
pany, which were to be financed by the American Inter- 
national Corporation, were also making trouble. Protests 
were made by the Russian Legation with regard to the 
alignment from Tatungfu toward Lanchow; these rested 
upon an old assurance given by the Chinese to Russia that 
any line northward or eastward from Peking and Kalgan 
should first invite Russian capital. But the protests had a 
weak leg to stand on, for the proposed line led southwestward 
from Kalgan, away from Russia's dominions. They had 
the less force in that the European Powers could not at this 
time furnish money for the construction of the much-needed 
railways which had been committed to their care; the more 



220 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

need, therefore, that America, which had means, should 
build other necessary railways to provide China with inter- 
provincial transit. 

But that was the method of diplomacy — ^to hunt about 
for some ground of protest to the Chinese Government, in 
order to obtain from it a few counterbalancing advantages. 
The American policy of equal opportunity had the verbal 
agreement of the other important powers, but we had to be 
vigilant if Americans were to be protected in their right to 
do business in various parts of China on the basis of this 
policy. Everywhere we met attempts to solidify the in- 
choate desires and lusts to secure exclusive rights, until the 
"spheres of influence" should be firmly outlined. 

I always took the position with the Russian minister that 
the American concession in this case did not conflict with any 
promise given to Russia. He spoke to me about the wish of 
Russia to use Mongolia as a protective barrier. If Mongolia 
were to be developed through railways and colonization, he 
felt that friction between Russia and China might come 
about through this mutual approach of large populations. 
To keep so vast a territory barren and unproductive just to 
serve as frontier marches seemed to me unjustifiable. But I 
did not dispute the policy, rather insisting that a railway that 
connected one of the eighteen provinces of China with 
another could have but remote bearing on the fears expressed 
by my Russian colleague. I told him the survey would go 
on, but whether the road would be built would depend upon 
the judgment of the engineers as to whether it would 
be commercially profitable. The conversations were very 
leisurely. He did not say so, but I could see that the 
minister fully expected the Americans to go ahead, while he 
would use his protests as a means of getting some "compen- 
sation" out of the Chinese. 

I was therefore not a little surprised when on one of my 
visits to him the Russian minister met me with a quizzical 



GUARDING THE "OPEN DOOR" 221 

smile, and handed me a telegram which he had just received 
from Washington. The dispatch was from the Russian 
ambassador, and read in substance as follows: 

A representative of the American International Corporation has just 
called on me. He stated that the corporation regretted beyond measure 
that the impression had been given that it might contemplate undertakings 
in China which would be unwelcome to the Russian Government, and to 
which the latter would object. He stated that it was far from the inten- 
tion of the corporation to do anything in China that would thus be objec- 
tionable to the Russian Government. 

Never was the ground cut from under any one exerting 
himself to safeguard the interests of others as was done in 
this case. There was nothing to do but to say: "They are 
very courteous, and wish to save your susceptibility. They 
would probably not ask for any branches in the direction of 
Urga, and confine themselves just to building the main line 
to Kansu." The Russian minister did not take an undue 
advantage of me. 

The next protest came from the French Legation. They 
had dug up a note sent them on September 26, 1914, by 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that time. This note, 
conveying an entirely unnecessary gift by that good-natured 
minister, had been kept secret; it acknowledged the hand- 
some manner assumed by the French minister during the 
negotiations about a small frontier incident. Just to show 
absence of ill feeling, the Foreign Minister assured the 
French minister that in case in future any mining or railway 
enterprises were to be undertaken in the Province of Kwangsi, 
French capital would be consulted first. It was a grim joke 
that an official should thus light-heartedly and without quid 
pro quo sign away important rights in contravention to all 
the announced policies of his and other governments, in- 
cluding that to which the grant was made. The French 
protest related to the southern part of the line from Chuchow 
in Honan, to Chinchow, on the coast of Kwangsi. 



222 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

I took the stand that the note which had turned up was 
contrary to the expressed poHcy of the various governments 
concerned, and could have no bearing on the relations of 
American citizens with China; moreover, it had been secret, 
and neither the public nor any other government knew 
about it. As the French minister whom the Chinese had 
asked the French Government to withdraw because of his 
domineering attitude was not at this time complacent in 
this or any other matter, I suggested that the Department of 
State take up this question directly with the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. I expressed the hope that the 
French, our military and diplomatic associates, would wish 
particularly to adhere "to the letter and the spirit of the 
declarations of equal commercial opportunities." 

The Continental Commercial Bank Loan had been 
announced in November, 1916. I was happy that this 
result had been achieved. An advance of only ^5,000,000 
was made, but even that small sum was an important aid 
to the Chinese Government. The fact that a big Western 
financial institution had taken up relations with China was 
promising. What foreign banking there was in New York 
was tangled up with European interests, followed the lead 
of London, and had not manifested much readiness to exert 
itself for the development of American interests abroad. 

The French protested this loan because it carried the 
security of the tobacco and wine tax which had been assigned 
to some previous French loans. I saw Doctor Chen, and 
Count Martel called on me. I took the position that as the 
French loan — ^which was small in amount and would require 
only a very minor portion of the proceeds of the tax — re- 
mained entitled to be the first lien, the French interests were 
in no way prejudiced. I imagine, what they really objected 
to was the eventual appointment of an American auditor 
or co-inspector for this revenue. As this, however, would go 
to strengthen the security for their loan, I do not see that 



GUARDING THE "OPEN DOOR" 223 

they had any reason for complaint. The representative of 
the French bank which was interested saw me and made a 
tentative suggestion that if adviserships were estabHshed 
the French might take the wine tax, and the Americans the 
tobacco tax. I felt, however, that the hands of the Chinese 
were perfectly free when the loan was made; there could be 
no objection, except on the supposition that wherever the 
Chinese do business, no matter how small, with respect to 
any subject matter, they impliedly give a lien on all future 
dealings. To the general suggestion of American-French 
cooperation in matters for which both parties could find 
capital, I was by no means averse. 

In this same mxonth the affairs relating to the Standard Oil 
Company's exploration were finally wound up. The geo- 
logical experts they sent over had not "struck" oil enough to 
pay. Drilling expeditions had come over, which by the 
spring of 191 5 had found traces of oil, and the Chinese were 
considering giving them further areas for investigation. But 
as they wished to modify their contract relating to production 
and refining activities, Mr. E. W. Bemis, vice-president of 
the company, came on and negotiated for a whole summer 
with the officials. He left without concluding an agreement. 
Not only had he received the support of the Legation at 
Peking and of the American Government, but the Chinese 
were anxious to extend the privileges of exploration; his 
decision to abandon the negotiations must therefore have 
been based on a total change of policy. The company 
had apparently decided not to develop production in China, 
but to continue merely its marketing business. It was 
to be expected that competitors would be discouraged from 
undertaking similar explorations. Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling, 
ex-Premier and chief of the National Oil Administration, 
called on me at this time and gave me an account of his 
final negotiations with the company. He had offered to 
establish a joint Chinese and American enterprise if more 



224 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

extensive search should reveal oil deposits of great value. 

The mineral situation in China was being surveyed during 
this time by representatives of the New York Orient Mines 
Company, Mr. John W. Finch, Dr. F. Bain, and Mr. 
Joseph E. Johnson, Jr. The attitude of these men, whose 
training as observers and clean-cut scientific methods gave 
their conclusions a particular cogency and definiteness, 
interested me. They had found that the iron deposits of 
China were not so extensive as is usually supposed. They 
believed, also, that the market for iron products could only 
gradually be developed with the growth of the general 
industry. They had analyzed the organization of the 
Hanyehping Iron Works, and learned that its lack of success 
was due to faulty planning, which necessitated the bringing 
of both the coal and iron ore from a distance to the central 
point of manufacture. They believed that for the time 
there was room for only one first-class iron and steel enter- 
prise in China. As smaller enterprises would hardly pay, 
they favoured a national industrial plant, to be equipped on 
a scale to assure every advantage of short transport and 
economic production. The Premier gave them permission 
to investigate China's ore deposits, with a view to suggesting 
a basis upon which a national industry could be founded with 
temporary American financial assistance. 

The Chinese Government had fully decided to adhere to 
its policy of nationalizing the iron deposits, and the decree 
already issued by Yuan Shih-kai was to be reenacted by 
parliament. The Chinese were eager to establish a national 
steel industry. It should help supply the national needs for 
iron products, with the aid, if necessary, of foreign capital. 
They would not take the sole assistance of the Japanese, 
because they knew that in that case the Chinese industry 
would be confined to the production of pig-iron and would 
become the slave of the steel industry of Japan. China 
would furnish raw materials; Japan, the finished products. 



GUARDING THE "OPEN DOOR" 225 

Another secret agreement, this time with Japan, came to 
light. A loan of 3,000,000 yen had been concluded with 
Japanese banks in the latter part of 1916, and the secret 
agreement attached thereto gave Japanese interests the right 
to meet the lowest price of any competitor in bidding on any 
materials for the Chinese telephone and telegraph service. 
Of course, this would have destroyed the equal opportunity 
for other nationals in this business. The contract had been 
signed by a notoriously corrupt official, who was completely 
under Japanese influence and had since fled to escape prose- 
cution for corruption. 

I protested strongly. I told the Minister of Communica- 
tions that the provision was monopolistic, therefore in con- 
flict with the treaties. His answer disavowed the existence 
of the provision. But I knew it did exist among the original 
agreements; nevertheless, the awards actually made at this 
time, after my protest, were in accordance with the bids sub- 
mitted, and with the recommendations of the experts. 

In a talk I had with the Premier during the spring of 1917 
I advised him to take up quickly the offer of the American 
International Corporation to float the first bond issue of 
^6,000,000 on the railway to be constructed by the Siems- 
Carey Company. The Ministry of Communications was 
obstructing it, acting under Japanese influences. I told 
the Premier that Mr. Carey's authority to conclude the loan 
might be revoked at any time, whereupon he promised to 
instruct the acting Vice-Minister of Communications to com- 
plete the transaction forthwith. 

. The Ministry of Communications was then in charge of 
one Chuan Liang, who had, in fact, long been considered as 
representing the Japanese element. He had married a Japa- 
nese woman. Chuan refused obstinately, first, to take up 
the negotiations, then, to advance them when they were 
begun. The rate of interest and terms of issue offered were 
fair, considering existing market values; but the American 



226 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

company agreed to make a concession and raise the issue 
price. 

Chuan continued to be stubborn. I spoke to the Premier, 
General Tuan, about it; President Li himself gave his sup- 
port, and the orders to make the loan were thus reenforced. 
Still delay. After General Tuan's retirement. Dr. Wu Ting- 
fang as acting Premier again issued orders, which were re- 
peated for the third time by General Chiang when he, in 
turn, displaced Doctor Wu. All these high officials concurred. 
Yet, in an astounding manner, the acting vice-minister, 
together with a ring of petty officials in tiis ministry and in 
the cabinet office, blocked the carrying out of the orders 
issued by the President, the Premier, and the whole cabinet. 

But Dr. Wu Ting-fang was anxious to see the contract 
carried out. He suggested that I write a note demanding 
its execution, which I did on June 6th. Wu intended to have 
the successive orders published in the Government Gazette, 
and, thus published, to be communicated to me officially by 
the Foreign Office in response to my note. But the petty 
ring delayed the publication. Meanwhile, the answer of the 
acting vice-minister was prepared and inserted in the Gov- 
ernment Gazette on the 27th, before the Foreign Office could 
communicate it to me. It presented unfairly the proposals 
of the American company, its language was almost insulting. 

During all this time the high Chinese officials, who were 
my friends, were at a loss to explain to me how this subordi- 
nate's defiance of their orders could be successful. They inti- 
mated that the obstruction must be due to Japanese influence 
exercised in opposition to American enterprise in China. 
We noted that immediately upon publication of the vice- 
minister's answer and before we knew about it ourselves, a 
secretary of the Japanese Legation quite officiously expressed 
to one of the American secretaries his surprise at such a 
publication. 

But by this act the vice-minister had overstepped the 



GUARDING THE "OPEN DOOR" 227 

mark. The leaders of the Communications party, who were 
holding aloof from politics with General Tuan, strongly con- 
demned Chuan, who had always been dependent on them. 
He showed a remarkable change. He even sent emissaries 
to me, pleading for forgiveness and stating that he was in no 
way animated by hostility to American interests, but had 
acted on an honest though mistaken view of the transaction. 

Calling on me on July 2nd, he repeated his apology. On 
the 30th of June the Ministry of Communications had for- 
mally accepted the offer of funds by the American company. 
Thereafter negotiations were again interrupted by political 
changes and disturbances. 

This incident will serve to illustrate the complexity of 
Chinese affairs, and the condition of disorganization in which 
the Chinese Government was at this time. 

The creation of a Chino-American Industrial Bank was 
the subject of many discussions I had with Chinese officials 
and financiers. This occupied a good deal of my attention 
during 191 8, while Mr. Hsu Un-yuen, after his retirement 
from the presidency of the Bank of China, was devoting his 
time to working out a plan and securing the support of 
prominent Chinese for this undertaking. Mr. Hsu Sing-loh 
was also working on it independently; Mr. Hsu was secretary 
of the Minister of Finance, educated in England, and excep- 
tionally well informed. In December of 191 8 I accompanied 
Mr. Hsu to the house of Mr. Yang, a capitalist interested in 
the China Merchants Steamship Company, where we met 
with the Premier, Mr. Chien Neng-hsun, and Mr.Chou Hsueh- 
hsi, who had recently been Minister of Finance. Here we 
talked over matters of banking and finance, with Mr. Chou 
leading the conversation. He was sure the Government 
would give a favourable charter that would enlist the neces- 
sary capital. Chinese ideas about an industrial bank were 
vague; in some mysterious way it was thought that it could 
produce capital for developing industries, or, rather, could 



228 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

manifold its capital for such uses. Three industries were 
ready — cotton, steel, and scientific agriculture — for an ex- 
tensive development. He did not know how bad it is for a 
bank to lock up Its capital in long-time commitments. I 
asked those present as to how ready the Chinese public 
would be to absorb the long-term bonds. Mr. Chou thought 
they would take them, If strongly backed, at a relatively low 
interest. All desired to go ahead. Ultimately the bank was 
founded, but by another group. 

Before parting on that day our wealthy host brought forth 
from the strong-boxes many great treasures of Chinese art, 
including paintings of the Sung and Ming periods. China 
boasts only one museum. Only through seeing such private 
collections can one form an estimate of the richness and ex- 
tent of Chinese art treasures. For an hour I looked on de- 
lightedly while one after another of these precious works 
of Chinese painting were unrolled before us. Chinese pic- 
tures are very modest. They come out when called, but retire 
again readily to the quiet of the storeroom. Also, darkness 
has not the dulling effect on the water-colours used by Chinese 
painters that it exercises upon pictures done in oils. 

Incidentally, Minister Chow and other prominent officials 
had been interested In a savings bank combined with a lot- 
tery, which announced the sale of so-called premium bonds. 
There were to be quarterly drawings, at which a certain num- 
ber of the bonds would receive prizes, ranging as high as 
$100,000. Mr. Chow explained to me that it would be futile 
for a Chinese savings bank to offer a matter of 5 or 6 per 
cent, interest for funds. Nobody would heed it, because 
of the profitableness of commercial enterprise. In order to 
strike public attention and to cause people to bring their 
money for deposit, the Inducement of winning a large amount 
must be provided. The assurance that the original deposit 
itself would not be lost, but would ultimately be repaid, would 
be the second attraction. 



GUARDING THE "OPEN DOOR" 229 

The minister said that it was the plan of the bank to reduce 
the amount of prizes and to increase their number so that 
gradually the payment of a reasonable interest would be 
approached, as the people got accustomed to the idea of plac- 
ing their funds in such an institution. The fact that this 
country, whose people are so frugal and parsimonious and 
where there is so much accumulated capital, should hither- 
to have been without savings banks appears remarkable to a 
stranger. But the high return on commercial loans, and the 
ever-present gambling instinct of the Chinese, account to 
some extent for this absence. 



CHAPTER XX 
A DIARY OF QUIET DAYS, AUTUMN OF 1916 

September j; Judge Elbert H. Gary has just been in Pe- 
king for ten days with^Mrs. Gary and a small party. I 
took them to call on President Li who is now living in a pri- 
vate residence with extensive rockeries and gardens, in the 
East City. We threaded our way to a central pavilion where 
the President received us. He talked amiably about his 
desire to see the great resources of China developed with 
American cooperation. In the evening I gave a dinner to 
Judge Gary and the new Ministers of Finance and Com- 
munications. Charles A. Coolidge, the Boston architect, 
was also present. On the following day I arranged for the 
American guests to see the Winter Palace; Mr. Coohdge 
afterward said to me that the trip through the palace 
grounds had been the most interesting experience of his life 
from the point of view of architectural beauty. Someone 
with Judge Gary told me that every lunch, afternoon re- 
ception, and dinner engagement, for the entire stay in Japan, 
was already arranged for, together with many engagements 
for breakfast; adding: "The Japanese certainly know a 
great man when they see him, more than the Chinese.'* 
As a matter of fact, the Chinese are so unartificial that they 
do not think of organizing their hospitality to any distin- 
guished guest. What they do is quite spontaneous; they are 
truly hospitable, but they do not understand the first ele- 
ments of the art of advertising. 

September g: I took a trip to Dajessu with the Austrian 
minister. This temple lies about twelve miles beyond the 
summer palace. We walked part of the way; a Chinese fell 

230 



QUIET DAYS, AUTUMN OF 1916 231 

in with us, and, as is customary, opened conversation. With- 
out seeming unduly inquisitive he ehcited information about 
the size of our famihes, our age, income, and the cost of our 
clothing, the material of which he greatly admired. When 
the Austrian minister told him that he had about four hun- 
dred men under him, our companion looked rather dubious, 
and finally asked: "Why, then, if you have so many atten- 
dants, are you walking?" The explanation that we pre- 
ferred to walk did not seem to remove his doubts. He told 
us in turn all the details of his family and business affairs. 

We spent the week-end at the beautiful temple, from which 
we took walks to the surrounding mountainside. A deserted 
temple on a high hill overlooking the valley is picturesque 
as any castle on the Rhine. We ascended to the summer 
residence of Mr. HsuUn-yuen, a temple perched on a precipi- 
tous spur of the main mountain range. The temple had 
evidently been erected originally for a semi-residential pur- 
pose, though it was in a quite inaccessible place, where neither 
worshippers nor vacationists would ordinarily have sought 
it out. We found Mr. Hsu and his wife enjoying the magnifi- 
cent view from a terrace opening out from the living apart- 
ments. 

September Jj; I gave a dinner to Mr. C. T. Wang, the 
vice-president of the senate, and a few representative mem- 
bers of parliament. We engaged in a general after-dinner 
discussion of politics. Most of the men present were Pro- 
gressives. They argued volubly. The arguments and illus- 
trations were such as one would hear in a Western country. 
I missed, as usual, a thorough discussion of underlying facts, 
traditions, and practices of Chinese life, out of which institu- 
tions should develop. I mentioned this; Mr. Wang said that 
they needed a guiding principle of organization, which they 
must get from the experience of constitutional countries. 
The question uppermost was the proposed election of pro- 
vincial governors by the people of the respective provinces. 



232 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

instead of their appointment by the Central Government. 
Most of those present considered this change necessary, as 
through union and mutual support the appointive military 
governors could exercise great power and defeat the aims of 
Parliament. 

September 14: Failing to get financial assistance from 
America, the Chinese have been considering Japanese offers 
of loans. Dr. Chen Chin-tao, forced by the situation and 
the importunities of the ministers, who need money, has 
signed a preliminary agreement for a loan of eighty million 
yen, on which an advance of five million yen is to be paid 
over immediately. 

September 18: The House of Representatives to-day in 
secret session discussed the Japanese loan. I am informed 
that it was strongly attacked on the ground that certain 
mines in Hunan Province had been pledged to secure the 
advance. The Minister of Finance was not present, the 
vice-minister appearing to answer questions. The minister 
was violently condemned for signing the preliminary agree- 
ment without the consent of parliament. The argument was 
made that it related to an advance, but not to the main loan 
itself. That argument was not considered valid. 

September ig: Negotiations were concluded with the 
Minister of Communications for a satisfactory adjustment of 
the American railway contract. Most of the proposals made 
were accepted, so that the American corporation ought cer- 
tainly to be thoroughly well satisfied, considering all the 
changes and difficulties that have occurred since the original 
contract was made. That of the 17th May was allowed to 
stand, the changes being introduced by way of annexes. 
After the Chinese have thus gone to the limit of making the 
undertaking attractive to Americans, it is to be hoped that 
there will be no further delay; that, at least, some important 
constructive work will be done by Americans. 

September 21. We welcomed a little son to-day in the 



QUIET DAYS, AUTUMN OF 1916 233 

family. I do not know that any children were born to any 
American minister in Peking before our little daughter 
Pauline came, in February, 191 5. The two little ones were 
born into a strange world in which parents may well fear 
for the health of their children, because of frequent epidemics. 
Still, aside from such visitations, the Peking climate seems 
to be most favourable to children; they thrive and grow 
apace. Claire, the eldest daughter, aside from a terrible 
attack of appendicitis in which Dr. M. A. Stewart, of the 
Navy, saved her life, has been the very spirit of health. 
The faithful Chinese servants surround the children with 
every care. 

October 5; I gave a men's dinner, attended by the minis- 
ters of Portugal, Russia, and Japan, and by Mr. Obata, the 
Japanese counsellor; Count Martel, the French first secre- 
tary; Mr. Aglen, Inspector-General of Customs; Mr. Alston, 
the British counsellor; Mr. Herrera de Huerta, formerly 
Mexican Charge; Mr. Mitrophanow, of the Russian Lega- 
tion; Doctor Willoughby, Doctor McElroy of Princeton, and 
other guests. It was really a dinner of welcome to the new 
Japanese minister, Baron Hayashi, who has recently arrived 
to take the place of Mr. Hioki. It was probably thought 
better to displace the minister upon whom had fallen the 
disagreeable duty of forcing through the Twenty-one De- 
mands of 191 5. Baron Hayashi, who had been ambassador 
in Italy, brings a long diplomatic experience and very care- 
ful methods. He is very silent, speaks little except when 
few or only one other person are present. In a larger com- 
pany or at a meeting, he gives the impression of detachment 
and deep reflection. In social intercourse he is more retiring 
than his predecessor. He impresses me as a thoughtful, fair- 
minded man. 

October 4: I am told that a guest at last night's dinner, a 
visitor from a distant country, complained because he had 
not been ranked with the ministers. As I had no informa- 



234 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

tion, nor have it now, that he was entitled to such ranking, 
I shall not worry. This is the first instance of any dissatis- 
faction with the seating. My predecessor related to me that 
a secretary of the British Legation once took his sudden de- 
parture before dinner for this reason. I have not always 
closely adhered to rank in seating, particularly at dinners 
where there are Chinese, in order to avoid a grouping which 
should make conversation impossible; but in such cases, of 
course, I always speak to whichever guest is slightly preju- 
diced by the arangement and explain the reason to him. 
I have never noticed the least sign of displeasure. At a very 
formal dinner, it is of course always safer to follow rank and 
let the conversation take care of itself. Any enjoyment 
people get out of such a dinner they set down as pure profit, 
anyhow. 

October '/: Ambassador and Mrs. Guthrie arrived to-day. 
They will be our guests for several weeks. Mr. Guthrie has 
not been very well, so has come for a rest. We spent the day 
together, talking over Chinese and Japanese affairs and rela- 
tions. We agree on most points. 

In the evening we dined at the officers' mess, after which 
there was dancing. Mrs. Ollie James and Mrs. Hall of 
Washington came with the Guthries. They were at the 
dinner, at which great cheer prevailed. Colonel Neville, 
the new commandant of the marines, radiates good fellow- 
ship. He is sociable, efficient, and ready to cooperate in all 
good causes. His officers and men seem to revere him, and 
a very fine spirit reigns in the marine compound. 

October ii: I presented Ambassador Guthrie to the 
President, who had invited us for luncheon. We were only 
six at the table. Mr. Quo Tai-chi, the youthful English- 
speaking secretary of the President, interpreted. The Presi- 
dent had many questions to ask about Japan. Then, he 
spoke quite hopefully about the outlook in China. Financial 
difficulties will be overcome through cooperation of parlia- 



QUIET DAYS, AUTUMN OF 1916 235 

ment and the cabinet, so that the Government may count on 
popular consent to an increase in taxes. 

President Li now occupies the palace where Yuan Shih-kai 
had lived. We met in a small apartment in the building 
constructed for the Empress Dowager, which was tastefully 
furnished in the best Chinese style. 

October ij: The dinner season has fully set in. There are 
dinners every night, and will be, throughout the winter. 
This evening we entertained for the Guthries, having Prince 
KoudachefF, Baron Hayashi, and the wives of the Russian 
and Danish ministers, who are themselves absent. 

October 25; The Political Science Association met at my 
house. The Minister for Foreign Affairs presided. Doctor 
W. W. Willoughby and Senator Yen Fu, the noted scholar, 
read papers. Over a hundred men were in attendance — 
the cream of the Western-educated officials, as well as Euro- 
pean and American members. 

October 29; The Guthries left yesterday. To-day arrived 
General and Mrs. Liggett, who will be our guests for a few 
days. General Liggett is tall and impressive-looking. We 
had a long initial conversation about the effects of the war in 
the Far East. The Philippines are beginning to be prosper- 
ous on account of the war demand for their products. 

October ji: I presented General Liggett to President Li. 
In a long conversation the President was frank in his state- 
ment concerning the international difficulties of China. He 
expressed himself in strong terms as desirous of close coopera- 
tion with America. I gathered that he feared that certain 
foreign influences might stir up trouble between the parlia- 
ment and the Government, and otherwise seek to cause em- 
barrassment. 

November 5; I went with a small party to the mountain 
temple Djetaissu. Mrs. Chadbourne, the sister of my friend 
Mr. Charles R. Crane; Miss Ellen Lamotte the writer; Mr. 
and Mrs. Burns of Shanghai; and Mr. Charles Stevenson 



236 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Smith, of the Associated Press, took this excursion riding on 
donkeys, with many spills as the animals slipped on the 
rocky road. The temple is near the top, commanding a mag- 
nificent view of the plains and of the higher mountains far- 
ther inland. It rises tier above tier, its platforms shaded by 
huge trees, with enchanting vistas of architecture and a 
broad sweep of view in all directions. 

November g: The Continental Commercial Bank Loan is 
announced. I am happy that this result has been achieved. 
An advance of only ^5,000,000 will be made, but even that 
small sum will be an important aid to the Chinese Govern- 
ment. The fact that a big Western financial institution has 
taken up relations with China is promising. What foreign 
banking there is in New York is tangled up with European 
interests, follows the lead of London, and has not manifested 
much readiness to exert itself for the development of Amer- 
ican interests abroad. 

November 10: I attended the balloting for the election of 
the Vice-President of the Republic, at a joint session of the 
two houses of parliament. While no speeches were made, 
with the exception of brief discussion on points of order, yet it 
was of interest to see the general aspect of parliament. The 
procedure, certainly, was businesslike. Balloting was by 
written and signed vote; after each ballot, the individual 
votes are read oflP from the tribune. I had the impression 
that a true election was going on. General Feng Kuo-chang, 
the Military Governor of Kiangsu, had the lead from the 
start, which was gradually increased by the balloting until 
finally he got the necessary majority. I could not stay until 
the result was announced, when there was a demonstration 
to honour the nomineee. But I saw before me a body which 
had evidently mastered the procedure of parliamentary ac- 
tion, so that things were done with a smoothness and ease 
which implied long experience. Many people witnessed the 
election, among them several of my colleagues. I had a brief 



QUIET DAYS, AUTUMN OF 1916 237 

conversation with Mr. C. T. Wang, who was hopeful that, 
now the Vice-Presidential succession was settled legally and 
peacefully, the future of the Republic was assured. 

General Feng has occupied a pivotal position at his post at 
Nanking. He is shrewd and clever. Like a boy standing 
over the centre of a seesaw, he used his weight to balance 
either side according as the pendulum movement required. 
He was at first believed to have given Yuan Shih-kai encour- 
agement to be emperor, but when asked to express himself, 
had allowed the report that he was neutral to gain currency; 
then, as the opposition gained strength, he added his weight 
with gradually increasing force to its side, although never at 
any stage coming out with positive statements. His selec- 
tion was an attempt to form a compromise between the mili- 
tarist and the progressive parties. 

November 10: I took a long excursion with Prince Kouda- 
chefF. We rode to the foothills by automobile, then climbed 
to the top of a lofty range back of his temple, where one 
can promenade for six or eight miles along the crest of the 
ridge with glorious views of mountain country on either 
side. 

November 15: I had a long conversation with Baron 
Hayashi to-day. 

November 20: Admiral and Mrs. Winterhalter arrived for 
a few days' visit. The Admiral is tall, gray-haired, strong- 
featured, of energetic movements. He has always manifested 
a deep interest in what is going on in China; we sat down for 
a long talk immediately after his arrival. 

November 22: I presented the Admiral to President Li 
and we had a pleasant conversation, although the President 
was not quite so expansive and confidential as during my 
last call. As we made the rounds of calls on the cabinet 
ministers, I took the conversation beyond the ordinary civil- 
ities, so as to give the visitor an opportunity of getting more 
insight into the affairs now engaging our attention; also, to 



238 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

use this valuable time for an exchange of ideas with the 
Chinese leaders. 

November 25: The French are protesting against the 
Continental Commercial Bank Loan, in so far as the security 
is concerned. The security of the tobacco and wine tax had 
been assigned to some previous French loans. I saw Doctor 
Chen, and Count Mattel called on me. I take the position 
that as the French loan — ^which is small in amount and will 
require only a very minor portion of the proceeds of the tax 
— remains entitled to be the first lien, the French interests 
are in no way prejudiced. I imagine what they really object 
to is the eventual appointment of an American auditor or 
co-inspector for this revenue. As this, however, would still 
strengthen the security for their loan, I do not see that they 
have any reason for complaint. The representative of the 
French bank which is interested, saw me and made a tenta- 
tive suggestion that if advisorships were established, the 
French might take the wine tax, and the Americans the 
tobacco tax. I feel, however, that the hands of the Chinese 
were perfectly free when the loan was made; there can be no 
objection, except on the supposition that whenever the 
Chinese do business, no matter how small, with respect to 
any subject matter, they impliedly give a lien on all future 
dealings. 

December 4: I called on Doctor Morrison to take a look 
at his library. This unusual collection contains about 
twenty thousand books in European languages, dealing 
with China. The rare editions of early works are almost 
completely represented. Doctor Morrison, who lives in a 
Chinese-style house, has built a fireproof building for his 
books. He has devoted the last fifteen years to getting them 
together, and I believe has spent the larger part of his in- 
come on them. Recently he married a lady who had been 
for a while his secretary. They now have a little boy. I am 
told that his marriage and fatherhood have greatly aug- 



QUIET DAYS, AUTUMN OF 1916 239 

merited Doctor Morrison's standing and influence among the 
Chinese. A bachelor does not fit into their scheme of hfe. 
We repaired to his study, and for a long time were discussing 
affairs. We spoke particularly about the railway situation 
and the fact that construction on all the lines contracted for 
has practically been stopped. This is an enormous disad- 
vantage to the Chinese. They have to pay heavy interest 
charges on the initial loans, for which there is as yet no 
income-paying property to show, but only surveys and partial 
construction. We agreed that the Four-Power bankers, 
for instance, have a very weak case if China should decide 
to cancel their contract for non-performance, as money to 
continue the building is not forthcoming. On the British 
concession of the Pukow-Singyang Railway, on which vir- 
tually no work has yet been done, the Government neverthe- 
less has to pay interest on a million dollars of capital that 
has been advanced. 

December 7: I visited Prince KoudachefF, the Russian 
minister. I jokingly asked him whether he found that the 
Chinese thought of the Russians as half-Asiatic, therefore as 
brothers. **No," he replied; "they count us with you and 
with the other Europeans, as a scourge and pestilence." 
In this conversation the Prince uttered a prophecy. "As 
a result of this war," he said, "the empire will be abolished 
in Germany." 

(Neither of us at this time dreamed of the enormous sub- 
versions and convulsions which were soon to take place in 
Russia.) 

December 8: I called on President Li in order to present 
a personal letter from President Wilson, in which the latter 
sends his good wishes. We discussed the American loan 
policy. The President, like other Chinese, finds it difficult 
to understand why America, with her great capital strength 
and industrial development, is so slow in taking advantage 
of opportunities for investment and development in China. 



240 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

The President said: "Americans love pioneering. In China 
there is pioneering to do, with the added advantage of having 
a ready labour supply and local capital, which may be en- 
listed. Why are they so slow to come in?" I agree with 
him that it is difficult to understand. 

December i6: Mr. Victor Murdock is in Peking, bringing 
a breeze of American good-fellowship, and a vision unob- 
structed by theories. He finds China interesting, but, I 
fear, he will suffer the usual disability of the passing visitor, 
that is, he will see the unfavourable aspects of Chinese life 
and will not stay long enough to appreciate the deeper vir- 
tues. 

This diary account of some of the happenings during the 
fall of 1916 contains nothing of the daily work of conferences, 
discussions, interviews, dictations dealing with the innumer- 
able problems that come up from the consulates, or that arise 
in the capital directly, or referring to general policies which 
are hammered out and formed for action. 

A great part of the work of a legation is concerned with 
foreseeing trouble and trying to avoid it. Such work usually 
does not appear at all in the record. In a country where con- 
ditions are complicated as they are in China, where there is 
such a crisscrossing of influences, it is easy to make a mistake 
if constant care be not exercised to keep informed of every 
detail and to head off trouble. 



CHAPTER XXI 
CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY 

The time came for the United States to sever relations 
with the German Kaiser's government. I had taken advan- 
tage of the clear sunshine and mild air on Sunday, February 
4, 1917, to visit Doctor Morrison at his cottage outside of 
Peking near the race-course. After lunch a messenger came 
from the Legation, bringing word that an important cable- 
gram had arrived and was being decoded.' I returned to 
town, and at the Legation Mr. White handed me the decoded 
message which said that the American Government had not 
only broken off diplomatic relations with Germany, but that 
it trusted the neutral powers would associate themselves 
with the American Government in this action of protest 
against an intolerable practice; this would make for the peace 
of the world. I was instructed to communicate all this to 
the Chinese Government. 

After a conference with the first secretary, Mr. Mac- 
Murray, and the Chinese secretary, Doctor Tenney, I made an 
engagement to see the President and the Premier on that 
same evening. I felt justified in assuming that the invita- 
tion to the neutrals to join the United States was more than a 
pious wish and that there was some probability]that the Euro- 
pean neutrals would support our protest. As to China 
I had already informed the Government that we could reas- 
onably expect support there. I therefore considered it to be 
the poHcy of the Government to assure a common demonstra- 
tion on the part of all neutral powers, strong enough to bring 
Germany to a halt. So far as my action was concerned, I 
therefore saw the plain duty to prevail upon China to asso- 

241 



242 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

ciate herself with the American action as proposed by my 
government. 

I found President Li Yuan-hung resting after dinner in his 
palace and in an amiably expectant mood. With him was 
Mr. Quo Tai-chi, his English secretary. He was plainly 
startled by the prospect of having to consider so serious a 
matter, and did not at first say anything, but sat silently 
thinking. His doubts and objections were revealed rather 
through questions than by direct statements. "What is the 
present state of the war, and what the relative strength or 
degree of exhaustion of the belligerent parties?" *' Could 
the Allies, even with the assistance of the United States, win 
a decisive victory.?" Finally, he said: **The effect of such a 
far-reaching international act upon the internal situation 
in China will have to be carefully considered." 

The President's secretary appeared strongly impressed 
with the favourable aspects of our proposal, so that he began 
to argue a little with the President. On my part, I pointed 
out the effects which a positive act of international assertion 
in behalf of a just cause and well-disposed associates would 
have upon China by taking attention off her endless fac- 
tional conflicts. When I touched upon the ethical phases 
of the matter, the President fully agreed with me. I had par- 
ticularly impressed upon him the need of prompt action in 
order that counsels might not be confused by adverse influ- 
ences from without. 

We next drove to the residence of the Premier, General 
Tuan Chi-jui, who was then playing an important part in 
the politics of China. I recalled my first interview with him 
when he had received me in a dingy room, himself wearing a 
frowzy long coat and exhibiting a general air of tedium and 
lack of energy. There was no suggestion of the military man 
about him. The qualities upon which General Tuan's great 
influence is founded become apparent only upon a longer 
and more intimate acquaintance. Despite his real indolence, 



CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY 243 

his wisdom, his fundamental honesty, and his readiness to 
shield his subordinates and to assume responsibility himself 
have made this quiet and unobtrusive man the most promi- 
nent leader among the Chinese militarists. His interest 
centres chiefly in the education of miHtary officers. He is 
no politician and is bored by political theory. He is always 
ready to turn over the handling of affairs to subordinates, by 
whom he is often led into a course which he might not him- 
self have chosen. This, coupled with extraordinary stubborn- 
ness, accounts for his influence often tending to be dis- 
astrous to his country. His personality, however, with its 
simplicity and pensiveness, and his real wisdom when he lets 
his own nature guide him, make him one of the attractive 
figures of China. 

Though in himself the principal influence in the Govern- 
ment, Tuan left all details to his assistants, Mr. Tsao Ju-Hn 
and General Hsu Shu-cheng. He preferred to play chess. 
He was, however, always ready to shoulder responsibility for 
what his subordinates had done. Often when he was deep in 
a game of Chinese chess, his mind focussed on the complexi- 
ties of this difficult pastime. General Hsu would approach 
him with some proposal. Giving only half an ear to it, the 
Premier would respond, "All right" {How how). When, 
later, the results of the action thus taken turned out to be 
bad and the Premier asked for an explanation, he was re- 
minded that he had himself authorized it. He would then 
faintly recollect, and would make a gesture toward his 
shoulder, which indicated that — very well — he took the 
responsibility. 

But on this occasion General Tuan was all attention. He 
had with him Mr. C. C. Wu of the Foreign Office, who con- 
tinued throughout these negotiations to act as interpreter. 
The circumstance that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. 
Wu Ting-fang, was ill and had to be represented by his son, 
and that in all important interviews both the Premier and 



244 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

young Mr. Wu were present, greatly facilitated the business 
and saved time which would have been needed to carry on 
parallel conversations in the Foreign Office and with the 
Premier. General Tuan was far from accepting the proposal 
at first sight. "It would be wise for Germany to modify 
her submarine policy/' he stated, "because in land warfare 
she could press her opponents so seriously that her absolute 
defeat would be difficult unless the United States entered the 
war." He appeared to contemplate the possibility of China 
taking so unprecedented a step as the breaking of relations 
with a great power with less concern than did the President. 
We arranged for a longer discussion on the following day. 

Far into that night I was in conference with the legation 
staff, and with certain non-official Americans and Britishers 
of great influence among the Chinese. These men looked 
with enthusiasm upon the idea of an association with the 
United States, aligning against Germany the vast popula- 
tion of China. While the energies and resources of China 
were not sufficiently mobihzed to be of immediate use in the 
war, yet by systematic preparation they might bring an 
enormous accession of strength to the Alhes if the war should 
last long. We felt, also, that through positive alliance with 
the declared policy of the United States, China would greatly 
strengthen herself internally and externally. 

Dr. John C. Ferguson addressed himself directly to the 
Premier and the President; his thorough knowledge of Chi- 
nese enabled him to bring home to them the essential points 
in favour of prompt action. Mr. Roy S. Anderson and Mr. 
W. H. Donald, an Australian acting as editor of the Far 
Eastern Review, who were close to the members of the Com- 
munications Party and the Kuo Min Tang, addressed them- 
selves especially to the leaders in parliament. Dr. G. E. 
Morrison, the British adviser of the President of China, 
had long worked to have China join in the war: he quietly 
used all his influence with the President and high officials, 



CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY 245 

in order to make them understand what was at stake. Other 
Americans and British newspapermen, hke Charles Steven- 
son Smith and Sam Blythe, who happened to be in Peking, 
all tirelessly working in their own way with men whose con- 
fidence they enjoyed, urged the policy proposed by America. 
These men made a spontaneous appeal based upon the fun- 
damental justice of the policy of resisting an intolerable prac- 
tice, and on the beneficent effect which a great issue like this 
would have in pulling the Chinese nation together and in 
making it realize its status as a member of the family of na- 
tions. However, what counted most with the Chinese was 
the fact that America had acted, and had invited China to 
take a similar step. 

At a second long interview with the President, he asked 
me: "Would not a positive active foreign policy, particularly 
if it should lead to war, strengthen the militarist party.?" 

I replied that in my opinion such a contingency would 
strengthen decisively the Central Government, enabling it to 
keep the military in their proper place as an organ of the state 
and preventing the further growth of the pseudo-feudalism 
inherited from Yuan Shih-kai. 

"But would the American Government assist China in 
bearing the responsibilities of such a step?" 

Before replying to this question, I had to cable the Depart- 
ment of State for instructions as to what assurances I would 
be authorized to give to the Chinese Government in the event 
of their taking the action suggested by the United States. 
Unfortunately, as was several times the case during some 
critical situation, the cable connection was broken and I 
failed to get any reply to assist me during the negotiations. 

With a map the Premier and I, later that afternoon, ana- 
lyzed the military situation of the European Powers. From 
the analogy of the American Civil War, I expressed to him 
the belief that Germany could not resist the enormous pres- 
sure from all sides. "What," the Premier asked, "may be 



246 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

expected of America by way of direct military action ? Bear 
in mind that I wish for nothing more than for a strong Amer- 
ica, able to exercise a guiding influence in the affairs of the 
world." 

My positive belief that America would, if necessary, follow 
the severance of relations with the strongest kind of military 
action interested him. America had been represented to the 
Chinese as a big, over-rich country which lacked energy 
for a supreme military effort. 

"What, then, will happen at the conclusion of the war?" 
he asked. 

The fact that Japan had already made efforts to assure 
for herself the right to speak for China was worrying the 
Chinese. With the Premier, as with the President, the idea 
that, through breaking with Germany, China could assure 
herself of an independent position at the peace table, had 
much weight. Both men also faced the possibility of being 
drawn into the war. The Premier appeared to regard this 
with a certain degree of positive satisfaction; to the President 
it seemed a less agreeable prospect- I made it plain that the 
American proposal did not go beyond breaking off^ diplomatic 
relations with Germany, and, that by taking that step, China 
would effectually rebuke and discourage the illegal and in- 
human acts of Germany on the high seas, keeping her hands 
entirely free as to future action. Should further steps be 
later needed, the road would be open. 

Intensive discussions were going on all day Monday and 
deep into the night among the Chinese officials and the 
leaders of parliament. I received calls on Tuesday from 
many Chinese leaders who wished to talk over the situation. 
The progressive, modern-minded, and forward-looking among 
the Chinese readily supported the idea that China should 
range herself alongside the United States in this action. 
Admiral Tsai Ting-kan, who was very close to the President, 
laboured in company with Doctor Morrison to bring before Li 



CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY 247 

Yuan-hung all the considerations favouring positive action. 
The President, however, still adhered to his idea that it was 
safer for China to remain entirely neutral. 

In the cabinet, Dr. Chen Chin-tao, the Minister of Fi- 
nance, and Mr. C. C. Wu, representing the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, from the earliest moment associated them- 
selves with those of the opinion that China must act, and they 
led the younger officials. In the Kuo Min Tang, Mr. C. T. 
Wang, vice-president of the senate; Dr. Wang Chung-hui, 
the leading jurist of China; and General Niu Yung-chien, of 
revolutionary fame, were the first to become active. The 
Peking Gazette^ with its brilliant editor, Eugene Chen, came 
out strongly in favour of following the United States. A 
powerful public opinion was quietly forming among the 
Chinese. The Young China party was beginning to see the 
advantage which lay in having China emerge from her 
passivity. 

When I returned from a dinner with the Alstons at the 
British Legation on Tuesday night, Mr. C. C. Wu brought 
me word from the cabinet that it would be quite impossible 
to take action unless the American Government could ade- 
quately assure China assistance in bearing the responsibihties 
which she might incur, without impairment of her sovereign 
rights and the independent control of her national forces. 

The Chinese ministers had in mind two things: In the first 
place, the need of financial assistance, in order to make it 
possible for China eventually to participate in the war, if 
that should be desired; and, second, the prevention of all 
arrangements whereby Chinese natural resources, military 
forces, arsenals, or ships, would be placed under foreign con- 
trol incompatible with her undiminished national indepen- 
dence. 

All through Wednesday I struggled with this difficult 
problem. I had to act on my own responsibility, as I could 
not reach the Department of State by cable. If all the in- 



248 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

fluences unfavourable to the action proposed were given 
time to assert themselves, the American proposal would be 
obstructed and probably defeated. The Chinese Govern- 
ment would act only on such assurances as I could feel justi- 
fied in giving to them at this time; if I gave them none, no 
action would be taken. It seemed almost a matter of course, 
should China follow the lead of the American Government, 
that the latter would not allow China to suffer through lack 
of all possible support in aiding China to bear the responsi- 
bilities she assumed, and in preventing action from any quar- 
ter which would impose on China new burdens because of her 
break with Germany. Unable to interpret my instructions 
otherwise than that a joint protest of the neutrals had actually 
been planned by the American Government, and feeling that 
the effect upon Germany of the American protest depended 
on the early concurrence of the important neutral powers, I 
considered prompt action essential. I was sure that all sorts 
of unfavourable and obstructive influences would presently 
get to work in Peking. 

When discussion had reached its limit, on the afternoon of 
February yth, I felt it necessary to draw up a note concerning 
the attitude of the American Government. The tenor of 
this note I communicated to the Premier and the Foreign 
Office, with the understanding that I should send the note if 
favourable action were decided upon by the Chinese Govern- 
ment. 

I believed that without such assurances the instructions of 
tTie American Government could not be carried out, and that 
it would act in all respects in a manner consonant with its 
position as a powerful government and as a leader of protest 
among the neutrals; moreover, that its relations with those 
who gave support in a policy of such fundamental importance 
would be determined by principles of equity and justice. I 
felt that the United States could not be less liberal toward a 
country coming to its support than toward those countries 



CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY 249 

which the American Government was now going to help. 
It was only these self-evident conclusions which I cautiously 
expressed in my note. The text of this note, in its essential 
part, had the following form: 

Excellency: 

In our recent conversation concerning the policy of your Government in 
associating itself with the United States in active opposition to the un- 
restricted submarine warfare by which Germany is indiscriminately jeop- 
ardizing the lives of neutral citizens, you have with entire frankness pointed 
out to me that, whereas the Chinese Government is in principle disposed 
to adopt the suggestion of the President of the United States in that re- 
gard, it nevertheless finds itself in a position in which it would not feel safe 
in so doing unless assured that it could obtain from American sources such 
financial and other assistance as would enable it to take the measures 
appropriate to the situation which would thus be created. 

With like candour I have stated to you that I have recommended to 
my Government that in the event of the Chinese Government's associating 
itself with the President's suggestion, the Government of the United 
States should take measures to put at its disposition the funds immediately 
required for the purposes you have indicated, and should take steps with 
a view to such a funding of the Boxer Indemnity as would for the time 
being make available for the purposes of the Chinese Government at least 
the major portion of the current indemnity instalments; and I have indi- 
cated to you my personal conviction that my Government would be found 
just and liberal in effecting this or other such arrangements to enable the 
Chinese Government to meet the responsibilities which it might assume 
upon the suggestion of the President, I should not be wholly frank with 
you, however, if I were to fail to point out that the exact nature of any 
assistance to be given or any measure to be taken must be determined 
through consultation of various administrative organs, in some cases in- 
cluding reference to Congress, in order to make effective such arrangements 
as might have been agreed to in principle between the executive authori- 
ties of the two countries; and I therefore could not in good faith make in 
behalf of my Government any definite commitments upon your suggestions 
at the present time. 

I do, however, feel warranted in assuming the responsibility of assuring 
you in behalf of my Government that by the methods you have suggested, 
or otherwise, adequate means will be devised to enable China to fulfill the 
responsibilities consequent upon associating herself with the action of the 



250 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

United States Government, without any impairment of her national in- 
dependence and of her control of her military establishment and general 
administration. 

Final presentation of everything that had to be considered 
in making a decision was arranged with the Premier for 
Wednesday evening. I found General Tuan alone. We 
spoke awhile about the news of the day, then I began to go 
into the main matter. But General Tuan appeared weary 
and worried. This may have been the reason for the failure 
of the interpreters to make smooth connection: I suggested, 
as the Premier had had an excessively long day, that we meet 
again the following morning. It was arranged for ten o'clock 
at the cabinet office, just before the Thursday morning cabi- 
net conference. 

I had just dined with Mr. C. T. Wang and a number of 
parliamentary leaders. They were keen on the policy of 
following the United States. They had seen President Li 
during the day; he was still full of doubts, but stated that he 
would leave the decision in the hands of the cabinet, and 
would abide by the results. Mr. Wang believed that the 
President was gradually coming around to the American point 
of view, and that his acceptance of it would be the stronger 
and heartier because of the conscientious doubts which he 
was overcoming. 

The negotiations of these three days had gone on quietly. 
The men upon whom rested the responsibility of making the 
decision were constantly in conference. Several men of in- 
fluence worked with officials of the Government and leaders in 
parliament. But the outside foreign public was not fully 
alive to what was going on, and those who knew and were 
interested generally believed that ancient China would not 
take so unprecedented a step. The Japanese minister. 
Baron Hayashi, was absent from Peking. The German 
official representatives apparently had no idea that any radi- 
cal action could come from the Chinese Government. 



CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY 251 

I arrived at the cabinet office on Thursday morning, at 
ten, and was shown to the room where the Premier was to 
receive me. As he had told me that Mr. C. C. Wu would 
be present to interpret, I had not brought an interpreter for 
this informal and intimate interview. The Premier soon 
entered unattended and we sat down together, smoking 
cigarettes, and observing an enforced silence, as Mr. Wu had 
not appeared. We were without an interpreter, but even in 
such circumstances the perfection of Chinese manners allows 
no embarrassment to arise. We had been sitting in mute 
thought a little while, when Admiral Chen, the Minister of 
the Navy, came in; he spoke English quite well, so that our 
conversation could begin; soon we were in the midst of earnest 
discussion. Within another ten minutes Dr. Chen Chin-tao, 
the Minister of Finance, arrived, and shortly after him came 
Mr. C. C. Wu. Thus, quite by chance, I had the opportu- 
nity of talking over these momentous matters jointly with the 
representatives of the four departments of government most 
nearly concerned : Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, and Navy. 

We could now once more thoroughly go over all doubts 
and objections, and look at the proposed policy in all its mani- 
fold aspects and probable results. In this intense and earnest 
conversation no formal interpreting was needed. Whoever 
replied to my remarks would first repeat in Chinese what I 
had said for the benefit of the Premier. When the Premier 
had spoken, Mr. Wu would interpret his thought for me. 
All the others addressed me directly in English. I advanced 
arguments on every point, of which the following is a memo- 
randum : 

The American Government has taken the present action because the wil- 
ful disregard of neutral rights went to the extent of imperilling not only 
neutral property, but the lives of our citizens. In this matter the interests 
of China are entirely parallel to those of the United States; both nations 
are peaceful and see in the maintenance of international right and peaceful 
conditions a vital guarantee of their national safety. Through association 



252 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

with the United States, China would enter upon this controversy with a 
position consonant with every tradition and interest of her national life, a 
position which would have to be respected by friends and foes alike, as 
dictated by the highest principles which could guide national action. 
By taking this action, China would improve her independent standing 
among the nations, she would have to be consulted during the course of 
the controversy and at the conclusion of the war; she would, in all this, 
be most closely associated with that nation which she has always looked 
upon as peculiarly friendly and just to her. In addition to these argu- 
ments, many favourable results were discussed which China would obtain 
in international diplomacy. 

Many arguments were advanced by the Chinese officials in doubt of the 
policy suggested; it was stated that China had not led up to a breach with 
Germany by notes of protest, such as had made the action of the United 
States seem natural and unavoidable; Germany had of late years always 
been considerate in her treatment of China, a sudden breach might seem 
treacherous; it might also be taken by Japan as so surprising an action as 
to give a favourable pretext for pressing the dreaded demands of Group V. 
It was also apparent that the representatives of the European Allies were 
not in a position to give China, at the present time, any advice favourable 
to the action suggested. 

I pointed out in turn that were the action suggested once taken by 
China, the representatives of the Allied Powers would have no choice but 
to applaud it, which some of them, at least, would do from the fulness of 
their hearts. As far as Japan was concerned, the situation would be such 
as to indicate that that country, too, would decide to express approval 
of the action. Having taken a definite position on this side of the contro- 
versy, without yet entirely associating herself with the Allies, China would 
be in a position to command their goodwill; any interference with China's 
sovereign rights would be rendered more difficult because of the situation 
thus created. It was almost inconceivable that coercive action should 'be 
taken against the friend who had declared himself. Moreover, the United 
States having taken the initiative in inviting China to participate in the 
protest, it would be unlikely that any action could be taken over the 
head of the United States or without consulting the American Government. 

As to the suddenness of the action suggested, I urged that the action of 
the German Government in announcing unrestricted submarine warfare 
was itself so astounding in its disregard of neutral rights that no action 
taken in reply could be considered too drastic. It was virtually a threat to 
kill Chinese citizens navigating certain portions of the high seas; and injury 
could be prevented only by taking a determined and forceful position. 



CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY 253 

We continued our discussion until nearly twelve o'clock, 
when I took my leave, thanking the ministers for their cour- 
tesy and goodwill. The cabinet sat until six in the evening. 
Shortly after six I received a telephone call from Mr. C. C. 
Wu, who said : " I am very happy to tell you that the cabinet 
has decided to make a protest to Germany, and to indicate 
that diplomatic relations will be broken off unless the present 
submarine warfare is abandoned." 

It is interesting to remember, as the publication of the 
Russian secret archives has shown, that on this very day the 
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was urging the 
Russian ambassador at Tokyo to get from his government 
assurances of various benefits (including Shantung) to come 
to Japan if she undertook the supposedly difficult task of 
inducing China to join the Allies. Japan was thus asking a 
commission for persuading the Chinese to join the Allies, 
although they were willing to do so freely of their own accord, 
as their action this day showed. 

The Chinese had made a great decision. These men had 
acted independently upon their judgment of what was just 
and in the best interests of their own nation. It was the act 
of a free government, without a shadow of attempt at pres- 
sure, without a thought of exacting compensations on their 
part. When it is considered in comparison with the manner 
in which some other governments entered the war, it will 
stand as an honour to China for all time. Incidentally, this 
was China's first independent participation in world politics. 
She had stepped out of her age-long aloofness and taken her 
place among the modern nations. 

I now sent the note to the Chinese Government which 
contained the simple assurance of fair treatment by the 
United States. In return I received this promise: 



In case an act should be performed by the German Government which 
should be considered by the American Government as a sufficient cause for 



254 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

a declaration of war, the Chinese Government will at least break off its 
diplomatic relations with Germany. 

In his formal note to me, dated February 9th, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs declared : 

The Chinese Government being in accord with the principles set forth 
in Your Excellency's note and firmly associating itself with the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America, has taken similar action by protest- 
ing energetically to the German Government against the new measures of 
blockade. The Chinese Government also proposes to take such action in 
the future as will be deemed necessary for the maintenance of the principles 
of international law. 



On the same day a formal note of protest was dispatched 
to the German minister. 

The entire cabinet reported on February loth to a secret 
session of parHament on the diplomatic action it had taken. 
The report was well received; only a few questions were 
asked concerning the procedure which had been followed. 
Parliament did not take a vote on this matter, as it was 
considered to be an action by the cabinet within the range 
of its legal functions. 

A wave of exultation passed over the country. There 
seemed to be hope for harmony among factions; the self- 
respect of the Government was visibly heightened. That 
China had without coercion or sordid inducement taken a 
definite stand on so momentous a matter inspired the Chinese 
with new hope. In coming to the support of international 
right, they felt that they were strengthening the forces which 
make for the independence of their own country. 

Expressing themselves unofficially the representatives of 
the Allied governments during these negotiations cautiously 
favoured the step proposed. When the decision had once 
been taken, the approval of the Chinese action was unani- 
mous. My Belgian colleague remarked to me: "The air has 



CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY 255 

been cleared, a weight has been lifted off China and the 
powers. The stock of America has risen 100 per cent." 

Mr. Sam Blythe gave a dinner on the evening of February 
9th, at which Dr. George Morrison and many other American 
and British friends were present. The dinner became a 
celebration. Greeting me, Doctor Morrison said : "This is the 
greatest thing ever accomplished in China. It means a new 
era. It will make the Chinese nationally self-conscious; and 
that, not for narrow, selfish purposes, but to vindicate hu- 
man rights." 

But the thing was not yet accomplished. I knew well 
enough that the decision of the Central Government would not 
be immediately accepted in all parts of China. Opposition 
might crop out. In certain regions men of strong German 
sympathies were in control, or political intrigues to cause em- 
barassment and difficulties to the Central Government were 
going on. All China must understand and support the deci- 
sion taken by the Government. 

Of the leaders in the provinces the Vice-President, General 
Feng, at Nanking, was most important; as the blunder had 
been committed of not consulting him, he was predisposed 
against the decision; moreover, General Feng had several 
German advisers in whom he placed confidence, and who had 
given him a strong notion of German invincibility. 

Fortunately, Mr. Sam Blythe was going to stop at Nanking 
on his way to Shanghai, in order as a journalist to interview 
the Vice-President. Blythe argued the matter out with him. 
He found that General Feng really felt injured. This was 
smoothed over. With Mr. W. H. Donald as an able second, 
Sam Blythe impressed upon the General that China had 
merely been asked to break off relations, which did not 
imply going to war. After a long and serious conversation, 
with some side-flashes from Sam Blythe, the Vice-President 
declared himself fully satisfied, and he came out in favour of 
the Government's policy. (Thus, as has often been the case, 



2S6 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

an unofficial visit by private individuals accomplished the 
good results.) 

In other ways and by other persons, different leaders were 
visited and familiarized with the underlying reasons for the 
act of the Central Government. These influences interplayed 
with cumulative effect; no concerted opposition was formed; 
by a sort of football "interference" the policy to condemn 
German submarine warfare, and, if necessary, to break rela- 
tions with Germany, scored its touchdown. 

Intelhgent teamwork and American energy were in a fair 
way to give China the backing she needed, having first assured 
her concerted action with the United States. At a diploma- 
tic dinner which I gave the Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
February, the absorbing talk was about the diplomatic action 
taken by China. Count Mattel and M. Pelliot of the 
French Legation, Miles Lampson of the British Legation, 
Mr. Konovalov, Russia's financial adviser for China, and 
other Allied representatives all came to me during the even- 
ing to say how enormously gratified they were at the initiative 
of the United States and the stand taken by China. For 
once nobody could disapprove of Chinese action. 

The Japanese also expressed approval, but immediately 
tried to get China to take the further step of declaring war, 
and the French minister, too, worked actively for this. Japan 
was eager to recover the lead. A great campaign of intrigue 
and counter-intrigue resulted among the various factions in 
China which threatened to destroy the unifying and inspiring 
effects of China's action. The question of joining the Allies 
out and out was thrown into politics. From all this most 
of the ministers held aloof. When Liang Chi-chao sounded 
me on this question, I told him, while lacking instructions 
from my government, that I thought the rupture of diplo- 
matic relations would be enough, if it should come to 
that. Within a few days instructions came from the State 
Department to the same effect. 



CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY 257 

During March I repeatedly saw Vice-President Feng and 
President Li. Feng, small and slender, intelligent in appear- 
ance, bald, with keen but shifty eyes, was courtesy itself. I 
was specially delighted with the refinement and musical 
quality of his diction. I went over the whole ground with 
him, satisfying him, especially, on the question of the specific 
American objections to the German U-boats. "I approve 
heartily and completely," he finally assured me, "of the pro- 
posed break with Germany." 

I found that General Li was not only in favour of breaking 
with Germany, but of an internal break with his own premier, 
General Tuan. " I cannot trust him," said Li; " he wishes to 
eliminate me from real power." This friction within dis- 
tressed me not a little, as I had sincerely hoped that these 
two men would come to cooperate. 

Then I saw Dr. Wu Ting-fang. Besides being China's 
foreign minister. Doctor Wu is a spiritualist. When I 
entered, he followed his usual bent, bundled the morning's 
business details over to the counsellor in attendance, and 
devoted himself to philosophizing. Spiritualism, longevity, 
and the advantages of a vegetarian diet, were to him topics 
for real thought and speculation. In mystic language, he 
remarked: *' There is an aura gradually spreading from 
Europe over the entire surface of the world. It enters the 
brains of the people and penetrates them, making them war- 
mad. We are having the first signs here." 

By March loth, submarine warfare had not been modified. 
Parliament then formally approved the breach of diplomatic 
relations with Germany. 

I had almost belaboured the department for instruc- 
tions during the progress of our work. But it was not 
until the 13th of March, the very day the break of diplo- 
matic relations was formally notified, that the instructions 
came. These rather implied that the circular inviting 
cooperation on the part of the neutral powers had been too 



258 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

strongly acted upon by me. I could not but be inwardly 
amused. 

When a government takes a step involving life and death 
and all the interests of its own and of general civilization; 
when, in connection therewith, it calls upon other powers to 
associate themselves with it — it ought to be safe to presume 
that the government means what it says. It should see 
that the action it invokes involves great sacrifices, and it 
must not invoke it lightly. A responsible official would not 
be justified in interpreting such a note in a platonic sense. 

At once questions of finance arose. Ancient China had 
taken her brave step in modern world affairs. She might 
now have to go to war. That would take money, and money 
would be needed to guard such a contingency — indeed, intern- 
ally and externally China had need to put her financial 
house in order. Yuan Shih-kai's imperialism had left a bur- 
den of debt. The Republic required strengthening by a new 
system of national credit and by the building up of its natural 
resources. Now the public debt was relatively still small, 
the rate of taxation upon the hundreds of millions of citizens 
low. The situation was basically sound. The question had 
been asked since last summer: Would America supply China 
with an investment loan of a hundred millions, thus deliver- 
ing her of lenders who were seeking to dominate her and to 
split her up into "spheres of influence"? 

Minister Wellington Koo, who had journeyed to the United 
States in behalf of Yuan Shih-kai's imperial ambitions, 
now worked for the Republic there. I suggested at first that 
the firm of Lee, Higginson & Company, which still held its 
option, should complete its loan. This was not done. Then 
other capitalists were approached and in November, 1916, 
Doctor Koo arranged for a large loan with Mr. John J. Abbott, 
president of the Continental and Commercial Savings Bank 
of Chicago. Mr. Abbott, wishing to study the Chinese finan- 
cial situation, arrived in Peking during April, 1917, bringing 



CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY 259 

his lawyer. I got him acquainted with the Chinese ministers, 
and took him and Mr. Joy Morton, also of Chicago, to lunch 
with President Li and Dr. Chen Chin-tao and Hsu Un-yuen. 
The President said: "I will back all financial legislation which 
American experts may find necessary for the proper organiza- 
tion of China's credit." 

Doctor Chen was arrested and put in prison through the 
plotting of his enemies, but Hsu Un-yuen remained, with his 
sound financial training. Finally Mr. Abbott proposed an 
ingenious scheme, with the wine and tobacco taxes as the 
basis— for every $1,000,000 of annual revenue there should 
be a loan of $5,000,000; if the taxes amounted to ten millions, 
they would serve as security for a loan of fifty millions. 
Mr. Abbott left behind him a plan for reorganizing these 
taxes, and a promise to take up at any time the question of 
loans on this basis, in addition to five millions lent the pre- 
ceding November and an option for twenty-five millions 
more. 



CHAPTER XXII 
CHINA'S BOSSES COME TO PEKING 

I HAVE noted that Dr. Chen Chin-tao, Chinese Minister 
of Finance, was put in prison. Doctor Chen had adminis- 
tered Chinese finances strictly and well, in a most difficult 
period. For the military governors or Tuchuns,who were the 
real bosses of China's vast population, he was too honest and 
too strict. The Tuchuns looked upon the Minister of Fi- 
nance as in duty bound to procure funds for them by hook or 
crook. 

When the government banks were broken and had declared 
a moratorium, their large over-issues of notes were worth 
only one half their face value. Working with Doctor Chen 
was Hsu Un-yuen, managing director of the Bank of China. 
Mr. Hsu managed judiciously to bring the notes of his bank 
virtually to par. The Tuchuns, aided by the pro-Japanese 
clique, which formed part of the Premier's entourage, at- 
tacked both Hsu and Doctor Chen. For the latter the cabal 
laid a trap. It was made to appear that he gave support to a 
certain company in return for having his brother employed. 
So the cabal, using this pretext to satisfy their grievances, 
got him arrested and jailed, thus ending his negotiations with 
the Chicago bank of John J. Abbott. President Li was in- 
terested and distressed. When I asked Premier Tuan about 
Doctor Chen, he smilingly stated that he should have a 
chance to clear himself. 

Meanwhile, the breach between the Premier and the 
President widened. To strengthen himself in his policy of 
favouring a declaration of war, the Premier called all the 
Tuchuns to Peking for a conference. Nine governors-general 

260 



CHINA'S BOSSES COME TO PEKING 261 

came, and all the other provinces sent delegates. General 
Tuan was successful with them, and by April 28th they had 
decided to support his war policy. 

The Tuchun of Shantung was bulky, coarse-looking. I 
had some idea of his views on representative government 
from his inaugural address to the Shantung Assembly. 
*' Gentlemen," the Tuchun said with genial frankness,** you 
resemble birds who are in a large cage together. If you 
behave well, and sing songs that are pleasing, we shall feed 
you; otherwise, you shall have to go without food." 

Several of the Tuchuns called on me by appointment, and 
later I gave them a formal reception, at which I saw all who 
had come to Peking, observed their personalities, and tried 
to fathom the source of their personal prominence and power. 
I talked with them individually and in groups, chiefly about 
the progress of the war and the relative strength of the com- 
batants. My guests were full of smiles and good cheer, 
particularly did the Tuchun of Fukien radiate joy. In their 
sociability they were true Chinese, and here, where they had 
been received with the military honours due to their position 
and in the spirit of hospitality, they could show themselves 
in a more amiable light than when maintaining their power 
in their provinces. To a brief speech of welcome which I 
made when they had all arrived General Hsu Shu-cheng 
replied with a most emphatic expression of friendship for 
America. 

That so many of these governors should have risen from 
the lowliest position was indeed strong evidence of the under- 
lying democracy of Chinese life. But that a mere handful 
of men should wield such power, each in his province, did not 
bespeak strength in representative government. 

Some of the military commanders were men of education, 
although most of them had risen from very modest surround- 
ings: Yen Hsi-shan, of Shansi; Chu Jui, of Chekiang; Tang 
Chi-yao, of Yunnan; Chen Kuang-yuan, of Kiangsi; Ni Tze- 



262 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

chung, of Anhwei; Li Shun, of Nanking, a fisherman's son; 
Li Ho-chi of Fukien, Tien Chung-yu of Kalgan, both of 
middle-class families — all these were fair scholars. General 
Wu Pei-fu, who rose from the post of a private in the Chino- 
Japanese War, had through great intelligence and industry 
acquired a good education, as likewise had General Feng 
Yu-hsiang; both of these generals professed the Christian 
religion. President Feng Kuo-chang came of a poor family, 
and as a young man played a fiddle in a small local 
theatre. 

Among the other Tuchuns were many to whom the Chinese 
applied the proverb: "A good man will never become a sol- 
dier." These men, indeed, deserve credit for having risen 
from their original state as coolies, bandits, or horse-thieves, 
but they often owe their prominence to qualities which by no 
means make for the good of the state. Chang Tso-lin, the 
Viceroy of Manchuria, commenced his career as a bandit; 
he was pardoned by Chao Er-shun, and became a govern- 
ment officer. Chang Huai-chi was a coolie, and never got 
much education. Tsao Kun, of Chihli, was a huckster. 
Wang Chan-yuan was a hostler. The trio, Chang Hsun, 
Lu Yung-ting, and MuYung-hsing, headed the so-called Black 
Flag Band; at one time the partners put up fifty thousand 
taels to enable Chang Hsun to buy himself an office and be- 
come respectable. But he spent it all in high living. With 
the antedecents of some of these men one marvels not only 
at the position they have acquired, but at the personal polish 
and air of refinement of many of them. 

All of them dealt with political power as a commodity, 
secured through the use of money and soldiers. They were 
somewhat like the condottieri of the Italian renaissance, 
looking ahead only to the goal of their personal ambition for 
wealth and power. Even among these militarists, however, 
there were those who gave some attention to matters of 
public policy, and the idea of national welfare and unity had 



CHINA'S BOSSES COME TO PEKING 263 

begun to dawn upon their consciousness. Moreover, in them 
I felt a mixture of the old and the new. They had suddenly 
come into great power, thought in terms of airplanes and 
modern armaments, but had as yet few other modern ideas 
to inspire their action with anything beyond personal motives. 
In their human qualities, however, several of them excelled; 
and some, even, showed a real spirit of public service and 
ability as administrators. 

The Japanese Government was still trying to get China 
into the war, and its minister called on President Li to urge 
it. I talked on May 9th with the President, who said that 
he favoured a declaration of war provided parliament was 
not overridden in the process. Then I saw the Premier. 
"If parliament is obstinate," General Tuan said bluntly, 
"it will be dissolved." 

I told him it would make a very bad impression in the 
United States and with other Western powers if parliament 
were ignored in so important a matter. I knew that parlia- 
ment did not oppose declaring war, but desired to control the 
war policy. "But," the Premier urged, "the opposition of 
parliament disregards national interests. It desires merely 
to secure partisan advantage." Tuan discussed the attitude 
of Japan. "The Japanese have assured me," he declared, 
"that if I follow a strong policy I may count on their support. 
Now circumstances force the Chinese Government to be 
friendly to Japan. Of course, I will not give up any valuable 
rights to anybody, and I will strengthen China in every way 
so that resistance may be offered to any attempted injustice." 

Ironically, he asked whether confidence could be placed in 
the southern leaders of the Kuo Min Tang. "I have proof," 
he continued, "that both Sun Yat-sen and Tsen Liang-kuang 
have given written assurances to the Japanese Consul-General 
at Shanghai that if either of them becomes President of China 
he will conclude a treaty granting to Japan rights of supervi- 
sion of military and administrative affairs more extensive 



264 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

than those sought in Group V of the twenty-one demands." 
So each party believed the worst of the other. 

Events were tending to a dimax. The Government was 
demorahzed. Doctor Chen was in prison; Mr. Li Ching-hsi, 
a nephew of Li Hung-chang, who was to take Chen's place, 
would not assume office while affairs remained so unsettled. 
The Ministry of Communications was in charge of an under- 
ling. The Minister of Education, who also acted as Minister 
of the Interior, was seriously ill. The Kuo Min Tang minis- 
ters had lost their influence with their party in parliament 
because of their failure effectively to oppose the Tuchuns' 
policy. It was believed that the Tuchuns, with the followers 
of General Tuan, were planning a coup against Parliament. 

In the midst of this I had a personal chat with Chen Lu, 
the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, at an evening reception 
at the British Legation. I told him of my surprise that the 
Tuchuns, instead of attending to the urgent business in their 
provinces, should be gathered here, interfering with the Cen- 
tral Government. I let it be distinctly understood that any 
movement to overthrow parliament in order to carry out the 
war poHcy could not be expected to receive the sympathy 
of the United States. The vice-minister was in close touch 
with the Tuchuns. I expected that he would repeat my re- 
marks to them. He did. 

As I was leaving the chancery a few evenings later Mr. 
Roy Anderson appeared with the news that something was 
happening and drove me over to the railway station. We 
went through the Chenmen gate. Along the main street 
were many carts rapidly driven, loaded with military stores 
and household goods. Automobiles were rushing by them 
to the station. On the platform was a turmoil of troops 
busily transferring the various military possessions to cars. 
In a parlour car our friends the Tuchuns were assembling. 
I left Mr. Anderson there to observe and to get information. 

It appeared that the Tuchuns had all of a sudd^ decided 



CHINA'S BOSSES COME TO PEKING 265 

to leave Peking for their various capitals, taking their body- 
guards with them. Two or three were to remain in Tientsin 
a Httle longer to watch developments. Their precipitous 
exit seemed to indicate that President Li had at last got the 
upper hand. 

As a farewell courtesy to Doctor Willoughby, the American 
legal adviser, the President had invited him and me to lunch- 
eon on the following day. President Li was cheerful. The 
discomfiture of the Tuchuns filled him with glee. *'All 
danger is passed," he announced; *'I will dismiss General 
Tuan, appoint a new cabinet, and have parliament decide 
the war question without compulsion." 

In order to inform myself as to what was behind the 
President's confidence, I asked him what he had to put in 
the place of his cabinet and General Tuan, and whether he 
believed that the Government could be carried on without the 
concurrence of that important party. 

"Oh, yes," the President assured me, "it is all arranged." 

Pressing him a little further, and asking upon whom, In 
particular, he was relying, to my unspeakable surprise, he 
said: "General Chang Hsun will assist me." 

Now General Chang Hsun was an old-time bandit and 
militarist. His ideas were devoid of any understanding of 
representative institutions. It passed my power of imagina- 
tion to see how rehance could be placed in this general for 
the vindication of parliament. As I looked dubious, the 
President repeated: "Yes, you may beheve me. I can rely 
on General Chang Hsun." 

It was not what Chang Hsun stood for that the President 
relied on, but on his enmity to General Tuan. Li Yuan-hung, 
though quite modern in his conception of government, in 
this instance followed a strong Chinese instinct which 
aims to prevail by setting off strong individuals against each 
other. 

After I had heard that the dismissal of General Tuan had 



266 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

been announced, General Chin Yun-peng called on me. He 
was agitated and much worried. "Do you not think that 
General Tuan should leave Peking?" he asked. "His ene- 
mies will undoubtedly wish to take his life." 

I tried to cheer him up by telling him that in a modern 
government such ups and downs must be expected. "Let the 
other side now develop their policy, and show what they can 
do; let General Tuan use this time for quiet recuperation, 
after the strain he has been through. Then," I said, "the 
time will come again when Tuan will be called back to power." 
The eyes of the good general lit up with gratitude. General 
Ni Tze-chung, most notorious and active among the military 
party, declared on the 26th of May that the dismissal of 
General Tuan had been illegal. His province of Anhwei dis- 
approved; it would act independently of the Central Govern- 
ment. 

This was the crucial point in the development of the 
situation. 

Expert observers said that had the President immediately 
dismissed Ni and ordered his punishment, appointing a junior 
commander in his place, the rest of the militarists would 
have fallen away from Ni, and the President could have 
dealt with them individually. Instead, he was persuaded to 
send a conciliatory letter to General Ni. 

This, of course, confirmed the leadership of Ni over the 
military party; further, it encouraged the majority of the 
Tuchuns to declare their independence. 

A so-called provisional government was set up at Tientsin. 
The older and wiser heads of the military party, men like 
General Tuan Chi-jui and Mr. Hsu Shih-chang, held them- 
selves entirely aloof from this new organization. 

General Ni Tze-chung was the leading spirit. By dint of 
force the so-called government helped itself to the deposits of 
the Chinese Government in the Tientsin branch of the Bank 
of China. The men greatly in evidence were the»members of 



CHINA'S BOSSES COME TO PEKING 267 

the pro-Japanese clique, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin and General Hsu 
Shu-cheng. General Aoki, the Japanese military adviser to 
the Government, was also on the ground. 

In Peking a paralysis crept over the Government. The 
President lost his advantage as quickly as he had gained it. 
On the railways all orders of the Tuchuns for transportation 
were implicitly obeyed. When at this time the question of 
the movement of revolutionary troops and their stationing at 
Tientsin and along the railway came up, the Japanese minis- 
ter persisted in the position that it would be highly undesir- 
able to make any objection on the ground of any possible 
conflict with the protection of the railway by foreign troops. 
Two months before, the Japanese Legation had strongly 
objected to the stationing of a few government troops along 
the same railway. 

The President issued a mandate inviting Chang Hsun to 
Peking as arbitrator. 

When I interviewed the President, he looked disconsolate. 
His youthful English secretary, Mr. Kuo, tried his best to 
give a more cheerful and confident note to Li's conversation, 
but Doctor Tenney, who was with me, easily compared the 
President's doleful Chinese with the more buoyant English 
translation. 

The plan of the Tuchuns was directed toward isolating 
and strangling Peking. They controlled the railways leading 
there, and were preventing the shipment of foodstuflfs. The 
ministry that controlled the railways, it must be remembered, 
was controlled by Japanese influence. Constitutional gov- 
ernment in China was paralyzed through the lack of military 
and financial authority. 

The war issue worried the Chinese. First, they feared that 
the militarist party would take advantage of it, through the 
support of Japanese influence, to fasten its hold upon China; 
second, that China might by the Allies be made a field in 
which to seek compensations. But if local political troubles 



268 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

had not entirely upset the situation, it might have been possi- 
ble to arrange for a joint declaration of the powers that 
would have allayed suspicion and made it feasible for China 
to enter the war with a sense of security. 

Dr. Wu Ting-fang, acting on the suggestion of Mr. Lenox 
Simpson and liberal-minded Chinese publicists, made a move 
to have the American Government do something. He sent 
advices to Minister Koo in Washington telling him about 
General Ni and his leadership of the revolt of the Tuchuns. 
The southern provinces were still loyal to the President and 
parliament, and the civil and commercial population disap- 
proved of the rebellion. President Wilson and Secretary 
Lansing were asked to make a statement in behalf of repre- 
sentative government in China. This was followed by a 
direct appeal to President Wilson. 

But the American Government had already instructed me 
on the 5th of June to communicate to the Chinese Govern- 
ment a statement evincing a sincere desire for internal politi- 
cal harmony. The question of China's entry into the war, 
it said, was secondary to continuing the political unity of 
China and the laying aside of factional disputes. I accom- 
panied it orally with a personal statement that the United 
States conceived the war to be one for the principles of democ- 
racy; that it would deplore any construction of its invitation 
which would lend itself to the idea that it contemplated any 
coercion or restriction upon Chinese freedom of action. I 
made plain that no matter how much the United States 
wished the cooperation of China in the war, it did not desire 
to bring this about by using the political dissensions or work- 
ing with any one faction in disregard of parliament. 

General Tuan Chi-jui at once stated to Doctor Ferguson, 
who unofficially informed him of the American note at Tient- 
sin, that he had totally withdrawn from all politics. The 
Chinese press gave a very favourable reception to the note; 
the Chinese people welcomed America's advice General 



CHINA'S BOSSES COME TO PEKING 269 

Feng Kuo-chang, later when he had become President, spoke 
of the note to me, and remarked on the salutary influence it 
had wielded upon public opinion in China. 

While the political dissensions in the Chinese state were too 
personal to be overcome by any friendly suggestions from the 
outside, nevertheless.the American note had set up a standard 
for all the Chinese. It had, furthermore, given convincing 
proof of the fact that the true interests of China were im- 
partially weighed by the American Government, and were 
not entirely subordinated to any war policy which America 
might desire to advance. From all parts of China came 
expressions of gratitude and satisfaction that the American 
Government should have spoken to China so justly and 
truly. The Chinese appreciated the spirit of justice of the 
American Government in not desiring to have the war issue 
used for the purposes of enabling any faction or party to 
override the free determination of the Chinese Government 
and people. As America was itself at war and would there- 
fore have welcomed cooperation, this just policy particularly 
impressed the Chinese. 

The Japanese press both in Japan and China immediately 
launched forth into a bitter invective against the American 
action. The United States should have consulted Japan. 
Its action constituted interference in the domestic aff'airs of 
China. *'If China listens to advice from America," a Japa- 
nese major-general declared in an excited speech at a dinner in 
Peking on the 7th of June, "she will have Japan to deal 
with." 

The Japanese ambassador at Washington protested in- 
formally. Had not Secretary Bryan, in a note dated the 
13th of March, 191 5, recognized the special and close rela- 
tions, political and economic, between Japan and China ? It 
was impossible that the American minister at Peking was 
taking a part in political affairs in China, but the Japanese 
public was sensitive about the note sent by the American 



270 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Government to China. Would it not be useful if the Ameri- 
can Government would confirm Mr. Bryan's statement? 

The reply to this communication did not come until the 
6th of July. Mr. Bryan's statement, the reply said, referred 
only to the special relations created by territorial contiguity 
in certain parts of China. Even with respect to them it in 
no way admitted that the United States might not in future 
be justified in expressing itself relative to questions that 
might arise between China and Japan. The United States 
could not be indifferent to matters affecting the welfare of 
the Chinese people, such as the unrest in China. 

The first detachments of Chang Hsun's troops arrived in 
Peking on the 9th of June. Chang Hsun's theory was that 
it is the business of a trooper to make himself terrible. These 
wild horsemen, wearing loose-fitting black uniforms, with 
their cues rolled up on the back of the head, rode about Pe- 
king with the air of conquerors. The "Mediator" was com- 
ing with sufficient military force to back his judgment. 

When General Chang himself arrived, the streets from the 
railway station to the Mediator's house in the Manchu city 
were entirely shut off. Mounted troopers blocked the way 
as my automobile came along a side street to cross one of 
these thoroughfares. They nearly collided with the front of 
my machine, drew their guns, and would not budge. To 
explain to them my right to pass would have meant sending 
someone to the Foreign Ofl&ce; even then in order to go on 
I might have to run over them, for the Foreign Office, un- 
doubtedly, meant nothing at all to them. I told my com- 
panion not to let them know my position. We tried to 
pass through on the ground that we had business on the 
other side, but they reared their horses up and down, and 
nearly came into the machine with us. We were held up 
until the great man had arrived and had raced from the 
station to his residence. 

When I was with Dr. Wu Ting-fang a few days later the 



CHINA'S BOSSES COME TO PEKING 271 

card of a secretary of the cabinet was brought in. I knew 
that he was trying to induce Doctor Wu to sign a decree dis- 
solving parhament. I had heard in the morning that Presi- 
dent Li had finally caved in; for Chang Hsun's first 
prescription for restoring China was to declare that parlia- 
ment must be dissolved. The President relied on Chang's 
assistance. He could not help himself, he must accept the 
dictation of the man he had summoned. 

I rejoined a friend who awaited me outside in the automo- 
bile. He had just overheard the chauffeur of the cabinet 
secretary and the doorman of the Foreign Office. The chauf- 
feur had said : "Is your old man going to sign up .? You had 
better see to it that he does, else something might happen to 
him." 

These subordinates were keeping their eyes open. 

The Japanese minister, on whom I called that morning, said 
to me: "General Chang's mediation is the last hope of peace. 
It is desirable that parliament be gotten rid of, it is obstruct- 
ive, and makes the doing of business well-nigh impossible." 

Dr. Wu Ting-fang stood out against countersigning the 
mandate that would dissolve the parliament. In matters of 
spiritualism, vegetarianism, and longevity, I had perhaps not 
always been able to take him quite seriously. But I admired 
his quiet courage in not allowing himself to be bowled over, 
after even President Li had given in. Before daylight on 
the 13th of June Doctor Wu was roused from his bed and 
now asked to countersign a Presidential mandate designating 
the jovial General Chiang Chao-tsung, commander of the 
Peking gendarmerie, to act as Premier, and accepting Doctor 
Wu's resignation. Before daybreak General Chiang signed 
the mandate dissolving parliament. The President con- 
sented to its issue, for he had been told it would be impossible 
to prevent disturbances in Peking unless this were done. 

So wore on the early summer of 1917. Affairs seemed to 
have arrived at a stalemate. 



CHAPTER XXIII 
AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY 

My family had gone to Peitaiho for the summer. I was 
staying at the residence alone with Mr. F. L. Behn, who had 
recently come to Peking to join my staff. I slept rather late 
on Sunday, July ist, as the morning was cool. When Kao, 
the first boy, came in to take orders he appeared excited and 
cried: "Emperor has come back again!" 

I did not immediately grasp the significance of this aston- 
ishing announcement; but he went on volubly telling me that 
it was true, that the Emperor had returned, that all the 
people were hanging out the yellow dragon flag. I sent out 
for information and soon learned that the little emperor, in 
some mysterious way, had been restored during the night. 

The monarchical movement came as a complete surprise 
to everybody, for it was entirely the personal act of General 
Chang Hsun. The men whose names were recited in his 
proclamations as assisting him had known nothing about it; 
it was undreamed of even by those who found themselves 
forced to assist, such as the Chief of Staff and the heads of 
the gendarmerie and of the police. 

Kang Yu-wei, the "Modern Sage" of China, arrived in 
Peking on June 29th, and with him the restoration was 
planned. Kang Yu-wei, who had been the leader of the 
first reform movement in 1898, when he made a stand against 
absolutism, had always remained a consistent believer in 
constitutional monarchy. He encouraged Chang Hsun with 
philosophical theory, and wrote all his edicts for him. The 
two believed that the Imperial restoration would immediately 
bring to the active support of the Government all the military 

2^^ 



AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY 273 

governors, whose true sentiments were notoriously imperial- 
istic. Their consent was taken for granted, and the edicts, 
as drawn up, expressly assumed that it had been given. 

It became known to me that Chang Hsun had also dis- 
cussed the possibility of an Imperial restoration with the 
Japanese minister. The latter expressed the opinion that 
the movement should not be undertaken without first making 
sure of the assent of the chief military leaders. Chang Hsun 
had no doubt of this support; he evidently regarded the ad- 
vice of the Japanese minister as encouraging, and believed 
that his movement would have diplomatic countenance. 

Chang Hsun had his intimate advisers, particularly Kang 
Yu-wei, draw up the requisite Imperial edicts on the 30th of 
June. In these it was stated that leading governors, like 
Feng Kuo-chang, Lu Yung-ting, and others of equal promi- 
nence, had petitioned for the restoration of the monarchy. 
Lists of appointments to the highest positions in the Central 
Government and the provinces were prepared. The existing 
military governors were in most cases reappointed. In the 
Central Government the important men designated were Hsu 
Shih-chang as Guardian of the Emperor, Liang Tun-yen as 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Chu Chi-pao as Minister of 
the Interior. Wang Shih-chen was retained as Chief of the 
General Staff. 

As an amazing instance of how consent was taken for 
granted, it was recited in an Imperial edict that President 
Li Yuan-hung had himself petitioned for the reestablishment 
of the Empire; this edict appointed Li a duke of the first 
class. 

So soon as these edicts were prepared and ready for 
presentation, a dinner was arranged for the evening of the 
same day, to which the heads of the Peking military and 
police establishments were invited. They met at the Kiang- 
su Guild Hall. After great quantities of wine had been 
consumed, Chang Hsun broached his project for the sal- 



274 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

vation of China, stating that all preparations had been made 
and that miHtary and diplomatic support was assured. 
Then, pointing to the Chief of Staff, he said : "Of course, you 
are supporting the movement." 

General Wang, completely taken aback, saw no way to 
refuse — since he was in the presence of an accomplished fact. 
In the same way the consent of General Chiang, head of the 
gendarmerie, and of General Wu, head of the police, was 
obtained. 

Thus the enterprise was launched. Chang Hsun directed 
General Wang and four others to proceed immediately to 
the residence of President Li, to wake him up, and to obtain 
his consent to a memorial asking for reestabHshment of the 
monarchy. Chang Hsun himself proceeded to the Imperial 
City. Not being able to obtain the support of the Imperial 
dukes for his movement, he had lavishly bribed the eunuchs 
in charge of the palace, who opened the gates for him and his 
retinue, and took him to the private residence of the young 
Emperor. Chang Hsun prostrated himself, and informed 
the Emperor that the whole nation demanded his return to 
the throne. Thereupon he took the frightened boy to the 
great throne room, and, in the presence of his retainers and 
members of the Imperial Family, who had been summoned, 
formally enthroned the Emperor. Then the edicts which 
had been prepared were formally sealed. 

As may be imagined, there were some comic incidents. 
A rather distinguished man had been summoned by the 
Premier to discuss with the President his assumption of one 
of the cabinet portfoHos. A Chinese friend of mine who had 
just heard of the restoration saw him at the hotel about ten 
o'clock in the morning. On being asked what was his 
errand in Peking, the distinguished personage stated con- 
fidentially that he was awaiting a carriage to take him to the 
President's palace. "There is no President," he was told. 
"This is now an Empire; the Emperor was enthroned at four 



AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY 275 

o'clock this morning." The great man's astonishment was 
amusing. 

As the mihtary chiefs were deceived on the preceding night, 
so Peking was deceived for one day. As the news spread, the 
population showed an almost joyous excitement. Every- 
where the yellow dragon flags appeared, soon the entire city 
took on a festive appearance. Revived memories of past 
splendour seemingly made the population of Peking im- 
periahst to a man. But the height of this movement was 
reached as early as the morning of the 2nd of July. 

I had avoided receiving General Chang Hsun. Mr. 
Liang Tung-yen came to assume office as Minister for Foreign 
Affairs; I also abstained from seeing him, as well as the rest 
of General Chang's ministers, asking Doctor Tenney to talk 
with those who presented themselves. Mr. Liang had always 
been an imperiahst, and was in high spirits, beHeving that at 
last China was saved. He had been led to beheve that the 
foreign diplomats would readily recognize the restoration. 

Strong doubts as to the character of the movement became 
manifest on Monday, the 2nd of July. Tuan Chi-jui did not 
figure in the Imperial official lists. When asked about this, 
Chang Hsun declared that General Tuan was unimportant, 
having no troops under his command. But Liang Chi-chao 
had been playing cards with friends at about 2 a. m. on the 
fateful night, when the news was telephoned to Tientsin. 
Liang immediately went to General Tuan's residence, where 
the latter was similarly engaged at cards. General Tuan, who 
was thoroughly weary of public affairs, was difficult to rouse; 
he begged to be spared the trouble of thinking of what might 
be occurring in Peking. More details came in, and it be- 
came apparent what a thoroughly one-man affair the move- 
ment was. Then Tuan roused himself. 

Tuan was at that time actually only a private citizen, 
without authority or command. But I learned later that 
Liang Chi-chao had gone to Japanese friends for funds to 



276 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

enlist the military against the Imperial movement, and he 
got 1,000,000 yen as a loan to himself and General Tuan for 
this purpose. It was to be treated as a government loan 
upon restoration of normal conditions. 

The two proceeded on Tuesday to Machang, where the 
Eighth Division had been encamped since the attempt to 
overawe President Li Yuan-hung. General Tuan, it was 
stated, felt nervous as to the outcome of his venture, but he 
called the commanders, declaring that he had always been 
opposed to a restoration of the monarchy, and that it was 
now being attempted by a single general. To resist this act 
he proposed to take command of the republican troops. 

General Tuan was at once recognized as commander-in- 
chief. President Li, on his part, did not yield to the impor- 
tunities of Chang Hsun. He gave out an absolute denial of 
the statement that he favoured the restoration. After 
issuing a mandate that turned over the Presidential powers 
to the Vice-President and appointed General Tuan Chi-jui 
Premier and Commander-in-Chief, he took refuge in the 
Legation Quarter. I sent a personal representative to 
General Tuan at Tientsin, who declared that he already had 
complete control of the military isituation and could finish 
Chang Hsun inside of ten days. 

As hostilities threatened in and around Peking, and as the 
danger of looting was always present, I discussed the pre- 
cautions to be taken with several of my colleagues, and 
agreed with the Japanese minister that we would each bring 
a company of reinforcements from Tientsin. Meanwhile, 
the movements of Tuan's troops began. To hinder their 
advance, Chang Hsun's men broke the railway at a point 
about one third of the way from Peking to Tientsin. 

Certain members of the diplomatic corps urged that we 
give notice that no fighting should take place on or near the 
railways. As we had made no objection to the bringing in of 
Chang Hsun's troops and to their being stationed in Peking 



AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY 277 

and along the railway, I took the position that we were not 
justified in objecting to the troops of the government to which 
we were accredited taking necessary action against Chang 
Hsun. We might, however, insist upon the right of keeping 
the railway open. This met with approval. On the 5th of 
July a demand was made upon the belligerent generals that 
the railway must be kept open, and that at least one train 
be allowed to pass in each direction every day. 

The damaged line was reconstructed, and on July 6th, the 
American infantry arrived in Peking; on the 7th, the first 
trains travelled between Peking and Tientsin — one train 
actually passing between the armies during a battle. Fight- 
ing went on during these days between the troops of General 
Tuan, directly commanded by General Tuan Chi-kwei, and 
Chang Hsun's forces; there was much firing but small loss of 
life, and the latter 's forces were finally driven back toward 
Peking. The troops of General Tsao Kun also advanced 
upon Peking from the west. 

Mr. Grant, of the National Printing Bureau, on Friday 
rushed into the legation compound in his automobile, with 
the report that looting was going on in the southern part of 
the city. We ascended the wall. From the Chenmen 
Tower we saw excited groups moving up and down the main 
streets, but nothing was happening save the bringing in of a 
few wounded men. To investigate the cause of the excite- 
ment I went with Mr. Belin in our private rickshaws to the 
Chinese city, passing to the end of the broad Chenmen 
thoroughfare. The street was still crowded, the people 
were excited though well behaved; the shops all had their 
shutters up. Near the south end of the street some shop- 
keepers posted in front of their shops told us that the return 
of Chang Hsun's troops from outside the walls had been 
reported. Looting had been expected but had not taken 
place. We proceeded to the Temple of Heaven, where great 
crowds were walking about among the tents of the troops. 



278 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

On returning, we entered a shop to look at some antiques, 
remaining half an hour. When we came out our rickshaws 
had disappeared. Doctor Ferguson joined us as we searched 
for our men. Suddenly, Belin shouted to a rickshaw man, 
who with a dozen others was conveying some of Chang 
Hsun's petty officers southward. We insisted that the non- 
commissioned officer occupying the rickshaw get out, and 
he finally complied. 

The rickshaws had been requisitioned by these bandits. 
Upon our return to the Legation, my rickshaw-runner had 
just arrived, excited to the point of tears. Our two coolies 
had drawn the men who originally commandeered them up 
to the Imperial City; there they were requisitioned again 
to convey other men back to the Temple of Heaven. But 
my man, when opposite the entrance to Legation Street, had 
upset his bandit into the road and made a quick entry into 
the Legation Quarter, where the angry and sputtering 
trooper dared not follow him. That the rickshaws belonging 
to foreigners should thus be pressed into service shows the 
disregard which these troopers had for everything but their 
own desires. 

As we returned to the Legation we noticed a wonderful 
colour effect. Coal-black clouds were banked against the 
western sky, above which were lighter clouds or angry shreds 
of flaming colour. Against this the dark walls and towers of 
Peking stood out in sharp relief. In the streets the crowds 
still surged, in restless expectancy. Suddenly the sunset 
light disappeared; the sky became black with clouds; a 
sharp gust of wind whirled the dust of the Chinese city 
northward; then came a flash of lightning, a clap of thunder, 
and a heavy downpour, which cooled the excited heads and 
drove all to shelter. The late afternoon had been weird and 
fantastic, and appeared to presage the happening of still 
stranger things. 

I was lunching with a friend at his race-course house on 



AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY 279 

Sunday, the 8th of July, when word was brought to me that 
a certain Colonel Hu, coming from Chang Hsun, had per- 
suaded the French minister that the city was in imminent 
danger of sacking, fighting, and general disturbances. The 
only salvation, Colonel Hu had said, lay in asking Hsu 
Shi-chang to come from Tientsin to mediate. The French 
minister thereupon induced his Entente colleagues to agree 
to transmit a note to General Tuan Chi-jui urging him to 
prevail upon Hsu Chi-chang to come as mediator. This 
seemed to me ill-advised. It meant, at a time when Chang 
Hsun was already as good as defeated, that he would be 
solemnly treated as entitled to dictate the terms and per- 
sonnel of mediation by influential members of the diplomatic 
corps. I returned to Peking and saw my colleagues, urging 
my opinion strongly. The British charge withdrew his con- 
sent; he had just received a telegram from his consul in Tien- 
tsin reporting that General Tuan was absolutely opposed to 
mediation. The action contemplated was not taken, though 
Chang Hsun persisted in his attempts to gain recognition 
from the diplomatic corps. The French minister, who 
hated Dr. Wu Ting-fang — this would explain his support 
of Chang Hsun — gradually came to see the obverse side of 
his policy as certain Germanic affiliations of Chang Hsun 
became known. 

Kang Yu-wei presented himself at my house on the 8th, 
seeking refuge, and I assigned him rooms in one of our com- 
pounds. He informed me that Chang Hsun had had full 
assurances of support on the part of Hsu Chi-chang and 
other important monarchists. Next day he informed me 
that Prince Tsai Tze was anxious to consult me. 

I arranged to have the Prince come to the house assigned 
to Mr. Kang, where I had two hours' conversation with the 
Manchu and the sage. Kang Yu-wei commenced with a long 
disquisition on the advantages of a constitutional monarchy. 
He wished to explain his action and to prove to me that he 



28o AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

! 

was not a reactionary, but was aiming only for progress under 
the monarchical form, which he considered most suitable to 
China. 

All this time the Prince was silent. He seemed greatly 
depressed, not inclined to say anything at first. After in- 
quiries about his health, I asked him what he would like to 
say to me. With eyes of real sadness he looked me full in 
the face, saying: "What shall we do? My house has been 
drawn into this affair without our consent. It has been 
forced on us. We did not wish to depart from the agree- 
ments we had made with the Republic. But Chang Hsun 
would not Hsten to us. He thought he saw the only way. 
Now what shall we do?" 

I told him that I appreciated the difficulty in which the 
Imperial Family found itself, but that I of course could not 
'know the details of the situation sufficiently to give any 
opinion. One thing, however, seemed to me certain : if the 
leaders of the republican government knew the true attitude 
of the Imperial Family, and if the Emperor would formally 
and absolutely dissociate himself from the movement of 
Chang Hsun, I believed that they would not make the 
Imperial Family suffer. I asked him whether they had con- 
sidered having the Emperor issue a decree, absolutely and 
for all time renouncing all rights to the throne and declar- 
ing his complete fealty to the Republic. 

The Prince regarded me aghast. "Oh, no ! No matter 
how desirable that might be from many points of view, it 
is not in the power of the Emperor to do it. The rights he 
has inherited are not his. They came to him in trust from 
his ancestors. He will have to maintain them, and hand 
them on to his descendants. He, and we of his family, shall 
not do anything to make these rights prevail against the 
State, but as the sons of our ancestors, we cannot repudiate 
them." 

Never had I been so deeply impressed with the complexity 



AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY 281 

of Chinese affairs as by this answer — an Imperial family 
maintaining traditions of empire in the midst of a republic, 
an emperor continuing to reside in the Irnperial Palace, a 
neighbour of the republican President in his residence, and 
yet no desire to enter again into politics and to grasp the 
sovereign power! I could now understand why the Chinese 
had allowed the Emperor to remain in the palace; it was the 
house of his ancestors, from which he might not be driven. 
That common reverence was the one point of understanding 
between Chinese and Manchus. 

Prince Tsai Tze evidently still hoped that Hsu Shih- 
chang, the loyal friend of the Imperial Family, might be 
brought to Peking to mediate, and that he might be prevailed 
upon to preserve the favourable treatment hitherto accorded 
the Imperial Family. I could not give Prince Tsai Tze any 
encouragement on this point, on which I had very definite 
opinions, but had to content myself with general expressions 
of sincere sympathy with the strange fate of this family. 

The question of mediation was again taken up by the 
diplomatic corps on the afternoon of this day. Some of 
the ministers feared that the city would suffer greatly if 
things should be allowed to go on. I was strongly of the 
opinion that our interference in this matter could have no 
good result, but would only further confuse and complicate 
the situation. For once, the Chinese must settle it them- 
selves, regardless of any incidental inconvenience. From 
what I knew of the strength of the contending forces and of 
the whole situation, I Had no doubt whatsoever that if left 
alone the republican forces would be easily successful and 
that there would be no disturbances. I was on principle 
against any action which would be in substance intervening 
in behalf of a general who had attacked the RepubUc and 
whom nothing could now save from overthrow except such 
diplomatic action. 

I was approached on the loth of July by a representative 



282 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

of General Chiang, chief of the gendarmerie. He stated 
that it was desired to bring Chang Hsun into the American 
Legation, for his own safety though against his will, and that 
an agreement to this effect had been made among the 
different commanders. I stated that in the circumstances 
it would be better for the diplomatic corps to discuss what 
protection could be extended to Chang Hsun. An informal 
meeting was held, at which the British charge agreed that 
he would receive Chang Hsun if he were brought in. 

The legations were notified by General Tuan, late in the 
afternoon of July i ith, that during the night the troops would 
move against Chang Hsun's forces in the city, and bombard- 
ment of the Temple of Heaven and the quarters near the 
Imperial Cityheld byChang Hsunwould begin at dawn on the 
1 2th of July. In conjunction with the commandant of the 
legation guard, I sent notice to the American residents in 
the quarters particularly affected, directing them to seek 
safety. Eighteen refugees came to the Legation, where they 
were cared for during the day at the Students' Mess. A 
company of the Fifteenth Infantry, which had been brought 
up from Tientsin, was encamped in the compound in front of 
my residence, to which their tents and military equipment 
imparted an aspect of great military preparedness. 

I was awakened at daybreak on July 12th by the sound of 
artillery and rifle fire. As the fighting commenced people 
went out of curiosity upon the city wall. But stray bullets 
frequently fell on the wall, and the commandant ordered 
it cleared. Unfortunately, several of these onlookers — 
among them three Americans — ^were injured. During the 
battle I received word from the Imperial tutors that the 
Dowager Empresses were preparing to bring the Emperor to 
my residence. Since the 9th of July they had wished to re- 
move the Emperor to this legation for safety. While the 
Empresses and some of the dukes desired this, the eunuchs 
under Chang Hsun's influence opposed the removal. The 



AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY 283 

Prince Regent, also influenced by Chang Hsun, took the 
same view. Thus on various occasions the eunuchs, whose 
existence had almost been forgotten, came out on the 
stage of action in this curious affair. 

About eleven o'clock, while the firing was at its height and 
after several bombs had been dropped from aeroplanes upon 
the Imperial City, telephone messages came to the effect that 
several friends of the Imperial Family and Doctor Ferguson 
of the Red Cross were about to rescue the Emperor from 
danger and bring him to the Legation. I had the house 
prepared. Half an hour later two automobiles with the Red 
Cross flag flying entered the legation compound. Mr. Belin 
ran to the door, expecting to see the Emperor and Empress 
emerging from the automobiles, but he returned with only 
Mr. Sun Pao-chi, who was shivering with excitement. I 
took him to the reception room and comforted him with tea. 
He still expected the Emperor to come. The automobiles 
left again for the Imperial Palace, but as the aeroplanes had 
ceased dropping bombs and the artillery fire was decreasing 
in violence, the people in the palace decided against carrying 
out the flight. 

As I sat in the library all through the forenoon receiving 
reports and giving directions, there was a constant hissing 
of bullets and shells overhead. No shell dropped in our 
legation, although two or three fell in the British. The 
Chinese artillery fire was remarkably accurate. Sitting 
there and listening to the tumult of shouting and firing from 
the Chenmen gate and the volleys of guns and artillery 
exceeding in volume of sound any Fourth of July I had ever 
experienced, I felt thankful to have seen a day when the 
Chinese would stand up and fight out a big issue. I soon 
found that the battle was not commensurate with its sound. 

Shortly before noon Chang Hsun was brought to the 
Dutch Legation, accompanied by a German employe of the 
Chinese pohce. Chang Hsun had been persuaded to come 



284 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

by his generals almost with the use of force. He was still 
under the illusion that he could mediate. When the Dutch 
minister informed him that this was impossible, he wished 
to return to his troops. This, of course, could not be per- 
mitted. 

Firing was violent from dawn until nearly noon. The 
field guns, machine guns, and rifles filled the air with enor- 
mous tumult, but from eleven o'clock on the firing gradually 
diminished, and it entirely ceased at four in the afternoon. 
Immediately thereafter I proceeded by motor car to the 
various centres of fighting. I found that Chang Hsun's 
house had been struck by several shells and that the indirect 
artillery firing of the government troops had been managed 
with considerable accuracy. The human dead had already 
been removed from the neighbourhood although numerous 
carcasses of horses remained. Thence I proceeded to the 
Temple of Heaven, where I was astonished to find Chang 
Hsun's troops encamped with all their guns and artillery, 
eating, drinking, and talking in the best of spirits. They 
told me that five of their men had been killed, and that their 
bodies were still there. The absence of visible results from 
the enormous expenditure of ammunition during the day was 
astonishing. I found, however, that the method of fighting 
employed by the troops was to creep up as closely as possible 
behind a high wall, and fire into the air in the general direc- 
tion where the enemy might be. Hence, the bystanders 
were in rather greater danger than the combatants them- 
selves. In fact, the total number of killed as a result of 
the fighting of July 12th was twenty-six; seventy-six were 
seriously wounded, and more than half of these were ci- 
vilians. 

The Chang Hsun contingents in the Temple of Heaven had 
hoisted the republican flag at 10 a. m. An agreement was 
reached by which they were to be paid ^60 per man upon the 
delivery of their arms. Chang Hsun's troops about the 



AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY 285 

Imperial City held out for a larger payment. To my as- 
tonishment, as late as Saturday, the 14th of July, I saw fully 
armed soldiers of Chang Hsun on guard at the central police 
headquarters. Asking the reason for this — for Chang Hsun's 
troops were supposedly routed in pitched battle on the 12th 
of July — I was told that the commanders had not yet 
settled upon the sum these contingents were to be paid. 
Eighty dollars per man was finally agreed upon, and by the 
15th of July Chang Hsun's troops, deprived of their arms 
and their pigtails, had left Peking with their money, and were 
on their way to their rural homes in Shantung. 

The dragon flags disappeared on the 12th of July as 
suddenly as they had appeared on the 2nd. The city quickly 
resumed its ordinary life. 

The swift failure of Chang Hsun's enterprise was due to no 
inherent weakness of monarchical sentiment in north China. 
In fact, monarchist leanings among the northern military 
party are quite well known. It had been assumed that 
such a movement would be launched, and, if it had been 
more prudently planned and prepared, it might easily have 
succeeded, at least for a time. Its total failure was due to 
the fact that Chang Hsun, counting on monarchist ten- 
dencies among the northern military men, neglected to make 
those preparatory negotiations which would have turned the 
potential support into real strength. While this is true, 
there can be no doubt that Chang Hsun's failure gave an 
enormous setback to the cause of monarchism in China. 
After two failures to reestablish the empire, ambitious men 
will think many times before embarking on such a venture 
again. Which is to say that the efforts to restore the 
Empire actually served to entrench more deeply the re- 
publican form of government. 



CHAPTER XXIV 
WAR WITH GERMANY: READJUSTMENTS 

"It has been decided by the Chinese Government to 
declare war; on this very day the decision has been formally 
adopted by the cabinet." 

Thus General Tuan Chi-jui, then Premier, conveyed to me 
on the 2nd of August the news of China's further entrance 
into world politics. I had known about this from other 
sources. General Tuan had announced it as his policy when 
I visited him on the 14th of July. He had then stated that 
Vice-President Feng Kuo-cheng would assume the functions 
of President, which President Li would relinquish, and that 
it would be a war government. 

The American Government had held to its view that China 
should not be pressed to declare war. It believed that the 
breaking off of diplomatic relations, for the time being, was 
sufficient contribution to our cause in the war. But the 
Japanese, aided especially by the French, had strongly urged 
the Chinese Government to join them. Not until much 
later did the Chinese learn of secret treaties made between 
France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, giving assurance to 
the Japanese that no effective resistance would be offered by 
those powers to anything which Japan might desire in China 
at the end of the war. 

In their ignorance of these secret arrangements, the 
Chinese thought that association with the war powers would 
put them on the footing of an ally. Also, doubtless, the 
militarist party surrounding Tuan hoped to increase its 
power through war activities. For my part, I allowed the 
Chinese to feel that the American Government, desiring 

286 



WAR WITH GERMANY: READJUSTMENTS 287 

them to decide this question according to their own best 
judgment, hoped that a way might be found to bring the 
war situation into harmony with justice to China. 

When he announced the cabinet's decision, Premier Tuan 
took up with me the matter of finance. He evidently 
expected that the American Government, or the Consortium, 
together with independent banks, would now furnish China 
the money needed for her war preparations. The powers 
were considering what assurances to offer. In previous 
discussions with Chinese officials I had repeatedly dwelt on 
the fact that should China take this step, she would be 
entitled to specific and strong assurances from the powers 
guaranteeing her political and administrative integrity, in 
terms that could not easily be evaded in future. I had made 
continued efforts to effect an agreement upon a declaration 
favourable to the full maintenance of the sovereign rights 
of China. My conversations with the Japanese minister 
during 1916 and 1917 had this in view. Now that China 
was considering entry into the war, I again suggested the 
desirability of such a declaration, and hinted to the Chinese 
officials that they might be successful upon this occasion in 
obtaining a statement which would fortify the sovereign 
rights of China and prevent the further growth of special 
privileges and spheres of influence. 

My colleagues all appeared to be favourable to the idea. 
It would undoubtedly have been possible for the Chinese 
Government to secure such a specific and effective decla- 
ration. Instead, however, of taking advantage of the po- 
sition which their readiness to declare war gave them, and 
boldl}^ proposing such a declaration as a necessary condition, 
they became tangled up in long discussions. The substance 
originally proposed was worn down to a rather empty 
formula. 

The first proposal was that the governments should de- 
clare their policy to "favour the independent development of 



288 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

China, and in no way to seek in China, either singly or 
jointly, advantages of the nature of territorial or preferential 
rights, whether local or general." The Chinese had sug- 
gested, in addition, a statement that the other governments 
would accord to China their full assistance, in order to "help 
it obtain the enjoyment of the advantages resulting from the 
equality of powers in their international relations." As 
finally adopted, the declaration simply gave assurance of 
friendly support in "allowing China to benefit in its inter- 
national relations from the situation, and from the regard due 
a great country." Vague and unmeaning as it was, the 
latter term was undoubtedly flattering to Chinese amour 
propre. These assurances were given to China on August 
14th, and the United States participated in them. 

China's internal political situation had not improved 
greatly as a result of the overthrow of the monarchical move- 
ment. On his return to Peking as restorer of the repubhcan 
government, General Tuan had the chance to rally all ele- 
ments in Chinese politics to a policy of constructive action. 
With whom would he ally himself? As his distrust of the 
Kuo Min Tang was great, he constituted his new govern- 
ment without regard to that party, and sought instead to 
govern through a combination of the Chin Pu Tang and the 
so-called Communications Party. Of the latter the real 
leaders, Liang Shih-yi and his immediate associates, were still 
living in exile under the mandate issued by President Li. 
Mr. Tsao Ju-lin controlled the new wing of the Communi- 
cations Party, and he had a disproportionate prominence 
through Japanese support. Both he and Liang Chi-chao, 
the leader of the Chin Pu Tang, were under the Japanese 
thumb. This influence could thus act strongly and ex- 
tensively on Chinese affairs. It was a Japanese loan that 
had facilitated the overthrow of Chang Hsun and made the 
leadership of General Tuan possible. 

These two factions, while they supported General Tuan, 



WAR WITH GERMANY: READJUSTMENTS 289 

were mutually antagonistic. Mr. Liang Chi-chao is a liter- 
ary man and a theorist. Long befriended by the Japanese, 
he doubtless believed himself to be a patriotic Chinese who 
was ready to use Japanese aid, but would not surrender any 
essential national rights. Not being a man of affairs, he 
may not always have seen the bearing upon the ultimate 
independence of China of the measures which he proposed. 
Some Chinese as well as foreigners thought him merely the 
venal instrument of Japan; others regarded him as es- 
sentially honest, but subject to being misled because of his 
theories. As Minister of Finance, his administration tended 
to bring about a great increase of Japanese influence in 
China. 

Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, cynical, practical-minded, and keen, is a 
different type of man. He was closely associated with Mr. 
Lu Tsung-yu, himself the most pliable instrument of Japa- 
nese policy in China. Mr. Tsao was educated in Japan; one 
or more of his wives were Japanese, and in business and pleas- 
ure he was constantly in Japanese company. He was out- 
spokenly skeptical about his own country and about re- 
publican institutions. 

The Government felt dependent upon assistance from 
abroad, for it had financial difficulties due to inherited 
burdens and present military expenses. It was made to 
believe that assistance could come only from the Japanese. 
The Americans had left the Consortium four years ago; they 
had every opportunity to interest themselves in China, but 
they had done nothing substantial beyond the loan of the 
Chicago bank. In China, the margin between tolerable 
existence and financial stress is so narrow that a few 
million dollars may wield an enormous influence for good 
or bad. 

These needs were accentuated because the southern 
republicans were holding aloof. They felt themselves 
excluded from the Government; they doubted General 



290 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Tuan's honesty of purpose, and they planned to remain 
independent of the central authorities. From Shanghai 
Mr. C. T. Wang, the most prominent of the younger re- 
publicans, wrote that Tuan Chi-jui and his cabinet repre- 
sented the reactionary element; that they were strongly 
backed by undesirable foreign influence, and that the latter 
would virtually control the Government. He ascribed to 
General Tuan the ambition of paving the way to make him- 
self emperor. The opposition to Tuan, he said, would 
continue the fight until the Chinese Republic was indeed a 
republic. As to American action in China, he noted that 
America plays the game as a gentleman, therefore it is 
Ukely to be outmanoeuvred by another country less squeam- 
ish about its methods. Another letter from Mr. C. C. Wu, 
dated July 19, 1917, I will give textually, in part: 

. . . When General Tuan arrived at the head of his troops in Peking, 
he had a good opportunity to gain the goodwill and cooperation of the 
whole country if he had proclaimed his adherence to the constitution at 
present in force, and to reassemble the dissolved parliament in order that 
the Permanent Constitution may be completed and the organization of the 
future parliament provided for; in other words, that the basis for a legal 
and constitutional government may be found. Unfortunately, other 
counsels seem to have prevailed. Another assembly, without any sem- 
blance of legality, is to be convened and the future regulation of the Re- 
public is to be left in its hands. This will only mean fresh internal dissen- 
sion and strife. It is to be admitted that there is much fault to be found 
with the old parliament, but as I once told General Tuan, it is the name, 
the signboard, of parliament that we must respect. . . . 

Meanwhile, the papers are full of the inquiry which the Entente Powers 
are alleged to have made in regard to the declaration of war against Ger- 
many, and the reply made by the Waichiao Pu that the step will be taken 
almost immediately. Now, it is unnecessary to tell you of my opinion in 
regard to this question ever since the interview we had on that fateful 
Sunday in February, of my firm conviction of the many advantages, both 
material and moral, that such a step would confer on China, nor of the 
efforts I have exerted in the cause. And my week's stay in Shanghai has 
not altered my opinion. At the same time I agree witircly with the vi«w 



WAR WITH GERMANY: READJUSTMENTS 291 

expressed in the note you recently presented to the Waichiao Pu on behalf 
of your government to the effect that the paramount need of the moment 
is the consolidation of the country and the establishment of an effective 
and responsible government, and that, compared with this, the demarche 
against Germany, desirable though it is, is of secondary importance. In- 
deed, it is nothing short of ridiculous to declare war against a foreign power 
when every man and every resource has to be kept in hand to meet possible 
civil strife and when the authority of the Central Government is effective 
in only a doubtful half of the country. It is difficult to see what benefit 
the Entente Powers expect to derive by urging such a government to take 
such a step, a step which is detrimental to the best interests of China and 
contrary to the good advice tendered by the U. S., with whom Great 
Britain, at least, associated herself. It is enough to make one almost sus- 
pect that it is for these very two reasons that the war measure is being 
urged on the Government. 

Quite plainly, the southern leaders believed that the party 
of General Tuan was in its war policy animated with the 
purpose of building up its power at the expense of the rest 
of the country — particularly of subduing the southern re- 
publicans. Even less unselfish purposes were attributed to 
those who based their policy on foreign financial support. 
In a speech in Parliament, Senator Kuang Yen-pao makes 
the officials who contract ill-advised public loans say: "We 
are planning for the conservation of the property of our 
sons and grandsons; why should we have compunctions 
about driving the whole people to the land of death ? What 
matters the woe of the whole nation by the side of the joy 
and happiness of our own families.?" But the southern 
leaders did not disavow the act of the Central Government 
in declaring war. Their political opposition continued; but 
they accepted the international action of Peking as binding 
on the whole country. 

In such matters China has not the hard-and-fast ideas of 
sovereign authority and legality which reign in the West. 
It was therefore possible for a local government to be inde- 
pendent in most matters, and yet to allow itself to be guided 



292 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

by the central authority in some. A declaration of inde- 
pendence by no means implies that there are no relationships 
whatever between the recalcitrant ones and the central 
authorities. For this reason, too, the visit of a foreign 
representative to any one of the governors who had declared 
his independence would not, as in other countries, be re- 
garded as an affront to the Central Government. Circum- 
stances might occur under which the Central Government 
itself might favour such a visit, as incidentally relieving the 
strain. I felt quite free to send attaches of the Legation to 
the governors of disaffected provinces, and should quite 
freely have gone myself. 

In all my interviews with high officials the prime subject 
was finance. Not that China, as an associate in the war, 
was to get such aid — ^which was taken as a matter of course — 
but how it was forthcoming suppHed the only question. 
Mr. Liang Chi-chao, Minister of Finance, who called on me 
on the 4th of August, talked in favour of a big loan by the 
Consortium. With this he hoped that the United States 
would again associate itself. When he spoke of independent 
American loans, I called his attention to the difficulty of 
concluding them or of calHng up the option under the 
Chicago loan, unless there were a parliament whose authority 
was recognized by the country. Shortly after this I saw the 
Acting President, General Feng. "China," he said — un- 
doubtedly to tell me something pleasant, but also because 
all Chinese do prefer association with America — "China has 
followed the United States in the policy of declaring war 
upon Germany. Now will not the United States inde- 
pendently finance China ? Or, if that is out of the question, 
then, surely America will join the Consortium since that is 
the only way the Chinese Government can be safely and 
effectively supported." 

"The republican form of government," he vowed, "is now 
eternally secure in China." I could not but remember his 



WAR WITH GERMANY: READJUSTMENTS 293 

previous monarchist leanings. The Acting President spoke 
of General Tuan. "I have a very cordial understanding 
with the Premier," he assured me. 

I went to the Premier on the 21st of August. In this dis- 
cussion the Chinese iron industry came up. The Premier 
asked: "Why not go ahead with the development of mining 
and iron manufacture.? Create a national Chinese iron 
industry, and it will form the basis of a general loan for 
industrial purposes." He thought, at first, that the Chinese 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce should summon 
experts and start the enterprise. I told him about the 
enormous technical difficulties of such a project. Then he 
seemed to recognize that a contract with an experienced and 
powerful organization, which could be held responsible, 
would be more effective in establishing a national iron 
industry for China. "I am not sure about the ore deposits 
near Nanking," he added; "they may not be included in such 
cooperative enterprises." 

I suspected that he was trying to get financial support from 
another source, and was leaving his hands free to make them 
a grant there. I put in a caveat against any grant of iron ores 
to foreign nationals. Americans had in the past been 
invariably informed that iron deposits could not be leased 
or granted to individuals because they had been reserved 
for national uses. 

I visited General Tuan on August 22nd and found him 
more talkative, more anxious to discuss the general aspects 
of policies than ever before. "We must first of all establish 
the authority of the Central Government," he said; "this can 
be done only through a defeat of the opposition. My 
purpose is that military organization in China be made 
national and unified, in order that the peace of the country 
shall not at all times be upset by local military commanders. 
The military power thus unified I intend to take entirely 
out of politics and confine it to its specific military purposes. 



294 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

At present the military is used in factional and political 
disputes. When this is no longer possible, then we shall leave 
the public mind in civil life entirely free to settle all questions 
of the Constitution and of the public policy.'* 

I believe the Premier was sincere in these views, and in his 
efforts to vindicate the authority of the National Govern- 
ment, but he thought only in terms of military authority. 
He did not realize what the organization of public opinion 
and of a civilian administration require. His opponents feared 
that a consolidated military power would be used by him, 
after all, to accomplish the reestablishment of a military 
dictatorship, such as that of Yuan Shih-kai. 

The personal wisdom and integrity of General Tuan com- 
manded respect, but he was not fortunate in selecting his 
assistants. Both in Peking and in the provinces his im- 
mediate advisers gave him trouble. When he appointed 
General Fu Liang-tso governor of Hunan Province, he 
expected the ready settlement of all difficulties there; 
General Fu would know how to handle the situation. But 
the people of Hunan did not welcome General Fu. Soon his 
authority and that of the Central Government were ques- 
tioned throughout that province. But the Premier never 
disavowed or deserted his representatives. He was loyal to 
them, which accounts for the strong personal influence which 
Tuan enjoyed. 

The country could not be unified, of course, until railways 
were built, and representatives of the Chinese Government 
often approached me to ascertain whether some action could 
not be taken in regard to the Hankow-Canton Railway, long 
delayed in construction. This trunk line would have 
joined the north and south. A trip from Peking to Canton 
by existing routes took from ten days to two weeks: by direct 
railway it should be possible to make it in two days. Not 
only the movement of passengers, but of mail and freight, 
would stimulate an intercourse that would be sure to over- 



WAR WITH GERMANY: READJUSTMENTS 295 

come separatist tendencies. But China had entrusted the 
building of this railway to foreigners, who had played with the 
concession, had lost it, and, after reacquiring part of it, were 
now delaying its execution. Europe was preoccupied with 
the war. And now that China was herself entering the war, 
it seemed a prime need of national preparedness to have this 
comparatively short remaining gap in the communications 
of China filled out. Good friends of America among the 
officials — among them Mr. Pan Fu, Mr. T. C. Sun, the 
managing director of the Siems-Carey railway offices, and 
Mr. J. C. Ho — argued with me, as did their superiors, to 
have America lead in completing this essential highway of 
commerce. 



CHAPTER XXV 
THE CHINESE GO A-BORROWING 

The time was come for China to put money in her purse. 
She was sure she could do it, and sure that the United States, 
her great, rich sponsor and friend, would help her to the 
means commensurate with her needs of development for war. 
A suggestion to this elFect had been made to the Chinese 
minister at Washington by the Department of State. It 
was undreamt of that no assistance whatever could be given 
to China. 

During the fall of 191 7 all my powers were devoted to 
securing for our Far Eastern associate in the war the best 
form of American assistance. I wished to avoid, if possible, 
a loss of the chance for giving Chinese financial affairs a sound 
basis. Above all, it was essential to aid in steering China 
beyond earshot of the financial sirens that were luring her 
upon the Japanese rocks. China invited American leader- 
ship, relied upon it. No other nation in the circumstances 
could justly take exception to it. It involved no vast enter- 
prise of immediately raising a huge army in China, but of 
preparing the way for such mobilization, if need should 
arise. This could be done by facilitating works which would 
endure and which would contribute to the welfare of China 
and the world, war or no war. It meant building means 
of communication and improving the food supply. It 
meant reconstruction after the war. It meant an ex- 
penditure of money that would be infinitesimal compared 
with the sums spent in Europe. America had lent billions 
to the Entente Allies; the hundred millions that would have 
served to make China fit were a mere trifle. Nor was it 

296 



THE CHINESE GO A-BORROWING 297 

necessary to insist upon independent American action in this 
matter. America's leadership in behalf of the common inter- 
est and in cooperation with her associates could produce the 
results desired of putting the situation in the Far East on a 
sound basis. I had always desired American independent 
enterprise in individual cases, free from all entanglements 
and semi-political arrangements with other nations, whose 
favour, fortunately, we did not require. But in the great 
task of the World War joint action with others was natural, 
and action in China, given only positive American leadership, 
could have produced fine results. The war powers did get 
together for some action. They suspended the Boxer 
indemnity payments for China, and she got the benefit of 
the twentieth o^ad valorem duty which the treaties provided; 
on the basis of reckonings two decades back, the 5 per cent, 
had really shrunk to 3. To restore the rate fixed by the 
treaties was hardly a beginning of justice. 

Here was China, ready, wilHng to take her part in the 
war. What should she do ? In America the slogan : " Food 
Will Win the War" was in vogue, and China could furnish 
food. She could supply coolies, millions if necessary, as 
workmen and as soldiers. The war had proved that the 
training of men as soldiers could be a matter, not of years, 
but of months. Plans were drawn up, at first for hundreds 
of thousands of Chinese soldiers, then for half a million. 

I urged my proposals on the State Department. The 
Canton-Hankow Railway needed finishing. The Chinese 
arsenals and shipyards could be refitted. I asked the 
consular officers and attaches for a rapid survey of China's 
food resources; their returns showed that a large surplus 
could be produced, if steps were taken at once to assure a 
market. The Chinese have a genius for growing food; 
among them they have the world's most skilful gardeners. 
But they needed added credit if they were to put in more 
seed and harvest bigger crops. In these estimates Professor 



298 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Tuck of Cornell, who was up in Manchuria, and Professor 
Bailey, in Nanking, gave their expert aid. 

England and her European allies, it was determined, had 
"gone broke"; if there was to be a Consortium of lenders to 
China, would America lead the way? Liang Chi-chao, 
Minister of Finance, proposed it. There was China's public 
credit, with such vast human and material resources as to 
stagger belief, waiting to be organized. There was the 
supreme opportunity to send scattering all of the promoters 
of the unseemly scramble to get special advantages through 
Chinese financial deals. I spared no pains — for four years, 
indeed, I had laboured for this very thing — to impress upon 
America the new vision of a developed China. Two things 
halted action. Outside influences working in America itself 
were aimed to stop the free play of financial enterprise in 
China; next, there was the provincialism of the New York 
financiers. They would only follow where other nations led. 

Then there was the alternative — cooperation between the 
war powers. By hoops and barrages of steel we were bound 
to our brothers of Britain, France, and Italy; Japan was an 
alHed and associated power; at every point our gold and war 
bonds were mingled with theirs. We were powerful enough 
to hold our associates to a policy of developing China for 
the benefit of all participants; an end might be put there to 
"special interests." I suggested a new consortium on this 
basis. 

I went to the Chinese President. "I know," he declared, 
"that America will spare no means whereby China may 
carry out her purpose to stand by the side of the Allies on 
the battlefields of Europe." 

From the President I went to the Premier. By this time 
he was not so friendly. Time had elapsed; the glitter of 
Japanese money had been made to catch his eye. I inquired 
concerning the Japanese loan of 20,000,000 yen, and in- 
cidental arrangements connected therewith. "Does not 



THE CHINESE GO A-BORROWING 299 

China need to keep a credit balance in a foreign country," he 
asked; ''and would not the same arrangements be made with 
the United States if a loan were made there ? " Curiously, he 
added, "There is no need, yet, of convoking parHament; no 
time has been set for it." A militarist leader, he was being 
comforted by hopes of Japanese backing. But he was quite 
willing to send a big army to Europe. 

The Japanese were alive to this situation. Professor 
Hori was sent to lecture on finance before an association 
which Liang Chi-chao had helped form. The theme of his 
opening lecture was the bankruptcy of the Western powers. 
China must rely on Japan for money. Following Hori came 
a commission of ten officials from Tokyo to study Chinese 
financial administration. Then came Doctor Kobayashi to 
act as Japan's expert in China. Prominent posts, it was 
freely said, were to be created for "currency reform," posts 
which would be held by Japanese. Later on Baron Sakatani 
came, to study Chinese finance. 

From Japan came loans and offers of loans. They lent 
10,000,000 yen through the Yokohama Specie Bank. This 
was merely an advance on a future reorganization loan. 
Then a loan, labelled "Industrial," of 20,000,000 yen, was 
made through the Bank of Communications. Two Japanese 
financial chques sprang up and flourished. Liang sat at the 
receipt of customs at the Ministry of Finance, dealing with 
the Yokohama Specie Bank; the other clique, headed by Tsao 
Ju-lin and Lu Tsung-yu, played in with the tri-fold group of 
the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Bank of Chosen, and the 
Bank of Taiwan (Formosa). With the loan dubbed "In- 
dustrial" — this to evade the provisions of the reorganization 
loan — came Japanese advisorships in the Chinese Bank of 
Communications. Not by the remotest chance would the 
loan be used by the bank to strengthen its depreciated notes. 
It went for politics and the military. 

The Japanese financiers coolly calculated that the British 



300 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

and French banks would fail to take up their option on the 
currency reform loan, which they had held since 191 1. That 
would leave the field clear for Japan. The French and Brit- 
ish legations got busy about this, and so did we. As a con- 
sequence the American Government resumed its interest in 
currency reform in China, and the sigh of relief was almost 
audible. I called on Minister Liang. Did he not remember 
the Treaty of 1903 and America's long-continued interest in 
Chinese currency betterment .'' There was the Jenks-Conant 
Monetary Commission; there were the long negotiations 
conducted by Willard Straight, and the resultant Currency 
Loan Agreement of 191 1. *T remember all these things," 
Liang responded; "America should lead in this matter. 
Our banknote issues are being shot to pieces by local issuance 
of worthless paper. The Tuchuns have bent the national 
banks to their purposes. The books of the banks must be 
kept and made public. I suggest appointing three principal 
foreign experts on a reform of the entire currency. Let them 
be an American, a European, and a Japanese." 

The currency loan option was extended until the following 
April. 

But Japan had other shots in her locker. Suddenly the 
Japanese press bristled with news of a projected "arms alli- 
ance" with China. It sounded almost menacing. The 
Tai Hei Company, originally organized by the Japanese 
Government to supply arms to Russia, was going to furnish 
China with her armament. General Tuan said that he had 
long been urged to buy a "limited amount" of war material 
from Japan. The Japanese minister chimed in with the 
statement that, inasmuch as the United States refused to sell 
steel to Japan — under the war trade restriction — the time 
was come for Japan to control China's ore deposits. "Japan 
is to sell China arms. Why may she not have the raw ma- 
terials for them?" he asked. 

The disproportion involved in this demand served to 



THE CHINESE GO A-BORROWING 301 

amuse the Chinese. The deposits on which Japan's eyes 
were fixed amounted to from forty to fifty milHon tons of ore 
— enough to make several guns. 

Along with these negotiations came proposals to establish 
Japanese military and arsenal advisorships. 

I asked the Premier about these reports. I told him we 
could not object to the purchase of arms by China from any 
source whatever. But in negotiations for loans and conces- 
sions the United States had held unswervingly to the princi- 
ple of the "open door" and no special privileges. As it 
sought no control of this kind, it was equally interested that 
none should be given to any other power. 

"Have you not," the Premier asked me, "found me always 
candid and true?" Most sincerely I assured him I had. 

"Then," he replied, "we have bought of Japan 40,000 rifles, 
160 machine guns, and 80 field guns. There will be no in- 
cidental commitments. I can rely implicitly on my mili- 
tary associates [General Hsu Shu-cheng, the Vice-Minister of 
War; Ching Yun-peng, Acting Chief of Staff; and Fu Liang- 
tso, Tuchun of Hunan]. They would not sanction such a 
thing." 

But the next day I got positive evidence that they had. 
The negotiations were in full blast for Japanese military 
advisorships, control of the Nanking Arsenal, and rights to 
specific iron deposits. I saw General Hsu, telling him 
everything before giving him a chance to answer. I was not 
then solely concerned about the encroachment on Chinese 
independence. American and European interests had been 
told: "Hands off the national iron ore reserve; all remaining 
iron deposits are to be held for the nation." Respecting 
this decision, we had told our people that concessions for iron 
ores could not be obtained. We could not in justice to them 
now consent to a change of policy, without protecting our 
interests. Japan had already one half of China's iron ore 
deposits. Was she to get the rest ? Also, were Chinese arma- 



302 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

ments to be standardized without consulting the experts of 
the AlHed Governments, so that the arms might be used in 
the present war? 

"We have been hard pressed," General Hsu explained. 
"The Japanese wished us to do something for them and we 
need the arms. They will be of the larger calibre, such as 
China's armament now has. The Japanese did demand the 
assignment of new ore deposits; they needed security for 
the contract. They compromised by reducing the amount 
of ore we are to furnish. But we must supply it under a 
contract of 191 6, between the Japanese and a company 
formed by Chow Tsu-chi, whereby a million dollars was paid 
in advance on iron ores from deposits near Nanking. This 
is the best we can do. They demanded at first the grant of 
new ore deposits." 

"I should like to visit you more often," General Hsu re- 
marked later; "but my movements are closely watched." 
I stated I hoped he entertained no fear that would keep him 
from seeing the minister of a friendly power at any time he 
wished. 

The real trouble lay in the rivalries between the north 
and south. The Premier and General Hsu were willing to 
barter the nation's birthright in the form of concessions in 
order to impose an internal unity of their own making. For 
China was torn. The situation in October, 191 7 — how 
different from that of April and May, 1915, when the twenty- 
one demands came to their climax! Then the Chinese people 
and Government were united as one man. The sentiment of 
the nation was now the same; nearly all the members of the 
Governmentwere unchanged, yet a small pro-Japanese minor- 
ity were in the saddle. The men who had Japanese funds 
under their control had the advantage over the mass of offi- 
cials. They succeeded in muzzling the Chinese press. By 
Japanese insistence, aided in this case by the French minister 
— some of the Chinese papers had criticized his attitude — 



THE CHINESE GO A-BORROWING 303 

news of diplomatic negotiations had been absolutely sup- 
pressed. Without information, the public was disturbed and 
confused. The editor of the Japanese Kokumin, Mr. Toku- 
tomi, in an interview in Peking, advocated still more stringent 
press control. Japan was using the war to displace the in- 
fluence of her associates in China and to make her own power 
predominant. 

Bad as the situation was it might have been saved by an 
adequate loan from America. Liang's first proposal was for a 
reorganization loan of ^200,000,000, which was vetoed by 
Europe; this shrivelled to the mess of pottage of 10,000,000 
yen offered by the Yokohama Specie Bank. General Hsu had 
unfolded to me in September a comprehensive scheme of 
equipping 500,000 soldiers, and providing for the immediate 
transport of at least 500,000 to Europe; further detachments 
were to go as fast as ships could be had. Later came more 
specific plans for 1,000,000 men, out of which the best contin- 
gents were to be sent to France. It was planned ultimately 
to send the whole million, if needed. Then came a modified 
proposal for outfitting 500,000 men and the completion of 
the industrial plants needed for war materials and ships. 
The European ministers were all anxious to secure China's 
active participation; the French Legation, through its 
military attache, was cooperating with special energy in 
planning for the eventual use of Chinese forces. From my 
conversations with the President, the Premier, and his most 
active assistant, there was no doubt that the Chinese were 
in earnest. Now it was all simmering down to a few millions 
of Japanese money, supplied for politics and internal dis- 
sension, with Japan seeking special advantages. 

Work was to be done. The United States could still bring 
relief and a strong call for united action into this troubled 
situation without giving just cause for complaint or for tak- 
ing offence. The French were especially desirous of bringing 
the Chinese actually into the war. The Belgians wished 



304 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

the mobilization of Chinese material resources, particularly 
foodstufFs. The British were in general accord, though they 
doubted whether Chinese troops could be soon transported 
to the theatre of war. Dr. George Morrison* who had just 
goneoverthewholesituation with the President and cabinet, 
came to me saying: "The Chinese will apply to you for ad- 
vice. You have a freer hand than the British minister.*' 

But an event of profound significance was impending, and 
it interrupted my efforts along these constructive lines. It 
was at this time that the results of Japan's efforts to reach an 
agreement with the State Department in Washington became 
known to China. 



PART IV 
LAST YEAR OF WAR AND AFTERMATH 



CHAPTER XXVI 
THE LANSING-ISHH NOTES 

It was in rather an indirect way that I learned of the secret 
negotiations which had been going on between the head of 
the State Department in Washington and the Japanese 
Government. Since these negotiations concerned some of 
the most vital problems in the whole Chinese situation, it 
was surprising that everyone had been kept in ignorance of 
them. I learned of them, I confess with mingled emotions, 
from none other than Baron Hayashi himself. I called on 
him on the evening of November 4th; and, after going over 
the matter of routine which I had wished to take up with 
him, I remained chatting pleasantly with him. In the course 
of our talk the Baron remarked: "I have just received some 
information that is quite important, and I want you to know 
about it. Let me get the cablegram." 

He brought a paper and handed it over to me without com- 
ment. It was a cablegram from Tokyo that informed him of 
the signing of the Lansing-Ishii notes, and gave a summary 
of their text. The first paragraph contained the vital clause: 
"The Government of the United States recognizes that 
Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part 
to which her possessions are contiguous." This naturally 
struck me in the face with stunning force, before I had time 
to weigh its meaning in relation to the remainder of the 
declaration. I read the dispatch twice and made an effort 
to impress its salient points on my memory, and then 
turned to m.y Japanese colleague attempting to retain my 
composure. 

"Yes," I managed to say, "this is quite interesting. It is 

307 



3o8 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

somewhat in line with conversations we have had, yet differs 
in some respects." 

I forced myself to remain a little longer and tried to con- 
tinue the matter-of-fact conversation which this astounding 
piece of news had interrupted. When I finally took my 
leave, I was uncertain whether Baron Hayashi did or did not 
know that I had been unaware of this exchange of notes. 
Hurrying to the Legation, I dispatched a cablegram to the 
Department asking that I be informed. 

It had been agreed, so the cable from Tokyo had stated, 
that an announcement of the parley should not be given out 
until November 7th. But the Japanese minister had already 
informed the Chinese Foreign Office on Sunday night; and 
early on Monday its representative called to get my version 
of the matter. 

No word had been sent me. It was inexcusable to fail 
to give the local representative the earliest possible informa- 
tion, and I intimated as much in my cablegram to the Secre- 
tary of State. As the Foreign Ofiice had been fully informed, 
I could only state to my visitor that I was not authorized 
to deliver the text until later, and that I was myself still con- 
sidering the full import of the document, which in certain 
respects followed lines of policy that had been discussed in 
the past. 

As I could plainly see, the notes had been paraded in the 
Chinese Foreign Office as yielding important concessions from 
the United States and as a diplomatic triumph for Japan. 
I knew nothing of the motives which had animated the Presi- 
dent and Secretary of State when they agreed to the paper. 
I could not explain its purposes; but when my visitor asked: 
"Does this paper recognize the paramount position of Japan 
in China?" I could and did answer with an emphatic "No." 
Beyond that I said nothing. 

All that day and the next reports streamed in from many 
quarters that the Japanese were "crowing over their vie- 



THE LANSING-ISHII NOTES 309 

tory " in their talks with the Chinese. More Chinese officials 
and many Americans applied at the Legation for authentic 
word. But no help came from the Department of Strte. 
Indeed no word reached me until the morning of the 7th. 

It cannot be said that the American secrecy pledge was not 
punctiliously observed — even to the extent of keeping in 
ignorance the American minister, who would have to bear 
the brunt of the consequences of this diplomatic miSmoeuvre. 
The Japanese, meanwhile, had given the note not only to the 
Chinese Government several days in advance, but — was it 
out of abhorrence for secret diplomacy? — even before the 
notes had been signed their text was communicated to the 
representatives of Great Britain, Russia, France, an Italy. 
This was done at Tokyo. 

It is not surprising that this procedure produced upon the 
Chinese the impression that the Japanese had got v, l\:;t they 
wanted. They thought the declarations made by the United 
States contained admission of a special position held by 
Japan in China, not desired by the latter, but forced through 
by the military and political power of Japan. 

The reception given the note by Far Eastern experts and 
by the public indicated that it would be interpreted in widely 
varying fashion. The first impression only gradually gave 
way to a calmer judgment when the specific terms of the 
notes were carefully read and the ambiguous character of the 
instrument was realized. In the first place, the Japanese 
Legation, in translating for the benefit of the Chinese Minis- 
try, had used for "special interest" a Chinese term which 
implied the idea of "special position." Doctor Tenney's 
more direct translation of the term was without this extra 
shade. The Department authorized me to deliver an ex- 
planatory note to the effect that the interests referred to 
were of an economic, not a political, nature. It referred to 
"Japan's commercial and industrial enterprises in China"; 
these, it added, "manifestly have, on account of the geogra- 



3IO AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

phfcal relation of the two countries, a certain advantage over 
similar enterprises on the part of citizens or subjects of any 
other country.'* 

I could not avoid the feeling that the form which the ex- 
change of notes at Washington had taken was unfortunate. 
It was indeed desirable that the friendly attitude of the 
United States toward all Japan's economic activities in China 
should be stated strongly. This had been the tenor of the 
conversations between successive Japanese ministers and 
myself, which had been communicated to the State Depart- 
ment. It was necessary, if the Japanese really entertained 
it, to disabuse them of the conception that the political in- 
fluence of the United States was being used to discourage 
close business relationships between China and Japan, and 
to frown upon Japanese enterprises in China. On the basis 
of such an understanding, it was hoped that Japan would 
join with the United States in agreeing that special privi- 
leges in any part of China, or any sort of economic advantage, 
would not be sought by political means; that the Manchurian 
regime, to be more specific, would not extend to other parts 
of China. 

But the notes definitely stated that Japan would not use 
her special interests in a way to "discriminate against the 
trade of other nations, or to disregard the commercial rights 
heretofore granted by China in the treaties with other 
powers." This might give rise to the idea that "special 
interests" did not refer merely to specific economic interests 
and enterprises. It might include also a certain political 
influence or preference. 

The Japanese minister, though disclaiming a reading 
which would imply a paramount interest, evidently saw in 
the notes an endorsement of the principle of spheres of in- 
fluence. "The notes speak for themselves," he said in an 
interview on the 8th of November; "they simply again place 
on record the acknowledged attitude of the United States 



THE LANSING-ISHII NOTES 311 

and Japan toward China. They are simply a restatement 
of an old position. Even the term 'special interests' is 
doubtless used in the same sense here as in the past. Several 
other countries have territory that borders on China; this 
fact gives them a special interest in these parts of China 
which they touch. In exactly the same way, Japan has 
special rights in China." 

The non-official Japanese statements claimed much more 
than this. They did "crow over" the Chinese. Was not 
here a vindication of distinct priority enjoyed by Japan in 
China? In Japan the veteran Okuma, who is never back- 
ward in airing his opinions in the press, also seemed to have a 
rather broad idea of the notes. *' Hitherto," he said, 
"America's activities in China were often imprudent and 
thoughtless. For instance. Secretary Knox's proposal to 
neutralize the Manchurian Railway was, indeed, a reckless 
move. The United States also relegated Japan to the back- 
ground when she sent the note of June 7th to China, advising 
that country concerning domestic peace. Thus America 
disregarded Japan's special position in China. We may 
understand that she will not repeat such foHies, in the light 
of the new convention." 

Of course, there is nothing in the notes to Interfere with the 
fullest and freest interchange of communications between the 
American Government and the Chinese, on any topic what- 
ever. 

In reporting his conversation on the notes with the Japa- 
nese Minister for Foreign Affairs before they were signed, the 
Russian ambassador at Tokyo hit it off in this way: "Never- 
theless, I gain the impression from the words of the minister 
that he is conscious of the possibility of misunderstandings, 
also, in the future; but is of the opinion that in such a case 
Japan would have at her disposal better means than the 
United States for carrying into effect her interpretation." 
To show how different people were affected, I shall cite 



312 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

from some letters. Dr. George Morrison wrote to a friend 
from southern China: "Relays of Chinese have thronged 
to see the American consul, all sounding one note — that they 
have been betrayed by America. After all her valiant pro- 
testations, what earthly good did America gain by making 
such a concession to Japan, giving recognition to that which 
every American and Englishman in China had been en- 
deavouring to prevent? Carried to its logical conclusion 
this agreement gives recognition not only to Japan's * special 
interests' in Manchuria, but also to those in Fukien Province 
which lies in 'geographical proximity' to Formosa. Surely 
the British will now claim recognition of similar rights in 
Kwangsi Province. It is all very deplorable." 

Another Britisher, Mr. W. H. Donald, took a different 
view. "When I saw the notes," he wrote, "I was delighted, 
because I read into them the fact that America had, to use 
an Americanism, 'put one over' Japan. Ishii went to Amer- 
ica to get acquiescence in Japan's predominance in China; 
to get America to admit Japan's hegemony of the Pacific. 
He got neither. Instead, he had to reaffirm adherence to the 
previous undertakings — undertakings which were discarded 
when Japan put in her twenty-one demands." 

The Chinese papers generally pronounced the notes incon- 
sistent. The Chung Htia Hsin Pao saw no need for having 
the "special interests" of Japan particularly recognized any 
more than those of other nations, like Great Britain, France, 
Russia, and the United States, all of which have territory 
adjacent to China. The paper thought that the assurance 
that Japan seeks no special rights or privileges, should be 
taken at its face value when the point of the whole agreement 
was the recognition of "special interests" enjoyed by Japan. 
The tenor of the note, therefore, appeared to favour "special 
interests," consequently the division of China into spheres of 
influence — contrary to the traditional policy of the United 
States. 



THE LANSING-ISHII NOTES 313 

Personally, from my knowledge of the situation in the Far 
East, I could not see any urgent reason for making this dec- 
laration. I learned later that the notes had been drawn up 
in consultation between the President and the Secretary of 
State, without other reference to the Department of State 
and without the knowledge of its staff. Also, the Secretary 
had acted upon the belief and understanding that the first 
statement concerning special interests was simply a self- 
evident axiom, but that its restatement would clarify the 
situation. Certainly, on the other hand, the positive affirm- 
ative pledge against "the acquisition by any government of 
any special rights or privileges" was clearer and went 
further than any previous declaration. 

To safeguard its rights under any construction that might 
be given to the document, the Chinese Government declared 
that it could not recognize any agreement relating to China 
entered into between other powers. 

I have said that I could not see the need of these notes. 
Failing to receive instructions which I sought from the De- 
partment of State, I continued to take the position that the 
policy of the American Government remained unchanged 
with respect to the existence of a special position or special 
privileges on the part of any other power in China. But the 
immediate effect of the notes on the Chinese Government 
was to make its high officials feel that nothing very positive 
could be expected from the United States by way of assis- 
tance out of the nation's difficulties. 

The general and continuing effect of the notes was seen in 
the behaviour of the Japanese in China. The Japanese 
papers boldly declared that Japan would interpret the term 
"special interests" in a way to suit herself, and that it im- 
pHed the supremacy of Japanese political influence in China. 
The thrusting forward of this view did not strengthen the 
government of General Tuan. Several more provinces 
followed those which had declared their independence with 



314 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

acts that made their allegiance at least doubtful. General 
Tuan's appointee as military governor of Hunan suffered 
defeat at the hands of the southern troops. The governors 
of the Yangtse Valley, under the leadership of General Li 
Shun, addressed to the Government pointed inquiries about 
financial dealings with the Japanese and the purchase of 
arms, which was reported to involve an arms alliance. 

As the attacks were directed at him personally, General 
Tuan felt that he must resign. Notwithstanding an outward 
show of amity, General Feng Kuo-chang and the Premier 
had actually not agreed. The Premier wished to make war 
on the south and conquer it. The Acting President, on the 
other hand, was in constant correspondence with southern 
leaders in an attempt to bring about reconciliation. Tuan 
sent in his resignation. The Japanese worked for his reten- 
tion. The President did ask him to reconsider, but his 
resignation finally took effect on the 20th of November. 
General Wang Shih-chen, who was close to the President as 
chief of staff, became acting premier. But Tsao Ju-lin, 
who headed the Japanese clique, was retained. 

Peace and unity did not result. The northern Tuchuns 
gathered at Tientsin on December 4th, and decided to push 
the war against the south with 200,000 men. This was to 
be made a pretext for getting more funds. 

I kept in touch with General Tuan, in whose personal 
character and honesty of purpose in wishing China to take 
part in the war I placed reliance. Also his friend, Mr. Chu 
Ying-kuang, who had made a fine record as civilian governor 
of Chekiang, had kept his eye mainly on this goal. Through 
them I kept in touch with all of the Chinese who fostered 
such action. If the Chinese of their own initiative should 
create services for supplying urgent needs of the Allies, and 
should train a model division for use on the battlefields of 
Europe, I felt that the United States and her associates would 
find a way to transport them to Europe. General Tuan was 



THE LANSING-ISHII NOTES 315 

now free of politics. In the conversations I had with the 
Premier and his associates, the idea of a special organization 
for preparedness was talked over. The upshot of this was 
the creation of a War Participation Office, with General Tuan 
as its president. The Office was to make constructive plans 
for developing resources useful in the war, and for training 
troops for Europe. 

Meanwhile, the Japanese were "cutting loose" in Shan- 
tung. Quite openly they were trying to set up an administra- 
tion in what they called the railway zone. The agreements 
between China and Germany contained no provision for 
such a zone. The Germans merely had the railway itself, 
and certain specific mining enterprises, together with the 
port of Tsingtao. A general priority in the mining districts 
within a zone of ten miles along each side of the railway had 
been abandoned some time previous to the war. Now the 
Japanese asserted in this "zone" general administrative 
power, including policing, taxation, forestry, and education. 
With this encroachment, the Chinese noted evidences of 
Japanese toleration of revolutionary and bandit activities 
wherever they served the purposes of the invaders. 

People came frequently from Shantung to see me in order 
to lay before me their complaints and petitions. They were 
distressed, but I could not help them, save where American 
rights were involved. The Shantung men reported that the 
Japanese were making the Lansing-Ishii notes the basis of 
their propaganda, stating that Japan's special position had 
now been recognized. This penetration into the interior of 
one of the provinces of China proper by a foreign political 
administration was undoubtedly the most serious attack ever 
made on Chinese sovereignty. 

A member of the Chinese Foreign Office called on me on 
the 2ist of December, and spoke earnestly about the Japa- 
nese inroads in Shantung. He said nothing could stop the 
Japanese. Their minister had stated that it would be diffi- 



3i6 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

cult to change an ordinance signed by the Premier and sanc- 
tioned by the Emperor. 

Among both Chinese officials and the general public all was 
discouragement and depression. The first effect of the 
Lansing-Ishii notes, the strong influence exercised by the pro- 
Japanese clique in the government because of the financial 
backing they got, the knowledge that such backing had to 
be bought with valuable national concessions, the increasing 
disunion between north and south, the general despair of 
any constructive and unifiying poHcy being possible, made 
the Chinese individually and collectively paralysed with 
doubt, fear, and a feeling of impotence. It was plain that 
Japanese influences, making a politico-commercial campaign 
in China, were everywhere actively taking advantage of this 
demoralized state of the public mind and intensifying it 
through their manipulations. 



CHAPTER XXVII 
AMIDST TROUBLES PEKING REJOICES 

The Armistice meant the end of the Great War. Would it 
also mean the end of sinister intrigue in China? 

In the joy of the world victory everybody felt so. But 
when I returned to Peking early in October, 191 8, I found 
that things had gone from bad to worse. Money had been 
squandered on war expeditions which had torn the country, 
not united it. The unofficial Japanese financial agent, Mr. 
Nishihara, a borer in the rotten trunk of Chinese finance, had 
been at work all summer. The fact of his loan negotiations 
was denied to the very last by the Japanese Legation. Sud- 
denly, on October ist, Japan's Minister of Finance announced 
that his government had arranged a number of loans to 
the Chinese. They involved commitments in the sum of 
320,000,000 yen, ostensibly to build railways and iron works; 
of this amount 40,000,000 yen would be immediately ad- 
vanced. 

The earlier loans had all gone to the inept militarists. The 
advances on these so-called industrial loans were in the same 
way dissipated in partisanship, division, distraction. The 
new parliament had been elected. It was to elect a new 
president. Money was poured into the contest between 
Feng, the Acting President, and Hsu Shih-chang. General 
Tuan had his army of small political adherents, who battened 
on the funds supplied by the chief manipulators. They 
formed the Anfu Club — from Jnhui, the province of the 
army clique, and Fwkien, the province whence the navy drew 
most of its admirals. 

The inner military ring was operating from the War Par- 

317 



3i8 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

ticipation Bureau, which had preempted the control of fi- 
nance, natural resources, and police. The ministries were 
powerless. The Government was debauched with the easy 
money from Japan. With a sardonic grin, the Japanese 
offered to lend China 200,000,000 paper yen, not redeemable, 
on which the Chinese Government should base a gold-note 
issue. On this paper of the Bank of Korea China should 
repay Japan, with interest annually. 

Using the militarists, they tried hard to put it through. 
But the foreign press, and such Chinese papers as dared, 
succeeded in laughing it down. Redeemable in Korean or 
Japanese banknotes, which the Chinese never use in daily 
trade, the proposed government gold notes could not have 
been forced into circulation. They would only have worse 
confounded the already existing monetary confusion. 

The police terrorized and bullied the papers that opposed 
Japan's loan negotiations and printed the facts about them. 
Nearly a dozen were suppressed. The Anfu gang had cowed 
the Government and people in north China. Without moral 
and legal authority, it made the Government impotent in its 
prime functions, such as levying taxes and protecting lives. 

The diplomatic corps had to consider whether the customs 
and salt revenues should be released to such a government. 
The best interests not only of China, but of all the friendly 
nations, including Japan herself, were being blighted. The 
prostitution of the War Participation Bureau by the gold- 
lust of the militarists, with Japan as pander, fostered the 
brawls of faction and disunion. Public opinion was throt- 
tled and the corrupt elements found no organized popular 
opposition. 

Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of Finance, advocated the spurious 
gold-note project, which had been dubbed the "gold-brick 
scheme." Tsao had represented that the diplomatic corps 
had approved this scheme. Four ministers jointly informed 
the Chinese Government that Mr. Tsao's methods tended to 



I 



AMIDST TROUBLES PEKING REJOICES 319 

destroy confidence between the Government and the lega- 
tions, and one minister said his' legation would thenceforward 
accept no statement coming from the Minister of Finance 
until the Foreign Office had vouched for its truth. 

The Finance Minister unblushingly tried to suspend the 
renewal of the currency loan option until the foreign banks 
should consent to the gold-note scheme. Here I protested, 
saying that under the Currency Loan Agreement the Amer- 
ican Government had a right to be consulted before any 
such proposals could be considered. 

His Excellency Hsu Shih-chang was elected President — a 
veteran statesman of the old regime. In my first interview 
with him he complained : " I am trying to deal with the south ; 
but they have nobody to bind them together and represent 
them. We are demobilizing most of our superfluous troops, 
but I am worried because the Government lacks financial 
support." 

I talked with him again often. General Li Shun, of Nan- 
king, had been asked to mediate. The southern leaders 
needed to be "grubstaked" to pay off" their troops, then an 
agreement with them could be reached. The President's 
solution smacked of buying them off". But this would not 
end the militarist intriguing. President Hsu issued on October 
25th a peace mandate, taking President Wilson's statement 
about reconstituting international unity as his point of de- 
parture. The President had cabled this to Hsu when he was 
inaugurated. The press was reporting that the British and 
American ministers were working for internal peace; our 
mediation would have been popular. It would have pulled 
the leaders of north and south out of their impasse. Presi- 
dent Hsu cabled back to Mr. Wilson: "Though we are 
separated by a great distance, yet I feel your influence as if 
we were face to face." 

President Hsu had gotten a report from Dr. George E. 
Morrison, who had returned from investigations in south 



320 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

China. Doctor Morrison made the point that internal strife 
must be ended if China was to do anything in the Great War 
and to hold up her rights strongly at the Peace Conference. 
I will quote this report somewhat at length : 

China under the advice of several of her more powerful ministers looks 
to Japan for guidance, Japan having in an incredibly short space of time, 
by the energy and patriotism of her united people and the wisdom of her 
rulers, raised herself to an important position among the nations. But 
Japan is no longer one of the great world powers. Japan lacks experience 
of modern war. Her army and navy are much out of date. Her troops 
have no experience of the marvellous methods of modern war. She has no 
submarine service, she has no air service. Her government, created after 
the model of Germany, her kaiserism, her Prussian militarism, are fast 
becoming obsolete. Compared with the great powers of Great Britain, 
America, France, and Italy, the strength of Japan -is meagre. Japan at the 
end of the European war is a third-rate power. Her government is the 
only military autocracy existing in the world to-day, and for that reason 
Japan will occupy a unique position at any peace conference. Japan is 
the only one of the Allied nations who has failed to take any adequate part 
in the great world struggle. 

For China, a republic, to seek the guidance of the only existing auto- 
cratic military government in the world to-day has at least the appearance 
of inconsistency. Such action is viewed with suspicion by all those in China 
who are aspiring to a democratic government — a government by the people 
for the people. 

If intervention is to be prevented, there must be early restoration of 
democratic government, early reconciliation. As the simplest and quick- 
est way in which this can be effected, I suggest that your Excellency invite 
the President of the United States to act as mediator, to bring together 
representatives of the two great parties of state in China that they may 
hear and weigh each other's view and agree to a compromise. There is no 
loss of face in doing this. 

During my recent visit to the south I gave expression to Chinese views 
to all the leading men with whom I had the opportunity of discussing the 
question of peace and reconciliation in China. All without exception 
expressed their belief and confidence that an invitation to the President 
of the United States to act as mediator would be a wise act and one that 
promised the easiest solution of the grave conflict which at present divides 
into hostile camps this fair land of China. 



AMIDST TROUBLES PEKING REJOICES 321 

Japan persisted in her work, the United States remained 
indifferent. 

The people of China got tired of all this. As a matter of 
fact, China was divided only on the surface. Deep down 
into the life of the people political controversies had not 
penetrated. They went on, placid and industrious, regard- 
less of the bickerings of politicians. Chinese revolutions 
and declarations of independence might be bruited to the 
world, which might think China had plunged into anarchy. 
As a people the Chinese are freer from governmental interfer- 
ence than any nation living. If the entire Central Govern- 
ment should suddenly disappear from the face of the earth, 
it would make little difference in China. Yet the long con- 
tinuance of political conflicts lets foreign intrigue into the 
national quarrels, and so reacts dangerously. 

The people as a whole wished the nation to be a unit. But 
the professional militarists had to be paid off. After the 
President had issued his peace mandate, he asked that I see 
him. "If decisive action for peace is taken," he asked, 
"may we depend on the United States to back us in getting 
funds to pay off these large bodies of troops ? If not, will she 
not lead in a reorganization loan joined by several powers?" 

I asked the American Government for the funds desired. 
If they came conditionally upon the reunion of China, the 
responsible military governors and civilian leaders north and 
south would have the means to be rid of the predatory and 
parasitic bands. Japan then roused herself. She ap- 
proached the governments of the United States, France, 
Great Britain, and Italy on October 23rd, asking that they 
work toward a peace settlement with the leaders both 
north and south. The American Government approved, 
adding that China needed money, but that no funds 
would be afforded her until a reunited government was 
seated. 

Meanwhile, the temper of the Chinese people was sounded 



322 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

in a gratifying way. John Mott asked the Y. M. C. A. in 
China to raise ^100,000 for the War Works Drive. I sat at 
dinner one evening with Liang Shih-yi and Chow Tsu-chi, 
and said: "A drive is going on in the United States to aid all 
the war works undertaken for the benefit of the soldiers at 
the front. Do you suppose that some of our friends in 
China would wish to contribute ?" They both rephed: 
"Yes, we are sure they would." ^ 

Two days elapsed. Chow Tsu-chi called, told me they had 
formed a National War Works Committee, and that local 
committees were being formed in every provincial capital. 
They raised, not $100,000, but more than $1,000,000! 

It was the more remarkable because this way of contribut- 
ing to a public purpose had never been tried in China. Only 
the Shun Tien Shih Pao of Peking, Japanese-controlled, 
threw cold water on the movement, saying that to be sending 
money to Europe while so many provinces in China them- 
selves needed aid was peculiar. 

The representatives of the Associated Powers met on Oc- 
tober 1 8th. They felt that participation in the war had not 
united China; a clique had perverted it to factional uses. 
Each representative, it was agreed, should present instances 
in which the Central Government or local officials had ob- 
structed action or been remiss. At the next meeting, on the 
28th, I had prepared a memorandum of instances; this was 
made the basis of a statement. A conference was to be held 
with the President of China, to be quite friendly, but to make 
manifest the grave shortcomings due to political vices. Thus, 
it was thought, the responsible and conscientious elements 
in the Government would be fortified against the clique that 
had invaded it. The Foreign Minister, however, asked that 
the conference be deferred, in order that the Government 
might strive to bring its action more completely into accord 
with its real desire. There was no threat in our suggestion. 
But publicists often overlooked its true object, and treated 



AMIDST TROUBLES PEKING REJOICES 323 

it as if it had been a condemnation of China rather than of the 
controlling clique in the Government. 

Joy and cheerfulness greeted the news of the Armistice. 
The American Legation Band was the first to celebrate, 
with a detachment of marines it paraded the legation com- 
pounds; only the Japanese Legation sentinel failed to salute 
it; he had failed to gather its purport. At Sir John Jordan's 
personal invitation I joined the British Legation's impromptu 
festivities that night, with some members of my staff. 
Responding to Sir John's remarks of welcome, I spoke of the 
trinity of democratic peoples, the British, French, and Amer- 
icans, as destined to lead the world to a fuller understanding 
of free institutions and popular rights. 

In the continuous round of festivities and celebrations the 
foreign and Chinese communities joined whole-heartedly, 
with dinners, receptions, special meetings of societies, and 
finally a great national celebration on the 28th of November. 
We gave a reception on the 20th to the ministers of the Asso- 
ciated Powers. As each minister arrived, the national air of 
his country was played by the Marine Band. When the Rus- 
sian minister came in, the band, without special instructions, 
played the old Russian Imperial hymn. Prince KoudachefF 
was moved, for this anthem was now outlawed in his country; 
he came to me in tears. Next day he showed me a song with 
music which he had suggested for adoption by the Siberian 
Government as the Russian national hymn. But at the 
solemn service held on the Sunday following, when the na- 
tional airs of the different countries were played, when the 
turn came for the Russian hymn a pause was noted. Those 
conducting the service had ruled out the old Imperial hymn. 
As there was apparently no music available as a substitute, 
poor Russia had to go unsaluted. 

From early in the morning of the national celebration, 
Chinese troops marched toward the Imperial City, where 
they lined the spacious interior courts. The legation guards 



324 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

followed. Multitudes of Europeans and Chinese flocked to 
the palace, where the diplomats were gathered, all but my- 
self resplendent in gorgeous uniforms. The neutral ministers, 
too, were in attendance. The European adviser had found a 
precedent among peace celebrations in Europe, such as that 
after the Danish War and the Franco-Prussian War, in accor- 
dance with which the neutral ministers might attend, though 
peace was not fully concluded. Also, it was argued that the 
Chinese were celebrating the cessation of hostilities, and the 
participation of friendly representatives might be invited 

Whispered controversy was heard among the ministers. 
The representative of France, seeing senior neutral represen- 
tatives ahead of him, said this occasion was different, and 
demanded that the rank of precedence be changed. Time 
was too short for so thorny a problem. We agreed to say 
nothing at all, but to walk in a group forming itself spon- 
taneously. 

We gathered in the pavilion of the Ta Ho-men, the gate 
which leads into the court immediately before the main 
Coronation Hall of the Imperial City. Here, in the very 
inner sanctuary of the thousand-year-old imperialism of 
China, the victory of freedom was celebrated. The square 
was massed with troops, Chinese and foreign. On the ascend- 
ing terraces stood thousands of guests, the military and 
ojEcials in uniform; over the balustrades waved forests of 
flagsof the Associated Nations, as well as long floating banners 
with Chinese inscriptions in gold. 

After the President had ascended the steps to the music 
of bands of the nations, bowed to all the flags, and made his 
address, aeroplanes appeared, dropping innumerable Chinese 
flags and messages of felicitation printed in gold on red; then 
they continued to circle above the Imperial City. While 
the military were marching to the gate, rockets were sent 
skyward; exploding, they released paper figures of animals, 
as well as soldiers and weapons of war, which floated a long 



AMIDST TROUBLES PEKING REJOICES 325 

time in the air. When the President left the Tung Hua 
Palace, where he had received thousands of guests, the aero- 
planes preceded him on his ride to his own residence. 

We celebrated Thanksgiving that afternoon in American 
fashion with a religious service, the American colony and 
many British and other Allied residents attending, as well as 
the ministers of the Associated Powers with their staffs. 
Premier Chien Neng-hsun dined the diplomatic corps and 
welcomed President Wilson's proposal for a league of na- 
tions. President Hsu invited us on November 30th, and then 
the French minister, who still was troubled with the question 
of the non-belligerents, objected to the neutral ministers 
being there at all. If they went, he said, he would not go. 
The British minister and I devised, as we thought, a way 
out. Would the neutral ministers view the Allied ministers 
as guests of honour on this occasion ^ The secretary to the 
Foreign Minister was chosen to ask them. Unfortunately, 
the neutrals took it as a demand rather than an inquiry. 
Then the fat was in the fire — the neutral ministers would 
not attend the dinner. This was the one discordant note 
in our celebrations. 

In order to enable the Central Government to get along at 
all, the diplomatic corps agreed to the release of surplus salt 
revenues to the extent of ^5,300,000. President Hsu on the 
i6th of November ordered immediate cessation of hostilities 
in the Chinese interior. The northern leaders were still war- 
like, but accepted his decision. The British, French, Ameri- 
can, Japanese, and Italian representatives and myself met on 
the 22nd to uphold President Hsu's attitude. We took up 
the Japanese proposals, decidingthatidenticalrepresentations 
be made at Peking and Canton. My colleagues asked me 
to draft an aide memoire which was to accompany the oral 
representations. Japan objected to including in it the Amer- 
ican suggestion that no financial advances would be made 
now but that a reunited China would get support from the 



326 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

powers. The Japanese banks had bound themselves to 
make further payments to China, it was said. The aide 
memoire deplored disunion, disavowed wishing to intervene, 
and hoped that, "while refraining from taking any steps 
which might obstruct peace, both parties would seek without 
delay, by frank confidence, the means of obtaining reconcilia- 
tion." In the clause about obstructing peace I had in mind 
such acts as the election of a northern militarist as Vice- 
President. This, though in itself a peaceful act, would have 
raised an insurmountable obstacle to peace. 

Five powers were represented in an audience before the 
President on December 2nd, the British minister speaking. 
The northern military leaders had held a conference at 
Tientsin. If, as reported, they wished to demand that Tuan 
be reinstalled as Premier, and that Tsao Kun, Military Gov- 
ernor of Chihli, be elected Vice-President, it would have em- 
bittered the south. The public therefore welcomed the 
representations of the powers. The American reference to 
loans was omitted; nevertheless, the situation produced made 
it no longer possible for any one country to lend money to 
either faction without putting itself in an equivocal position. 

The Japanese felt moved on the 3rd of December to publish 
a statement about Chinese finance. Japan could not dis- 
courage financial and economic enterprises of its nationals 
in China, the statement read, "so long as these enterprises 
are the natural and legitimate outgrowth of special relations 
between the two neighbouring and friendly nations. At the 
same time they fully realize that under the existing condi- 
tions of domestic strife in China loans are liable to create 
misunderstandings and to interfere with peace in China. 
Accordingly, the Japanese Government has decided to with- 
hold such financial assistance to China as is likely in their 
opinion to add to the complications of her internal situation." 

This declaration left great latitude in the making of loans, 
yet it did, in fact, acknowledge the appropriateness of the 



AMIDST TROUBLES PEKING REJOICES 327 

American position. I asked Baron Hayashi about it. What 
exceptions would be made ? The Baron was not very definite 
but said bona fide industrial loans were meant. "Most de- 
cidedly," he added in reply to my continued questioning, 
"I favour the strictest scrutiny of each loan, and mutual 
information among the governments about such transac- 
tions." He gave me plainly to understand that he did not 
approve, and had opposed, certain deals attempted by his 
countrymen in the semi-official group. I gathered his 
thorough disapproval of direct interference by the military 
in international affairs; but the military were in power in 
Japan, and its diplomats were helpless. 

In accordance with its main suggestion, the American 
Government followed with a memorandum about financing 
China, sent to Great Britain, France, and Japan. It had 
already proposed a new consortium, including virtually all 
parties interested in each national group. The Currency 
Reform Loan should come first, with the shares of the British 
and French groups carried by the Americans and Japanese 
so long as the former could not furnish funds. Industrial 
as well as administrative loans should be included, and thus 
removed from the sphere of destructive competition. 

The danger that industrial loans might be converted to 
political ends was patent. Yet in my recommendations I 
felt it difficult to avoid evils of monopoly, unless independent 
enterprises involving loans should be admitted. 

The British and French banking representatives plainly 
wished to have America lead in the international financial 
reorganization of China. Japan, as its minister often said, 
desired the United States to reenter the Consortium — but he 
meant the old Consortium, in which Japan had the leader- 
ship. Japan did not readily take to the idea of the new Con- 
sortium. It declared that it favoured the proposal "on 
principle," but found it necessary to weigh every detail with 
considerable minuteness. This caused great delay. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 
A NEW WORLD WAR COMING? 

The old World War ended with the Armistice. Was a new 
one looming? 

If one came it would break in China — of that we were 
convinced. Unless it settled China's problems the Peace 
Conference would fall disastrously short of safeguarding the 
world against a renewal of its titanic conflict. In China the 
powers were rivals, each with its jealously guarded sphere of 
influence. In the extravagant language of fancy, Ku Hung- 
ming thus pictured to me the situation: "China's political 
ship, built in the eclipse and rigged with curses black, has 
been boarded by the pirates of the world. In their dark 
rivalries they may scuttle it and all sink together, but not 
until they have first plundered and burned civilization as we 
know it." 

Should any action be taken which might be interpreted as 
a recognition of a special position for Japan in China, whether 
in the form of a so-called Monroe Doctrine or a "regional 
understanding" or in any other way, forces would be set in 
motion that in a generation would be beyond controlling. 
In comparison with this tremendous issue, even the complex 
re-alignments of Central Europe fell into relative unimpor- 
tance. The same fatal result was sure to follow any further 
accentuation of spheres of influence. 

We in China realized this, and in deadly earnest we worked 
out a plan of joint preventive action by the powers, which 
would unite them instead of leaving them in fatal rivalry. 
The root of all evil is in the love of money. It was local 
financing by single exploiting powers in spheres protected by 

338 



A NEW WORLD WAR COMING? 329 

political influence that was the evil. If, instead, the finance 
oftheworld could be made to back a united China, there would 
be a great constructive development, from which all would 
benefit far in excess of selfish profits garnered in a corner- 
We planned a system of joint international finance. That, 
despite its drawbacks, would destroy the localization of for- 
eign political influence. The plan in its relations to the 
Chinese Government was worked out with everyone that 
we could reach competent to give advice. There were the 
official and business representatives of Great Britain and 
France; the Chinese cabinet ministers and other officials, and 
all of the American representatives, including the commercial 
attaches Julean Arnold and P. P. Whitham, and the Amer- 
ican advisers, Dr. W. W. Willoughby, Dr. W. C. Dennis, and 
Mr. J. E. Baker of the Department of Railways. Day and 
night the conferences went on informally; by day and night 
these matters were threshed out. Japanese experts, too, were 
consulted. 

The time seemed propitious. The Armistice brought the 
hope that the powers would cooperate. The separatist po- 
litical aims in China might be overcome, together with the 
sinister intrigue for dismembering or dominating that mighty 
nation of freemen. Could foreign financial action and in- 
fluence in China be gathered up into a unit? Could it be 
made to build for the whole of China, not tear it down in its 
several parts? At all events, we hammered out a plan to 
make this possible. 

Foreigners had gone deeply into railway loans, making 
their chief investments there. Hence we made the plan of 
unified financial support apply, first of all, to the railway 
service. The operating of the diff'erent Chinese lines accord- 
ing to the respective national loans was a curse; it was evil 
politics, and it broke down the railway service. Foreign 
experts, acting as servants of the Chinese Government, 
might unify the Chinese railroads, though of this Liang 



330 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Shih-yi, Chow Tsu-chi, and Yeh Kung-cho — ^who knew most 
about Chinese railway affairs — had their doubts. It would 
pile up the overhead expenses, they thought. The railways 
could be managed thriftily only by the Chinese. The foreign 
banking interests, too, might try to be depositories for the 
railway funds, as they were already for the customs and salt 
revenues. Thus Chinese capital would pay tribute to foreign 
capital. If still other revenues were thus absorbed, as might 
be feared, national economy would be fettered too much. 

Therefore they proposed a Chinese banking group. It 
would help in the financing and could be made the depository 
of funds. 

These men sympathized, however, with the main purpose 
of the suggested arrangement for unification. Foreign ex- 
pertship on the railways, also, was highly valued by Chinese 
railwaymen trained in the West. True, Mr. Sidney Mayers 
somewhat frightened them by his proposals. This British 
industrial representative of long experience in China proposed 
internationalizing each separate line by putting on it an 
international group of experts. The Chinese objected; it 
would mean giving all the important positions to a large staff 
of foreign officials. Of this they had had enough in the 
Customs. 

It was necessary to dissociate banking from building; such 
a union would mean monopoly and fierce attacks upon it by 
all outside interests. With the financing separate, the con- 
tracting might be left free to all competitors, bidding low and 
resting their bids upon their repute and responsibility. 

So long as it remained possible for different countries to 
acquire special privileges in distinct spheres, promises of 
''integrity and sovereignty" would be nothing but empty 
words. No matter how much they might promise that they 
would not discriminate against the trade of other nations, the 
fact remains that established position in itself constitutes 
preference. 



A NEW WORLD WAR COMING? 331 

The favoured nations might more honestly say: "Give us 
our special position and we will give you all the equal oppor- 
tunity you ask." 

Foreign influence could safely be wielded only as a trustee- 
ship for China and the world, without any vested political 
interests or economic advantages secured through political 
pressure. But Chinese administration was lax. I urged the 
Chinese officials to set their house in order, to put their public 
accounting on an efficient plane; even if necessary to employ 
foreign experts to do this. They said: "Yes, if the United 
States will lead," for a long record of square dealing had en- 
deared our business men to the Chinese. 

But Americans had been slow in China. Two years had 
fled, and the Grand Canal was not yet restored as promised. 
The half million dollars advanced had been spent on prelimi- 
nary surveys. Silver had risen; American gold bought only 
one half what it had before. Overhead expense was high, 
and for the preliminary work more than the half-million was 
needed. The Chinese were disappointed, grief-stricken; 
they began to be suspicious. 

The Japanese-controlled papers redoubled their attacks on 
Americans. Pretty soon a Japanese journal at Tsinanfu 
assaulted the name and character of President Wilson. I 
had an understanding with my Japanese colleague that 
all press misstatement should be corrected. I saw him about 
this attack on the head of a friendly nation. He promised 
to look into it. After ten days I wrote inquiring again. 
Under the press laws of Japan, he responded, a paper could 
indeed be punished for libellous attack upon the head of a 
foreign state, provided that such head happened to be in 
Japan at the time. As this paper was notoriously under 
the domination of the Japanese authorities, amenable to their 
very breath and whisper, I failed to see how the minister 
should find it hard to bring it to book. I merely called for a 
retraction where the Japanese, if a Chinese-owned paper 



332 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

so scurrilously had attacked the Japanese Emperor, would 
have asked for total suppression. The Japanese minister 
said he would "further consider the matter" and would see 
what he could do. A mild apology and retraction were even- 
tually published. 

The action of the Japanese in China, ojficial and unofficial, 
during the war, had aroused the deepest resentment among 
the Chinese, who were on the verge of despair. The Chinese 
people were being whirled in the vortex of old and new. 
The old organization was beginning to crumble; the new had 
not yet taken shape. It was easy to find spots of weakness 
and corruption, aggravation of which would bring about an 
actual demoralization of social and political life and the ob- 
struction of every improvement; bandits could be furnished 
with arms; weak persons craving a stimulant could be 
drugged with morphia; the credit of native institutions could 
be ruined; and the most corrupt elements in the government 
encouraged. For the original weaknesses and evils the out- 
side influence was not responsible, but it was culpable for 
making them its instruments for the achievement of its aims 
of political dominion. 

A vast system whose object was the drugging of China with 
morphia, which utilized the petty Japanese hucksters and 
traders throughout the country, was exposed in the "opium 
blacklist " published by the British papers in China. Specific 
proof was adduced in each case. Often the blacklist extended 
over two pages of a paper. Obviously these Japanese drug- 
gists, photographers, and the whole outfit of small-fry traders 
could not traffic in morphia without the connivance of the 
Japanese Government and the support of semi-official Japa- 
nese interests. The Japanese post offices were used for its 
distribution in China. Chinese police interference with the 
thousands of Japanese purveyors was ruled out under the 
exterritoriality agreements. In Korea, the Japanese opium 
grown officially for "medicinal uses" was produced far in 



A NEW WORLD WAR COMING? 333 

excess of medicinal needs, and through the ports of Dairen 
and Tsingtao large quantities of morphia came into China. 

The Japanese-controlled press at first answered the black- 
list with charges of tu quoque; but when they defamed the 
American missionary hospitals, alleging that they were 
centres for distributing narcotic drugs, nobody among the 
Chinese paid further attention to them. The blacklists map- 
ped graphically the thickly sown morphia "joints" around 
the police station of the Japanese settlement at Tientsin 
and the responsibility was brought home to Japan. An offi- 
cial Japanese announcement was evoked that no effort would 
be spared to stop the "regrettable, secret, ilHcit traffic." 

In Shantung Japanese civil administration had been set up 
along the railway without a scintilla of right. It was later 
withdrawn for new concessions and privileges wrung from the 
Peking Government. The Japanese were old masters of this 
trick. Seize something which you do not really want, and 
restore it to its owner if he will give you something you do 
want. Then what you want you get, but it is not "stolen," 
and can be kept with smug immunity. The arrangements 
in Shantung were made secretly, riding roughshod over 
Chinese rights, and intended to sterilize in advance the enact- 
ments of the Peace Conference. If a foreign power should 
wish to own the Pennsylvania Railway system, and should 
actually come into the United States and occupy it, the paral- 
lel would be exact with what Japan did in Shantung. After 
taking the Shantung Railway and holding it, the Japanese 
stoutly claimed an "economic right" to it. The whole 
course of Japan in China during the Great War alarmed both 
Chinese and foreigners. I may not name the responsible 
and fair-minded writer of a letter from which I quote: 

It would be in the highest degree unfortunate if the present fortuitous 
and temporary possession of the Leased Territory and Shantung Railway 
by Japan should be confirmed by the final Treaty of Peace, for not only 
would China's sovereignty in Shantung be in danger of impairment, but 



334 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

the trading rights of Chinese, Americans, and Europeans would undoubt- 
edly be prejudiced. 

Another consideration that has the greatest weight with the writer is 
that the principles for which the United States entered the European War 
and on behalf of which the United States, in common with the whole world, 
has paid an unthinkable price in gold and blood, make unbearable a con- 
tinuance, not to say accentuation, of the old system of foreign intrigue in 
China. It is unbearable that one result of the victory bought in part with 
American lives should be the extension of Japanese power in China, when 
such extension means the further strengthening of the domination of a 
monarchical and imperialistic foreign nation over China, a result constitut- 
ing in its own sphere a complete negation of the objects for which the 
United States devoted its entire resources in the war against Germany. 

Dr. Sun Yat Sen wrote me at Shanghai on the 19th of 
November, referring both to internal and external troubles, 
and the union of militarists, foreign and Chinese: 

Through you alone will the President and the people of the United 
States see the true state of affairs in China. Your responsibility is indeed 
great. Whether Democracy or Militarism triumphs in China largely 
depends upon Your Excellency's moral support of our helpless people at 
this stage. 

These words show the Chinese belief in the sheer force of 
public opinion, and their wish that the Chinese situation be 
known and understood abroad. This achieved, the evils 
under which China groans and travails would shrivel. 

We built up our solution of unity for China. In carefully 
weighed dispatches I sent it to the American Government, 
and cabled the President a statement of China's vital relation 
to future peace. I was constrained to condemn Japan's 
policy, quite deliberately, summing up the evidence accumu- 
lated in the course of five years. I had come to the Far East 
admiring the Japanese, friendly to them — my published writ- 
ings show this abundantly. I did not lose my earnest good- 
will toward the Japanese people but I could not shut my 
eyes to Japanese imperialist politics with its unconscionably 
ruthless and underhanded actions and its fundamental 



A NEW WORLD WAR COMING? 335 

lack of every idea of fair play. The continuance of such 
methods could only bring disaster; their abandonment is a 
condition of peace and real welfare. The aims and methods 
of Japan's military policy in the Continent of Asia can bring 
good to no one, least of all to the Japanese people, notwith- 
standing any temporary gains. Such ambitions cannot per- 
manently succeed. 

A cure can come only when such evils are clearly recognized. 
Lip-service to political liberalism might mislead the casually 
regardful outside world. To those face to face with what 
Japanese militarism was doing to continental Asia there was 
left no doubt of its sinister quality. Japan herself needs to 
be delivered from it, for it has used the Japanese people, 
their art and their civilization, for its own evil ends. More 
than that, it threatens the peace of the world. If talk of 
"a better understanding" presupposes the continuance of 
such aims and motives as have actuated Japanese political 
plot during the past few years, it is futile. What is needed 
is a change of heart. 

Here is the substance of the memorandum upon which my 
cablegram to the President was based : 

In 191 5, coercion was applied and China was forced by threats to solidify 
and extend the privileged position of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia ' 
and to agree prospectively to a like regime in Shantung together with the 
beginnings of a special position in Fukien Province. After this there was a 
change of methods although the policy tended to the same end — domina- 
tion over China. 

Instead of coercion, Japan applied secret and corrupt influence through 
alliance with purchasable officials kept in office by Japanese support. The 
latter insidious policy is more dangerous because it gave the appearance 
that rights are duly acquired through grant of the Chinese Government; 
no demands or ultimatums are necessary because corrupt officials strongly 
supported by Japanese finance, acting absolutely in secret channels, sup- 
pressing all public discussion with the strong arm of the police, are able to 
deliver contractual rights regular in form, though of corrupt secret origin 
and evil tendency. 



336 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Japan has used every possible means to demoralize China by creating 
and sustaining trouble; by supporting and financing the most objectionable 
elements, particularly a group of corrupt and vicious military governors 
akin to bandits in their methods; by employing instigators of trouble; by 
protection given to bandits; by the introduction of morphia and opium; 
by the corruption of officials through loans, bribes, and threats; by the 
wrecking of native banks and the debauching of local currency; by illegal 
export of the copper currency of the people; by local attempts to break 
down the salt administration; by persistent efforts to prevent China from 
going into the war and then seeing to it that China was never in a position 
to render to the common cause such aid as would be in her power and as 
she would willingly render if left to herself: finally, by utilizing the war 
and the preoccupation of the Allies for enmeshing China in the terms of 
a secret military alliance. 

As a result of these methods and manipulations, Japan has gained the 
following advantages: a consolidation of her special position in Manchuria 
and eastern Mongolia, and the foundation of the same in Shantung and 
Fukien; control in the matter of Chinese finance through the control of 
the Bank of Communications and the Bureau of Public Printing and the 
appointment of a high financial adviser together with the adoption of the 
unsound gold-note scheme happily not yet put in force. She has secured 
extensive railway concessions in Manchuria, Shantung, Chihli, and Kiang- 
su; mining rights in various provinces; and special monopolistic rights 
through the Kirin forestry loan, the telephone loan, and others. Through 
the secret military convention Japan attempts not only to control the 
military policy of China but incidentally national resources such as iron 
deposits. All these arrangements are so secretly made that in most cases 
not even the Foreign Office is in possession of the documents relating there- 
to. Together with this goes the persistent assertion of special interests 
which are interpreted as giving a position of predominance. 

This is a strong indictment and I feel the fullest responsibility in making 
these statements. Fundamentally friendly to the Japanese as my pub- 
lished expressions show, I have been forced through the experience of five 
years to the conclusion that the methods applied by the Japanese military 
masters can lead only to evil and destruction and also that they will not 
be stopped by any consideration of fairness and justice but only by the 
definite knowledge that such action will not be tolerated. 

As a steady stream of information from every American official in China 
and from every other source as well as my own experience have made this 
conclusion inevitable, I owe the duty to state it to the American Govern- 
ment in no uncertain terms. Nor is this said in any spirit of bitterness 



A NEW WORLD WAR COMING? 337 

against the Japanese people but from the conviction that the policy pur- 
sued by their military masters can in the end bring only misery and woe to 
them and the world. During all this period it has not been possible for the 
European powers or the United States to do anything for China. The 
United States, though assisting all other Allies financially, could not con- 
tribute one dollar toward maintaining the financial independence of China 
as undivided attention was needed to the requirements of the west front. 
The Lansing-Ishii notes, undoubtedly intended to express a friendly atti- 
tude toward any legitimate aspirations of Japan while safeguarding the 
rights of China, were perverted by the Japanese into an acknowledgment 
of their privileged position in China. Now at last, when the pressure has 
been released, America as well as the European countries must face the 
issue which has been created, that is, whether a vast, peaceable, and indus- 
trious population whose most articulate desire is to be allowed to develop 
their own life in the direction of free and just government, shall become 
material to be moulded by the secret plottings of a foreign military despot- 
ism into an instrument of its power. If it is said that the aims of Japan 
are now but economic and in just response to the needs of Japan's expend- 
ing population, it must be remembered that every advantage is gained and 
maintained by political and military pressure and that it is exploited by the 
same means in a fashion, taking no account of the rights of other foreign 
nations or of the Chinese themselves. Divested of their political character 
and military aims the economic activities of Japan would arouse no opposi- 
tion. 

Only the refusal to accept the results of Japanese secret manipulation in 
China during the last four years, particularly, the establishment of Japa- 
nese political influence and a special privilege position in Shantung can avert 
the result of either making China a dependence of a reckless and bound- 
lessly ambitious military caste which would destroy the peace of the entire 
world, or bringing on a military struggle inevitable from the establishment 
of rival spheres of interest and local privilege in China. 

Peace is conditioned on the abolition for the present and future of all 
localized privileges. China must be freed from all foreign political influ- 
ence exercised within her borders, railways controlled by foreign govern- 
ments, and preferential arrangements supported by political power. If 
this is done, China will readily master her own trouble, particularly if the 
military bandits hitherto upheld by Japan shall no longer have the coun- 
tenance of any foreign power. 

The advantages enumerated above were gained by Japan when she was 
professedly acting as the trustee of the Associated Powers in the Far East, 
and they could not have been obtained at all but for the sacrifices made by 



338 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

them in Europe. They are therefore not the exclusive concern of any one 
power. With respect to Shantung the German rights there lapsed, together 
with all Chino-German treaties, upon the declaration of war. A succession 
of treaty rights from Germany to Japan is therefore not possible, and the 
recognition of a special position of Japan in Shantung could only proceed 
from a new act to which conceivably some weak Chinese officials might be 
induced but which would be contrary to the frequently declared aims of 
international policy in China and which would amount to the definitive 
establishment of exclusive spheres of influence in China leading in turn to 
the more vigorous development of such exclusive spheres by other nations. 
The present situation of affairs offers the last opportunity by common con- 
sent to avert threatening disaster by removing the root of conflict in China. 

Never before has an opportunity for leadership toward the welfare of 
humanity presented itself equal to that which invites America in China 
at the present time. The Chinese people ask for no better fate than to be 
allowed freedom to follow in the footsteps of America; every device of 
intrigue and corruption as well as coercion is being employed to force them 
in a different direction, including constant misrepresentation of American 
policies and aims which, however, has not as yet prejudiced the Chinese. 
Nor is it necessary for America to exercise any political influence. If it 
were only known that America in concert with the liberal powers would not 
tolerate the enslavement of China either by foreign or native militarists 
the natural propensity of the Chinese to follow liberal inclinations would 
guide this vast country toward free government and propitious develop- 
ment of peaceful industrial activities, even through difficulties unavoidable 
in the transition of so vast and ancient a society to new methods of action. 

But if China should be disappointed in her confidence at the present time 
the consequences of such disillusionment on her moral and political develop- 
ment would be disastrous, and we instead of looking across the Pacific 
toward a peaceable, industrial nation, sympathetic with our ideals, would 
be confronted with a vast materialistic military organization under ruth- 
less control. 



CHAPTER XXIX 
JAPAN SHOWS HER TEETH 

Mr. Obata had succeeded Baron Hayashi as Japanese 
minister in December. He was a dour, silent man who had 
been much in China, as consular officer and in the Legation. 
He had sat with Mr. Hioki in the conferences m which the 
twenty-one demands were pressed on China. He was known 
to be a very direct representative, in the diplomatic service, 
of the militarist masters of Japan. His appointment was to 
the Chinese ominous of a continuance of aggressive tactics. 
A wail of indignation went up from the Chinese press, but 
Mr, Obata remained. In my personal relations with this 
secretive man I thought I saw gradually emerging a broader 
and more humane outlook. 

The new Japanese minister called on the 2nd of February, 
1919, at the Foreign Office and expressed resentment at the 
attitude of the Chinese delegation at Paris. The Chinese 
representatives had said they were willing to publish all the 
secret agreements which the diplomacy of Nippon had been 
weaving around China. Japan objected. The sacred trea- 
ties between China and Japan were not to be divulged with- 
out the consent of both parties. If China was so anxious to 
purge herself of secret diplomacy, let her publish first the 
agreement of September 24, 191 8, which gave the special 
privileges of Germany in Shantung to Japan. The displeas- 
ure of the Japanese in Paris was reenforced by Mr. Obata in 
Peking by what the Chinese took to be a veiled threat. 
"Great Britain," said he, "is preoccupied with internal dis- 
orders. She cannot assist China. But Japan is fully able 

339 



340 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

to assist, as she has a navy of 500,000 tons, and an army of 
more than a milHon men ready for action." 

The Shantung agreement had been the consummation of 
the Japanese-controlled Minister of Communications, The 
Chinese Foreign Office was not consulted when the Chinese 
minister at Tokyo signed it, and it had not been ratified by 
the Chinese Government. The Chinese people viewed it 
merely as a draft, and demanded its cancellation with the 
return to Japan of the moneys received under it by the poli- 
ticians. 

Mr. Obata's threat, which the Chinese took to be an at- 
tempt to intimidate the Chinese delegation at Paris, evoked 
a deluge of telegraphic messages urging the President and 
the Government by all possible means to back their delegates. 
These expressions came from men of all parties. Chen Lu, 
Acting Foreign Minister, tried in vain to minimize the effect 
of the interview. Called before the Chamber of Representa- 
tives in secret session, he said that the newspaper reports had 
been "somewhat exaggerated,'* and added: "In this time 
when the right and justice of the Allied Powers have definitely 
destroyed militarism and despotism, we Chinese, although 
as yet a weak country, may consider every menace of foreign 
aggression as a thing of the past, and accept it with a smile." 

The Government at first cabled the Paris delegation not to 
make the secret treaties public; they were not held to be valid 
by the Chinese Government, and publication might lend 
them force. Later, the Government cabled, leaving it en- 
tirely to the discretion of the delegates. The diplomatic 
commission of the Chin Pu Tang recommended this. Mean- 
while, Mr. Liang Chi-chao had gone to France. He meant to 
go by way of the United States, where I had prepared for him 
an itinerary and letters of introduction. Then his intimate 
associate. Tang Hua-lung, was assassinated in Vancouver. 
Liang, fearful of a similar fate, went straight to France, evad- 
ing the Kuo Min Tang sympathizers in America. Ex- 



JAPAN SHOWS HER TEETH 341 

Premier Hsiung Hsi-ling told me that Liang was to inform 
the Chinese delegates unofficially about the state of things 
in China. 

This was so bad that the American recommendation that 
the powers keep their money away from either party until 
China was reunited looked more and more desirable. An 
influential and responsible Chinese, who talked with me 
about the clique that ran the War Participation Bureau, 
made this statement: "The danger to China is in the efforts 
of Tuan's militarists. Japan is giving them money to build 
up an army. With this they will try to overawe the Presi- 
dent and force him to fall in with their aims. The negotia- 
tions for peace with the south will cease; the war with the 
south will go on." 

One of the most burning questions both to private individ- 
uals and the press was how to oblige Japan and her officials 
to cease their support of the northern militarists by the send- 
ing of m.oney and arms. Certainly a fire was built under 
them. The Japanese minister called on me on the 9th of 
January to say that his government would now join in a 
declaration on financial assistance to China. He had to 
make reservations about the loan of 20,000,000 yen, pledged 
in connection with the secret military agreement, also as 
to the so-called "industrial" loans. The secret loan arrange- 
ment had been made with three Japanese banks: the Bank of 
Chosen, the Industrial Bank of Japan, and the Bank of For- 
mosa, by the War Participation Bureau. With this, the 
minister said, he could not interfere. Also, his government 
was in principle favouring a restriction of the sale of arms, 
as America recommended; but it would be best for the powers 
to say nothing about it, as their joint statement would be 
taken as an attempt to restrain Japan, which was the only 
country able to furnish arms to China. Besides, the War 
Participation Bureau had a troublesome private contract for 
arms with the Tayeh Company, which the Government felt 



342 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

it couldn't interfere with. So there you are, as Henry James 
would put it. 

I told the Japanese minister that we were not proposing 
any platonic arrangement as Americans were both able and 
willing to furnish arms to the Chinese under legitimate con- 
tracts, if the American Government would permit it. More- 
over, as to the transaction of those three Japanese banks — 
since the Government of Japan had an interest both in them 
and in the munitions company mentioned, their alHance with 
the War Participation Bureau would be dissociated with 
difficulty in the public mind from the Japanese Govern- 
ment. 

The War Participation Bureau clique was actually getting 
ready to equip an army against the south while the North- 
and-South Peace Conference was sitting at Shanghai. Tang 
Shao-yi, chief peace representative of the south, formally 
remonstrated to the British minister, as dean of the diplo- 
matic corps, against such doings of this "Bureau" and its 
Japanese support. 

Now, the Bureau had been established as its name implied, 
to facilitate participation of China in the Great War. Japan's 
financial support of it was ostensibly given also in behalf of 
the other Allies. If it were to be prostituted to the foment- 
ing of civil war the others as well could not escape responsi- 
bility. A meeting was held on the 12th of February by the 
Allied and Associated ministers. Several strongly urged 
that outside money continually given for recruiting of troops 
was opposed to the aim of restoring settled conditions in 
China and to the policy of the joint declaration of December. 
The Japanese minister was silent. He said he must await 
instructions. 

He informed me on February 21st that Japan had called a 
halt on the shipping of ammunition and equipment to the 
War Participation Bureau, but the payment of the balance 
of the loan could not be stopped. Just then, as it happened. 



JAPAN SHOWS HER TEETH 343 

an American firm would soon be ready to begin delivery of a 
certain amount of equipment in China, contracted for in 
good faith during the previous August. America had pro- 
posed a jomt declaration against the furnishing of arms, 
which Japan had blocked. As the declaration had not been 
made, I could not then stop the American delivery though I 
did so later. But America would still be only too glad to 
join in the declaration as proposed. 

As the Japanese were still paying the loan funds into the 
War Participation Bureau, another diplomatic "indignation 
meeting" was held about it on March 6th. The Japanese 
minister said his banks could not help paying over those 
funds, but he had suggested to the Chinese Government that 
it might be well, in the circumstances, to refrain from draw- 
ing the money; Japan could not object to this. Forthwith 
one of the ministers spoke up: "Then let us all make this 
recommendation which Japan has made." 

At this the Japanese minister was taken aback, almost 
shocked. He had always argued that the War Participation 
Bureau was a Chinese internal affair, not one in which the 
powers that had helped form it should presume to dip. But 
the suggestion was quickly adopted. As a result, the repre- 
sentatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United 
States, all solemnly called on the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, expressing their opinion that to draw the war partici- 
pation funds was not advisable, as it constituted an obstacle 
to internal peace. 

But Japan's advice had been merely for the record, not at 
all to be acted upon. Soon there came over to Sir John 
Jordan an informal memorandum from the Foreign Office, 
taking the Japanese line of thought that the War Participa- 
tion Bureau was China's internal affair. It might be con- 
strued as an intimation that we were meddling. Indeed, 
two Chinese of high position told me that the President and 
the Premier ha4 held up the memorandum for several days 



344 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

for fear that it might give offense, until the Minister of 
War absolutely insisted upon its being sent. 

Through these two men I sent a quiet intimation to the 
President that withdrawal of the memorandum would pre- 
vent unpleasant feelings among men who were sincerely 
friendly to him and to China. The memorandum was pulled 
back without delay; thereupon all the Chinese officials, ex- 
cept the few directly connected with the War Participation 
Bureau, rejoiced. 

The five representatives who signed the original declara- 
tion of December met again on the nth of March, because 
the French minister had instructions favouring action upon 
the Bureau. The Japanese minister advanced his argu- 
ments about its being China's business, not ours. But the 
others took the view that as it was an Allied war institution 
and Japan had dealt directly with it, it was quasi-external in 
character. "Is it not quite clear," protested the Japanese 
minister, "that the loan was purely a commercial affair, 
made by certain banks, and not controlled by the Japanese 
Government?" How, then, it was asked in reply, does it 
happen that in connection with this loan, officers of the 
Japanese army had been assigned to the War Participation 
Bureau as advisers and instructors; was it customary to make 
such extraordinary arrangements in connection with a purely 
commercial transaction ? 

"I am not sufficiently informed," Mr. Obata responded 
evasively. "I shall have to refer to the reports of these 
transactions." 

The position of Japan in this matter was so patently equi- 
vocal that it was amusing. We decided that we should make 
it plain that as this bureau was created to further our common 
purposes, we could not acquiesce in any political action or in 
the use of any money which would tend to prolong internal 
strife. 

The Japanese minister on the ist of March had notified 



JAPAN SHOWS HER TEETH 345 

the Chinese Government that no further deliveries of arms 
would be made to the War Participation Bureau pending 
the termination of the North-and-South Peace Conference 
at Shanghai. We proposed to follow this up with joint 
action. Certain representatives were uninstructed, though 
they favoured frowning on the arms imports. Finally eight 
powers united "effectively to restrain their subjects and citi- 
zens from importing into China arms and munitions of war 
until the establishment of a government whose authority is 
recognized throughout the whole country." This included 
the delivery of arms under contracts already made but not 
executed. I could then warn the American firm not to exe- 
cute its contract for the time being, and I did so. 

From time to time, since the early spring of 1918, Baron 
Sakatani, Japanese ex-Minister of Finance, had been in 
Peking. Mr. Liang Chi-chao, when as Minister of Finance 
he made his Japanese loans, had held out the possibility 
of the appointment of a Japanese financial advisor. The 
Baron was an old acquaintance of mine and I held him in 
high regard; but, in view of the fact that I could not consider 
this time a proper one for settling the matter of the financial 
advisorships, I had to distinguish between my personal feel- 
ings for him and the official stand which I might have to take. 
A Japanese friend wrote me in connection with Baron 
Sakatani's visit to China: "h section of our capitalists have 
been given every facility to make money and to lend it to 
China; with the money squeezed from them, the military 
bureaucrats have been corrupting party men and sending 
them to China and elsewhere, to exploit the warring na- 
tions while they are busy with the war. The civilian 
officials and militarists cannot think anything except in 
terms of German fear or admiration. If such Japanese 
are employed by the Peking government, it will forever 
alienate Chinese sympathies from anything we may pro- 
pose." 



346 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Baron Sakatani from the first had nursed the ambition of 
being made currency adviser to the Chinese Government; 
by January, 1919, it appeared that his wish was to be 
fulfilled. The Japanese minister announced that the other 
nations had agreed to the Baron's appointment. I had not 
agreed to it. I had heard nothing whatever about it and had 
consistently and energetically opposed any action of this 
sort. I considered that it would permanently determine the 
course to be taken with regard to currency loans, and would 
preclude the possibility of any consultation with the United 
States. I requested the Minister of Finance to defer the 
appointment until I could consult my government. The 
next development came on the 20th when the Japanese 
minister handed me a memorandum which referred to the 
personal goodwill I had expressed to Baron Hayashi and 
which went on to state that the proposed appointment 
of Baron Sakatani had been sanctioned by Mr. Lansing in 
Washington. 

I cabled to Washington, receiving therefrom on the 30th 
instructions saying that the appointment of a currency 
adviser should be settled only after full consultation by all 
concerned, and that Mr. Lansing had not committed himself 
to any other understanding. I sent a note to the Minister 
of Finance, stating that as one of the parties to the Currency 
Loan Agreement, the United States wished that action be 
postponed until further consideration could be given. I 
was immediately assured that the position taken would be 
considered as final. As a personal friend I regretted that 
Baron Sakatani could not be retained, but in so important a 
matter it was impossible to stand aside while action was 
rushed through which would be prejudicial to the long- 
established interests of the powers who were, at the time, pre- 
occupied with after-war problems. 



CHAPTER XXX 
BANDITS, INTRIGUERS, AND A HOUSE DIVIDED 

There is a phase of Chinese hfe which I should touch upon 
if the picture I am trying to give of the China I knew is to be 
complete. 

Brigandage is an established institution in China, where it 
has operated so long that people have become accustomed to 
it and take it for granted as a natural visitation. At this 
time there was a vicious circle around which brigands and 
troops and rich citizens and villagers were travelling, one in 
pursuit of the other. The brigands were recruited from 
disbanded soldiers — men who had lost connection with their 
family and clan. Often their families had been wiped out 
by famine, flood, or disease, or had been killed in the revo- 
lution. At other times the individual may have lost touch 
through a fault of his own causing him to be cast out. It is 
very difficult for an isolated person, without family and 
clan connections, to reestablish himself. The easiest way 
is to enlist in the army. If that cannot be done, he becomes 
a brigand. Brigands foregather in provinces where the 
administration is lax or in remote regions difficult to reach. 
They lie in ambush and seize wealthy persons, who are 
carried off to the hills and released only when ransom is paid. 
In this way, a considerable tax is levied on accumulated 
wealth. This money the brigands spend among the villagers 
where they happen to be. Meanwhile, the Provincial 
Governor bethinks himself that a certain brigade or division 
has not been paid for a long time and therefore might cause 
trouble, so he announces what is called a "country cleansing 
campaign." The situation is so intolerable that the general 

347 



348 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

sees himself forced to go to extremes, and to send his troops 
with orders to exterminate the brigands. They proceed to 
the infested regions; the brigands, having meanwhile got 
wind of these movements, depart for healthier climes, 
leaving the troops to quarter themselves on the villagers, who 
are by them relieved of the money which they have made out 
of the brigands. Some brigands may be unfortunate enough 
to be caught; some will be shot as an example, and others 
will be allowed to enlist. When the soldiers have dwelt for a 
while among the villagers, they report that the bands have 
now been fully suppressed and that the country is cleaned. 
They are then recalled to headquarters; their general 
reports to the governor, and is appropriately rewarded. 
Meanwhile, the brigands return from their safer haunts and 
begin again to catch wealthy people, whom they relieve 
of their surplus hquidable property. And so the circle 
revolves interminably. 

A little more efficiency in China would deliver it of much 
of its intriguing and all of its banditry. Returning to 
Peking from a trip to the Philippines I found that Mr. Kyle, 
an American engineer on the Siems-Carey railway survey, 
and Mr. Purcell, another employe, had been seized by bandits 
in a remote part of Honan. The bandits took a large sum 
of silver these men were carrying to pay off the surveying 
parties farther up toward Szechuan, then they decided to 
hold Kyle and Purcell for ransom. 

Doctor Tenney, the Chinese secretary, was in Kaifengfu, 
stirring up the provincial governor to hurry the release of the 
men. The company was quite ready to pay the ransom, 
and I could easily have induced the Chinese Government to 
pay it. I was advised that this would be the only certain 
way of rescuing the men, but I felt it would be a dangerous 
precedent; as the bandits would then go on taking and hold- 
ing foreigners for ransom. Mr. Kyle was neither young nor 
robust. I feared for the strenuous life and the worry he was 



BANDITS AND INTRIGUERS 349 

undergoing, but waited two weeks for the Central and the 
Provincial Government, which I made responsible, to get 
them back. One night, Mr. Purcell escaped. I then 
through Doctor Tenney notified the Governor-General that 
he must surround the entire region where the bandits were, 
telling them emphatically that if anything happened to Mr. 
Kyle the band would be hunted down and exterminated. 

The threat was "got across" to the bandits, and with it a 
promise that those instrumental in restoring the captive 
would escape punishment and in some way be rewarded. 
After a week's further suspense Mr. Kyle was delivered to 
the pursuing troops and forthwith returned to Peking. The 
chief of the band was rewarded with a commission in the 
army; his henchmen were enlisted as soldiers. But those 
who had no part in the delivery were one by one caught and 
executed. So, in the end, a salutary example was set to 
keep bandits from interfering with foreigners. 

Mr. Kyle moved with the band every night in their 
mountainous and inaccessible region. Over divides they 
went from valley to valley. Mr. Kyle kept his normal 
health, but complained that they had not let him sleep. He 
snored so loudly, the bandits told him, that they feared he 
would attract the notice of the troops; so, during the final 
ten days, he had not had a solid hour of sleep. But he made 
up his mind that he would keep his mental equipoise and his 
physical fitness in order to live through the experience. 

Two woman missionaries had been taken at about the 
same time by bandits in Shantung Province. But they were 
released after a few days. The missionaries of the society 
they belonged to circulated a pamphlet somewhat later, 
pointing out the superior efficacy of prayer over diplomatic 
intervention. In response to prayer these two teachers had 
been freed within a week; whereas all our diplomatic efforts 
had not yet secured the release of the American engineer. 

Fear of foreign displeasure lost the Chinese the chance to 



350 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

get the services of a great engineer. Before going to the 
Philippines I had been visited by Mr. Ostrougoff, Minister 
of Railways in Kerensky's time, who had inaugurated the 
Russian agreement under which Mr. John F. Stevens was 
given the task of helping to reorganize the Russian railways. 
The work had been prevented by disturbed conditions. 
Admiral Kolchak, together with Alexis Staal, had also called 
on me, with others who had faith in the beginnings of a 
representative political organization in Siberia. I recall 
Kolchak's fine, serious face, and his manner which was that 
of a man under the strain imposed by duties that transcend 
any mere personal interest. On my return, John F. Stevens 
came to Peking for a month. He was discouraged by the 
Russian and Siberian situation. The general breakdown, 
the social revolution, and the establishment of Soviets had 
demolished the chances for carrying out his railway plans in 
Russia. No organized authority had backed him. In 
Peking he studied the Chinese railway situation. In his 
quiet, thorough-going way, he looked into the whole question 
for China; it was not long before he had great confidence 
in its possibilities. I felt it would be a godsend if a man 
of his genius for original planning and constructive work, 
proved in the great Panama Canal project; a man, more- 
over, who had intimate experience of American railway 
operation, could work out with the Chinese a systematic 
plan for developing their railway service. The Chinese 
would have eagerly welcomed this chance, but they were 
not free. The engagement of one foreigner would have 
brought demands to employ many more. 

This was in the spring of 191 8. I called on Mr. Liang 
Shih-yi to greet him on his return from exile. ''The urgent 
thing," he said, "is to put a stop to military inter- 
ference with the civil government. The question of a parlia- 
ment is not quite so important, but, as it has been put to the 
fore, it must be solved first. My solution is to elect a new 



BANDITS AND INTRIGUERS 351 

parliament under the old law. Then reduce the army and 
separate military from civilian affairs." 

Liang described to me the characteristics of the nine chief 
southern leaders. They were rivals, they had their hos- 
tilities; no three leaders would agree. Two would come to 
an understanding, and the rest would turn and rend them. 
Finally, he predicted that Hsu Shih-chang would be the 
most likely candidate for President, Tuan having declined. 

In Hunan the northern and southern troops were still 
fighting and inflicting suffering on the people there; General 
Chang Chin-yao, in particular, an opium-smoking gambler 
and corrupter, the military governor of Hunan; his troops 
destroyed certain property belonging to missionaries. Ameri- 
can and British residents of Chang-sha, the capital, pe- 
titioned the British and American ministers for protection 
to foreign life and property. I had learned that the governor 
put no bridle on his troops. With my British and Japanese 
colleagues I insisted that commanding officers be held 
personally and individually responsible for injuries to 
foreigners. We pointed out that Chang, especially, was 
under observation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs de- 
livered a warning, and Admiral Knight, whom I had fully 
advised, ordered a gunboat to Changsha. 

Meanwhile, the War Participation Bureau, created to aid 
the Associated Powers in the Great War, was watched by 
Japan. Because of it they made their special military 
convention of which General Tuan had spoken to me, using 
the revolution in Russia and the rise of Bolshevism as their 
pretext. The Japanese militarist element in the Govern- 
ment was active and urgent, and General Aoki at Peking 
and General Tanaka at Tokyo were leaving no stone un- 
turned to aid them. They sought at first a general military 
alHance. The Chinese would not consider anything so 
sweeping. Then the unrest in Siberia was made the basis 
of more limited cooperation. In March a preHminary 



352 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

entente was formed; China and Japan would consider in 
common the measures to be taken to cope with the Russian 
situation and to take part in the present war, and the means 
and conditions of cooperation would be arranged by the 
military and naval authorities of both countries. 

War participation in general was thus put into the pur- 
view of mutual agreement between Japan and China. 
While no general military alliance was concluded, neverthe- 
less the Japanese could now control what was to be done by 
China in the war. It meant that China would do nothing. 

The terms of the military and naval conventions on 
methods of cooperating, concluded the i6th of May, flexibly 
permitted Japan in certain circumstances to control Chinese 
railways and resources. The whole thing was managed 
secretly. The public became suspicious of the results, since 
the chief arrangements were made not by the cabinet or the 
Foreign Office, but by the military and naval representatives. 
Would China longer freely cooperate with the other Allies ? 
Would she not be under Japan's strict leadership ? Was not 
this the entering wedge for a complete control of Chinese 
military affairs by Japan .? Would not Chinese militarism be 
strengthened and made obedient to Japanese policy ? 

Japan's acts in Shantung gave these questions pertinence. 
There she was expropriating by eminent domain; in Tsingtau 
the Japanese authorities thus acquired about twelve square 
miles of land, including the shore of Kiaochow Bay for 
several miles, which gave control of every land approach and 
every possible steamship and railway terminal in this port. 
Plainly, Japan was carrying out a policy of permanent 
occupation. 

While the Chino- Japanese entente was being negotiated, 
Japanese-controlled papers in China were preaching enmity 
to the white race. In May a Japanese parliamentary party 
visited China, making speeches calculated to stir racial 
feehng. The burden of the appeals was that, after the war, 



BANDITS AND INTRIGUERS 353 

European nations would try to fasten their control more 
firmly on China, hence the yellow race should now unite 
in timely opposition. 

Mr. Nishihara, close associate of the Japanese Premier, 
General Terauchi, was unofficially doing the financial busi- 
ness of Japan in China. The Japanese Legation could deny 
that negotiations were going on, while Japanese interests 
were actively influencing the financial measures of the 
Peking Government. A large loan was proposed, to be 
secured on the tobacco and wine revenues. They were the 
security for the existing American loan, with option for 
further advances. I asked Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of Finance, 
about this and his answer was: "The United States is not 
giving to China the assistance she gives to her other as- 
sociates in the war. The American bankers have not 
completed their contract. It is necessary for China to look 
elsewhere.'* 

Mr. Tsao said he would at any time consider American 
proposals and give them as favourable treatment as to any 
other nation. I asked assurances that before anything 
further was done on the basis of the tobacco and wine 
revenues, the American bank have a chance to consider a 
proposal from the Chinese Government under its option. 
The minister had denied that the revenues were now in any 
way involved; but at this request he sidestepped. I made 
the most of his denial, placing it on record in a note to the 
Foreign Office. The French minister took action similar to 
mine. Tsao was not only Minister of Finance; he was 
concurrently Minister of Communications. Both depart- 
ments, therefore, were under the thumb of Japan. 

I have rather rapidly sketched the state of afi'airs within 
China up to July of 191 8. I wished a personal discussion of 
the situation with the officials at Washington — my first 
since America's entrance into the war. I left Peking for the 
United States after another long interview with General 



354 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Tuan, who had become Premier. On June 27th the Premier 
stated to me his policy and motives with frankness. "If 
we stop military action," he said, "that would be interpreted 
as weakness. The south would only make more extrava- 
gant demands, and further encroach on northern territory. 
Force that is adequate — that answers the question. For this 
we need money. If home revenues are not enough, then we 
must have foreign loans. That will restore national unity, 
which, in turn, will make repayment easy. The army will 
be reformed. The people will get protection, and the 
country will prosper." 

This policy was wise, inevitable, he thought. But it suited 
a class of inept generals who systematically made war at 
home, with only moderate risk of actual fighting. Their 
methods involved money more than bayonets. 

"When you return from America," Tuan said at parting 
"everything will be settled, and the south will recognize our 
authority," 

A sea-borne war expedition, sent to conquer the south, 
was in his mind. I could not but express my conviction of 
the impossibility of such an achievement but he was obstinate. 

I divided my time in America between Washington and 
New York, save for a visit to my mother. In four weeks I 
saw representatives of most of the great interests, public and 
private, involved in China. I by no means stopped with 
the State Department. I saw the Secretary of War and the 
Adjutant General, on questions dealing with the recruiting 
of troops to be stationed in China; the Intelligence Division 
of the War Department and of the Navy, as well as the 
Committee on Public Information; the Secretary of Com- 
merce, and officials of the War Trade Board and War 
Industries Board, about restrictions on commerce and Ameri- 
can com.mercial developments in China, together with the 
men of the Shipping Board about trans-Pacific lines. Among 
great private organizations I conferred with members of 



BANDITS AND INTRIGUERS 355 

the National City Bank; J. P. Morgan & Company; the 
Guaranty Trust Company of New York; Kuhn, Loeb & 
Company; the General Electric and American Locomotive 
companies; the Standard Oil Company of New York; the 
International Banking Corporation and American Inter- 
national Corporation; the Chase National Bank; the Siems- 
Carey Company; Pacific Development Corporation, and 
the Continental & Commercial Bank of Chicago. 

The American policy with respect to Russia and Siberia 
had not been determined, and in interviews with President 
Wilson the Siberian problem, to which I had been very close, 
as well as Chinese finance, were subjects of particular at- 
tention. I showed to the President how the Chinese got 
loans for alleged industrial purposes; then, with the conni- 
vance of the lenders, instead of building railways and tele- 
phone systems, they diverted them to political or partisan 
ends. Thus Chinese credit and the authority of the Govern- 
ment were progressively weakened. Then foreigners would 
encroach, and in some fields American opportunity was in 
danger of being restricted or lost entirely. I wished to see 
the United States backing financially a sound programme of 
Chinese reorganization. That would accord with our tra- 
ditions. But jealousies and friction were to be eliminated, 
hence I favoured the forming of an International Public 
Loan Consortium. 

This would support the credit of the Chinese Government 
and put Chinese finance on a sound basis. Such a consor- 
tium would claim priority in making all administrative or 
political loans; but monopoly should be avoided by leaving 
contracts for building and supplies open to competition, and 
by letting outside financiers make industrial loans. Of 
course, the Consortium as the chief backer of China should 
have full information about industrial loans, and each 
government should engage to scrutinize all loans made by its 
nationals for industries. All this, at his request, went to the 



356 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

President in a memorandum submitted on the 14th of 
August. 

With respect to Siberia and Russia, my information led me 
to beheve that the Russian people might still be influenced 
to remain friendly to the Allies, so as to prevent the growth 
of German control. I had in mind, not intervention, but 
economic assistance. I urged a commission that would aid 
the Russian people to import the commodities they needed 
most. The Russian Cooperative societies were anxious for 
just such assistance; thus, their leaders believed, further 
unfavourable developments could be prevented. I knew the 
Russians to be universally friendly; any movement initiated 
by America would be received with extreme goodwill. 

President Wilson seemed to wish something like this to be 
carried out. He even discussed with me what men were most 
likely to succeed in organizing so huge an enterprise. But he 
feared to place a representative of "big business" in such a 
position; men would suspect selfish national motives. I 
felt that he wished America to lead in giving the Russian 
people such aid in reorganizing their economic life as would 
permanently benefit them and preserve them for our common 
cause. 

After many, many departments and boards were consulted, 
I found they were not thinking of China. Their chief 
problem was to train the American army and transport it to 
the western front. They did not care to get Chinese contin- 
gents there. This was the critical moment of the war. By 
comparison other interests shrivelled. As for financial ad- 
vances to China, the Government found that China entered 
the war after the law authorizing advances was passed. A 
new law would be needed. To propose it would bring up the 
whole question of war poHcy. The temper of the day was to 
concentrate every effort on the greatest immediate show of 
strength on the west front. I appreciated all this, but I 
deeply regretted that a tiny rivulet out of the vast streams of 



BANDITS AND INTRIGUERS 357 

financial strength directed to Europe could not pass to China. 
Even one thousandth part of the funds given to Europe, 
invested in building up China, would have prevented many 
disheartening and disastrous developments. For every 
dollar tenfold in value would have been gained in fortifying 
Chinese ability to help in the war and in the post-bellum 
recovery. 



CHAPTER XXXI 
YOUNG MEN IN PEKING, OLD MEN IN PARIS 

A CROWD of Students appeared before the legation gate on 
the 5th of May clamouring to see me. I was absent, that 
day, on a trip to the temple above Men Tou-kou and so 
missed seeing them. Their demonstration, as it turned out 
afterward, was the first step in the widespread student 
movement which was to make history. Their patriotic 
fervour had, on that morning, been brought to the boiling 
point by the first inkling of the Paris decision on Shantung, 

The first reaction of the Chinese people as a whole to this 
news was one of dumb dismay. It was a stunning, paralyz- 
ing blow. It seemed that all the brazen intrigue through 
which Japan had been seeking to strengthen her hold on 
Shantung, all the cunning by which she had prepared the 
basis of her claim to permanent possession of the German 
rights, had been endorsed by the Versailles Conference. 

The Chinese people, discouraged in Peking, had centred 
their hopes on Paris. When hints of a possible acceptance 
of Japan's demands were received in Peking, the first im- 
pulse of the students was to see the American minister, to 
ask him whether this news was true, and to see what he had 
to say. I escaped a severe ordeal. 

When they were told that I was absent there was at first 
a hum of voices, then came the cry: "To the house of the 
traitor!" They meant the house of Tsao Ju-lin, where the 
schemers had assembled to make the contracts which China 
hated. Tsao Ju-lin, the smooth little plotter whom most 
people regarded as the guiding spirit of the humiliatmg busi- 
ness, was the most despised; but they associated with him 

358 



YOUNG MEN IN PEKING 359 

Chang Ching-hsiang, who had been Chinese minister at 
Tokyo when the secret treaties were drawn up. The students 
rushed over to the house and broke down the door and trooped 
inside. They found both men there. No time was lost, 
either on the part of the students or their prey. The stu- 
dents breaking up chairs and tables and using pieces of them 
for weapons went after the two diplomats. Tsao, still smooth 
and slippery, managed to escape through a window and into 
a narrow alley where he eluded his pursuers. Chang, how- 
ever, was beaten into insensibility. Lu Tsung-yu, the other 
plotter whom the students would have "treated rough", 
was not to be found. 

For four days we were without foreign news. The first 
brief telegraphic intimation of the Paris decision was followed 
by the cutting of the wires; Japanese agents, the people sur- 
mised, did this to prevent the universal Chinese protest 
from influencing the decision or causing its review. 

Primarily the cause of the student violence lay in the prox- 
imity of the fourth anniversary of the Japanese ultimatum of 
191 5; but they were also anxious and stirred because of the 
reported action of the old men at Paris. 

While other telegraphic communication was cut off I got 
information of what was actually done by wireless. I found 
it hard to believe that President Wilson would be compliant 
to the Japanese demands, in view of the complete and in- 
sistent information the American Government had had from 
me and all other American officials in China as to what would 
result from such action. The Shantung decision constituted 
a wrong of far-reaching effect; no general benefits bestowed 
by a league of nations could outweigh it. Indeed, as I stated 
to the Government, it destroyed all confidence in a league of 
nations which had such an ugly fact as its cornerstone. 

To any one who had watched, day by day, month by 
month, the unconscionable plotting for these claims, the 
decision was a lamentable denial of every principle put for- 



36o AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

ward during the war. President Wilson brushed aside the 
unanimous opinion of the American experts, it would seem, 
for two reasons: first, he believed that if only the League were 
established, all difficulties of detail could easily be resolved; 
and, second, he had not given enough attention to the 
Shantung question to realize that this was not a matter of 
detail, but a fundamental issue. 

President Wilson tried to make himself and others believe 
that with the acceptance of the Treaty and Covenant, the 
Shantung question would be solved through fulfilment by 
Japan of its promise "to restore Shantung Peninsula to 
China with full sovereignty," reserving only economic rights. 
This was his primary misconception. The ownership by a 
foreign government of a trunk railway reaching from a first- 
class port to the heart of China could not be correctly termed 
an economic right. Political control of such "economic rights" 
was exactly what American policy had tried to prevent for 
decades. The President submitted, also, in the apparent 
fear that Japanese delegates might follow the lead of the 
Italians and leave the Conference. Colonel House, it ap- 
pears, was frightened into this belief and communicated it 
to President Wilson; the two believed the League was en- 
dangered, and that every sacrifice must be made to save it. 

The fear was quite unfounded. I had seen indications 
enough, of which I had told the Government, that the 
Japanese set enormous store upon their membership in the 
Conference and their position in Paris. As a military, naval, 
and financial power, Japan could certainly not be put in the 
first class, notwithstanding the tactical advantages which 
the war had brought her. She would never forego the first- 
class status bestowed by the arrangements of the Peace Con- 
ference. The Japanese had not the remotest idea of throwing 
these advantages to the wind. The impression they produced 
on Colonel House simply proved their capacity for bluffing. 
Had President Wilson taken the trouble to understand the 



YOUNG MEN IN PEKING 361 

situation, he could without difficulty, by the use of friendly 
firmness, have secured a very different solution. As a 
matter of fact, it is now well known that the Japanese were 
ready to agree to an arrangement whereby the German 
rights in China should accrue to the Allied and Associated 
Powers jointly with an early reversion to China. 

Probably nowhere else in the world had expectations of 
America's leadership at Paris been raised so high as in China. 
The Chinese trusted America, they trusted the frequent 
declarations of principle uttered by President Wilson, whose 
words had reached China in its remotest parts. The more 
intense was their disappointment and disillusionment due 
to the decisions of the old men that controlled the Peace 
Conference. It sickened and disheartened me to think how 
the Chinese people would receive this blow which meant the 
blasting of their hopes and the destruction of their confidence 
in the equity of nations. 

In the universal despair I feared a revulsion of feeling 
against America; not because we were more to blame than 
others for the unjust decision, but because the Chinese had 
entertained a deeper belief in our power, influence, and 
loyalty to principle. They would hardly understand so 
abject and complete a surrender. Foreign papers, also, 
placed the chief responsibility on the United States. The 
British in China felt that their government had been forced 
into the unfortunate secret agreements with Japan when it 
could not help itself, because of the German danger and the 
difficulties Japan might raise by going over to the other side. 
The United States, whose hands were free, could have saved 
us all, they said, by insisting on the right solution. They 
had really hoped for this; their saying so now in their edi- 
torials and in private conversation was in no spirit of petty 
hostility, but they had to give vent to their feehngs. I 
feared the Chinese might feel that they had been betrayed in 
the house of their friends, but they met the blow with sturdy 



362 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

spirit. They never wounded my feelings by anything 
approaching an upbraiding of the United States for the 
part that President Wilson played at Paris. They expressed 
to me their terrible dejection, but said merely that President 
Wilson must have encountered very great difficulties which 
they could know nothing about. 

They all knew, of course, that the case of China had been 
weakened by the treaties made through the connivance of 
Tsao Ju-lin and his associates in the fall of 191 8. Their 
resentment was turned toward Japan, which had thus taken 
advantage of the war and the weakness of China, and against 
the Chinese politicians who had become Japan's tools. 

The Americans in China, as well as the British and the 
Chinese, were deeply dejected during these difficult weeks. 
From the moment America entered the war there had been a 
triumphant confidence that all this sacrifice and suff"ering 
would establish just principles of world action, under which 
mankind could live more happily and in greater security. 
That hope was now all but crushed. 

In commemoration of the soldier dead, the American 
community gathered on May 30th, Decoration Day. It fell 
to me to make the address, in which I spoke of those recently 
stationed in Peking who had died during the war. Especially, 
I spoke of the fruitful career of Major Willard Straight. It 
was remarkable how many officers of the Marine Guard 
recently in Peking had gone through the brunt of the war 
and had been distinguished in their service. I spoke of 
General Neville, General Bowley, Commander Hutchins, 
Colonel Newell, and Colonel Holcombe, all of whom had 
been in the thick of it, and rejoiced in their record and the 
fact that though they passed through the valley of death 
they had been spared. My eyes often rested on the sad face 
of Mrs. Deering, transfigured with the mother's pride in that 
heroic son whose war letters, published by her, are one of 
the intimately human memorials of the great struggle. 



YOUNG MEN IN PEKING 363 

I was impressed with how inadequately this wonderful 
country of China and the promise of its people were under- 
stood in America. I knew the difficulties and dangers to be 
overcome there, and I felt that Americans well-disposed 
toward China would take a hand in its development. But 
the "folks back home," especially the interests that con- 
trolled the economic life of America, remained blind and deaf, 
lavishing their money in Europe. 

I had spent my energies freely, withholding assistance from 
none who deserved it, although I could easily have limited 
my official action within narrower and more convenient 
bounds. In developments that would mean a slow lift of 
this fine old civilization to a modern plane real Ameri- 
can interests had come in. Foundations had been laid in the 
Canal Contract, the China Medical Board, the railway con- 
cessions, the creation of a Chino-American bank, and many 
other enterprises. America stood no longer with empty 
hands; she could not be confronted with the gibe so often 
used before: "It is easy for you to suggest generous action, 
for you haVe nothing to contribute." 

With these as beginnings, I arrived at the conclusion that 
more, possibly, could be done by way of arousing American 
interests in Far Eastern affairs by going to the United States 
than by staying in China. I feared, also, that if I remained 
away from America too long, it would be difficult readily to 
get in touch again with affairs there. 

For such reasons, I came to the decision that I should send 
my resignation to the President. I did not wish to run away 
from a difficult and disagreeable situation. Indeed, until 
the first effects of the Paris decision had been overcome, I 
would not leave. Beyond that time, I had no desire to re- 
main. Like the Chinese, I at that time still believed that 
President Wilson had probably met tremendous difficulties 
of which I had no knowledge. At any rate, it was far from 
my purpose to embarrass him or the Government through 



364 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

my action. Therefore, the only motive I gave for my 
resignation was my desire to return to the United States. 
However, in my letter to the President I tried to express 
in moderate but serious terms my view of the situation 
and of the action which had been taken at Paris. This 
letter follows: 

June 7, 1919. 
Dear Mr. President: 

I have the honour to place in your hands my resignation as minister to 
China and to request that I may be relieved of the duties of this post as 
soon as convenient to yourself and to the Secretary of State. My reason 
for this action is that I am wearied after nearly six years of continuous 
strain, that I feel that the interests of my family demand my return to the 
United States, and that I should like to reenter affairs at home without 
making my absence so long as to break off all of the most important rela- 
tionships. 

I desire to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me, and it 
shall be my greatest desire to continue in the future to cooperate in helping 
to realize those great purposes of national and international policy which 
you have so clearly and strongly put before the American nation and the 
world. 

In making this communication to you I cannot but refer to recent de- 
velopments with respect to China. The general outlook is indeed most 
discouraging, and it seems impossible to accomplish anything here at 
present or until the home governments are willing to face the situation and 
to act. It is not difficulties that deter me, and I should stay at my post 
if it were necessary and if I did not think that I could be of more use in the 
United States than in China at the present time. But in fact, the situation 
requires that the American people should be made to realize what is at 
stake here for us in order that they may give the necessary backing to the 
Government for support in any action which the developments here may 
require. Unless the American people realize this and the Government feels 
strong enough to take adequate action, the fruits of one hundred and forty 
years of American work in China will inevitably be lost. Our people will 
be permitted to exist here only on the sufferance of others, and the great 
opportunity which has been held out to us by the Chinese people to assist 
in the development of education and free institutions will be gone beyond 
recall. In its stead there will come a sinister situation dominated by the 
unscrupulous methods of the reactionary military regime centred in 



YOUNG MEN IN PEKING 365 

Tokyo, absolutist in tendency, cynical of the principles of free government 
and human progress. If this force, with all the methods it is accustomed 
to apply, remains unopposed there will be created in the Far East the great- 
est engine of military oppression and dominance that the world has yet 
seen. Nor can we avoid the conclusion that the brunt of evil results will 
fall on the United States, as is already foreshadowed by the bitter hostility 
and abnormal vituperativeness of the Japanese press with regard to 
America. 

The United States and Great Britain will have to stand together in this 
matter; I do not think this is realized as fully by Britishers at home as 
by those out here. If Russia can become an independent representative 
government its interests would parallel ours. The forces of public opinion 
and strength which can thus be mobilized are entirely sufficient to control 
the situation here and to keep it from assuming the menacing character 
which is threatened at present; but this can only be done if the situation 
is clearly seen and if it is realized that the military party of Japan will con- 
tinue its present methods and purposes which have proved so successful 
until it becomes a dead wall of firm, quiet opposition. There will be a 
great deal of talk of friendship for China, of restoration of Shantung, of 
loyalty to the League of Nations, but it will be dangerous to accept this 
and to stop questioning what are the methods actually applied; as long as 
they exist the menace is growing all the time. We cannot rest secure on 
treaties nor even on the League of Nations without this checking up of 
the facts. Otherwise these instruments would only make the game a little 
more complicated but not change its essential character. The menace can 
be avoided only if it is made plain to Japan that her purposes are unmis- 
takable and that the methods utilized to effect them will by no means be 
tolerated. Such purposes are the stirring up of trouble and revolution, 
encouragement of bandits and pirates, morphia, financial corruption, mis- 
leading of the press, refusal of just satisfaction when Americans are injured 
in order to gain prestige for absolute power, and chief of all official duplic- 
ity, such as the disavowal of knowledge when loans are being made to the 
Chinese Government by leading Japanese banks and the subsequent state- 
ment by the Japanese minister that these loans were private arrangements 
by "merchants." 

If continuous support could be given not only to the activities of Ameri- 
can merchants but to the constructive forces in Chinese national life itself 
these purposes and methods would not have the chance to flourish and 
succeed which they now enjoy. 

During the war our action in the support of constructive forces in China 
necessarily could not be effective, as our energies were required elsewhere. 



366 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

Yet I believe that a great opportunity was missed when China had broken 
off relations with Germany. The very least recognition of her sentiments, 
support and eflForts, on our part, would have changed the entire situation. 
But while millions upon millions were paid to the least important of the 
countries of Europe not a cent was forthcoming for China. This lack of 
support drove Tuan and his followers into the arms of the pro- Japanese 
agents. Instead of support we gave China the Lansing-Ishii Note. 

Throughout this period the Japanese game has still been in the stage of 
bluff; while Germany seemed at her strongest in the war indeed the Japa- 
nese were perhaps making their veiled threats with a feeling that if they 
should ally themselves with a strong Germany the two would be invincible; 
but even at that time a portion of the American navy detached could have 
checkmated Japan. Since the complete breakdown of Germany the case 
of Japan has been carried through solely on bluff though perhaps it may 
be that the Japanese militarists have succeeded in convincing themselves 
that their establishment is formidable. But it is plain that they would be 
absolutely powerless in the face of a stoppage of commerce and a navy 
demonstration on the part of any one of the great powers. No one de- 
sires to think of this contingency, but it is plain that after the breakdown 
of Germany it was not feasible for Japan to use force nor could she have 
suffered a greater damage than to exclude herself from the Peace Conference 
where she had everything to gain and nothing to lose. In ten years there 
may be a very different situation. Then also our people, having grown wise, 
will be sure to shout: "Why was not this stopped while there was yet time?" 
It seems to me necessary that someone in the Government ought to give 
attention primarily to China and the Far Eastern situation. It is very 
difficult to get any attention for China. I mean any continuous attention 
that results in getting something actually done. Everything else seems 
to come first because Europe seems so much nearer; and yet the destinies 
of Serbia, Czecho-SIovakia, and Greece are infinitesimal in their importance 
to the future of America compared with those of China. 

During my service here I have constantly suffered from this lack of con- 
tinuous attention at home to the Far Eastern situation. It has reacted on 
the consular service; the interpreter service which is absolutely necessary to 
make our consular corps in China effective has been starved, as no new 
appointments have been made. In my own case promises of assistance 
which had been given repeatedly went unfulfilled. In this matter I have 
not the least personal feeling. I know the result is not due to the personal 
neglect or ill-will of any man or group of men, only it seems to me to indi- 
cate a general sentiment of the unimportance of Far Eastern affairs, which 
ought to be remedied. I repeat that these statements are not made in a 



YOUNG MEN IN PEKING 367 

spirit of complaint; all individual members of the Department of State 
have shown nothing but consideration and readiness to assist, but there 
has been lacking a concentrated interest in China, which ought to be repre- 
sented in some one of the high officials, designated to follow up Far Eastern 
affairs and accorded influence commensurate with responsibilities in this 
matter. 



CHAPTER XXXII 
A NATION STRIKES AND UNITES 

The students of Peking "started something." For the 
first time in thousands of years pubhc opinion was aroused 
and organized in China. Through the action of the students, 
with whom the merchants made common cause, before and 
after the Shantung decision, China found herself. 

The Japanese papers insisted steadfastly that these stu- 
dent disturbances had been brought on at the "instigation 
of certain countries. " But instigation was not needed. If 
foreigners had wished to make trouble in this way, they would 
have been kept extremely busy trying to keep pace with the 
Chinese themselves. You do not have to instigate a man 
to resist a pillager who is trying to break into his house. 
Those who started this tremendous movement toward 
nationalism — for that is what it grew into — were students in 
the government schools and in the private schools of Peking 
and Tientsin. In the beginning the students were alone in 
the agitation, but not for long Throughout the agitators 
were referred to as "students," but this term came to be used in 
a broad sense; it came to mean Young China, including all of 
the youth of the land who had been educated in modern 
schools. 

China is the home of the strike and the boycott; but 
never before had these weapons been employed on such a 
scale. The merchants and students of north China met 
during the second half of May, declared a general boycott of 
Japanese goods, and demanded the dismissal of the three 
men called traitors, the notorious agents in the Chino-Japa- 
nese negotiations. The boycott spread rapidly, a spontane- 

368 



A NATION STRIKES AND UNITES 369 

ous expression of deep resentment. But the movement 
strove also to control and purify the action of the Chinese 
Government. The instrument for this was the strike — passive 
resistance — the stopping of the wheels of commerce and 
industry till the will of the people was listened to. 

The popular sense of equity, which in China asserts itself 
naturally in strikes, responded everyw^here. Unless the 
Government dismissed the three offenders, merchants would 
close their shops. Teachers, students, shopkeepers, chauf- 
feurs, dockhands, all classes of workmen would strike. All 
China, indeed, would go on strike. 

The movement gained momentum like an avalanche 
thundering down a mountain. Its fury was first of all con- 
centrated on the attempt to force the dismissal of the three 
officials who were, in the popular mind, guilty of trading 
away the national birthright. The organization of the 
uprising seemed to be almost spontaneous. Active little 
groups, similar to the Committees of Correspondence in the 
time of Adams and Franklin, sprang up in all parts of China. 
The masses of the people were marshalled for action. From 
the ten thousand students who had originally struck in 
Shanghai the movement expanded swiftly until it included 
merchants and chambers of commerce and dozens of other 
bodies in every walk of life. Associations of servants were 
formed under the title of The Industrial National Salvation 
Society. Even Japanese bankers were put under the ban by 
the Chinese financiers; finally the boycott went so far that it 
blacklisted the foreign goods which were brought to Chinese 
ports by Japanese steamers. 

In Peking, fifty groups of student speakers were sent out 
to appeal to the public. General Tuan Chi-jui, who, among 
others, was held responsible by the students for the nation's 
troubles, stoutly stood by his subordinates. The militarists 
in general, feeling that the student movement was not favour- 
able to them, prevailed on the Government to try to suppress 



370 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

it. Martial law was proclaimed, and students trying to 
speak were arrested. The students were undaunted and 
working en masse. The Government soon saw that it could 
imprison them, but that it was powerless to stem the tide of 
feeling they were creating. Thundering from all parts of 
the country, it was recognized that the students could, if 
they chose, turn the entire people against the Government. 
By June 4th, nearly a thousand students were under forcible 
detention in Peking; those recently arrested had wisely 
provided themselves with knapsacks stocked with food before 
taking their lecture trips. 

Then the girl students came forth. They fully shared the 
patriotic feelings of their brothers. Seven hundred girls 
from the Peking schools assembled and marched to the 
President's palace to request the release of the young men 
under arrest. 

The Government made a technical mistake. When the 
student feehng seemed to be a little on the ebb, the 
Government took occasion to issue a decree trying to white- 
wash Tsao Ju-lin and his confederates. That fanned the 
flame which ultimately swept all over China. 

Weakening, the Government ofi'ered the students release 
if they would return to work and make no further trouble. 
The students saw their advantage, and stated that they had 
no wish to leave their prisons, if it meant promising to 
abstain from expressing their opinion in future; moreover, 
they would not leave until the Government had apologized 
for their unjust arrest. 

The jailing of this large number of the youth of China 
finally brought such ill-concealed opposition that the Govern- 
ment complied with the students' ultimatum. An apology 
was off'ered them, whereupon the students returned to their 
colleges and their work. But they continued their street 
lectures, calling upon the people to join in a powerful ex- 
pression of national opinion through which their country's 



A NATION STRIKES AND UNITES 371 

institutions and policies might be put on a sounder basis, 
and Japanese aggression powerfully resisted. 

In Shanghai the boycott and the strike of the shopkeepers 
were in full force. Their shops were closed, they threatened 
to pay no taxes unless the "traitors " were ousted. American 
officials at Shanghai sent me alarming reports. The British 
there, particularly those of the official class, were inclined to 
repress the movement. 

The Japanese, who were feeling the full force of the popular 
thrust, tried to brand it anti-foreign and to reawaken memo- 
ries of the Boxer period. Some of the influential British in 
Shanghai, frightened by the successful efforts of the mer- 
chants and students among the industrial workers, began to 
call them anti-foreign, too. I was told that the municipal 
council in Shanghai might take very stringent action against 
the boycott and strike. The British minister had gone to 
the seashore, and I sent him word that the situation was 
serious. 

It would have been the height of folly had either we or the 
British let ourselves be dragged into the disturbance, which 
was directed solely against the Japanese, and was fortu- 
nately not our concern, and in no sense anti-foreign. I sent 
specific instructions to the consulate-general at Shanghai 
advising the American community neither to encourage nor 
oppose this movement, which was the affair of the Chinese. 
The Americans saw the point clearly, and realized how un- 
desirable it would be to entangle the municipal council in the 
business. I told the Consul-General that, illegal and overt 
acts excepted, the foreign authorities in China had nothing 
to do with the strike; being happily free of Chinese ill-will, 
we wished to remain free. In order to avoid all danger of 
more general trouble, Americans exerted considerable in- 
fluence with the Chinese leaders to cause them to abstain 
from action that would tend to involve foreigners generally. 
They responded willingly. 



372 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

By this time even the mafoos (horse boys) at the Shanghai 
Race Club were on strike. A run on the Bank of Communi- 
cations was started because Tsao Ju-lin was associated with 
it. More and more serious grew the situation, but the 
demand on the Government remained unchanged: *'When 
the three traitors are dismissed, the strike will be called oflF; 
otherwise, still more people will strike." 

The Government finally yielded on the i ith of June. The 
insistent demand had come from all parts of China that 
the three unpopular officials go in disgrace. The Peking 
Government compHed. But the great pubUc in Shanghai 
was not content until the British minister and I gave con- 
firmation of the report that the mandate of dismissal had 
been issued. Then the strike was off. 

However, the boycott against Japanese goods continued 
unabated. Yet it must not be supposed that the movement, 
which at the begmnmg was distinctly turned against Japan, 
was either essentially anti-Japanese or purely oppositional 
and negative. Quite early, its true, positive, national 
Chinese character stood revealed. The Japanese had stung 
the Chinese national pride to the quick. It turned against 
them, not in a spirit of blind hostility, but only in so far as the 
Japanese stood in the way of the national Chinese regener- 
ation. 

Out of this unprecedented popular uprising several mo- 
mentous facts emerged. First, public opinion must be so 
awakened that it would be a continuing force, so organized 
that it would at all times have the means of expressing its 
will, so that it would be able to compel the Government to 
resist further encroachments on China's rights. That would 
take time; but it could be done, the strike and boycott 
proved that. For the first time in her history China had 
roused herself and wrung from her government a specific 
surrender. That lesson sank deep. The leaders reaHzed 
that this single act was merely a very small beginning. 



A NATION STRIKES AND UNITES 373 

But the important thing was that it did constitute a 
beginning. 

The second important result was the sudden focussing of 
attention on the means by which native Chinese industry- 
might be built up. The boycott of Japanese goods had had 
a positive as well as a negative side. Indeed it had been 
stated positively all along. The people were not told to re- 
frain from buying Japanese goods; they were advised to avoid 
buying goods of an inferior quality — ^which would be inter- 
preted to mean Japanese products, of course — and they were 
pointedly urged to patronize home industries. The people 
responded with a will. They did buy the wares produced by 
their own factories. It gave great impetus to the develop- 
ment of Chinese industry, and gave both the manufacturers 
and the Government a clue as to what a definite campaign for 
the stimulation of the home industries might accomplish. 

While we were talking together informally at a meeting of 
the diplomatic corps, the French minister, M. Boppe, re- 
marked: "We are in the presence of the most astounding and 
important thing that has ever happened — the organization 
of a national public opinion in China for positive action." 

Thus out of the evil of the Paris decision came an inspiring 
national awakening of the Chinese people, a welding to- 
gether for joint thought and joint action. All ranks of the 
population were affected. When to avoid foreign complica- 
tions student delegates went among the workers of a 
factory in Shanghai to persuade them not to strike, the 
workers asked: "Do you think we have no feeling for our 
country, nor indignation against the traitors ?" 

About the evil of the Shantung decision the foreign com- 
munities were unanimous, nor did they feel that they ought 
to be silent. They were on the ground; they knew the 
inevitable consequences that would follow the rigid applica- 
tion of the decision. They spoke out. Sir Edward Walker, 
chairman of the Commercial Bank of Canada, gave an 



374 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

address on June 6th before the Anglo-American Association 
of Peking, dealing particularly with the needs of transporta- 
tion. What the completion of two or three trunk lines 
would mean to China he fully reaHzed. After his address 
the British minister and I, who were honorary members, took 
our leave, as it had been intimated that the Association 
would discuss the Shantung matter. The meeting then 
adopted a resolution which expressed the conviction of Amer- 
icans and British in China in this wise: 

We express our solemn conviction that this decision will create condi- 
tions that must inevitably bring about extreme discord between the 
Chinese people and Japan, and raise a most serious hindrance to the de- 
velopment of the economic interests of China and other countries. A 
settlement which perpetuates the conditions created by Germany's aggres- 
sion in Shantung in 1898, conditions that led to similar action on the part 
of other states, that were contributing causes to the disorders in North 
China in 1900, and that made inevitable the Russo-Japanese war, cannot 
make for peace in the Far East, for political stability in China itself, or for 
development of trade and commerce equally open to all. 

Further, the evil consequences of conditions which are not only subver- 
sive of the principle of national self-determination, but also a denial of the 
policy of the open door and of the principle of equality of opportunity, will 
be greatly accentuated if Japan, a near neighbour, be now substituted for 
Germany, whose centre of political and economic activities was on the 
other side of the globe. 

Therefore we, the members of the Peking Anglo-American Association, 
resolve that representations be made to the British and American Govern- 
ments urging that the states taking part in the Peace Conference devise 
and carry through a just settlement which will not endanger the safety of 
China and the peace of the world. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 
TAKING LEAVE OF PEKING 

The Government was now confronted with the question of 
whether its delegates at Paris should or should not sign the 
Treaty and Covenant. The Chinese people were opposed 
to signing, for with China's signature would go specific 
recognition of the transfer of German rights to Japan. They 
had learned one great lesson: that to make concessions to 
foreign powers never got them out of trouble, but only 
aggravated it. If the Peking officials in 1898 had turned 
a deaf ear to the German demands, despite threats of naval 
demonstrations, the Germans could never have secured the 
things which the Chinese actually gave them. The Chinese 
people now said: "Never again!" 

I was informed on the 28th of May that nearly all the 
officials in Peking were agreed that the Treaty should be 
signed. Knowledge of their readiness to capitulate brought 
the national movement of the Chinese people to its height 
almost immediately, in opposition to the reactionary militar- 
ist control. By the ist of July, a gentleman from the im- 
mediate entourage of the President, who often came to see 
me on the latter's behalf, told me that the President had 
instructed the delegates at Paris not to sign the Treaty. 
They did not sign it then, and steadfastly resisted all efforts 
to make them sign it later. 

When the student troubles were at their height, on the 
2nd of June I was at the Legation late one evening to answer 
some cablegrams. I was interrupted by an American 
woman teacher who with five Chinese schoolgirls came to 
my office in a state of great excitement. The girls had stood 

375 



376 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

with a crowd for forty-eight hours asking admission to the 
President's palace to present their grievance. They had 
endured these hardships as bravely as any of the young men, 
but they were now alarmed because two of the student 
leaders had been seized and taken inside the palace. The 
girls feared their execution, and begged me to intercede. 
As I could not quiet their apprehensions, I finally said I 
would direct that an inquiry be made at the palace. By 
telephone I learned that the students were being detained 
because they had been too forward in their demonstrations, 
but that nothing untoward would happen to them. 
The girls, happy and thankful at this reassurance, went 
home. 

No one could fail to sympathize with the aims and ideals of 
the students, who were striving for national freedom and 
regeneration. I, too, felt a strong sympathy, though I, 
of course, abstained from all direct contact with the 
movement, as it was a purely Chinese matter. Never- 
theless, the Japanese papers reported quite in detail 
how I had organized the student movement, and how 
I had spent ^2,000,000 in getting it under way. As 
everybody knew how spontaneous and irrepressible the 
movement of the students was, these items excited only 
amusement. 

Pessimism reigned among liberal-minded people in early 
June. They feared that followers of General Tuan would 
insist upon putting him back into the Premiership, in which 
case there would be no escape from another revolution to 
oppose him, with the general demoralization and waste of 
national resources which would attend it. The second 
aide memoire of the associated representatives was presented 
to the President by Sir John Jordan on the 5th of June; it 
conveyed the hope that China's internal difficulties might 
now come to an end, that the peace conference at Shanghai 
might be resumed and successfully concluded without delay, 



TAKING LEAVE OF PEKING 377 

and it stated that meanwhile military measures should not be 
resumed. The friendly advice encouraged the liberal ele- 
ments, particularly the express desire that there should be no 
further fighting. It was felt that the President's hands were 
strengthened for peace. 

Dr. Chiang Monlin, Acting Chancellor of Peking Uni- 
versity in the absence of Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei, went to 
Shanghai because the militarist faction wished to hold him 
responsible for the acts of the students. He was, indeed, 
one of their chief counsellors, but he counselled wisdom and 
moderation. He told me that the leaders were conscious 
of much progress in organizing public opinion, but that at 
least ten years of further work and experience would be 
necessary before there could be any approach to a public 
opinion consciously and unceasingly active in support, 
or in proper restraint, of the Government. "All we ask," 
Doctor Chiang said, "is ten years' time — freedom from 
outside interference — ^then the New China will be organ- 
ized." 

I visited General Tuan, finding him calm but stubborn 
as usual. I asked him whether, if the students should call 
on him, he would go out to speak to them. "I would 
certainly do that," he replied; "I am in sympathy with them, 
but I feel that they are often misled by people whose motives 
are not disinterested." I told him that I believed the students 
would gladly follow him and make him their leader if 
they could be assured that he would not be controlled 
by counsellors who had not the true welfare of China at 
heart. 

This movement of the Chinese people impressed me the 
more vividly in the light of a letter from R. F. Johnston on 
July 3rd which led me to hark back to the days of the old Em- 
pire. Mr. Johnston was a tutor of the young Emperor, 
and he inclosed a translation of a Chinese poem which the 
Emperor had written out for me. It bore the Imperial seals, 



378 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

and was dated: "Eleventh year of Hsuan Tung, sixth month, 
fifth day." Here is the first verse: 

The red bows unbent, 

Were received and deposited, 

I have here an admirable guest, 

And with all my heart I bestow one on him. 

The bells and drums have been arranged in order. 

And all the morning will I feast him. 

Shortly after, in a talk I had with Mr. Johnston, he told 
me that the little Emperor had himself conceived the idea of 
writing something for me. Johnston had suggested a cer- 
tain poem but it did not satisfy his pupil, who finally made 
his own selection. He said to his tutor: "I want to imagine 
that the American minister is coming to the palace as my 
guest." 

The young Emperor, Mr. Johnston said, was interested in 
everything that went on in the political and social life of 
the capital, and read the papers every day. I attributed his 
interest in my doings to the fact that the Emperor shared the 
love for America that is general in China; but, also, I think 
the repeated likelihood of being taken to the American 
Legation for refuge and shelter had impressed itself very 
strongly on his youthful mind, so that it seemed to him a 
haven of escape from all terror and danger. 

Reports came at the end of July that President Wilson was 
defending the Shantung settlement, by stating that it con- 
ferred on Japan no political rights but only economic privi- 
leges. Had Mr. Wilson given attention to the details of 
the question, as reported over and over again in telegrams 
and dispatches from the Legation and consulates in China, he 
could not have harboured such a misunderstanding. In this 
instance the President based his action rather on vague 
assurances given by Japan, the actual bearing of which he did 
not know. The term "economic privileges" can hardly 



TAKING LEAVE OF PEKING 379 

apply to such matters as control of the port of Tsingtao and 
the Shantung Railway, and to a general commercial prefer- 
ence in Shantung Province; yet these were plainly what 
Japan wished to retain. Her pledge "to return Shantung 
Peninsula with full sovereignty" sounded satisfactory, but 
it was never defined to cover more than the 1 50 square miles 
of agricultural and mountain land which the Germans had 
held as a leasehold, exclusive of Tsingtao port. That im- 
portant harbour the Japanese intended to retain, as well as 
the terminals, railway, and mines. 

The refusal of the Chinese to sign the Paris Treaty afforded 
an opportunity for saving Shantung to China. But if the 
German rights were to be confirmed to Japan under the term 
of "economic privileges," we should soon find that these 
economic privileges meant an end of independent American 
enterprise in Shantung Province. Japan had used such 
"economic privileges" in Manchuria. We were amply 
warned what to expect from an extension of that policy to 
other parts of China. 

President Wilson stated later that the League would pre- 
vent Japan from assuming full sovereignty over Shantung. 
Here he again misunderstood. Japan had no idea of asking 
for sovereignty over Shantung; she had absolutely no right 
to it, and did not need it for carrying out her plans, so long 
as she could retain the politico-economic rights awarded at 
Paris. 

I reiterated these statements in my telegrams to Wash- 
ington. I explained again that ownership by a foreign gov- 
ernment of port facilities and of a railway leading into the 
interior of China, together with exclusive commercial pref- 
erences, are economic rights so fortified politically that they 
constitute political control — as Manchuria shows — ^without 
the name. In fact, they could be safely accompanied with 
most profuse protestations to respect Chinese sovereignty. 

The question of political sovereignty was beside the mark. 



38o AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

It had been broached, as I have pointed out, to make the 
world beheve that something was being returned. "Re- 
turning Shantung Peninsula with full sovereignty" was a 
big phrase and it had an imposing sound. But the sover- 
eignty of Shantung was not involved, it had never been either 
German or Japanese: it had always been Chinese. The 150 
square miles of unimportant land outside the port of Tsing- 
tao might be ** returned with full sovereignty," but nobody 
cared for that. To talk of sovereignty merely obscured 
the issue. 

Dr. Sun Yat-sen was just then busying himself with the 
task of drawing up projects for the further economic develop- 
ment of China with international participation, and I corre- 
sponded with him. In one of my letters I considered how 
rapid and sweeping the industrial transformation of China 
should be. I wrote: 

I believe that we should at all times keep in mind the fact that we are 
not dealing with a new country, but with one in which social arrangements 
are exceedingly intricate and in which a long-tested system of agricultural 
and industrial organization exists. It is to my mind most important that 
the transition to new methods of industry and labour should not be sudden 
but that the old values should be gradually transmuted. It is highly im- 
portant that artistic ability, such as exists, for instance, in silk and porce- 
lain manufacture, should be maintained and protected, and not superseded 
by cheaper processes. The one factor in modern organization which the 
Chinese must learn to understand better is the corporation, and the fidu- 
ciary relationship which the officers of the corporation ought to occupy 
with respect to the stockholders. If the Chinese cannot learn to use the 
corporation properly, the organization of the national credit cannot be 
effected. Here, too, it is necessary that the principle of personal honesty 
which was fostered under the old system should not be lost, but transferred 
to the new methods of doing business. So, at every point where we are 
planning for a better and more efficient organization, it seems necessary to 
hold on to the values created in the past, and not to disturb the balance of 
Chinese society by too sudden changes. 

Among his suggestions for constructive works, Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen had spoken of a northern port, somewhere on the 



TAKING LEAVE OF PEKING 381 

coast of Chihli Province, which should have water deep 
enough to admit large ocean-going ships. The port of 
Tientsin is not adequate: it is far up river, and lacks satis- 
factory anchorage where the river empties into the sea. 
Chinwangtao is a far better port, but so exposed that enor- 
mous expenditure would be needed to improve it; and its 
capacity, even then, would be too small. I asked Mr. Paul 
P. Whitham, special commissioner of the Department of 
Commerce, to go to the Chihli coast to see whether about 
half way between Tientsin and Chinwangtao a satisfactory 
port site might be found. He succeeded in finding a site 
where, with comparatively moderate expense, a deep-sea port 
could be built. It was easy to see the transformation in 
north China commerce that this would bring about. Here 
would be an outlet for a rich and extensive hinterland, 
including the Province of Chihli and all the region to the 
north and northwest of it, particularly inner Mongolia and 
western Manchuria. I talked the matter over with the 
civil governor and other provincial leaders of Chihli Prov- 
ince, also with the representatives of Governor Li Hsun of 
Nanking, besides certain members of the Central Govern- 
ment. They greatly favoured the project, and before many 
weeks preliminary surveys were made. It was to be known 
as the Great Northern Port. 

I visited Sir John Jordan on August 14th telling him of my 
resignation, at which ,he expressed regret; but he admitted 
that he could understand why I wished to return to the 
United States. He, too, wished to be relieved of his duties 
as soon as possible. I had on that day a very full talk 
about Shantung with Mr. Yoshizawa, Japanese Charge, 
in which we considered ways which might render the 
Shantung arrangement more satisfactory, especially if 
Tsingtao should be made into a genuine international 
settlement. But I emphasized the importance of the return 
of the railway. 



382 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

The negotiations for the new Consortium had been going 
on for some time. The Japanese proposed that the Con- 
sortium should not apply to Manchuria and eastern Mon- 
golia. The Japanese-controlled press had attacked the first 
proposal of this Consortium, as Japan purposed during the 
war to achieve complete leadership of foreign finance in China. 
If the United States would join the old Consortium, Japan 
would have been pleased, for there she led. But ordinarily 
the financial power of Japan is of distinctly secondary impor- 
tance, and the abnormal conditions of the war could not last. 
Now Japan approved of the new Consortium in principle, 
but continued to procrastinate when a decision on details 
was required. 

My resignation was accepted in a cablegram received on 
the 1 8th of August, the President expressing formally his 
regret that I should find it necessary to insist upon relinquish- 
ing my post. Even now, when I knew how decidedly the 
President had misjudged the Chinese situation, notwithstand- 
ing my insistent and detailed warnings, I had no desire to 
advertise differences in poHcy. The Japanese press, I knew, 
would consider my resignation due to the defeat of my 
"policy" to have America maintain her honourable and trusted 
position in China. I did not wish to favour this sort of inter- 
pretation by a controversy with the administration. 

The Chinese understood the situation quite completely. 
When I told the President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
the Premier, and non-offical Chinese friends, they seemed 
discouraged at the prospect of my leaving China at this 
juncture. I had the good fortune to make many friendships 
in China with men whose loyalty and truthfulness could be 
relied upon. Though seemingly distressed at the idea of my 
going, they knew I only hoped it might enable the work of 
developing close relations between the two countries to con- 
tinue more effectively. I wished to bring about positive 
practical action. The spirit of the American policies and 



TAKING LEAVE OF PEKING 383 

declarations was admirable, but not enough individual 
and specific American activity in China accompanied 
them. 

Mr. Fu, Acting Minister of Education, and a number of his 
associates visited me on the 25th of August, to consider ar- 
rangements for exchange professorships in American and 
Chinese universities. I had always favoured bringing young 
Chinese scholars into lectureships in American universities, 
to make accessible to the American public the treasures of 
Chinese literature, philosophy, and art. President Yuan 
Shih-kai had supported this idea, and, but for the unfortunate 
monarchical movement, would have done much to promote 
intellectual contact between the United States and China. 
His successors shared his sentiments, and only the turmoil in 
Peking's political life prevented their working out plans in 
detail. 

General Hsu Shu-cheng called on me from time to time and 
told me about his Mongolian venture. When the War 
Participation Bureau became plainly obsolete its name was 
changed to "Northwest Frontier Defence Bureau." Every- 
body knew against whom this Bureau was to "defend" 
China, though there was talk about Bolshevik activity in 
Mongolia, also of the designs of General SemenofF to create 
a Pan-Mongolian state. General Hsu unfolded in his talks 
with me very large schemes for developing Mongolia, includ- 
ing a colonial bank, the building of highways for motor 
transport, the digging of artesian wells, and the establishment 
of model farms. He would, he said, also promote the com- 
pletion of the railway from Kalgan to Urga, and would even 
extend it to Chinese Turkestan. Report had it that the Japa- 
nese had promised General Hsu an advance of ^50,ocx),ooo 
for his enterprises. But he told me that he would carry 
them out with capital entirely subscribed in China. The 
President and other Peking leaders, it was said, apprehensive 
of the direction the overflowing energies of General Hsu 



384 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

might take next, bethought themselves of the undeveloped 
reaches of Mongolia. There would be the field ample enough 
for his ebuUient nature. All this time the Japanese were 
carefully watching any factor that might become active in 
Mongolia, including General SemenofF, General Chang Tso- 
lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria, and General Hsu Shu-cheng. 
Whatever might happen there, they undoubtedly intended 
that it should fit in with their policy of imposing their influ- 
ence upon that dependency. 

Mrs. Reinsch and my family had sailed from Chinwangtao 
on the 1 2th of June for Honolulu, where they were to spend 
the summer. As my resignation had already gone forward, 
it was a farewell to Peking for Mrs. Reinsch, who was reluc- 
tant to leave the city which she had enjoyed so much. A 
series of farewell luncheons, dinners, and receptions began 
for me in August which, with the heavy work of winding up 
the business of my office, filled the remaining weeks with 
activity every day from sunrise until after midnight. When 
President Hsu Shih-chang entertained me for the last time, 
he said : "The Chinese look to you to be a friend and guide to 
them, and we hope your action and influence may continue 
for many decades." On the next day he invited me, through 
Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, to act as counsellor to the Chinese Govern- 
ment, with residence in America. 

I left Peking on the evening of September 13th. All my 
colleagues with members of their staff's, the high Chinese 
officials, and a throng of other people, had gathered at the 
station to say " good-bye." Drawn up on the platform were 
companies of the American marines, the Indian troops of the 
British Legation Guard, and Chinese troops. With the 
Acting Premier, Mr. Kung Shin-chan, I inspected them, 
accepted their salute, and made a few farewell remarks to 
the faithful marines. As the American band played "Auld 
Lang Syne," the train moved out of the station, and the 
thousands of faces of those who had come to see me off 



TAKING LEAVE OF PEKING 385 

became blurred in the distance, leaving impressed on my 
mind a composite face, friendly, eager, urging to endeavour. 

My friend. Chow Tsu-chi, accompanied me as far as Tient- 
sin where I parted with him. It had, all in all, been a truly 
heart-warming leave-taking. I felt that the spontaneous 
expressions of deep confidence both on the part of my country- 
men and of the Chinese would remain with me as the best 
reward for any exertions and efforts I had made. 

Dr. Charles D. Tenney, American Charge d'Affaires after 
my departure, wrote the following report to the Secretary of 
State concerning the farewell hospitalities : 

I have the honour to state that the departure from Peking of the Honour- 
able Paul S. Reinsch, American Minister to China, whose resignation has 
been accepted by the President, was made the occasion of gratifying mani- 
festations of cordiality toward the United States and of the highest popular 
and official esteem for the retiring Minister. 

Mr. Reinsch was naturally the guest of honour at numerous dinners 
and receptions in the period just preceding his departure, at which the 
Chinese present expressed the deepest appreciation of his diversified activi- 
ties during the six years of his tenure of office. Published references to 
Mr. Reinsch's career as American Minister, also, refer to his many-sided 
interest in and efforts to promote the joint commercial, industrial, and edu- 
cational interests of China and the United States, in addition to the usual 
duty of fostering international unity between the two nations. It was 
made strikingly evident that the Government and people of this Republic 
have come earnestly to desire and expect a policy of vigorous advancement 
of these interests by the United States in China. The feeling of all was 
epitomized by President Hsu Shih-chang, who, at Mr. Reinsch's farewell 
interview, asserted his profound belief that the latter's activities as Minister 
had advanced and strengthened in a very real way all those economic and 
social relations that to-day bind the governments and peoples of China 
and the United States in close friendship, at the same time expressing his 
hope that on his return to the United States Mr. Reinsch would abate none 
of his efforts toward these ends, but that in his altered capacity he would 
continue to work in the interests of China. 

Mr. Reinsch left Peking on the evening of the thirteenth instant and the 
scene at the railway station was of an unusual and gratifying description 
Although it is not customary for guards of honour to be tendered by other 



386 AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 

legations on the departure of ministers, on this occasion there was present 
a detachment from the British Legation Guard, and there were also present 
detachments from the American Legation Guard, the Peking police force 
and the Peking gendarmerie, with military music. The Acting Premier 
came in person to the station to bid farewell to Mr. Reinsch and there were 
present a thousand persons, including Chinese officials, foreign diplomats, 
representatives of all varieties of institutions and societies, and personal 
friends of all nationalities. 

I had turned over arrangements for my trip through Japan 
to Mr. Willing Spencer, the First Secretary, who had con- 
sulted with Mr. Tokugawa, of the Japanese Legation. Their 
main difficulty had been the fact that Korea was under 
quarantine because of the cholera. An amusing experience 
ensued. In order to avoid any risk of delay I agreed to be 
inoculated; this was done deferentially by a little physician 
who came from the Japanese Legation. At Shimonoseki our 
steamer arrived in the early morning, and was held in quaran- 
tine. The inspecting officers who boarded said I should be 
permitted to land almost immediately. However, they left 
and said a launch would be sent for me before noon. As 
the evening train would be the last that could make my con- 
nection with the steamer at Yokohama, I waited somewhat 
nervously for the launch. It was three o'clock before the 
officers returned, saying that my baggage could now be taken 
ashore; soon they disappeared with the baggage, but left me 
still on the boat. I wired the embassy at Tokyo, telling them 
of my predicament. The train was to leave at half-past 
seven, and no launch had appeared at six. 

Suddenly out of the evening mist covering the bay a little 
launch emerged, and an official I had not seen before boarded 
and asked me to accompany him. Descending to the launch 
with my two servants, I was surprised to notice that it did 
not head toward Shimonoseki, but took the opposite direc- 
tion. I remonstrated, but the officer, smiling reassuringly, 
said: "It will be all right." Then the two inspecting officers 



TAKING LEAVE OF PEKING 387 

appeared from below; smiling and bowing they told me we 
were going to the Isolation Hospital! 

And to the Isolation Hospital we went. There in the cen- 
tral reception room I was introduced to the chief, who, after 
a brief exchange of civilities, announced, "Now, everything 
is all right." 

We took the launch, and arrived at Shimonoseki with still 
a quarter of an hour to spare before the train departed, 
whereon a special compartment had been reserved for me. 
Everything was now clear. The Japanese passengers on the 
steamer were as little pleased at being detained there as I 
was. Had a foreigner, even a foreign minister, been taken 
off the ship to Shimonoseki, a small riot might be looked for. 
So the word was passed around that I was being taken to 
the Isolation Hospital, where nobody had any particular 
wish to go. I could not but admire the resourcefulness of 
these little officials, and to feel thankful to them for all the 
trouble they took to solve this knotty problem without doing 
violence to any of their quarantine regulations. 

I had only one day in Tokyo. A luncheon had been 
arranged for me at the house of Baron Okura, where I 
went with Ambassador Morris and met several Japanese 
gentlemen, among them Mr. Hanihara, just made Vice- 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Baron Shidehara, the new 
Ambassador to the United States. We took lunch on an 
open veranda, overlooking delightful gardens, and after an 
animated conversation I took my leave and hurried to Yoko- 
hama, with the same agreeable impression of Japanese hos- 
pitality that I had received six years before, on my first 
arrival in the Far East. 



THE END 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Abbott, John J., 256, 260 

Adams, Dr. Henry C, 30, 32, 35, 68, 

Administrative Conference, 46 

Advice from America, 269 

Advisers, Foreign, 47, 68 

Aglen, Sir Francis, 233 

Aide memoire of December 2, 1918, 326 

Alston, Mr., 151, 233 

American activity, 75 

American aims in China, 65 

American Chamber of Commerce, 200 

American cooperation, 72, 73 

American enterprise in China, 64, 65, 

82, 88, 91, 102, 106, 128, 200, 207, 

210, 214, 226 
American International Corporation, 

208, 217, 219, 225 
American Legation, 19 
American Marines, 17, i8 
American minister, 143, 309, 319, 358, 

378,385^ , ^ 
American Red Cross, 14, 80, 81, 151, 

163, 218 
American University Club, 200 
American-French cooperation, 223 
Ancestor worship, 34 
Anderson, Meyer & Co., 208 
Anderson, Roy S., 12, 85, 109, 213, 244, 

264 
Anfu Club, 317 

Anglo-American Association, 156, 374 
Anglo-American friendship, 155 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 135 
Anhui Party, 188 
Anti-foreign propaganda, 141 
Aoki, General, 267, 351 
Ariga, Professor, 154 
Armistice, 317 
Arms, Importation of, 342 
Army, 53, 189 

Arnold, Julean, 103, 185, 329 
Arsenals, 297 
Associated Press, 132 
Authority, 177 
Automobiles, 108, 117 



Backhouse, Edward, 52 

Bain, Dr. F., 224 

Baker, J. E., 329 

Bandits, 190, 347 

Bank of China, 90, 91, 97,'202 

Bank of Communications, 190, 299, 372 

Banking, 102 

Bashford, Bishop, 50 

Battle of Peking, 284 

Beelaerts, van Blokland, M., 52 

Belin, F. L., 272, 277, 283 

Bemis, E. W., 223 

Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 67, 83, 

84, 99, 140 
Bevan, Professor, 154 
Billings, Dr. Frank, 151 
"Bite to death," no 
Blood of enemies, 109 
Blythe, Sam L., 245, 255 
Boardman, Miss, 93 
Bolshevism, 351 
Botanical Gardens, 29 
Bowley, Major, 109, 362 
Boxer indemnity payments, 297 
Bredon, Sir Robert, 154 
Brigands, S4..347 
British Legation, 114 
British minister, 325, 371 
British-American Tobacco Company, 

66, 67, 75, 89 
Bryan, Secretary, 84, 140, 269, 270 
Business representatives, 215 
Buttrick, Dr., 150 

Calhoun, W. J., i6i 

Carey, W. F., 207, 208, 209, 213 

Central Government, 54, 55, 56, 292, 

293, 321 
Chadbourne, Mrs., 235 
Chang Chien, 29, 70, 71, 80, 8 1 
Chang Chin-yao, 351 
Chang Chung-hsiang, 113, 359 
Chang Hsun, General, 11, 184, 262, 265, 

267, 270, 272, 274, 283 
Chang Hu, 172 
Chang Tso-lin, 262, 384 



391 



392 



INDEX 



Chen Chin-tao, Dr., loo, 201, 202, 222, 

232, 247, 251, 257, 260, 264 
Chen, Eugene, 247 
Chen Huan-chang, Dr., 23 
Chen Lu, 340 
Chen Pan-ping, 213 
Chiang, Dr. Monlin, 377 
Chien Neng-hsun, 227, 325 
Chienmen, 17 

Chin Pu Tang, 96, 103, 288, 340 
Chin Yun-peng, General, 266, 301 
China Medical Board, 150, 363 
China Press, 62 

Chinchow-Aigun Railway, &J, 97 
Chinda, Ambassador, 140 
Chinese art, 29, 157, 228 
Chinese dinners, 32, 33, 152 
Chinese ethics, 34 
Chinese life, 22, 49 
Chinese handwriting, 29 
Chinese industry, 373 
Chinese iron industry, 224, 293 
Chinese language, 51 
Chinese manners, 71 
Chinese materia medica, 151 
Chinese musicians, 196 
Chinese navy, 74 
Chinese poHtics, 13, 42, 53 
Chinese Social and Political Science 

Association, 153, 235 
Chinese traditions, 177 
Chinese women, 27, 28 
Chino-American Bank, 227, 363 
Chino-American steamship line, 164. 
Chino-Japanese entente, 352 
Chinwangtao, 381 
Chou Hsueh-hsi, 227 
Chow Tsu-chi, 95, 96, 105, 118, 152, 

17s, 176, 179, 183, 184, 190, 192, 

201, 207, 213, 322, 330, 38s 
Chu Chi-chien, 24, 27, 182, 189, 201, 

215 
Chu Jui, 167, 261 
Chu Ying-kuang, 167, 314 
Chuan Liang, 225 
Chuchow Chinchow Railway, 221 
Chufu, 35, 37, 40, 41 
Chung Hua Hsm Pao, 311 
Claims, 113, 166 
Coal Hill, 19 

Communications, Ministry of, 104 
Confucian family, 38 
Confucian Society, 26, in 
Confucianism, 23, 26, 35, in 
Consortium, 62, 63, 69, 70, 80, 97, 

216, 239, 287, 298, 327, 3SS, 382 
Constitution, 199 



Continental & Commercial Bank loan, 

222, 236, 238, 256 
Coolidge, Charles A., 320 
Corruption, 57, 291 
Crane, Charles R., 40 
Currency loan, 97 
Currency loan agreement, 319, 346 
Currency reform loan, 327 
Customs, 55, 68, 69 

Dane, Sir Richard, 68 

Davis, Arthur P., 82 

Decoration Day, 362 

Deering, Mrs., 362 

Democratic party, 43, 45, 86, 96, 203 

Denby, Charles, 211 

Denials, diplomatic, 132, 135 

Dennis, Dr. W. C, 329 

Department of State, loi, 102, 148, 171, 

176,258,297, 307, 313, 354 
Diplomacy and commerce, 65 
Diplomatic corps in Peking, 114 
Diplomatic tactics, 116 
Disorganization, 56 
Donald, W. H., 48, 78, 244, 255, 3 12 
Dragon flags, 275 

Economic development, 380 

Eliot, President, 68 

Emerson, Miss, 185 

Emperor, 283, 377 

Empress Dowager, 15, i8, 29, 33, 108 

Equal opportunity, 100 

Extra-territoriality, 1 14 

Famine, Jo, 162 

Fan Yuen-lin, 151 

Farewell, 384 

Feng Kuo-chang, General, 54, 172, 183, 

184, 236, 237, 255, 258, 262, 292, 314 
Feng Yu-hsiang, 262 
Ferguson, Dr. John C, 244, 268, 283 
Festivities, 323 
Fifteenth United States Infantry, 14, 

282 
Finance, 89, 105, 214, 296, 317, 326, 

^.345. 3SS 

Fmch, John W., 224 

Fleisher, B. W., 159 

Flexner, Dr. Simon, 150, 151 

Forbidden City, 18, 19 

Foreign Office ball, 27 

Frazar, E. W., 163 

Frazar & Company, 67 

French interests, 222 

French minister, 302, 325, 344, 353 

Fu Liang-tso, 294 



